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Abstract 
 
Africa is by far the least developed continent in terms of protection of personal data. At present 
there are 11 countries out of 54 which have implemented comprehensive data privacy legislation. 
Nine of them namely, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Mauritius, 
Senegal and Seychelles belong to sub-Saharan Africa. The other two countries, Morocco and 
Tunisia, belong to North Africa. Yet, there are seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa with either 
Bills or drafts on data privacy pending before their respective legislative or executive bodies. 
These include Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire), Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and South 
Africa. The rest of African countries have neither Bills nor drafts of such laws. The dominant 
discourse on privacy and data protection advances the ‘culture of collectivism’ as the reason for 
the state of privacy and regulation in Africa. Founded on the normative assumptions of the old 
debates engraved in universalism and cultural relativism, the main argument held in this 
discourse is that Africa’s collectivism denies an individual a space to advance claims for privacy. 
The present study sought to interrogate this dominant discourse and in particular investigating 
the emerging trends of adopting comprehensive data privacy legislation in Africa. To avert from 
the inherent pitfalls of normative assumptions, this study engaged a hybrid methodology. It 
triangulated the doctrinal, empirical and international comparative law methodologies. Moreover, 
in order to gain in-depth insights of the state of privacy, the study delimited to three sub-Saharan 
African countries: Mauritius, South Africa and Tanzania as cases. Based on documents collected 
and interviews held, this study has found that although collectivist culture is an important factor 
in explaining the limited state of privacy in Africa, it is not a catch-all phenomenon. Instead, 
technological, economic, political and social processes have significantly affected privacy 
consciousness and consequently the systems of privacy and data protection in the continent.   
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1     Background 
 
The discourse of privacy protection has significantly evolved over years. Bennett observes that 
record keeping on individuals (the reason upon which data privacy laws partly emerged to 
regulate) is as old as civilisation itself.1 The Roman Empire, for example, maintained an extensive 
system of taxation records on its subjects, who were identified through census taking.2 Yet, the 
modern conception of privacy and data protection can be traced from Warren and Brandeis’ 
seminal article ‘the Right to Privacy’, published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890.3 Indeed, this 
article is increasingly acknowledged by commentators as the official birth date of the right to 
privacy in the world. However, it was in the 1960s and 70s that concrete privacy and data 
protection regulations emerged. This is unsurprising because the rise of computer technology 
around that time increased the many possibilities with which organisations, both public and 
private as well as individuals could process personal information in ways that could interfere with 
an individual’s privacy.4 This phenomenon has made Solove to remark that the small details that 
were once captured in dim memories of fading scraps of paper are now preserved for ever in the 
digital minds of computers, vast databases with fertile fields of personal data.5 Clarke argues that 
the collection and collation of large amounts of personal data create many dangers to both 
                                                          
1 Bennett, C. J., Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca/London, 1992, p.18. 
2 Roos, A., ‘The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical Study’, LL.D Thesis, UNISA, 
2003, pp.1-2. See also Roos, A., ‘Data Protection: Explaining the International Backdrop and Evaluating the Current 
South African Position’, South African Law Journal (SALJ), 2007, Vol.124, No. 2, pp.400-437, at p.402. It is 
noteworthy that the most extreme example of census abuse is Hitler’s use of the census to track minorities for 
extermination during the NAZI regime, see, EPIC., ‘The Census and Privacy’, http://epic.org/privacy/census/ last 
visited 3/10/2011. For more discussion about privacy risks associated with population census, see, the famous 
census-judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1983, Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 
15 December 1983, no. 1 BvR 209/83. 
3 Warren, S.D and Brandeis, L.S., ‘The Right to Privacy,’ Harvard Law Review, 1890, Vol.4, No.5, pp.193-195; this 
work has frequently and traditionally been cited in numerous scholarly writings on the history of the right to privacy. 
4 It was also around the same time that academics and researchers across the world and more specifically in Europe 
and America started to carry out researches on the interception of law and technology including issues of privacy 
and data protection. For example, the Norwegian Research Centre for Computers and Law (NRCCL) was one of 
the first academic institutions to take up the challenge information technology posed to law and legal research. In 
1970, Professor Knut S. Selmer asked the then appointed research assistant Jon Bing (now a professor) to look into 
the issue of “computers and law”. The first result was a seminar held on 16 March 1970, which the NRCCL has 
qualified as its “day of birth”, http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/about/organization/nrccl/ 
last visited 3/10/2011. 
5 Solove, D.J., ‘Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy’, Stanford Law 
Review, 2001, Vol. 53, No.6, pp. 1393-1462, at p. 1394.  
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individual and societal levels.6 At an individual level, once information is in a database a data 
subject has significantly less control over his personal data.7 This may in turn lead to lack of 
subject knowledge of data flows and blacklisting.8 At a societal level, databases create a prevailing 
climate of suspicion and repressive potential for a totalitarian government.9 Revealing the fears 
modern technologies have carried over individual’s privacy, George Orwell, in his renowned 
novel 1984,10 portrayed the totalitarian government’s ability to control its citizenry in a popular 
metaphor Big Brother is watching you. From such time onwards the Big Brother metaphor became an 
all catch phrase for state intrusion of individual’s privacy.11 Yet, despite its populism the Big 
Brother metaphor has been criticised on several grounds. Solove, for example, attacks the 
Orwellian metaphor for its failure to explain privacy problems resulting from computer 
databases. He argues that the metaphor arose in a totally different context: police search tactics, 
wiretapping and video surveillance, and drug testing.12 Thus its application has been wrongly 
extended to privacy problems emanating from computer databases. In contrast, Schwartz13 and 
Whitaker14 have criticised the Big Brother metaphor for being reduced to the domain of state while 
excluding the private sector. As a result, they have been forced to use the term Little Brother to 
capture the use of computer database in the private sector.15 In the same vein, Burchell argues 
that the powers of a Big Brother are no longer restricted to governments, political parties or the 
                                                          
6 Clarke, R., ‘Information Technology and Datavaillance’ Communications of ACM, 1988, Vol. 31, No. 5, pp. 498-
512, at pp.505-508; see also Froomkin, A. M., ‘The Death of Privacy?’ Stanford Law Review, 2000, Vol.52, No.5, 
pp. 1461-1543, at p. 1472. 
7 Froomkin, p.1464, note 6, supra. 
8 Ibid, p.1472. 
9 Clarke, p.505, note 6, supra. 
10 Orwell, G., 1984, Penguin Books, New York, 1972(Originally published in 1948). 
11 See for example, Slemrod, J., ‘Taxation and Big Brother: Information, Personalisation, and Privacy in 21st Century 
Tax Policy’, a lecture given at the Annual Lecture to the Institute of Fiscal Studies, London, September, 26, 2005, 
www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/WP2006-1pdf last visited 3/10/2011; Safier, S., ‘Between Big Brother and the Bottom 
Line: Privacy in Cyberspace’, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Spring, 2000, Vol. 5, No.6, 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue2/v5i2a6-Safier.html last visited 3/10/2011; Eden, J.M., ‘When Big Brother 
Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, the Privacy Act, 1974, and the Future of RFID’, Duke Law & Technology 
Review, 2005, No.20, pp.1-24; Baruh, L., ‘The Guilty Pleasure of Watching like Big Brother: Privacy Attitudes, 
Voyeurism and Reality Programs’, January, 2007, a dissertation available from ProQuest, 
http://www.repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI326087 last visited 3/10/2011.  Kantarcioglu, M & Clifton, C., 
‘Assuring Privacy when Big Brother is Watching’, DMKD03:8th ACM SIGMOD Workshop on Research Issues in 
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, 2003; Ncube, C.B., ‘Watching the Watcher: Recent Developments in 
Privacy Regulation and Cyber-surveillance in South Africa’, SCRIPTed, 2006,Vol.3, No.4, pp.344-354. 
12 Solove, p. 1397, note 5, supra. 
13 Schwartz, P.M., ‘Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 1999, Vol.52, pp.1609-1701, at 
p.1657 cited in Solove, D.J., ‘Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy’, 
Stanford Law Review,  2001, Vol. 53, No.6, pp. 1393-1462, at p. 1397. 
14 Whitaker, R., The End of Privacy: How Total Surveillance Is Becoming a Reality, The New Press, New York, 
1999, pp.160-75 cited in Solove, D.J., ‘Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy’, Stanford Law Review, 2001, Vol. 53, No.6, pp. 1393-1462, at p. 1397. 
15 However in the present day environment where there is mass convergence of technology as well as close 
collaborations between public and private institutions, the distinction between public and private sector is almost 
blurred. For contrary views, see Blume, P., ‘Data Protection in the Private Sector’, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 
2004, Vol.47, pp.297-318. 
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wealthy but extend to ordinary individuals.16 Be as it may, expressions such as Big Brother, Little 
Brother, Small Sisters17 and databanks, are all attempts to demonstrate the nature and magnitude of 
privacy problems associated with computer technology. However such problems magnified and 
became complex with the rise of the Internet in the 1990s. As a result, personal information can 
now be collected from remote computers and distributed instantly across the globe. In line with 
this view Zimmerman posits:- 
 
‘As technological innovations have become more advanced, mechanisms for 
monitoring people’s behaviour without their knowledge have become 
increasingly prevalent. Indeed, “[n]ew multimedia communications and 
computing technology is potentially much more intrusive than traditional 
information technology because of its powers to collect even more kinds of 
information about people, even when they are not directly aware they are 
interacting with or being sensed by it. Not only does this new computing 
technology allow the collection of more data, but it also allows collectors to do 
more with the data they acquire.’18 
 
On the Internet, user active participation or passive collection techniques provides possibilities 
for collection of his or her personal information. This point is well observed by commentators as 
follows:- 
 
‘When people log on the Internet and visit Web sites, a great deal of personal 
information is collected through both active user participation and passive 
collection techniques. Web sites collect information through active 
participation when, for example, users place online orders, fill out sweepstakes 
entry forms or register to gain access to “members only” sites. Conversely, the 
three most common forms of passive data collection methods include Web 
site’s use of cookies, a direct marketing company’s use of cookies, and an 
OSP’s collection of “click stream” data.’19 
 
                                                          
16 Burchell, J., ‘The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A Transplantable Hybrid’, Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law, 2009, Vol. 13, No.1, pp.1-26, at p.1. 
17 See, Olsson, A.R., ‘Big Brother, Small Sisters and Free Speech: Reanalyzing some Threats on Personal Privacy’, 
Scandinavian Studies in Law, 2004, Vol.47, pp.373-387. 
18 Zimmerman, R.K., ‘The Way the “Cookies” Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the Twenty-First 
Century’, Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 2000, Vol. 4, pp. 439-464, at p. 441. 
19 Ibid, p.442. 
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Cookies have great abilities. They can collect personal information and send it to data controllers 
without leaving behind any trace. Zimmerman generally argues:- 
 
‘Cookies can betray an Internet user’s privacy in two primary ways. First, 
cookies are stored on the user’s hard drive and can be accessed at a later date. 
Once accessed, the cookies will display a detailed list of each Web site that has 
been visited by the computer within a relevant time frame. Furthermore, the 
text of the cookie file may reveal personal information about the user, such as 
the user’s password, e-mail address, or any other information entered while at 
the site...The second way in which cookies may affect privacy is that the 
servers on the Web sites who send cookies also receive the information stored 
on that particular cookie a user makes a return visit to the same site. Using 
cookies, Web sites currently have the ability to track from what site the user 
came, the links on which the user clicked while in the site, any purchases 
made, and any personal information entered. Many cookies are also able to 
identify the Internet protocol (IP) address of the user, thus giving them the 
capacity to identify the exact location of the computer used to access the 
site.’20 
 
The Swedish Bodil Lindqvist v Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping21 offers yet another direct illustration of 
the impact of technology over data collection techniques. In that case, Ms. Lindqvist was held 
responsible for infringement of privacy by uploading personal information of her colleagues on 
website some of such information contained sensitive healthy information. This made anyone in 
the world connected to the Internet to have access to such information. Moreover, the recent 
rise of social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Hi5, LinkedIn, etc has made privacy 
issues on the Internet much more complex.22  
 
                                                          
20 Ibid, pp.443-444. 
21 European Court of Justice (ECJ), Case C-101/01; see also, Makulilo, A.B., ‘Does the Lindqvist Decision by the 
ECJ make sense in terms of its treatment of the application of Art 25 of Directive 95/46/EC to uploading and 
downloading of personal information on internet homepages?’ A Tutorial Paper presented at the Norwegian 
Research Centre for Computers and Law (NRCCL), Spring, 2006.  
22 For discussion about issues of privacy on social networking see, Humphreys, L et al., ‘How much is too much? 
Privacy issues on Twitter’, www2.research.att.com/~bala/papers/ica10.pdf, last visited 3/10/2011; see also Barnes, 
S.B., ‘A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the United States’, First Monday, 2006, Vol.11, No.9, 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1394/1312 last visited 3/10/2011.      
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As pointed out, the legal response to the rise of computer technology with respect to protection 
of individual’s privacy had been to enact data protection legislation.23 The point has to be made, 
however, that while technological factors occupied the central role to the emergence of data 
protection laws, there were other factors that operated as catalysts. Bygrave discusses three main 
catalysts for emergence of data protection laws: first, technological-organisation trends( growth 
in amount of data stored and their integration, increased sharing of data across organisational 
boundaries, growth in re-use and re-purposing of data, increased risk of data misapplication, 
information quality problems, and diminishing role of data subjects in decision making process 
affecting them), second, public fears (fears over threats to privacy and related values and 
restriction in transfer of personal data and thereby in goods and services), and third, legal factors 
(influence of international human rights instruments proclaiming rights to privacy as well as 
insufficiency of protection of privacy under existing rules).24 However, in 2004, he expanded this 
list to include ideological factors as essential in determining privacy levels. Central amongst these 
are attitudes to the value of private life, attitudes to the worth of persons as individuals, and 
sensitivity to human beings’ non-economic and emotional needs.25 He notes that concern for 
privacy tends to be high in societies espousing liberal ideals.26 Yet, in 2010, Bygrave elaborated 
the so called ideological factors to include cultural, religious and philosophical factors.27 It is 
important to note that Bygrave added this last set of catalyst (ideological factors) for emergence 
of data privacy amid the growing interest by European academics and researchers to study data 
privacy issues in non-Western cultures. This view is supported by Bygrave’s own observation:- 
 
                                                          
23 The first data protection law in the world was adopted by the German Land of Hesse in October 1970. Then 
followed Sweden (1973), the United States (1974), Germany (1977), France, Denmark and Austria (1978), 
Luxemburg (1979), New Zealand (1982), the United Kingdom (1984), Finland (1987), Ireland, Australia, Japan and 
Netherlands (1988), see Roos, (LL.D Thesis) p.17, note 2, supra. Today almost all western countries have adopted 
data protection legislation. After the EC Data Protection Directive 1995 came into force in 1998; countries 
belonging under the European Union were required to implement the Directive in their national laws leading to 
revision of their original data privacy laws. Likewise, the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of the 24th October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data (hereinafter the European Data Protection Directive) is currently under serious 
review just to take into account the technological development and societal advances that have taken place since 
1995, more particularly after the internet; European Union, ‘Data Protection Reforms-Frequently Asked Questions’, 
MEMO/10/542, Brussels, November, 4, 2010, 
europa.eu/rapid/press Releases Action. do? Reference= MEMO/10/542. In contrast there is a slow growth of data 
privacy legislation in non-Western countries. Africa is the least continent with regard to such developments. 
24 Bygrave, L. A., Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague/London/New York, 2002, Chapter 6. 
25 Bygrave, L. A., ‘Privacy Protection in a Global Context – A Comparative Overview’, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 
2004, Vol. 47, pp. 319–348, at p.328. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Bygrave, L.A., ‘Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective’, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 2010, 
Vol. 56, pp.165-200, at p.175. 
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‘Over the last four decades there has been an enormous growth in the field of 
law and policy which directly addresses privacy-related concerns, particularly 
with respect to the processing of personal information. While certainly not 
old, the field has now attained considerable maturity, spread and normative 
importance. It is augmented by an immense body of commentary analysing 
privacy issues from a variety of perspectives. Surprisingly, up-to-date 
comparative overviews of this development are scarce. This article is an 
attempt to lessen some of the gaps.’28  
 
Bygrave’s above view finds support of Cannataci who observes:- 
 
‘The debate on Privacy and Information Technology has been predominantly 
carried out from a “Western” perspective for over forty years. It is only 
relatively recently that an interest has arisen in examining whether other 
cultures, such as those which characterise China and Muslim societies, may 
stand on similar issues.’29  
 
Similarly, the interest to research on privacy in non-Western cultures is amply demonstrated by 
Gutwirth. In his book, Privacy and the Information Age,30 Gutwirth devotes a sub-chapter 
‘Privacy across Cultures’31 to address privacy issues in other cultures and societies. It is submitted 
that although the computer and the Internet and concomitantly privacy concerns manifested 
themselves firstly in the Western world their impact has reached far. Due to globalisation, there 
has been a speedy penetration of these technologies to developing countries.32 This phenomenon 
                                                          
28 Bygrave, p.320, note 25, supra. 
29 Cannataci, J.A., ‘Privacy, Technology Law and Religions across Cultures’, Journal of Information, Law and 
Technology, 2009, Vol.1, pp. 1-22, at p.3. 
30 Gutwirth, S., Privacy and the Information Age, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford/ Rowman & Littlefield 
Publ., 2002. 
31 Ibid, pp.24-26. 
32 See, Mayer, J., ‘Globalisation, Technology Transfer and Skill Accumulation in Low-Income Countries’, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, August, 2000; United Nations, ‘Globalisation of R&D 
and Developing Countries’, Proceedings of the Expert Meeting, Geneva, 24-26 January, 2005; see also, Wiley, J., 
‘The Globalisation of Technology to Developing Countries’, Global Studies Student Papers,  Paper No.3,  
http://digitalcommons.providence.edu/glbstudy_students/3 last visited 3/10/2011. Although the so called “North-
South Digital Divide” is still a problem( see, Martin, B., ‘The Information Society and the Digital Divide: Some 
North-South Comparisons’, International Journal of Education and Development using Information and 
Communication Technology (IJEDICT), 2005, Vol. 1, Issue 4, pp. 30-41) there are efforts to curb the problem to 
ensure the gap is bridged, see, Guðmundsdóttir, G.B., ‘Approaching the Digital Divide in South Africa’, 
NETREED Conference, 5-7, December, 2005, Beitostølen, Norway; Joseph, K.J., ‘Transforming Digital Divide 
into Digital Dividend: South-South Cooperation in Information-Communication Technologies’, Cooperation South, 
2005, pp.102-124, http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/Joseph.pdf last visited 3/10/2011; Gupta, A., ‘The Role of 
Knowledge Flows in Bridging North-South Technological Divides: A case analysis of biotechnology in Indian 
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has led scholars to use the term global village33 to explain the global interconnectedness via 
communications. As it was the case with the West, the prevalence of computer technology in 
developing countries is leading to surveillance societies.34 Africa is no exception. This 
surveillance has generated similar fears and concerns for individuals’ control over their personal 
privacy as those of European counterparts.35 In this context therefore, the objective of this study 
is to investigate, evaluate and analyse privacy concerns in sub-Saharan Africa along the lines 
defined by the research problem as well as research questions in 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 respectively. 
 
1.2   Methodological Approach and Rationale  
 
1.2.1 Research Problem 
 
Most national constitutions of African countries contain express provisions for protection of the 
right to privacy in their Bill of Rights.36 Yet, only Cape Verde (22 January 2001), Seychelles (24 
December 2003),37 Burkina Faso (20 April 2004), Mauritius (17 June 2004), Tunisia (27 July 
2004), Senegal (15 January 2008), Morocco (18 February 2009), Benin (27 April 2009) Angola (17 
June 2011), Gabon( 25 September 2011) and Ghana (10 February 2012) have implemented 
comprehensive data privacy legislation in EU’s style to give effect to such broad constitutional 
provisions on the right to privacy.38 The rest of African countries have either adopted sector 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
agriculture’, Centre for Science, Policy, and Outcomes, Washington, 2003; see also, Chakraborty, S., ‘Mobile Phones 
Bridging the Information Divide Issues and Lessons from Africa’, JOMC223. 
33 For detailed discussion on origins of the term ‘global village’ see e.g., McLuhan, M., The Gutenberg Galaxy, 
University of Toronto Press, 1962; Maggio, N., ‘“The Whole Earth as Village”: A Chronotopic Analysis of Marshall 
McLuhan’s ‘Global Village’ and Patrick McGoohan’s The Prisoner’, M.A Thesis, Brock University, Ontario, 2008. 
34 In this context the term ‘surveillance society’ is assigned a broader meaning to include the activities or operations 
of public and private organisations as well as individuals in as far as privacy violations are concerned. This is 
contrary to ‘Big Brother’ metaphor which focused on state interference of privacy while excluding the private sector. 
35
 For a detailed discussion about these privacy fears and how they shaped privacy consciousness in African context, 
see for example chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this thesis. 
36 Zimbabwe and Kenya (before 2010) have constitutions without express provisions on the right to privacy. Yet 
Zimbabwe is currently debating a draft new constitution with a privacy provision in its Bill of Rights. 
37 It has to be clearly pointed out that, although Seychelles has a data privacy legislation that resembles Directive, 
95/46/EC in that it is also ‘comprehensive’ yet it significantly departs from the European law in many respects. It is 
arguable that since the Act extensively focuses to regulate computer bureaux’s use of data and personal data, it is  
worth to call this law ‘Computer Bureaux Act’. Further that the Act’s data protection principles are limited. 
38 Commentators have given incomplete account or made factual errors with regard to the state of privacy law in 
Africa. This relates, first and foremost, to the countries which have implemented comprehensive data privacy laws 
in Africa. So far most of the pre-existing scholarly works give inconcrete list.  For example, in 2002, Gutwirth failed 
to mention Cape Verde as an African country with data protection legislation since 2001, see Gutwirth, note 30, 
supra. Similarly, in 2004 Lee A. Bygrave noted that none of the African countries had implemented a comprehensive 
data privacy law while that was not the case, see, Bygrave, p.343, note 25, supra. Elizabeth M. Bakibinga in her 
article ‘Managing Electronic Privacy in the Telecommunications Sub-Sector: The Ugandan Perspective’, 2004, 
http//:thepublicvoic.org/eventscapetown04/bakibinga.doc, p.4 subscribes to Bygrave’s account.  In 2009, Adam 
Mambi, in a power point presentation, ‘Internet Governance (IGF): Legal Issues on Cyber Security’ Mauritius, 
March, 2009, listed South Africa, Mauritius and Seychelles as African countries with comprehensive data privacy 
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legislation by then. In 2010, Christopher Kuner in ‘Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Protection 
and Privacy Law: Past, Present, and Future’, TILT Law & Technology Working Paper No. 016/2010 October 2010, 
Version: 1.0, p.6, Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689483 
noted that African countries with comprehensive data privacy law by 2010 were Benin, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, 
Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia. In the same year, i.e. 2010, Lee A. Bygrave noted that Burkina Faso, Tunisia, 
Morocco and Mauritius were the only African countries with omnibus privacy legislation, see Bygrave, p.193, note 
27, supra. In 2011, Christopher Kuner in ‘Table of Data Protection and Privacy Law Instruments Regulating 
Transborder Data Flows’, Annex to the study ‘Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Protection and 
Privacy Law: Past, Present, and Future’, TILT Law & Technology, Social Science Research Network Electronic 
Paper Collection, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783782 listed Benin, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal and 
Tunisia as countries with comprehensive data protection legislation in Africa. In the same year, David Banisar 
provided a list of African countries with comprehensive data protection legislation as on 1st November 2011 in a 
‘Data Protection Laws around the World Map’, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1951416 
last visited 20/12/2011. In that map Banisar lists Angola, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Benin and Burkina Faso as 
African countries with comprehensive data privacy legislation. Yet, the map left out Mauritius, Seychelles and Cape 
Verde. In ‘Information Privacy Law by Country’, http://www.informationshield.com/intprivacylaws.html 
last visited 20/12/2011, Morocco and South Africa are listed as African countries with comprehensive data privacy 
legislation. Jeff Rohlmeir lists none of African countries as having data protection legislation, see ‘International Data 
Protection Legislation Matrix’, http://www.accinfosys.com/docs/International_Data_Protection_Laws.pdf, 
last visited 20/12/201. At least the most comprehensive list of African countries with data privacy legislation, 
although still with an omission of Seychelles, is comprised in the most recent publication of an Australian Professor, 
Graham Greenleaf, see Greenleaf, G., ‘Global Data Privacy Laws: Forty Years of Acceleration’, Privacy Laws & 
Business International Report, 2011, No. 112, pp. 11-17; republished by Privacy Laws & Business in monograph 
form as ‘76 Global Data Privacy Laws’, September 2011. In a Global Table of Data Privacy Laws(as at 30 July 2011) 
at pp.14-16, Greenleaf lists alphabetically Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal 
and Tunisia as African countries with data protection legislation. The table indicates correctly the years when such 
legislation was enacted though with some errors in relation to the Senegalese data privacy legislation. It must be 
admitted that Greenleaf’s compilation of countries with data privacy legislation across the globe is resourceful for 
researchers, particularly those of comparative law. The periodic updates of this list are found on Greenleaf’s web 
page at www2.austlii.edu.au/~graham. Through this, Greenleaf has added Seychelles in the list( see, Greenleaf, G., 
‘Global Data Privacy Laws: 89 Countries, and Accelerating’, Privacy Laws & Business International Report, Special 
Supplement, 2012, No.115, also cited as Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 98/2012, pp.1-13. The second factual error with regard to the state of data privacy law in Africa relates to 
chronological dates for adoption of privacy legislation. For example, Joan Ankotol in a compilation ‘International 
Privacy and Data Protection Laws’, 2008 p. 34 states that  Tunisia was the first African country to enact a specific 
data protection law. However, Cape Verde was the firt country in the African continent to adopt the law, see,   
http://www.primr.org/uploadedFiles/PRIMR_Site_Home/Resource_Center/Useful_Links/International_Researc
h/International_Privacy_Laws.pdf last visited 4/10/2011. Other sources mention Burkina Faso and Tunisia as the 
first African countries to implement data privacy legislation followed by Senegal, Morocco and Ghana, 
http://senegal.senego.com/societe-de-linformation-au-senegal-une-commission-des-donnees-personnelles-creee-
par-decret/ last visited 29/10/2011. As it can be noted, this account is incorrect. There is yet another factual error 
that gives Francophone African countries the status of being in forefront in enacting comprehensive data privacy 
legislation, while in non-Francophone Africa only South Africa has a privacy bill; see, Bygrave, p.193, note 27, supra. 
This is also an incorrect account as Cape Verde, a former Portuguese colony appears to have data protection 
legislation since 2001 and Seychelles a former British colony implemented a comprehensive data privacy law in 2003 
well beyond the so called Francophone Africa. It is interesting also to point that Bygrave classifies Mauritius as one 
among Francophone African countries; however, this is not the case although, of course, having French spoken in 
the country has made Mauritius to get benefits from Francophone countries. This, notwithstanding, did not apply to 
the enactment of the Mauritian Data Protection Act 2004(this is according to the researcher’s interview with 
Mauritian Data Protection Commissioner -Mrs. Drudeisha Madhub on 4/07/ 2011 in Port Louis, Mauritius). It is 
worth noting that although French is spoken in Mauritius as it had once been under the French domination, it was 
the British who officially colonised Mauritius after the Berlin Conference which partitioned Africa among European 
powers, hence English outweighs French though they are both regarded as official languages. This is similarly the 
case with Rwanda, which, although it is principally a Francophone colony with French as the official language, it was 
admitted as a member of Commonwealth countries in 2009 which are principally Anglophone. Despite this, French 
outweighs English in Rwanda. Similarly, Mozambique, a Portuguese colony with Portuguese as official language, was 
admitted to the Commonwealth in 1995. Strictly speaking that does not make Mozambique an Anglophone country. 
What these incomplete accounts and factual errors tell us are two things, first, availability and access of adequate and 
accurate information relating to privacy in African setting is still difficult. The information available electronically is 
at times insufficient and out-dated to reflect the actual situation on the ground; second, the emerging scholarship in 
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specific legislation39 or statutory provisions with relevancy to privacy protection in general laws.40 
Yet, in some other countries, courts have developed common law principles in resolving privacy 
disputes.41 It should, however, be noted that more often one country may have a parallel 
approach to privacy protection.42 Despite that-such a country may have adopted a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Africa is yet fluid. Mivule and Turner comment, ‘there is little or no known literature on data privacy from Uganda 
and much of sub-Saharan Africa in general, given the relatively young and developing computing domain. At this 
time, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to call for the application of data privacy techniques in Uganda’ 
see, Mivule, K and Turner, C., ‘Applying Data Privacy Techniques on Tabular Data in Uganda’ 
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1107/1107.3784.pdf last visited 4/10/2011. From this comment, it is clear that 
the pre-existing literature in Africa does not seem to build upon the previous ones. There is exception with South 
African scholarships (e.g. Roos, 2003, 2007, 2008, see, Roos, notes 2, supra and 38 respectively) which build largely 
on literature from within South Africa and also from outside Africa. Outside of South Africa, few works on 
comparative study within Africa exist (e.g. Ncube, C.B, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Zimbabwean and South African 
Data Protection Systems’, Journal of Information, Law and Technology, (JILT), 2004, No. 2, 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law2/elj/jilt/2004_2/ncube/ last visited 9/10/2011; Gayrel, C., ‘Data 
Protection in the Arab Spring: Tunisia and Morocco’, Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 2012, No.115, 
pp.18-20) perhaps this is also due to the little available scholarship in other African jurisdictions. The rest of the 
scholars (of course within the desired objectives and limitations) have limited their scope to single country analysis, 
e.g. Traca, J.L and Embry, B., ‘An Overview of the Legal Regime for Data Protection in Cape Verde’, International 
Data Privacy Law, 2011, Vol.1, No.4, pp.249-255; write about data protection in Cape Verde; see also Traca J.L and 
Embry, B., ‘The Angolan Data Protection Act: First Impressions’, International Data Privacy Law, International 
Data Privacy Law 2012, Vol.2, No.1, pp.40-45; Murungi, M.M., Cyber Law in Kenya, Kluwer Law International, the 
Netherlands, 2011( see chapters 6 and 8 where the author in an ad hoc fashion deals with privacy issues). Worthwhile 
to note is the fact that comparative studies on privacy and data protection laws in Africa are also lacking. As pointed 
out, most emerging literature has a focus in a single country. The few available comparative studies touching upon 
Africa have in most cases been drawing from European, American and Asia Pacific laws and practice; see for 
example, Roos, LL.D Thesis, note 2, supra; Roos, A., ‘Personal Data Protection in New Zealand: Lessons for South 
Africa?’ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 2008, Vol.8, No.4, pp.61-109; Mayambala, K.R., ‘Phone-tapping & 
the Right to Privacy: A Comparison of the Right to Privacy in Communication in Uganda and Canada’, BILETA, 
2008; Kusamotu, A., ‘Privacy Law and Technology in Nigeria: The Legal Framework will not meet the Test of 
Adequacy as Mandated by Article 25 of European Union Directive 95/46’, Information & Communications 
Technology Law, 2007, Vol.16, No. 2, pp. 149 – 159. While this approach is important and necessary to learn from 
experiences of other jurisdictions, it has at the same time undermined the growth of African scholarly writings on 
comparative level within the continent. Resultantly, the approach has partly caused scholars in Africa to lack 
information and experiences of other African jurisdictions with comprehensive data privacy laws.  
39Most sector specific legislation regarding privacy protection in African countries cover the telecommunication 
sector. Some sector specific laws are comprehensive. For example, Cape Verde adopted Law No. 134/V/2001 on 
22nd January, 2001 (Lei nº134/V/2001 de 22 de Janeiro) specifically to regulate processing of personal data in the 
telecommunications sector. This legislation is akin to the Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector in terms of their scope i.e. covers the entire communication sector but not in 
principles they contain. In essence, Directive 2002/58/EC complements Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data. Note that some sector specific laws are not comprehensive in 
the sense that they only include few provisions with relevancy to privacy protection. See, for example, the Electronic 
and Postal Communications Act 2010 ( Act No. 9 of 2010) in Tanzania, which although it regulates among other 
things, collection, storage, discloser and dissemination of personal data in the registration of SIM Cards it lacks clear 
principles of data processing apart from few provisions which create offences for unlawful interception and 
disclosure of  information. See also Chapter XVI (Privacy and Data Protection, ss. 54, 55 and 56) of the Rwandese 
LAW N°44/2001 Governing Telecommunications, promulgated on the 30/11/2001. 
40 For instance Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon have statutory provisions as well as 
constitutional protection of the right to privacy. This trend of parallel protection is also notable in other countries.  
41 South Africa provides a good illustration for having common law principles for protection of privacy developed 
over time by the courts. It is also noteworthy that apart from common law, South Africa has privacy provisions 
enshrined in the Constitution 1996 as well as several statutes. Further discussions see chapters 4  and 6 of this thesis. 
42 For example, Cape Verdean Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 1/VII/2010, of 3 May 2010) contains 
provisions for protection of privacy of correspondence (Art 44), right to demand access to correct or update one’s 
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comprehensive data protection legislation or not. Scholars advance various explanations as to the 
state of privacy in Africa. These can roughly be reduced into five strands. A review of the 
literature comprising these strands sketches the research problem of the present thesis and 
consequently the formulation of research questions in the next section.   
 
The first strand focuses on the culture of collectivism.43 The main arguments emanating from 
this strand boil down to the universalism-relativism debates.44 Gutwirth is the leading scholar in 
this review. In his sub-title ‘Privacy across cultures’, he argues that in sub-Saharan Africa privacy 
stands for little because of the limitation of the status of the individual.45 He contends that due to 
this, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 1981 fails to mention privacy 
even though it makes reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
1948.The latter explicitly gives recognition to the right of privacy. He criticises the African 
Charter for attaching too much weight on African values and traditions which stress upon 
community’s values at the expense of an individual’s space for privacy. Gutwirth notes:- 
 
‘The Charter gives peoples a series of collective rights, including the right to exist, 
to self-determination and the right to development. Family too is propagated 
as the natural unit and basis of society and custodian of morals and traditional 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
information under public authority’s control (Art.45(1)) and of being informed the purpose of collection of one’s 
personal information(Art 45(1)). Apart from the Constitution, Cape Verde has a comprehensive data privacy 
legislation Lei nº 133/V/2001, de 22 de Janeiro Regime Jurídico Geral de Protecção de Dados Pessoais a Pessoas 
Singulares 2001 [Law No. 133/V/2001, of 22 January 2001 on protection of personal data of individuals] and above 
all a specific statute regulating privacy in the telecommunication sector, Law No. 134/V/2001 on 22nd January, 2001 
(Lei nº134/V/2001 de 22 de Janeiro).  
43 Collectivism is defined as the theory and practice that makes some sort of group rather than the individual the 
fundamental unit of political, social, and economic concern. In theory, collectivists insist that the claims of groups, 
associations, or the state must normally supersede the claims of individuals (Stephen Grabill and Gregory M. A. 
Gronbacher). On the other hand individualism regards man -- every man -- as an independent, sovereign entity who 
possesses an inalienable right to his own life, a right derived from his nature as a rational being.  Individualism holds 
that a civilized society, or any form of association, cooperation or peaceful co-existence among men, can be 
achieved only on the basis of the recognition of individual rights -- and that a group, as such, has no rights other 
than the individual rights of its members (Ayn Rand), http://freedomkeys.com/collectivism.htm. last visited 
07/10/2011. Collectivism is likewise defined variously by different authors belonging to different disciplines. 
44 Debates on universalism and relativism manifest prominently in the human rights discourse. These doctrines are 
highly contested. Suffice to point out that the universalists argue that human rights are universal. They transcend all 
cultures. On the other hand, the relativists argue that human rights are cultural relative. The universalism-relativism 
debates are not settled and it is unlikely they will settle because of the diversities of people and cultures. For detailed 
accounts of universalism and relativism see, e.g, Shivji, I.G., The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, Dakar, 
Codesria, 1989, Chapter 1; Arisaka, Y., ‘Beyond “East” and “West”: Nishida’s Universalism and Postcolonial 
Critique’, The Review of Politics, 1997, Vol.59, No.3, pp. 541-560;  Shih, C., ‘Opening the Dichotomy of 
Universalism and Relativism’, A Review of Negotiating Culture and Human Rights edited by Linda S. Bell, Andrew 
J. Nathan and Ilan Peleg. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 428 pp. and East Meets West: Human Rights 
and Democracy in East Asia by Daniel A. Bell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 369 pp. Human Rights 
& Human Welfare, 2002, Vol.2, No.1, pp.13-24; Hellsten, S.K., ‘Human Rights in Africa: From Communitarian 
Values to Utilitarian Practice’, Human Rights Review, March-April, 2004, pp. 61-85.  
45 Gutwirth, p.24, note 30, supra.  
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values recognised by the community. As a result, the group burdens the 
individual with duties: toward family, community, the state, the international 
community and other official bodies. This most likely also refers to tribes, 
clans, parentage, village communities and other group ties which are 
traditionally more important in Africa...Individualism is subordinate to the 
group, reducing the space for privacy.’46  
 
Similarly, Gutwirth challenges the relevance of the provisions protecting privacy in constitutions 
of African states. He argues that even though African countries shortly after independence partly 
or fully adopted the legal system of their colonisers which was based on individualism, still the 
effect of collectivist culture rendered them ineffective in the prevailing cultural environment.47 
He stresses that in Africa informal law often takes the upper hand and people prefer the law of 
the village to that of the state. Gutwirth goes far to the extent of citing and subscribing to the 
African novelist Chinua Achebe in his African Trilogy who contends that solving a murder in 
African context is much more about finding a settlement between two tribes than a procedure to 
find and punish the culprit.48 He finally makes two important conclusions: first, it is hardly 
imaginable that the Western concept of privacy would fit into African system, second, he 
considers socially and culturally Africa is a barren ground for privacy to take root and only the 
state and the legal system can proclaim such a thing.49  
 
Gutwirth’s views have parallels in Bygrave’s thought too. According to Bygrave, liberal affection 
for privacy is amply demonstrated in the development of legal regimes for privacy protection.50 
He finds that those regimes are most comprehensive in Western liberal democracies. By contrast 
such regimes are under-developed in most African nations because of the collectivist cultures 
which place primary value on securing the interests and loyalties of the group at the expense of 
the individual. To substantiate his views, Bygrave observes that with exception of the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981 all the international and regional human rights 
instruments to wit, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 1950 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 
1969 expressly recognise privacy as a fundamental right. He contends that the omission of 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, pp.24-25. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Bygrave, note 25, supra.  
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privacy in the African Charter is not repeated in all human rights catalogues even those from 
outside the Western, liberal democratic sphere suggesting that such omission is a result of culture 
of collectivism. Here he cites the example of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
(CDHRI) 1990 which, like its Western counterparts, incorporates provision for privacy rights. 
Similarly, Bygrave observes that none of the African countries have enacted comprehensive data 
privacy laws also suggesting that individual’s interests are clouded in the collectives such as 
family, clan, etc making privacy a less important value.51 Nonetheless, the author singles out the 
Republic of South Africa as a special case where stimulus to legislate a data privacy law is 
provided by recent first-hand experience of mass oppression and possibly the desire to meet the 
adequacy requirements of the E.U Directive 95/46/EC (Articles 25-26). He notes that, the 
Republic of South Africa has express provision for a right to privacy in section 14 of its 
Constitution 1996 and Freedom of Information Act 2002. Moreover, work is underway to 
legislate comprehensive privacy legislation. Furthermore, Bygrave takes cognisance of the 
constitutional making process of a new constitution in Kenya (passed in 2010) with similar 
provision for privacy protection as found in the South African Constitution.  
 
It is worth noting that Bygrave’s above views first appeared in his article ‘Privacy Protection in a 
Global Context – A Comparative Overview’52 published in 2004. Yet, in 2010 Bygrave 
dramatically modified his earlier views. Undoubtedly, this shift was conditioned by the emerging 
data privacy laws in Africa. In his new article ‘Privacy and Data Protection in an International 
Perspective’;53 built on ‘Privacy Protection in a Global Context – A Comparative Overview’, 
Bygrave notes that in Africa: Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritius have implemented 
data privacy laws. He observes:-    
 
‘Legal regimes for data protection are at least developed in Middle Eastern and 
African countries taken as a whole. As noted above, the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights, 1981 omits mentioning a right to privacy in its 
catalogue of basic human rights. Moreover, the bulk of African countries have 
yet to enact European-style data protection laws. Nonetheless, some such laws 
have recently emerged, chiefly in francophone African states, such as Burkina 
Faso, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritius...Of the non-francophone states, the 
                                                          
51 Ibid, p.343. 
52 Ibid, pp.319-348. 
53 Bygrave, pp.165-200, note 27, supra. 
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Republic of South Africa has come furthest along the path of establishing a 
comprehensive legal regime on data protection.’54 
 
Bygrave advances two major reasons as to why data privacy laws start to take root in Africa. 
First, he attributes this development partly to the efforts made by the French Data Protection 
Authority (Commission de l’Informatique et des Liberte´s (CNIL)) to cultivate data protection in 
former French colonies.55 Second, he advances economic concerns by these states, particularly 
the desire made by some of them to safeguard their outsourcing industries (the case with, e.g., 
Tunisia and Morocco).56  
 
Inspired by Bygrave’s earlier analyses, Bakibinga appears to argue that privacy in the African 
context is greatly affected by the philosophical concepts of communalism and individualism 
which explains the African way or approach to human rights.57 She subscribes to Diawara’s view 
that African philosophers emphasize communalism, collectivism and cooperation not because 
they are unfamiliar with individualism but because they see the value of the collective idea.58  
Bakibinga then argues that these philosophical concepts affect the evolution of societal norms 
that play a major role in appreciation and respect for human rights. She observes:- 
 
‘However individual privacy has not been fostered largely due to the 
subjugation of individuals’ interests by communal interests. The line between 
what is for the individual and the community is very thin and has been 
reflected in society and perception of rights and obligations relating to privacy 
in modern times.’59 
 
As Bygrave, Bakibinga says that aside the Republic of South Africa, African initiatives related to 
privacy have been limited. Privacy regimes are under-developed in Africa resulting in communal 
considerations over-riding individual and absence of legislation. Nonetheless, she argues that 
although in Africa the community comes first, privacy will still be an important concern as the 
information technology revolution advances. In this regard, she concludes, ‘one can have privacy 
                                                          
54 Ibid, p. 193. 
55 Ibid, p.194. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Bakibinga, pp. 2-3, note 38, supra. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid, p.5. 
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and still be part of the community’.60 Yet, in drawing example from Uganda, her home country, 
Bakibinga makes three remarks: first, that Ugandans largely suffer from ‘privacy myopia’ i.e. the 
tendency to undervalue the bits of information about themselves that it does not seem worth it 
to go to the trouble of protecting such information.61 Second, aware of the existence of 
multiplicities of privacy definitions, she says, ‘privacy has to be defined in a way that is acceptable 
to the Ugandan society given the emphasis on communalism versus individual rights. Privacy 
should not remain an abstract and one way to start would be to commission studies to obtain 
perceptions of privacy within the Ugandan society.’62 Third, she recommends the adoption of 
privacy legislation in the EU’s style.63 
 
Olinger et al64  offer a fairly comprehensive amount of discussion and analyses of privacy in the 
context of African collectivist culture. In contrast to the previous literature, Olinger et al, 
investigate privacy issues from the Ubuntu philosophical perspectives.65 It is noteworthy that this 
investigation was carried out in South Africa at the time the South African Law Reform 
Commission circulated a discussion paper to solicit stakeholders’ views about the forthcoming 
data privacy bill. The authors intended to find out to what extent, if any, the forthcoming data 
privacy bill in South Africa would be influenced by the EU Directive 95/46/EC on protection 
of personal data and the Ubuntu philosophy. For ease of reference the most relevant portion of 
this article is reproduced verbatim:- 
 
‘During the extensive literature review privacy was not explicitly mentioned 
anywhere among the Ubuntu writings. Privacy was glaringly absent as a 
cherished value or right within Ubutntu societies. When analysing the concepts 
and values of Ubuntu one can infer directly the implications for privacy and the 
attitude towards personal privacy. The statements made earlier about the 
welfare of the community (or group) being more important than that of the 
                                                          
60 EPIC Alert, ‘EPIC Hosts Privacy and Public Voice Conference in Africa’, 23 December 2005, Vol. 11, No. 24,            
http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_11.24.html last visited 7/10/2011. 
61 Bakibinga, p.5, note 38, supra. 
62
 Ibid, p.12. 
63 Ibid, p.13. 
64 Olinger, H.N, et al., ‘Western privacy and/or Ubuntu? Some Critical Comments on the influences in the 
Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill in South Africa’, the International Information & Library Review, 2007, Vol. 39, No. 
1, pp. 31-43. 
65 Ubuntu has been defined differently by scholars (e.g. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Louw, Mokgoro, Mbigi, etc,). 
However to put it in simple terms, the concept Ubuntu refers to African philosophy which emphasises collectivist 
human relationship and assistance in everyday life. In Ubuntu, an individual is subjected under communal 
considerations. The concept is well developed in South African scholarship though it has its reflection in other 
African societies. Find more discussions about Ubuntu in Chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis.  
15 
 
individual immediately shows that there is a tension between privacy and social 
good. The case here is that personal privacy might be regarded as not being 
beneficial for the good of the community and in Ubuntu it is difficult to make 
the case for the social benefit of personal privacy. The culture of transparency 
and openness in Ubuntu would not understand the need for personal privacy 
or be able to justify it. Thus personal privacy would rather be interpreted as 
“secrecy”. This “secrecy” would not be seen as something good because it 
would indirectly imply that the Ubuntu individual is trying to hide something-
namely her personhood. The core definition of Ubuntu, “people are people through 
other people”, indicates that there is little room for personal privacy because the 
person’s identity is dependent on the group. The individualistic cultures of the 
West argue that personal privacy is required for a person to express his true 
individuality. With Ubuntu individuality is discovered and expressed together 
with other people and not alone in some autonomous space, and hence 
personal privacy plays no role in this Ubuntu context.’66 
 
The above observations led Olinger et al, to conclude that the influence of Ubuntu would be of 
less significance in the development of privacy legislation in South Africa.67 These authors 
advance three main reasons: first, although human dignity is the prime Ubuntu value that has 
been infused into the Constitution of South Africa, there exist no-Ubuntu-specific references to 
privacy in the Constitution neither in the current privacy related legislation in South Africa.68 
Second, although Ubuntu can, and has indeed influenced jurisprudence in South Africa, it could 
only be so in those areas where Ubuntu has a strong expression and philosophy.69 In the case of 
privacy, Ubuntu leaves little doubt that privacy is not esteemed as priority for the community or 
for the individual. Third, the notion of Ubuntu is to a certain extent an idealistic concept in the 
world of economic realities that is regulated and controlled by international standards, rules and 
regulations such as those designed by, amongst others, the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) and the EU.70 Because of that, Ubuntu is exclusive and limited to the 
African way of life. It is not incorporated into the global trade agreements and its very nature is 
cultural and not legal or economical. The latter make it difficult for the South African policy 
makers to include Ubuntu elements into legislation that does not translate well into international 
                                                          
66
 Olinger, H.N, et al., pp.35-36, note 64, supra. 
67 Ibid, p.40. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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trade of personal data. On the other hand, in finding the great influence of the EU’s data privacy 
law to the forthcoming data privacy law in South Africa, Olinger et al, equally advance three 
reasons. First, the protection of dignity which is a core expression of the EU’s data privacy law 
overlaps with Ubuntu’s concept of human dignity, the South African Constitutional principle of 
dignity as well as the common law concept of personal dignity.71 Second, that the South African 
Constitution enshrines the right to privacy as a constitutional right, which is the highest order of 
protection and embodiment of a right possible.72 This is similar to the description of the privacy 
right in the EU’s privacy legislation which is comprehensive and also compulsory to all EU 
member states. Third, since the EU is the major trading partner with South Africa, its directives, 
charters and protocols will have an influence and direct bearing on South Africa.73 This is 
because of the requirement under the EU’s data privacy legislation which restrict transfer of 
personal data to a third country unless, it has adequate privacy protection. 
 
Critics of Olinger, et al such as Scorgie74 argue that some forms of privacy: peoples’ unique 
thoughts, ideas, characteristics and accomplishments exist in the Ubuntu cultures even though 
privacy is seen as secondary to relationships and relationship-building. People have privacy in 
those mentioned aspects because they fall within the private possession of an individual. 
Accordingly, the Western concept of privacy as dignity and part of an individual’s personhood is 
seen to be equivalent to Ubuntu. Yet, comparatively privacy is less strong in the villages than in 
urban settings. This is what Scorgie observes, ‘in rural villages in the South African province of 
KwaZulu Natal there is not strong sentiment towards privacy and that privacy has expressed 
itself as a response to community envy. Individuals that enjoy material success beyond the 
boundaries of the villages in urban employment become victims of community envy and tend to 
become “secretive” or “private” about these successes. This is a unique form of privacy that has 
originated to defend the individual against the community, and is by no means the norm for 
communitarian societies.’75  
 
For completeness of this review, it is noteworthy that the Ubuntu philosophical perspectives in 
the area of privacy had been underscored before by Bakibinga and later by Burchell. However in 
                                                          
71 Ibid, pp.40-41. 
72 Ibid, p.41. 
73 Ibid. 
74  Scorgie, F., ‘Ubuntu in Practice’, HIVAN Research Associate, 2004 (Comments received by email) Email to: HN 
Olinger (Hanno.Olinger@Kumbaresources.com) [6 November 2004] cited in Olinger, H.N, et al., ‘Western privacy 
and/or Ubuntu? Some Critical Comments on the influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill in South Africa’, 
the International Information & Library Review, 2007, Vol.39, Issue 1, pp. 31-43, p. 36. 
75 Ibid. 
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both instances the discussion and analyses had been superficial. For example, Bakibinga made a 
brief mention of Ubuntu in her power point presentation by way of equating it with other African 
philosophies like socialism, but she did not offer an in-depth insight of the concept in relation to 
privacy protection.76 In the same vein, Burchell briefly posits:- 
 
‘In a sense, the African concept of Ubuntu (we are human through others) 
highlights a spirit of interconnectedness or collectivity rather than individual 
privacy. It is the personality rights of dignity and privacy that underscore 
individuality and set both the limits of humanity and of human interaction. A 
community-centred Ubuntu needs to be complimented by the individualism 
implicit in the fundamental personality rights of dignity and privacy.’77 
 
An overview of the above scholarship reveals that the first strand over-emphasises individualism 
not only as a permanent natural condition but also a pre-condition for privacy to develop. This is 
misleading. There are two fallacious assumptions the individualism-determinism paradigm rests 
its claims. First, Western European society was founded on individualism ever since its existence. 
As a result, privacy has always existed in the Western world. On the other hand African society 
was founded upon collectivism and has continued to be so hence lacking roots for privacy. 
Because of that, this literature has tended to view African society as static and unchanging 
ignoring profound factors such as Africa’s external contacts with the outsider world, particularly 
Europe, through the Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, neo-colonialism and globalisation.78 It is 
submitted that human society is always dynamic. It transforms across time and space. This 
transformation may be rapid or slow across human societies depending on varying material 
conditions.  
 
Schoeman,79 in a complete chapter ‘The ascent of privacy: a historical and conceptual account’, 
provides both a historical and conceptual account of the notion of privacy as it emerged and 
developed in the Western cultures. Although at the end Schoeman seems to attribute the rise of 
privacy to the culture of individualism, which is still problematic (see the second fallacy infra), he 
situates his analyses in wider political, economic and social contexts. In other words, Schoeman 
                                                          
76
 Bakibinga, E.M., ‘Managing Electronic Privacy in the Telecommunications Sub-sector: The Ugandan Perspective’, 
http://thepublicvoice.org/events/capetown04/ last visited 7/10/2011(see slide 7). 
77 Burchell, p.2, note 16, supra. 
78 These factors had profoundly impacted upon the development of African societies, their social structures, 
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79 Schoeman, F.D., Privacy and Social Freedom, Cambridge University Press, USA, 1992, Chapter 7. 
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does not look at collectivism and individualism as natural conditions which are peculiar of a 
particular society irrespective of those contexts. To that end, he traces the rise of privacy partly 
from the Greek and largely from the Roman Civilizations to the modern days. According to 
Schoeman what we would treat as private the Romans found no reason whatsoever to be 
reserved about.80 He illustrates this point by noting that on the tombstones of Romans, often 
placed along the highways, surviving relatives addressed passerby with announcements, like the 
announcement of a father that the girl entombed was disinherited, or that of a mother 
announcing that another woman poisoned the boy.81 As a whole, Schoeman observes that the 
Romans generally were fond of exposing wrongdoing in public, and public censure of private 
conduct was ubiquitous.82 However, although the Roman law did not in fact transgress all 
boundaries, there was no obligation to stay clear of any domain of life.83 In any case, Schoeman 
is arguing that the limits put by the law were not occasioned by norms of privacy.84  
 
As time progressed especially during the Middle Ages, things began to change. By subscribing to 
other scholars, Schoeman observes that during the early Middle Ages attitudes toward sex were 
quite different: In order for a marriage to be valid, the bride and the groom, after being disrobed 
by their attendants, had to be placed naked on the bridal bed together in the presence of 
witnesses.85 Whereas this practice evidences the degree to which virginity and consummation 
were key elements in marriage practices, it also tells us how private affairs of individuals were still 
subjected under the social control of the community. Schoeman contends:- 
 
‘As political, economic, and social life became more complex, and as social 
functions became much more differentiated, individuals were compelled to 
regulate their conduct, checking their impulsive character through a process of 
internalisation of the principles of “correct” conduct-that is, conduct that 
allows one to carry out one’s varied functional relationship, independent of 
how one is inclined. Society changed its structure in moving from a basically 
agrarian, socially disassociated mass of small communities to a socially 
integrated economic and political state. Similarly, the structure of individual 
consciousness changed from one of impulsive and mercurial behaviour 
                                                          
80 Ibid, p.116; see also Blume, P., ‘Data Protection of Law Offenders’, Information, Communication and Society, 
1998, Vol.1, No.4, pp.442-466, at p.443. 
81 Schoeman, note 80, supra. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid, pp.116-117. 
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patterns to one of habitually internalised restraints that accommodated to the 
demands of the more interrelated social fabric.’86  
 
In ascertaining the proper rise of individualism, Schoeman posits that the individual only 
emerges in certain kinds of historical circumstances, because to be an individual is to be aware of 
oneself in conflict with society’s norms, internalised so as to give rise to inner conflict.87 
Accordingly, this self-awareness finds a need for private spheres and, as a result, reassigns the 
instinctive and less socialised parts of self to domestic and mental settings.88 Using an illustration 
of the English family life, Schoeman links the idea of individualism to privacy. He notes that in 
the early 16th century, the English nuclear family, husband, wife and children, did not constitute 
an intimate environment in which participants focused special emotional resources on, and in 
turn derived special emotional meaning from, their relations with one another; and privacy in 
one’s most important relationships, including one’s relationship to oneself, was not an active 
form.89 Instead, the development of intimacy and meaning in personal relations and the 
emergence of privacy norms are correlated with the emergence of the individual as the basic 
social unit replacing the kin group.90 According to Schoeman, the conception of a person as an 
individual comes only when individuals ask questions about life’s meanings and goals and then 
have the responsibility of finding answers.91 He underlines that individuals are not just entities 
given naturally in their entirety, but are constructed by their own personal experiences, their 
associations in which they participate, and the way in which they resolve conflicts.92 And what is 
meant by ‘individual’, Schoeman says this is not a being that is socially disengaged, but rather a 
person who has some say over which associations include her.93 Other factors advanced by 
Schoeman regarding the emergence of the individual and consequently the notion of privacy 
include the Reformation, literacy, and scientific, medical and technological developments.94 
 
Schoeman’s views find parallels in Sihlongonyane, who in comparing the Western and African 
societies with regard to individualism, correctly puts:- 
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‘Questions may arise about generalisation on Western and African values and 
practices at this point. It probably suffice to indicate that the initial traditional 
standpoint of both African and Western values were similar among primitive 
societies. For instance, communal bonding was strong and the notion of the 
“nation as a family”, the king and queen mother as father and mother of the 
nation respectively existed among other things. However, the shift from these 
notions has been drastic in the West than in African societies. 
Industrialisation, urbanisation and technological advancement have removed 
numerous factors that nurture the “bonding factor”. From the industrialisation 
of the modern era (1500-1800) families started spending less time together as a 
unit. Husbands were stolen by the industry and women were custodians of the 
house. In the 20th century, even women began to be absorbed by the 
workplace creating a space between family members. The introduction of 
formal schooling further created more space between the parents and children. 
In the process, the social forces (i.e. religion, social rules, mores, etc) of 
bonding family members were undermined. Eventually, industrialisation 
became a way of life and the order of progress. Similarly, urbanisation further 
weakened the social strings in the family. Strong sentiments for individualism 
started gaining popularity and became more meaningful to the economic life 
than social life of the urban environment. Materialism and individualism 
eventually became synonymous with urban life, a life that economises.’95 
 
In line with the above view, Walter Rodney,96 97a renowned Guyanese historian, observes that 
before Africa came into first contacts with Europeans in the 15th Century, there were in the 
former uneven development of social formations. He identifies four types of these social 
formations: hunting bands, communalism, feudalism and societies in transition from 
communalism to feudalism. Nonetheless, the predominant principle of social relations was that 
of family and kinship associated with communalism. Undoubtedly, these social relations were 
reinforced by low level of productive forces which made it necessary for an individual to rely 
upon the labour of another in the process of material production. In this case an individual could 
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not stand on his or her own. However with the development of productive forces man did no 
longer need another man in producing materials for his or her needs. Yet, the scholarship in the 
first strand does not address this parameter in assessing the collectiveness of individuals in the 
African society.  
 
Moreover, there are noticeable self-contradictions in the defenders of individualism’s account. At 
some point in his analyses, Bygrave cautions not to paint countries and cultures into static 
categories (referring to the collectivist culture in Asia and Africa which undermines existence of 
privacy values).98 He justifies his caution by noting that provision for privacy rights is increasingly 
on the legislative agenda of some African countries.99 Bygrave’s caution became real in 2010 
when he noted the existence of data privacy laws in Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Morocco and 
Mauritius. Paradoxically, he stresses that liberal affection for privacy is amply demonstrated in 
the development of legal regimes for privacy protection which are most comprehensive in 
Western liberal democracies. Now, if we were to argue as Bygrave that African society is 
collectivist as a result no genuine concept or value of privacy exists, and at the same time observe 
that provision for privacy rights is increasingly on the legislative agenda of some African 
countries, we are left in serious logical contradiction. First, Bygrave maintains a sweeping stance 
that African cultures are collectivist, yet he does not explain the motivations for increasing 
legislative agenda for provision of privacy rights in African countries. The reasons he advanced 
in 2010 with regard to the emerging data privacy law in Francophone African countries are in no 
way connected to individualism. For instance, it is difficult to comprehend how the Data 
Protection Authority in France (Commission de l’Informatique et des Liberte´s ) was able ‘to cultivate 
data protection’ in Francophone African countries. Bygrave does not further explain what is 
meant by ‘cultivating data protection’. Does this include planting individualism in such countries 
or it just ends with creating only capacities to enact such laws? While certainly the French Data 
Protection Authority could provide capacities in Francophone Africa to enact privacy legislation, 
it could not descend individualism in Francophone African countries as a suitable pre-condition 
for data privacy law to develop. Still on the first issue, it is not quite clear why despite the 
‘cultivation’ of data protection by the French Data Protection Authority only isolated countries 
in the sub-region have implemented data privacy legislation while a large number of them do not 
have even data privacy Bills. Second, although he cautions not to paint countries and cultures in 
static categories suggesting that, privacy legislative agenda in Africa is a result of cultural 
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transformation; he does not further explain whether such development is likely to result into 
individualism in the hitherto African collectivist culture.  
 
Gutwirth faces the same problem as Bygrave. In assessing the Western society with regard to the 
development of privacy, he observes that privacy is not a given mankind has been endowed with 
since the dawn of time.100 On the contrary, privacy has developed throughout history.  He traces 
the Western notion of privacy into three main epochs: the Greco-Roman antiquity, Middle Ages 
and Renaissance-Enlightment.   
 
According to Gutwirth, during Greco-Roman antiquity, privacy was seen as something negative. 
The individual who withdrew into private sphere (one of deprivation) was not considered better 
than a slave with no bearing on public life. At that time, there was no personal dignity or self-
respect without public function or responsibility. The situation slightly began to change towards 
the end of the Greco-Roman era. Within a few centuries self-image turned into the valorisation 
of Christian self-constraint symbolised by the individual confession. The homo civicus, who could 
only achieve self-fulfilment by controlling the public sphere, was shoved aside by the homo 
interior, who considered self-constraint a goal in itself.   
 
During the Middle Ages the situation became deplorable. Gutwirth observes, ‘in feudal times, 
there was little space for privacy because of the paradoxical reason that all power was private. 
There was neither public debate nor public space where the common good was considered or 
served. Conviviality, communality and promiscuity made things individual suspect. But, as time 
went by, Christianity carved out a little niche for the individual: the prescribed, regular, individual 
and discrete practice of confession forced individuals into solitary introspection.’101 Yet, the 
foundations of contemporary perception of privacy came to be created in the period between the 
Renaissance and Enlightenment, driven by a series of cultural political events. During this time 
there developed a central state which created order, reinforced its powers and control over its 
subjects. Family too took central stage as an important link in the pacification and maintenance 
of public law and order. However, the family’s private domain, which used to be poor second to 
the fame and honour of public life, was upgraded. It is important to point that during 
reformation, the religious movement boosting the individual confession and introspection was 
also spreading, even beyond the confines of the Roman Catholic Church.  
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Gutwirth also observes that literacy and literature expanded the potential of intellectual 
independence. Even if despots rule, even if the public sphere was lacking and even if le secret du 
roi still reigned, the conditions for the emergence of the individual sphere were being created. In 
continental Europe the development of privacy was only superficially and momentarily 
interrupted during the French Revolution years. Nonetheless, the French Revolution laid the 
foundations for a sharper legal separation between the public and private spheres.  
 
Gutwirth’s account of development of privacy in Europe runs against his conclusions about 
privacy developments in Africa. In sharp contrast to the above observation, Gutwirth rules out a 
possibility of similar notion of privacy in the West to develop in Africa. Interestingly he argues 
that only the state and the legal system can proclaim such a thing (i.e. privacy development). This 
view is against individualism explanation. Moreover, Gutwirth’s conclusion is an ‘ought’ 
statement in the ‘is’ form thus creates controversy in the individualism-determinism paradigm. 
 
Self-contradictions are also arising in Bakibinga’s analyses about African privacy. First, while she 
maintains that the notion of privacy in Africa is seriously affected by the culture of collectivism 
she continues to argue that ‘one can have privacy and still be part of the community’ suggesting 
that within collectivism Africans may still claim privacy. Bakibinga fails to reconcile these highly 
contested values. Again, she calls for re-definition of privacy concept in a way that is acceptable 
to the Ugandan society given the emphasis on communalism versus individual rights. This call 
falls in the same trap. Bakibinga’s recommendation for Uganda to adopt privacy legislation in the 
EU’s style is not anywhere justified. It is arguable that if individualism is a pre-condition for 
privacy to develop, at least according to Bakibinga’s account, then her recommendation to adopt 
privacy legislation in EU’s style is misplacement of arguments. 
 
The second fallacy of the individualism-determinism paradigm in the first strand is to assume 
that the privacy discourse arouse immediately with the rise of individualism. Critics of the 
individualism-determinism paradigm challenge the paradigm on three grounds. The first is the 
chronological problem. They argue that demand for legal protection for privacy came so very 
late in the day, long after the rise of individualism, whenever it actually started.102 Perri 6 notes:- 
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‘The first legal decisions on privacy do not really appear until the very 
beginning of the twentieth century; the main constitutional commitments and 
international conventions offering some general protection are all phenomena 
of the second half of the twentieth century; and the main statutory 
interventions such as data protection legislation all appear in the last quarter of 
the twentieth century. Indeed, privacy has been a latecomer in the 
development of liberal constitutional or legislative rights for the individual and 
is still relatively insecurely grounded by comparison with eighteenth and 
nineteenth century efforts to buttress rights against arbitrary arrest, rights to 
freedom of conscience, association, speech and to vote for elected 
representatives.’103 
 
Peri 6’s criticisms are supported by many commentators. Bennett, for example, underscores:- 
 
‘By the late 1960’s this development (technological determinism) had raised 
within post-industrial democratic states a complex but common set of fears 
that crucial individual rights and liberties were being compromised. States then 
responded with data protection statutes, designed to regulate the collection, 
storage, use and disclosure of recorded information relating to identifiable 
individuals and thus protect the value of personal privacy.’104  
 
Based on the above, individualism-determinism fails to offer a clear chronological account of the 
rise of privacy. Second, is the geographical problem relating to individualism paradigm. The 
argument runs as follows: in many conventional ways (limited labour market regulation, social 
insurance and so on), the most individualistic society on earth is surely the United States, which 
has as yet no general data protection law at federal level.105 Moreover, in the USA, individualist 
arguments about economic liberty are frequently deployed against proposals for data protection 
or press privacy law, on the grounds that these would present unacceptable interventions in 
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freedom to trade using personal information.106 Third, is the logical problem. The logical 
problem with the individualist history is that many claims to privacy cannot readily be reduced to 
claims of liberty and autonomy. The concerns of data protection and press privacy law are not all 
about the power or right to make certain fundamental or important kinds of decision for oneself 
and carry them out without the obstruction of government coercive power.107 Rather, they tend 
more often to be about claims to dignity.108 However, despite the problems of individualism 
determinism, Perri 6 still argues that together with urbanism and informatics, individualism 
gradually contributed to the rise of privacy as he notes, ‘although none of these is an adequate 
explanation of why privacy came to be so salient so late, individualism, urbanism and informatics 
no doubt all play a role in the gradual rise of concern about privacy’109  
 
Apart from the two fallacies discussed, there are also problems of empirical evidence supplied by 
the scholarships in the first strand in support of their arguments. In all cases, the literature on 
collectivism, as explanatory factor to the state of privacy in Africa, suffers from weak empirical 
evidence. To begin with, the absence of a privacy provision in the African Charter of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights 1981 is widely cited in the discourse as evidence of lack of value to privacy. 
It is noteworthy that immediately after independence from colonial powers African countries 
adopted constitutions which incorporated the Bill of Rights.110 Most of them included provisions 
on privacy.111 Compared to the African Charter, African national constitutions came so very 
earlier. Moreover, they continued to exist at and after the adoption of ACHPR. Thus, if 
according to Bygrave, mere mention of a right to privacy in ACHPR could be an evidence of 
Africans’ value to the right of privacy, then the inclusion of provisions on a right to privacy in 
African independence constitutions negates his argument out rightly. However to argue this way 
is probably misleading for two reasons. First, most independence constitutions in Africa were 
not rooted in the African soils. Instead, they were ‘imposed’ by their colonizers. Scholars argue 
that such ‘imposition’ did not reflect the African societal values.112  Gutwirth, for instance, argues 
that although African states adopted the constitutions of their colonisers founded on 
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individualism, the collectivist culture continued to outweigh the individual’s right to privacy.113 
This view is similarly echoed by Shivji who observes that most black African countries, as they 
marched into independence in the ‘60s, were bequeathed the Westminster constitutional and 
political order in the former British colonies, while constitutions in French-speaking Africa were 
modelled on analogies taken from French or Belgium.114 Yet, all the former British colonies were 
given written constitutions with protection of fundamental rights as part of the independence 
package.115 Shivji, just like other scholars, argues that the motive behind the inclusion of 
fundamental rights in the independence constitutions was to protect the property interests of the 
settler minority and foreign companies. 116 117 In support of the above claim, Shivji remarks, ‘ this 
argument is buttressed by the fact that the same powers were little concerned with fundamental 
rights, separation of powers or independent judiciary, etc during their own rule in the colonies.’118  
 
However care must be taken in generalising the use of the term ‘imposition’ of independence 
African constitutions and with respect to the Bill of Rights in particular. For instance, South 
Africa can be cited as an illustration of a country where the term ‘imposition’ must sparingly be 
used. This is because it is widely acknowledged that the 1996 South African Constitution was the 
result of several years of negotiations between dominant black, white, and Afrikaans parties.119 
Indeed its incorporation of religious and cultural rights in the Bill of Rights is evidence that it 
reflects the values of the majority South African people.120 Affirming this view, Keeva states:- 
 
‘South Africa’s constitution was negotiated by the people whose interests it 
must protect. In most sub-Saharan African countries, constitutions have been 
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imposed by departing colonial rulers. Those documents tended to vest power 
in ruling elite and ignore the particular needs of the nation. South Africa’s new 
constitution draws on this experience and broadly embodies the nation’s 
values because of the diversity of opinion brought to the negotiating table.’121 
 
Despite that, South African courts have given considerable weight on the provisions conferring 
individual rights in case of conflicts with the religious and cultural rights while interpreting the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights in the South Africa’s constitution.122 This tells us that the 
inclusion of provisions reflecting African values in the Constitution, which are collective in 
nature, does not necessarily warrant their protection. The South African courts seem to have 
upheld individual rights showing that individualism is becoming more important than 
collectivism. 
 
Tanganyika, a former British colony, offers another peculiar illustration where the term 
‘imposition’ has to be cautiously used. 123 The country rejected the inclusion of the Bill of Rights 
in her independence constitution making use of the term ‘imposition’ obsolete. Martin observes 
that in Tanganyika a Bill of Rights was considered by the government immediately before 
independence and again when the constitution for the Republic was under discussion.124 On 
both occasions the idea was rejected.125 Bill of Rights was inserted in the Tanzanian constitution 
23 years after independence vide the Fifth Constitutional Amendment made in 1984. It is 
interesting to note that all such time up to 1988 when the Bill of Rights came into force, the 
Tanzanian High Court rejected to enforce individual rights that were simply declared in the 
preamble.126 However since 1988 the High Court and even the Court of Appeal of Tanzania (the 
Supreme Court) have been prepared to give force to individual rights.127  
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A case closer to Tanganyika is Cameroon. The latter, which was partly former French and British 
colony, has a constitution which did not incorporate a Bill of Rights at the time of independence. 
Instead, the Cameroonian Constitution recognized the basic rights in its preamble.128 Chofor Che 
observes that the Constitution of Cameroon 1996 does not have any Bill of Rights.129 He argues 
that although there is reference to political and socioeconomic rights, rights to development and 
peace in the preamble remain less important because such rights do not form part of the Bill of 
Rights.130 In support of this view, Chenwi argues that the preamble part of the Constitution of 
Cameroon is unenforceable.131 However Chenwi’s argument has been made without reference to 
Article 65 of the Cameroonian Constitution. Akonumbo rightly posits:- 
 
‘Unlike the constitutions of some other African countries that clearly and 
extensively deal with fundamental rights under separate relevant headings (e.g. 
Mali, Senegal and Gabon), the Cameroon Constitution merely recalls the 
country’s commitment to the relevant human rights instruments and 
specifically mentions some, such as the right to life, the right to work and the 
right to property. While there may be doubts and a divergence in views as to 
the persuasiveness and binding power of the preamble of a constitution in 
comparison with the constitutional provisions themselves, article 65 of the 
1996 Constitution unequivocally discards such debate. This article provides 
that ‘[t]he Preamble shall be part and parcel of this Constitution’. The obvious 
implication is that the Preamble is no less than any part of, or provision in, the 
Constitution; the fundamental rights expressly or impliedly referred to in the 
Preamble have the same status and effect as individual provisions in the body 
of the Constitution.’132 
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In case of Ghana, a former British colony, there was no inclusion of a Bill of Rights simply 
because provisions were not previously on offer.133 Bill of Rights came subsequently hence it 
cannot be argued that such instrument was imposed at independence. It is submitted that 
although the Bill of Rights was less important in Africa immediately after independence, the 
situation significantly changed in 1980s and 1990s. The pressure that mounted from within and 
outside Africa culminated to inclusion of Bill of Rights in most African constitutions together 
with other constitutional reforms.134 This was either through re-writing of new constitutions or 
effecting substantial amendments. It can be argued that as African constitutions have undergone 
several changes or amendments since independence warranting protection of individual’s 
freedom and basic human rights, it would be erroneous to maintain wholly that the individual 
rights currently available in the African constitutions do not reflect the values of the African 
people.  
 
There is another argument that runs against the view that the omission of a privacy provision in 
ACHPR suggests lack of value to privacy in Africa. Analogously the American constitution does 
not contain any express provision on the right to privacy yet the American Supreme Court has 
implicitly interpreted the Fourth Constitutional Amendment as protecting the right to privacy.135 
If an omission of privacy right in the American constitution does not lead to a conclusion that 
Americans do not value privacy why then similar omission in the African Charter is automatically 
inferred to a negative conclusion?  Seen in that perspective, how is the conclusion for omission 
of privacy in ACHPR be explained in the context of inclusion of privacy provision in the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990?136 
 
The second piece of empirical evidence supplied by individualist school of thought is the 
absence of comprehensive data protection legislation in Africa. It is widely acknowledged by 
scholars including Bygrave himself that privacy was first conceived in America.137 These scholars 
also acknowledge that Western Europe has always been picking up issues with regard to data 
                                                          
133 Reed, note 124, supra. 
134 It is important to note that although the constitutional reforms in Africa in 1980s and 1990s were partly a result 
of the conditions imposed by IMF and the World Bank, scholars do not view them as ‘imposed’ in the same way as 
during independence. This is partly because most of the scholars were part and parcel of local movements that 
pressed for such reforms. Moreover, unlike the independence constitutions which were made and just given to the 
colonies, the constitutional reforms were made by local legislative bodies, constitutional conferences, etc. 
135 Gutwirth, p.26, note 30, supra. 
136 OAU, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) 
entered into force on 29 November 1999. 
137 Bygrave, pp.320-321, note 25, supra. 
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privacy after being debated in the United States.138 As pointed out, to date the United States has 
no comprehensive data privacy legislation in the European style. Can this lack of comprehensive 
data privacy legislation support a claim that Americans do not value privacy? Or there is no 
genuine concept of privacy in the U.S? Again, in Japan, where new data privacy legislation in a 
European style has been adopted, scholars argue that its implementation has been difficult.139 140 
The reason advanced in this case is the lack of attitude towards privacy. This contention dilutes 
the evidence of absence of data privacy law as a support of the claim under discussion. Again, 
how can the absence of a privacy provision in the ACHPR explain the emerging data privacy 
legislation in Cape Verde, Seychelles, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Tunisia, Senegal, Morocco, Benin,   
Angola, Gabon and Ghana? 
 
The third piece of empirical evidence is about frequent reference to family, groups, people and 
state in ACHPR. This evidence is similarly weak. First, it avoids mentioning the existence of 
individual rights in Articles 2 to 17 which open with reference to every individual... suggesting that 
the Charter contains also provisions on individual rights apart from those referring to collective 
rights. Perhaps, the argument would have been how can the two sets of rights be reconciled in 
actual practice? In other words, is the law in the books tally with the law in action? As pointed out, in 
South Africa for example, while interpreting the provisions of the Bill of Rights, courts give 
considerable weight on the provisions conferring individual rights whenever these come into 
conflicts with religious and cultural rights.141 Second, this piece of evidence has ignored the 
historical and political context in which the African Charter arose-the history of Western colonial 
domination, struggles for independence and development. It is therefore not surprising, that, 
some of the provisions of the Charter reflect the culture and values of the African people as the 
historical past and fact for their identity but this does not necessarily mean the practices are in 
conformity with the Charter. 
 
                                                          
138 Ibid. 
139 See generally, Nakada, M and Tamura, T., ‘Japanese Conceptions of Privacy: An Intercultural Perspective’, Ethics 
and Information Technology, 2005, Vol.7, pp.27-36; Adams, A.A et al., ‘The Japanese Sense of Information Privacy’, 
Al & Society, 2009, Vol.24, No.4, pp.327-341; Murata, K and Orito, Y., ‘Privacy Protection in Japan: Cultural 
Influence on the Universal Value’, Electronic Proceedings of Ethicomp, Linkoping, Sweaden, 2005; Murata, K  and 
Orito, Y., ‘Rethinking the Concept of Information Privacy: A Japanese Perspective’, Electronic Proceedings of 
Ethicomp, Tokyo, Japan, 2007; Lawson, C., ‘Japan’s New Privacy Act in Context’, UNSW Law Journal, 2006, 
Vol.29, No.2, pp.88-113. 
140 For the evolvement of privacy in China which has yet no comprehensive data protection legislation, see for 
example, Cheung, A.S.Y., ‘China Internet going wild: Cyber-hunting versus Privacy Protection’, Computer Law & 
Security Review, 2009, Vol.25, pp.275-279; Kong, L., ‘ Enacting China’s Data Protection Act’, International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology, 2010, Vol.18, No.3, pp.197-226; Yao-Huai, L., ‘Privacy and Data Privacy 
Issues in Contemporary China’, Ethics and Information Technology, 2005, Vol.7, pp.7-15. 
141 Keeva, note 121, supra. 
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The fourth empirical evidence is preference of the law of the village as opposed to the state. This 
piece of evidence is beyond the realities in Africa. Ever since Africa was put under European 
colonial rule in the second half of the 19th Century, there had been a constant erosion of 
customary law. In English colonies, for example, after the English legal system was put in place, 
African customary law was allowed to apply only where it was not in conflict with 
morality.142After independence, the English legal system continued to exist. This reduced 
significantly the domain of customary law. To date, the constitution is the supreme law in every 
African state (with exception of the North African Arab states where Sharia is the supreme law). 
Any law has to pass the constitutional test to be valid. Although customary law is still applicable 
it is insignificant. Most customary laws fail to pass the constitutional test. For example, most laws 
which have been denying women’s rights to ownership of properties, widows’ rights of 
inheritance, children born out of wed-lock right of inheritance, etc have been turned down as 
unconstitutional.143 Gutwirth’s assertion that in Africa many people prefer the law of the village 
as opposed to the state to the extent of settling a murder case is unsupported.  It can be argued 
that Gutwirth’s application of Achebe’s African Trilogy to support his assertion is misdirection. 
This is because, the African Trilogy which combines Achebe’s three novels (Things Fall Apart 
(1958), No Longer at Ease (1960) and Arrow of God (1964)) in one is based on the settings mostly 
drawn on the pre-colonial traditions of the Nigerian Igbo society as affected by colonialism. 
More specifically, the assertion seems to have been based upon the Things Fall Apart when 
Okonkwo, the main character, accidentally killed a boy with his gun as a result of which he was 
supposed according to traditions to leave his clan (Umofia) for seven years and return after 
expiry of such period.144 Arguably, this was and is not the position in Africa during the colonial 
rule and after. It is submitted that Gutwirth contextual misapplication of Achebe’s African Trilogy 
by extending ‘Umofia’ pre-colonial traditions in Nigeria to present day Africa is lack of 
understanding of the present day criminal justice in African countries. 
 
                                                          
142 The question was whose morality? It definitely appears that this was the British morality. Today when customary 
law comes into conflict with the constitutions or statutory provisions the latter prevail to the effect that the former 
becomes inoperational or declared unconstitutional. 
143 See, Bernado Ephraim v Holaria Pastory and Gervazi Kaizilege, (PC) Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1989, High Court of 
Tanzania, Mwanza (Unreported). In that case the High Court of Tanzania nullified the Haya Customary Law which 
denied a woman the right to inherit under the Haya Customary Law; See also, Ozoemana, R.N., ‘African Customary 
Law and Gender Justice in a Progressive Democracy’, LL.M Thesis, Rhodes University, 2006, p. 2 who posits, 
‘although customary practices play a very important role in the lives of the African people as mentioned above, 
some of the rules can no longer withstand constitutional scrutiny.’ 
144 Achebe, C., Things Fall Apart, East African Educational Publishers, Nairobi/Kampala/Dar es Salaam, 1966, 
pp.86-87 under licence from Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, UK.  
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There is also misconception in viewing South Africa and Kenya’s constitutions as peculiar model 
in Africa by inclusion of the privacy right. This has been a problem with scholars like Bygrave145 
and Murungi.146 Seen that way, it implies that the rest of African countries lack privacy provisions 
in their constitutions. This is an incorrect account. The point to be made here is that, South 
Africa and Kenya are the latest African countries to include express provisions for protection of 
privacy in their constitutions in 1996 and 2010 respectively. Moreover, this view tempts to 
suggest that the right to privacy embedded in the South Africa and Kenya’s constitutions 
provides sufficient protection of privacy as such, which is not necessarily correct. 
 
The second strand focuses on the impact of Islam over privacy.  With regard to Africa, this 
strand is relevant to the North African Arab states (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt) 
and to some extent Nigeria (northern states) which is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa 
with a densely Muslim population. By and large, this strand comprises the second most contested 
terrain in the privacy discourse after the collectivism strand. Debates in this strand manifest  in 
two conflicting schools of thought. To borrow Gutwirth’s nomenclature, the two schools are: 
orthodox rejectionalist and reconciliatory.147 The former considers human rights as part of the 
Western secular tradition based upon rationalism, cosmopolitanism and individualism. Islam on 
the other hand is a religion rooted deeply in tradition and which addresses men and women, 
Muslims, Christians, Jews and others differently.148 Accordingly, an individual is viewed as part of 
a group and a component of a family or community structure, than as an autonomous and 
independent being. To make matters worse, a person must live first by Allah’s commands. As a 
result, duties take precedence over rights and any claim for increased freedom has a touch of 
subversivity about it. An individual can claim limited rights within the framework of religious 
law. Moreover, the rejectionist theory does not accept religious norms to be tested by earthly 
standards.149 In this case, divine instructions always take precedence, even over the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The latter school of thought subscribes to human rights law 
(rationalism, humanism and individualism) as part of the Muslim values. It evokes an Islam 
which no longer badly clashes with the Universal Declaration, and which does not have to take 
any human rights lessons from a great many secular nations and politicians.150 From this 
perspective, a multitude of fundamental rights and freedoms seem to find their origin within the 
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sources of Islamic law, and more specifically in the verses of the Koran, Sunna and the Hadiths 
of the prophet. This is certainly so if, as some Muslim argue, the sources have to be progressively 
interpreted.151  
 
In 2007, a more detailed account of the relationship between Islam and privacy was examined in 
a pilot project between the value system and rule system in Islam, with data protection law as a 
point of departure. This project culminated in a publication of five articles in a special issue of 
the Information & Communications Technology Law, Volume 16, Issue No. 2, in 2007. A review of 
these articles is important for two main reasons. First, despite some limitations, they provide in-
depth analyses of the relationship between Islam and privacy in a more systematic approach. 
Thus, the articles make significant contribution in the privacy discourse which has previously 
focused in the Western secular states and at least non-Islam countries outside EU. Second, being 
a consolidation of articles drawn from experts in Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, the special 
issue offers researchers a starting point for doing research from different perspectives. To begin 
with, Caurana and Cannataci152 examine the impact (applicability) of the EU Directive 95/46 on 
protection of personal data in the North Africa and Middle Eastern states where Islamic culture 
or Islamic law underlines much of everyday legal practice. According to the authors, this 
examination was prompted by one major factor: the movement of more and more EU-based 
industries of their operations to North Africa and Islamic law states in order to take advantage of 
lower labour costs.153 Focusing on Jordan and Tunisia, Caurana and Cannataci observe, ‘it is in 
Jordan’s interests to introduce a law on privacy.’154 155 This observation has been arrived at after 
taking into account the fact that Jordan is a signatory of various international agreements (e.g. 
WTO, a trade partnership agreement with EU and a joint statement on e-commerce with the 
United States) that are likely to assist in propagating international standards of privacy protection 
in domestic law. With regard to Tunisia, the authors pinpoint that it has adopted a law on data 
protection. However, they argue that although such law is prima facie word perfect vis-à-vis EU 
Directive 95/46 its implementation is possibly seriously marred by inter alia the use of personal 
data for police purposes, which reportedly falls far short of the EU standard entrenched in 
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152 Carauna, M.M and Cannataci, J.A., ‘European Union Privacy and Data Protection Principles: Compatibility with 
Culture and Legal Frameworks in Islamic States’, Information & Communications Technology Law, 2007, Vol. 16, 
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153 Ibid, p.100. 
154 Ibid, p.113. 
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Recommendation R(87)15.156 Unfortunately, this article does not make any analysis with respect 
to Islamic culture or law despite its inclusion in this special issue and its title which specifically 
mention the former as its units of analysis.157  
 
Azmi158 focuses her analyses in Malaysia. She observes that the Malaysian Constitution contains 
no specific provision on the right to privacy. The Malaysian Courts do not either recognise the 
right to privacy in its jurisprudence (see, Ultra Dimension Sdn. Bhd v Kook We Kuan). Accordingly, 
Azmi argues, ‘in a country where individual freedom of expression is effectively not guaranteed, 
the European style notion that an individual should be free from unnecessary intrusion and 
snooping from the state is a luxury.’159 With regard to Islam, she notes that there are some traces 
of privacy, nonetheless she argues, ‘in a country that professes to adhere to Islamic teaching as 
its major religion, this proposition is entirely not acceptable.’160 Azmi’s analyses are in sharp 
contrast to Hayat161 who relates privacy and Islam in Pakistan. His views are summarised as 
follows:- 
 
‘Islam recognises all human rights considered necessary for the existence, well 
being and personal growth of every individual in a civilized society. The 
human rights recognised in modern constitutions, charter and international 
treaties are embedded in the religion of Islam, and respect for life, privacy, 
freedom, equality and religious belief is an essential feature of Islam. Islam 
gives great importance to the fundamental human right to privacy. Islamic 
Shariah fully acknowledges the sanctity of one’s home and private life, and 
there is ample admonition against prying into the affairs of others. The 
principles of Islam elevate the religious conscience of every Muslim, and 
protection of the privacy of every Muslim lies at the core of Islamic 
principles.’162 
 
Hayat observes further that privacy is a constitutional right in Pakistan. At the same time the 
same constitution recognises Islam as the state religion. This means Islamic laws are supreme in 
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Pakistan. By virtue of that, all laws must conform to the Holy Quran and Sunnah. To ensure this, 
the constitution establishes the Federal Shariat Court. The jurisdiction of this Court is to 
examine and decide on the question whether any law or provision of law is repugnant to the 
injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunahh of the Holy Prophet. This 
Court can invoke its jurisdiction on a complaint brought before it or suo motto. Commenting on 
the Pakistan draft law on privacy and data protection, Hayat argues, ‘there is no inconsistency 
with the principles and injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet; rather this law 
is in accordance with fundamentals of Islam and I do not expect any problem in getting it 
through Parliament. Because of the power of the Federal Shariat Court, the government is 
always very careful in drafting and introducing laws.’163 Hayat’s analyses are problematic. They 
just end making a one-to-one match between aspects of privacy in Islam and the Western notion 
of privacy. Arguably, his approach is too simplistic. First, the author fails to differentiate between 
having a law on privacy and its practice. It is common knowledge that law does not operate in 
vacuum. Thus one would have expected Hayat to assess the Pakistan’s Islamic environment and 
its impact on privacy instead of enumerating a long list of aspects of privacy in the Holy Quran 
and Sunnah. This is in sharp contrast to Azmi, who, although she finds some sorts of matching 
between privacy in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, she proceeds to assess the wider implication of 
Islamic religion on the practices of privacy rights in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Thus, Hayat’s 
analyses suffer from isolating the law from its context. Now, while it is easy to agree with 
Gutwirth on his nomenclature, which makes Hayat to fall under reconciliatory group, it is 
difficult to place Azmi under Orthodox rejectionist. The reason is that Azmi does not reject 
existence of the right to privacy in Islam rather she challenges the wider Malaysian socio-
economic and political context as presently unsuitable for privacy rights to be practised. 
 
Kusamotu164 considers the Nigerian legal framework for protection of privacy in the context of 
the ‘adequacy’ test in the EU Directive 95/46/EC. His analyses reveal such legal framework fails 
to meet the standard set by the European law. Kusamotu raises three important points in 
connection to that: first, Nigeria does not have specific privacy laws, but guarantees the right to 
privacy in her Constitution; second, Article 37 of the Nigerian Constitution 1999 which secures 
the right to privacy is discriminatory and segregative to non-Nigerians. This provision states ‘the 
privacy of citizen...’ Accordingly, Kusamotu argues, ‘ it would therefore appear that in the case of 
the personal data of non-Nigerians that are being processed or are to undergo processing after 
being transferred to Nigeria, the individuals concerned will not be able to enforce their 
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fundamental right to privacy under the Constitution;165 third, that the absence of data protection 
laws in Nigeria is not connected to the percentage of Muslims in Nigeria’s population or to any 
tenet of faith, Muslim, Christian or otherwise, but rather to the low level of data processing and 
awareness about its implications for privacy.166 Arguably, the claim by Kusamotu that the state of 
privacy in Nigeria is explainable in the low level of data processing alone is doubtful. This is 
because the government, private organisations following adoption of liberalisation policies to 
economic, social, technological and political reforms in Africa as well as individuals, increasingly 
process personal data for various purposes. Moreover, it must clearly be pointed out that there 
are differences between processing of personal data activities and awareness of the risks that are 
likely to be posed by such activities on individuals’ privacy. Such activities are likely to stimulate 
individuals’ concerns for privacy. Kusamotu seems to treat the two issues in isolation. The other 
shortcoming of Kusamotu’s arguments is that his analyses about the influence of religion on 
privacy, more particularly Islam, are too descriptive to support his conclusion.  Moreover, in his 
analyses of the Nigerian legal system, Kusamotu omits discussion about Nigerian common law 
making such analyses incomplete. 
 
In contrast to the previous commentators in the special issue, who specifically attempted to find 
the place of privacy in Islam and concomitantly its practices in Islamic states or predominantly 
Islamic cultures, Bonnici’s analyses depart significantly from his colleagues.167 His article focuses 
on discussion about relaxation of the general data protection principles in EU Directive 95/46 in 
the context of the EU Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC and the proposed Council 
Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters-with its primary ‘principle of availability of law 
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enforcement information.’ Bonnici’s main contention is that the two developments in the EU 
law (the Third Pillar) which regulates issues of public security, defence, State security and 
activities of the State in areas of criminal law, all of them exempted from the general application 
of EU Directive 95/46, has tended to relax (or devaluate) the standards set by the latter. The 
main standard referred is the ‘purpose specification principle’ which is cardinal before any 
processing of personal data takes place. He argues that in the EU Data Retention Directive 
2006/24/EC and the proposed Council Framework Decision, it is less clear to identify the 
specific purpose for processing personal data. Moreover, he contends that the broad justification 
for such processing i.e. counter-terrorism,  which most invariably the West links it with Islam, 
whether by using direct terminologies such as Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremist, etc or 
indirect terminologies such as criminals, terrorist, etc in order to avoid open criticisms and 
confrontations from Islamic communities is extremely confusing. It is submitted that while 
Bonnici’s analyses are relevant they address a totally different subject from the present study. As 
pointed out, this thesis is premised in the context of implementation of general data privacy laws. 
It has links to the EU Directive 95/46/EC which appears to be the main stimulus for countries 
outside Europe to enact data privacy laws in response to the requirements of Articles 25-26 
requiring ‘adequate’ level of protection of personal data to be ensured in third countries when 
data originating from Europe to such third countries is initiated. 
 
The third strand in the above review of literature concerns about developmentalism. Shortly 
after independence in 1960s and 70s, African countries, in a bid to rebuild their countries, 
devoted much effort to economic developments. Accordingly, other aspects of development, 
more specifically human rights issues, were given less priority affecting the right to privacy. 
Ncube takes the lead to introduce developmentalism factors in the African privacy discourse. In 
a review of Zimbabwean and South African data protection systems, she argues, ‘...from the time 
of independence Zimbabweans have been predominantly concerned with those rights pertaining 
to pressing political and economic issues such as the rising cost of living. Subsequently issues 
such as data protection have largely been overlooked.’168 This is despite the fact that Zimbabwe’s 
Independence Constitution 1980 contained a Bill of Rights albeit without an explicit provision 
for privacy protection. The case is different in countries such as Tanganyika where an inclusion 
of a Bill of Rights in the independence constitution was completely rejected by the TANU 
nationalists led by the late Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere. They argued that such a Bill would 
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hamper the new government in its endeavours to develop the country.169 Moreover, it would be 
used by the judiciary (mainly dominated by English judges) to frustrate the government by 
declaring most of its actions unconstitutional.170 This rejection of the Bill of Rights persisted 
even after independence. The rejection is reflected in the report of the commission charged with 
mandate to collect opinion and views from people regarding the issue. A portion of this report 
states:- 
 
‘Tanganyika has dynamic plans for economic development. These cannot be 
implemented without revolutionary changes in the social structure. In 
considering the Bill of Rights in this context we have had in mind the bitter 
conflict which arose in the United States between the President and the 
Supreme Court as a result of radical measures enacted by the Roosevelt 
Administration to deal with the economic depression in the 1930s. Decisions 
concerning the extent to which individual rights must give way to wider 
considerations of social progress are not properly judicial decisions. They are 
political decisions best taken by political leaders responsible to the 
electorate.’171 
 
The developmentalist camp leaves many questions to be desired. First, they wrongly view privacy 
as an antithesis of development. Paradoxically the very reason they advance as an excuse for 
overlooking privacy issues, i.e. national building is the same reason they advance for the adoption 
of data privacy protection legislation, i.e. economic outsourcing. Ncube observes:- 
 
‘Data protection is a very important international trade issue and the lack of 
adequate data protection may be a barrier to trade. ...The need to establish and 
enforce effective data protection systems in both Zimbabwe and South Africa 
is a trade and development issue. The 1995 European Union Data Protection 
Directive (http://www.bfd.bund.de/europa/EU_richtl_en.html>) imposes a 
standard of protection on any country in which the personal data of European 
citizens is processed. Such data can only be processed in countries that can 
guarantee adequate levels of protection (Articles 25-6)’172 
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She argues:- 
 
‘Developing nations, especially those in Africa, as evidenced by their recent 
establishment of NEPAD, intend to be full participants in the global 
economy. Such participation will only be enabled by conducive trade relations. 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, like all other developing nations therefore need 
to ensure that their data protection laws encourage rather that(sic) discourage 
international trade by providing adequate levels of data protection to enable 
the flow of data from European Union(EU) countries.’173 
  
In her other article, ‘Watching the watcher: recent developments in privacy regulation and cyber-
surveillance in South Africa’, Ncube stresses the need to adopt privacy legislation in South Africa 
for economic outsourcing.174 Other scholars who emphasise the need to adopt privacy legislation 
in the EU’s style include Roos, Bakibinga, Kusamotu, Neethling, Murungi,175 etc. Although none 
of these scholars have provided empirical evidence to show to what extent African countries 
have been affected by not adopting data privacy legislation in conformity with the EU’s law, 
emphasis has been placed on developmentalism as a justification for adopting data privacy 
legislation. Second, African countries have continued to remain poor with or without the 
adoption of privacy law or Bill of Rights. Thus explaining the state of privacy in Africa on 
‘overlooking to address privacy issues for economic development reasons’ is not well convincing.  
 
The fourth strand of literature explains the undeveloped state of privacy in Africa simply on 
people’s ignorance of this right. This is by far the most neglected strand. Bakibinga attributes the 
low level of privacy in Uganda due to Ugandans’ ignorance of their right to privacy.176 She uses 
Froomkin’s terminology ‘privacy myopia’ to capture this state of affair.177 This view is also 
echoed by Kusamotu with regard to privacy protection in Nigeria. He argues that the absence of 
data protection laws in Nigeria is not connected to the percentage of Muslims in Nigeria’s 
population or to any tenet of faith, Muslim, Christian or otherwise, but rather to the low level of 
data processing and awareness about its implications for privacy.178 While lack of awareness of 
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privacy right may partly explain the state of privacy in Africa, there is no study so far which has 
been carried to establish such claims.  
 
The fifth strand comprises debates on the ability of common law to secure individuals’ privacy. 
Two main conflicting schools of thought are noticeable within this strand. The first school  
largely propounded by a Nigerian professor Nwauche can well be summarised in the following 
paragraph:- 
 
‘I am of the firm opinion that a comprehensive protection of information 
privacy can be achieved through a tort of privacy that protects against 
intrusion well as disclosure as discussed above. In this way the dignity of the 
individual will be well protected. A tort of privacy is important as it assists the 
development of a constitutional right to privacy...’179 
 
However Nwauche admits that there is currently little Nigerian jurisprudence over protection of 
privacy under the tort of breach of confidence. As a result, he is forced to rely on the English 
case law in his analyses which he asserts it is not clear whether such case law is binding or not on 
Nigerian courts. He observes that in England there is no overarching cause of action for privacy. 
However, various aspects of privacy protection are fast developing especially with the enactment 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 as a measure to incorporate the European Convention on 
Human Rights into English law. Perhaps because of this, Nwauche considers the protection of 
privacy in Nigeria through a common law tort of privacy while paying due regards to the 
constitutional protection of the right to privacy under Article 37 of the Nigerian Constitution 
1999 which state, ‘the privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations 
and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.’ Unfortunately, Nwauche 
does not make any discussion, let alone any reference to the Directive, 95/46/EC. It is less clear 
whether the omission to discuss the implication of the Directive which is implemented in 
England, is attributable to lack of knowledge of existence of such law or otherwise. Opponents 
of this view and more particularly Kusamotu argues that Nigerian legal framework for privacy 
fails to meet the test of adequacy under the Directive 95/46/EC. Echoing this position are 
scholars such Chukwuyere180  and Nwankwo181 182 whose discussions and analyses are largely 
                                                          
179 Nwauche, E.S., ‘The Right to Privacy in Nigeria’, Review of Nigerian Law and Practice, 2007, Vol.1, No.1, pp.62-
90, at p. 83. 
180 Izuogu, C.E., ‘Data Protection and Other Implications in the Ongoing SIM Card Registration Process’, 2010, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1597665, last visited 11/10/2011; see also Izuogu, C.E., 
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focused on the adoption of the registration of SIM card scheme in Nigeria without having 
appropriate data privacy legislation.183 Further discussions with regard to sufficiency or otherwise 
of the common law are pounded by Bakibinga,184Ncube185, Neethling 186 and Roos.187 For 
example, Roos argues, that though there is rich development of the common law in South Africa 
with regard to privacy, the same is still insufficient. She therefore calls for adoption of a 
comprehensive data privacy law in the EU’s style. However, critics of Roos, particularly 
Burchell,188 argue that South African common law is adequate and goes far to invite Scotland to 
follow the South African approach with regard to protection of privacy through the tort of 
privacy.189 These conflicting arguments from commentators with regard to the ability of common 
law to protect privacy partly explain why African states in sub-Sahara do not adopt privacy 
legislation. However, a thorough examination of common law with regard to privacy protection 
needs to be undertaken.  
 
1.2.2 Research Questions 
 
An overview of the above strands of literature sketches the coverage and limitations of the 
existing literature about protection of an individual’s right to privacy in an African context. It is 
imperative to note that such strands are pivoted on generalised normative assumptions: cultural 
relativism, economic developmentalism, nature of the legal system, and to a very marginal extent 
lack of understanding of privacy issues. In bridging the gap left by the above strands, the present 
study addresses following set of questions:- 
 
a) Does a well-defined concept or value to privacy exist in sub-Saharan Africa? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Nigeria: Data Protection & Privacy Issues in NCC’s Directive on SIM Card Registration’, 2010, 
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=388277770826 last visited 11/10/2011. 
181 Nwanko, I.S., ‘Part I: Nigeria’s SIM Card Registration Regulations 2010: The Implications of unguarded Personal 
Data Collection’, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150095718055827 last visited 11/10/2011. 
182 Nwanko, I.S., ‘Part II: Nigeria’s SIM Card Registration Regulations 2010: The Implications of unguarded 
Personal Data Collection’, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150095718055827 
last visited 11/10/2011. 
183 See also, Akinsuyi, F.F., ‘Data Protection Legislation for Nigeria, The Time is Now!’, Nigerian Muse, 
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20071004075550zg/sections/general-articles/data-protection-legislation-for-
nigeria-the-time-is-now/ last visited 11/10/2011. 
184 Bakibinga, p. 9, note 38, supra. 
185
 Ncube, pp.3-4, 11-13, note 38, supra. 
186 Neethling, J et al., Neethling-Potgieter-Vesser Law of Delict, 6th Edition, LexisNexis, Durban, 2010; Neethling, J 
et al., Neethling’s Law of Personality, 2nd Edition, LexisNexis, Durban, 2005.  
187 Roos, p. 718, (LL.D Thesis), note 2, supra. 
188 Burchell, note 77, supra. 
189 Ibid, pp.25-26. 
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b) To what extent is privacy protected in sub-Saharan Africa? Do such means of protection 
reflect the pre-existing values of privacy in the sub-continent? 
 
c) Is the emerging regime of data privacy law in sub-Saharan Africa which most invariably is 
styled in European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, a mere compliance to meet the 
‘adequacy’ standard set by such law for non-European countries rather than a genuine 
attempt to ensure respect to individuals’ privacy in sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
1.2.3 Scope and Case Studies 
 
1.2.3.1 Scope 
 
Privacy problems are cross-jurisdictional. Concomitantly there are difficulties for a single country 
to address such problems in isolation from others. Yet, a collective approach to privacy 
problems has also been challenged. Raab posits, ‘the privacy of personal information has been 
under threat in recent years from many quarters. Information, like money and water, flows 
across jurisdictional boundaries; dangers and risks are imported and exported without, as yet, the 
consistent ability of regulators-singly or in concert-to counter them effectively.’190 Nevertheless, 
there is still merit in the collective approach hence drawing experience on other nations, how 
they have implemented privacy regulation, becomes imperative. In support of this view, Bygrave 
argues that as data-processing operations increasingly extend across national boundaries, the way 
in which they are to be regulated should not occur without consideration of the way in which 
they are regulated in a wide variety of countries, such consideration being one precondition for 
achieving harmonised regulation.191 Consistent with this view, Bennett posits, ‘as more and more 
countries passed these laws (i.e. data protection laws) they continue to draw lessons from 
pioneers about what worked, and what did not. Supervisory authorities learned from one 
another.’192 Africa has 54 states, including the recently independent state of the Republic of 
                                                          
190 Raab, C.D., ‘Information Privacy: Networks of Regulation at the Sub-global Level’, Global Policy, 2010, Vol.1, 
No.3, pp. 291-302, at p.291. Yet in an earlier article Bennett, C.J and Raab, C.D., ‘The Governance of Global Issues: 
Protecting Privacy in Personal Information’,  A Paper presented in the European Consortium for Political Research, 
March 28- April 2, 2003, p.6, http://courses.essex.ac.uk/lw/lw656/2007/RaabBennett.pdf last visited 11/10/2011 
appear to preach harmonisation of data privacy regulations through bilateral and multilateral mutual agreements. 
191 Bygrave, p.12, note 24, supra. 
192 Bennett, C.J., ‘International Privacy Standards: A Continuing Convergence’ 
 http://www.colinbennett.ca/Recent%20publications/PrivacyLawand%20BusinessJune2010.pdf, 
last visited 11/10/2011. 
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South Sudan.193 However, this research is limited to sub-Saharan Africa.194 The North African 
region (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) is excluded from the the present research.195 
The decision to include sub-Saharan Africa and excluding North Africa has been arrived based 
on the following considerations. First, despite the diversity of its people, socio-economic, and 
political dynamics, the sub-Saharan African countries have more shared common features than 
with its counterpart North African countries. Central to this is about culture. The Bantu culture is 
predominant in sub-Saharan Africa.196 In contrast, the North African region is predominated by 
strong Arab and Islamic culture. As a result, the influence of such culture in the affairs of the 
state is very significant. For example, Sharia law, which is restrictive of freedom of individuals’ 
affairs, is influential to the running of the affairs of the state and people’s lives in this region.197 
                                                          
193 South Sudan became an independent state from Sudan on 9th July, 2011. It became a member of the African 
Union on 28th July, 2011 and United Nations on 14th July, 2011, see, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan last 
visited 28/09/2011. 
194 Sub-Saharan Africa is a geographical term used to describe the area of the African continent which lies south of 
the Sahara or those African countries which are fully or partially located south of the Sahara, see, 
hhtp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sub-Sahara_Africa, last visited 1/10/2011. To be precise, sub-Saharan Africa include 
the following countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville),Congo DRC (Zaire),Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
195 North Africa or Northern Africa is the northernmost region of the African continent, linked by the Sahara to 
sub-Saharan Africa. Geopolitically, the United Nations definition of Northern Africa includes eight countries or 
territories: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Africa, last visited 1/10/2011. In contrast the African Development Group 
classifies six countries as comprising the North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, see, 
www.afdb.org/en/countries/north-Africa last visited 1/10/2011. Yet in further contrast, the North Africa has 
traditionally been defined as the region north of the Sahara comprising five countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco and Tunisia, see for example, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Mid-Year 
Report, North Africa Appeal No.MAA82001, 15 August, 2011, 
www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/annual11/MAA8200111myr.pdf, last visited 1/10/2011. A similar definition of the 
North African region can be found at Looklex Encyclopaedia, i-cias.com/e.o/north_africa.htm. It is this last 
definition of the North African region which is adopted in this study. 
196 For more about the Bantu cultures see, Van der Veen, L.J, et al., ‘Language, Culture and Genes in Bantu: a 
Multidisciplinary Approach of the Bantu-Speaking Populations of Africa’, OMLL-01_JA27:01-B07/01-S08/01-Vo1,  
http://www.ddl.ish-lyon.cnrs.fr/fulltext/Van%20Der%20Veen/Van%20der%20Veen_%E0%20para%EEtre.pdf, 
last visited 1/10/2011. 
197 Some Muslim scholars argue that Islam and specifically Sharia law is compatible with principles of human rights 
enshrined in various international and regional instruments as such they tend to regard the West as the resultant 
cause of misdirection: see for example discussions of 30/04/2010 between Emran Qureshi and Heba Raouf Ezzat 
on a topic ‘Are Sharia Laws and Human Rights Compatible?’ ISLAM 21, International Forum for Islamic 
Dialogue(IFID), http://www.ifidonline.com/m2/index.php/islam-21-monitor/cat_view/34-islam-21 last visited 
27/04/2011; see also Mohamed Talbi who argues, ‘From the Qur’anic perspective...human rights are rooted in 
human nature. And this is by virtue of God’s plan and creation. Now it goes without saying that the cornerstone of 
all human rights is religious liberty, for religion, which is ‘the explanation of the meaning of life and how to live 
accordingly’,  is the most fundamental and comprehensive of human institutions’; Talbi, M., ‘Religious Liberty as 
Divine Gift’, ISLAMI 21 Monitor, 2010, Issue 52-53, p.3, http://www.ifidonline.com/m2/index.php/islam-21-
monitor/cat_view/34-islam-21 last visited  27/04/2011. For a detailed discussion of the jurisprudence of individual 
freedom in Islam see, Ahmad, N., ‘A Study of Individual Freedom and Religious Liberalism in Islamic 
Jurisprudence’, the Journal Jurisprudence, 2009, pp.41-66,  
44 
 
Arguably privacy right is severely limited by such cultures. Thus, it has been considered that a 
more specific research study needs to be carried out in North Africa taking into account these 
extra Bantu cultural peculiarities. Second, although the initial proposal of this study was to 
research privacy across Africa including both regions, i.e. sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, 
the Arab spring which sweept the North African states in 2011 complicated the research 
environment.198 First and foremost, there were security concerns. In a state of turmoil in which 
citizens are pressing for regime change through demonstrations, wars, etc, it was considered that 
the sub-region was not safe for carrying out field research. Moreover, the relationship between a 
researcher and interviewees, which is apparently based on trust, becomes seriously affected in an 
unstable and unsecured political situation. As a result, gaining access to individuals, government 
institutions and office bearers for research clearance, interviews or collection of documents 
becomes extremely difficult. Narrating his experience in a similar situation as a PhD student at 
Humboldt-University in Berlin, Salmon199 states:- 
 
‘I landed at Khartoum airport on December 20th 2002 with few contacts and 
little beyond a house line up....One of these (few contacts), a pro-government 
Sudanese expat, used his connections to arrange passes and interviews that 
would have been difficult if not impossible to procure alone. These strategies 
slowly bore fruits, but only after almost one and a half months filled with dead 
end interviews, no-shows and trying to establish trust with highly sceptical 
interviewees.’ 
 
Salmon continues to observe, ‘having arrived in Northern Sudan I discovered that not only were 
the National Records Office, newspaper achieves and various libraries difficult to access, but also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.jurisprudence.com.au/juris5/nehaluddin.pdf  last visited 27/04/2011. However this position has been 
sharply criticised by other scholars mostly Western who view Islam and particularly Sharia law as in conflict with 
principles of human rights. See for example McCrea, R., ‘Limitations on Religion in Liberal Democratic Polity: 
Christianity and Islam in the Public Order of the European Union’, LSE Law, Society and Economy, Working 
papers 18/2007, London School of Economics and Political Science: Law Department,  
www.lse.ac.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and Social Science Research Network library, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1033332, last visited 27/04/2011. 
198 The Arab Spring (Arabic: يع رب ي ال عرب  also known as the Arabic Rebellions or the Arab Revolutions) is a ; ال
revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests occurring in the Arab world. Since 18 December 2010 there 
have been revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt; a civil war in Libya resulting in the fall of its regime; civil uprisings in 
Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen; major protests in Israel, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, and minor protests 
in Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Western Sahara. Clashes at the borders of Israel in May 
2011 have also been inspired by the regional Arab Spring; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring last visited 
29/09/2011. 
199  See, Salmon, J., ‘Field Research in Sensitive Areas’, Junior Research Group, ‘Micropolitics of Armed Groups’, 
Working Papers Micropolitics No. 1/2006, p.9. 
http://www.ipw.ovgu.de/inipw_media/schlichte/mikropolitik/MicropoliticsSalmon.pdf last visited 28/09/2011.  
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the Bank of Sudan’s economic report had been ‘tidied’, and the University of Khartoum(UoK) 
had been cordoned off after a series of anti-regime demonstrations.’200 These hurdles presented 
by the Sudanese case in this example alerted the researcher to reconsider the inclusion of North 
Africa in the present study. However, it must be clearly mentioned that in contrast to the present 
study Salmon’s thesis was typically a research project intended to be carried out in armed conflict 
regions.  Because of this, he invoked a special methodology usually employed in areas of armed 
conflicts. It is submitted that such methodology would still present difficulties in the present 
study. This is because most invariably research on privacy touches many things of one’s personal 
life. In a state of armed-conflicts, interviewees are highly suspicious about questions probing 
their personal lives. 
 
However, despite being excluded from the scope of this study, where necessary reference has 
been made to North Africa with regard to privacy and data protection systems. The intention for 
such reference was not to make a detailed examination of such systems in the sub-region but 
rather to make contrast and sometimes comparing generally such systems with trends of privacy 
legislation in sub-Saharan Africa. Another reason for making such reference is the fact that 
North Africa is still part of Africa. Because of that, any measure, that is likely to be taken by the 
African Union (AU) to protect privacy, is going to affect North Africa (except Morocco) as these 
countries are also members of AU. 
 
1.2.3.2 Case Studies 
 
In order to gain in-depth insights of privacy issues in sub-Saharan Africa, Mauritius, South Africa 
and Tanzania were purposively selected from the rest of the countries in the sub-region. In this 
selection, three clusters of countries were made. The criteria used to determine a country’ 
respective cluster was whether at the time of field research (June-September 2011) such a 
country had comprehensive data privacy legislation or a Bill on such law or had neither data 
privacy legislation nor a Bill. However, new enactments after this period but before finalisation 
of this study have been updated. To further clarify these criteria, countries which at one time 
adopted Bills on data privacy legislation and later abandoned them were classified in a cluster 
without data privacy legislation or Bills on such law unless such Bills were later re-introduced. 
This is because, first, a withdrawn Bill loses the force of being considered a Bill in the strict sense 
of the term. Moreover, where a Bill was yet to be introduced to parliament but subsequently 
                                                          
200 Ibid, p. 12. 
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abandoned because of strong criticisms from stakeholders and general public opinion or the 
abandonment was made by government suo moto, such situation was similarly grouped in a cluster 
of countries without data privacy legislation or draft Bills. At the same time, countries with 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) were put in the cluster of countries without data privacy 
legislation or draft Bills. This is because, although most invariably FOIA contains special 
provisions regulating personal data, it falls short of data protection principles.201 Moreover, data 
protection principles in FOIA have limited application. First, they apply only the moment a 
request for access of information is initiated; second, in most cases the legislation is only binding 
on the public sector. There are exceptions with regard to the second limitation. The direct case at 
point is South African Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA).202 This Act applies to 
(a) a record of a public body; and (b) a record of a private body, regardless of when the record 
came into existence.203 204 It is argued that PAIA is an unusual character of FOIA across the 
world whose normal application is limited to the public sector.205 It is worth noting that the 
emerging freedom of information law in Africa is influenced by PAIA by extending its scope to 
private sector.206 However, notwithstanding the broader scope of PAIA in bringing the private 
                                                          
201 See for example, ‘Data Protection and Freedom of Information in the Public Sector’, Notice No. 23 of 31 
December, 2006 prepared jointly by the Irish FOI Central Policy Unit of the Department of Finance in consultation 
with the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner and the Office of Information Commission, issued by the 
Irish Office of Information Commission, http://foi.gov.ie/Data-Protection-and-Freedom-of-Information-in-the-
Public-Sector, last visited 1/10/2011. This Notice attempts to interpret S. 1(5) of the Irish Data Protection Act, 
1988 and S.7 (7) of the Freedom of Information Act, 1997 with regard to an individual’s right of access to 
information held by the public sector; see also generally Turle, M., ‘Freedom of Information and Data Protection-A 
Conflict or Reconciliation’, Computer Law and Security Report, 2007, Vol. 23, pp.514-522; see also, UK House of 
Commons, ‘The Freedom of Information Bill: Data Protection Issues, Bill 5 of 1999-2000’, Research Paper 99/99 of 3 
December 1999, pp.11-16, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-099.pdf, last 
visited 1/10/2011; Banisar, D., ‘The Right to Information and Privacy: Balancing Rights and Managing Conflicts’, 
Working Paper, The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2011. In the 
context of the South African legislation on freedom of information in relation to data protection, see, Currie, I and 
Klaaren, J., Commentary on the Promotion of Access to Information Act, Siber Ink, South Africa, 2002, p.18, para, 
2.5; Roos, A., ‘Data Protection’ in Dana, M., et al, Information and Communications Technology Law, LexisNexis, 
Durban, 2008,pp.313-397, at p.360. 
202 Act No. 2 of 2000. 
203 Ibid, S. 3(a) & (b). 
204 Presently only seven countries in Africa have implemented Freedom of Information Act. Included in this list are 
South Africa(2000), Zimbabwe(2002), Angola(2002), Uganda(2005), Ethiopia(2008), Liberia(2010), and 
Nigeria(2011).  Counties with pending Bills on FOIA include Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda, Malawi, 
Botswana, Madagascar and Sudan. Zambia had at one time introduced the Bill on FOIA in parliament but withdrew 
it in 2002. Tanzania had taken sometime to discuss the Bill among stakeholders but the same is yet to be introduced 
in parliament. 
205 See, EPIC and Privacy International, Privacy and Human Rights(2005), p.632 cited in Roos, A., ‘Data Protection’ 
in Dana, M., et al, Information and Communications Technology Law, LexisNexis, Durban, 2008, pp.358-359. 
206 See for example, the Liberian Freedom of Information Act, 2010, SS. 1.4(a) & (d) which extends its application 
to both the public and private sector. However in slight contrast with PAIA which applies to the private sector 
generally, the Liberian law applies to the private sector with some limitations: where private entities receive public 
resources and benefits, engage in public functions, and or provide public services, particularly in respect of 
information relating to the public resources, benefits, functions or services. S. 2 of the Mozambican Access to 
Official Sources of Information Bill 2005 extends the scope of application of such proposed law to the private 
sector whenever private entities hold informative material of public interest; see also, S.25 (2) of the Kenyan 
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sector under its ambit, which in absolute terms makes it at equal level with most data protection 
legislation, the scope of the principles in PAIA are restrictive.207  Zimbabwe is among the earliest 
African states to enact FOIA. In contrast to PAIA, the Zimbabwean Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)208regulates only the public sector. 
 
From the above backdrop, cluster one comprises countries with comprehensive data privacy 
legislation: Cape Verde, Seychelles, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Tunisia, Senegal, Morocco, Benin, 
Angola, and Gabon. Ghana was not included in the list simply because at the time of field 
research she had no comprehensive data privacy legislation. She only adopted the Act after the 
field research. It is imperative to note that Tunisia and Morocco belong to the North African 
sub-region while the rest in this cluster belong to sub-Saharan Africa. Cluster two comprises 
countries with Bills or drafts on data privacy protection. In this cluster there is Ghana (which has 
passed its Bill into Act in February 2012), Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire), Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria and South Africa. Cluster three comprises countries with neither data privacy 
legislation nor Bills. These include Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville),Congo DRC (Zaire), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi,  Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It is important to note that in 2005/2006 
Tanzania prepared a draft on freedom of information with a chapter on data protection. This 
draft was later abandoned from circulation and discussion before it was introduced to the 
parliament. Ghana presents a similar case to Tanzania. On 29 November 2010 the Ghanaian 
government introduced the Data Protection Bill to the parliament. However this Bill was 
subsequently withdrawn in July 2011. It was re-introduced to the parliament in October 2011. 
On 10 February 2012 it was passed into law. 
 
To narrow down these clusters, Mauritius was selected from cluster one; South Africa from cluster 
two and Tanzania from cluster three. As pointed out, these country cases were purposively selected. 
A number of considerations were taken into account for these selections. To start with, the 
choice of Mauritius from cluster one was informed by the fact that the country’s data protection 
law and practices are more transparent and accessible. Nearly all the information about Mauritian 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Freedom of Information Bill, 2007 which subjects the private sector holding or controlling information that is 
necessary for the enforcement or protection of any right to the application of the proposed law. 
207 Roos, p. 360, note 201, supra. 
208 Chapter 10:27 of the Laws of Zimbabwe came into operation on 15th March, 2002 through G.N No.116 of 2002. 
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Data Protection Act 2004 and its enforcement is available at the Data Protection Office’s 
website.209 In contrast, the accessibility of similar information in the rest of the countries in cluster 
one is hardly lacking. For example, the only useful and accessible information to the researcher 
from Cape Verde was the data privacy legislation210 and a more recently published article on the 
Cape Verdean data privacy system.211 As to the rest of the countries, the primary information 
available and accessible to the researcher in Seychelles, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Benin, Angola and 
Gabon was only the data protection legislation in the respective countries.212 213 The accessibility 
to such information was also hampered by language constraints notably French for Burkina 
Faso, Senegal, Benin and Gabon and Portuguese for Cape Verde and Angola.214  This is with the 
exception of Seychelles which is an English speaking country. Since the researcher is conversant 
in English language, Mauritius whose one of the official language is English provided a more 
convenient research environment. Also, compared to the rest of countries in the cluster, 
Mauritius has relatively sufficient level of data protection practices. For example, although Cape 
Verde appears as the leading African country to enact data privacy legislation, it has not yet 
established the data protection authority.215 Seychelles’ Data Protect Act status was contradictory. 
For instance, the Seychelles Legal Information Institute (SEYLII), whose mission is to provide 
online free public access to legal information from Seychelles, placed on its website only the 
                                                          
209
 See, Data Protection Act 2004 for Mauritius via http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncbnew/files/DPA.pdf last 
visited 11/10/2011. 
210 Lei nº 133/V/2001, de 22 de Janeiro Regime Jurídico Geral de Protecção de Dados Pessoais a Pessoas Singulares 
2001[Law No. 133/V/2001, of 22 January 2001 on protection of personal data of individuals], 
http://portoncv.gov.cv/dhub/porton.por_global.open_file?p_doc_id=407, last visited 29/10/2011. 
211 Traca and Embry, note 38, supra. This article, written in English language, provides a broader overview of the 
entire Cape Verdean legal system of data privacy protection. 
212 Seychelles, Data Protection Act No.9 of 2003, http://dev.seylii.org/sc/legislation/act/2003/9 last visited 
11/10/2011; Burkina Faso, Loi n° 010-2004/AN Portant Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel 2004 
[Act 10-2004/AN on Protection of Personal Data],  www.cil.bf/legislations/loi_cil_burkina_faso.pdf  
last visited 29/10/2011; Senegal, Loi n° 2008-12 sur la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel 2008 [Law 
No. 2008-12 on the Protection of Personal Data], 
http://right2info.org/resources/publications/loi_sur_les_donnees_a_caractere_personnel.pdf 
last visited 29/10/2011; Benin, Loi n° 2009-09 du Mai 2009 Portant Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel 
2009[Law No. 2009-09 on the Protection of Personal Data in the Republic of Benin], 
http://ddata.over-blog.com/1/35/48/78/Benin-2/Loi-2009-protection-donnees-a-caractere-personnel.pdf 
last visited 29/10/2011;  Angola, Lei nº 22/11 Da Protecçao  de Dados Pessoais 2011 [Law 22/11 on Personal Data 
Protection]. Recently Traca and Embry, note 38, supra, have published an article in English about Angolan data 
protection legislation; Gabon, Loi n°001/2011 Relative à la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel 2011[Act 
No. 001/2011 on the Protection of Personal Data]. 
213 This was also the case with respect to availability and accessibility of information from Tunisia and Morocco. The 
former’s data privacy legislation is (Tunisia) Loi n° 2004-63 Portant sur la Protection des Données à Caractère 
Personnel 2004 [Organic Act n°2004-63 on Protection of Personal Data], http://www.inpdp.nat.tn/version-
anglaise/texte.html  while the latter’s similar piece of legislation is (Morocco) Loi n° 09-08 Relative à la Protection 
des Personnes Physiques à l'égard du Traitement des Données à Caractère Personnel 2009[Law No. 09-08 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to processing of personal data]. 
214 Note also that the language barrier was considered in excluding Tunisia and Morocco and North Africa generally 
whose languages are both French and Arab. 
215 Traca and Embry, p.249, note 38, supra. 
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name of the Data Protection Act with a ‘Not in Force’ status.216 In contrast the editorial notice 
on SEYLII’s website under which the Data Protection Act was listed reads, ‘Seychelles Acts in 
Force as at 20 June, 2011’.217 However against it there was an NIF defined as Not in Force. The 
researcher proceeded to the field research with this status in mind. However after the field 
research was over, he requested SEYLII to be supplied with an electronic document of the Act, 
by using the ‘contact us’ function on the website. The link to the Act was promptly supplied on 3 
October 2011.218 This was exactly the date when the Act was uploaded on the website under 
‘recent posts’219 with an ‘in force yes’ status.220 221 To ascertain the date when the Act came into 
force, the researcher sent a follow up email to SEYLII which was never replied. As it can be 
noted from this account, at the time of the field research, it was clear to the researcher that 
Seychelles’ Data Protection Act was inoperational. The data protection authorities in Burkina 
Faso, Senegal and Benin were recently established hence the law was insufficiently put into 
practice as compared to Mauritius.222 As for Angola and Gabon, the data protection authorities 
are yet to be established.223 As pointed out, Ghana was not at all considered bedacsue she had no 
data protection legislation at the time of field research. There were also considerations of local 
research contacts established prior to the commencement of the field research. The contacts for 
Mauritius were obtained easily from the Data Protection Office’s website. It is interesting to note 
that request to undertake field research in Mauritius made to the Mauritian Data Protection 
                                                          
216 SEYLII, http://dev.seylii.org/sc/table/legislation/seychelles-acts-force-20-june-2011 last visited 11/10/2011. 
217 Ibid. 
218Email communication from Thelma Casquette sent via telly74@gmail.com to alex.makulilo@gmail.com providing 
the link to the requested information to http://www.seylii.org/sc/legislation/act/2003/9. 
219 See the link to the updates at SEYLII, http://dev.seylii.org/sc/legislation/act/2003/9 last visited 11/10/2011. 
220 It is noteworthy that on 11/10/2011 when the researcher last visited the SEYLII’s website the post relating to 
the Data Protection Act 2003 was only seven (7) days and twenty one hours old; see http://dev.seylii.org/tracker.  
221 It is important to bear in mind that under the ‘Terms of Use’ on its website, SEYLII brings to the general public 
a disclaimer notice on the inaccuracy, incomprehensiveness or lack of up-to-date information on the Acts posted. 
The researcher paid attention to this disclaimer in following up the status of data privacy legislation in Seychelles. 
222 For example, for Burkina Faso la Commission de l'informatique et des libertés (CIL) was established on 18 May 
2007 vide Décret n° 2007-283/PRES/PM/MPDH du 18 mai 2007 portant organisation et fonctionnement de la 
Commission de l'informatique et des libertés  [Decree No. 2007-283/PRES/PM/MPDH of May 18, 2007 on the 
organization and functioning of the Commission on Informatics and Liberties] http://www.cil.bf/, see also, 
http://www.cai.gouv.qc.ca/CCPDF/doc/bf.pdf  last visited 29/10/2011. It must be pointed out that although the 
Office of Mauritian Data Protection Commission was proclaimed on 27/12/2004, the first Commissioner, was 
appointed on 10/10/2008, see http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/mcsa/files/president.pdf last visited 29/10/2011; 
for Senegal, the Data Protection Commission was established on 29/06/2011 vide Decree No. 2011-0929 
appointing the members of the Commission for the protection of personal data i.e Décret n° 2011-0929 du 29 juin 
2011 portant nomination des membres de la Commission de protection des données à caractère personnel, 
http://www.demarches.gouv.sn/textes/decret_creation_cdp-2.pdf last visited 29/10/2011;  surprisingly the date for 
establishment of the Senegalese Data Protection Commission is erroneously referred to as 20/04/2009 by 
Association Francophone Des Autorités De Protection Des Donnees Personnelles. This is the association for data 
protection authorities in Francophone, suggesting that it would be more informed on this development within its 
members, see, democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Telechargez_ce_document-4.pdf last visited 29/10/2011; 
for Benin the Office of Data Protection Commission was established on 11 March 2010 see http://www.journal-
adjinakou-benin.info/?id=4&cat=6&id2=1475&jour=12&mois=3&an=2010 last visited 30/10/2011.   
223 Note that the Angolan Data Protection Law 22/11 was enacted when the researcher was in the field research, i.e. 
17/06/2011. Thus in any case it would have been less fruitful to choose Angola as a case study under cluster one. 
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Commissioner (Mrs. Drudeisha Madhub) on 26 January 2011 was responded positively and 
quickly on the same day. Moreover in contrast to the rest of countries in cluster one, Mauritius has 
gone far to formally seek EU’s ‘adequacy’ accreditation. Although other countries have applied 
for the EU ‘adequacy’ rating or about to do so in future, Mauritius is far in the accreditation 
process. These considerations made Mauritius to be selected a case country study from cluster one. 
 
South Africa was selected from cluster two. Closely to Mauritius, the South African legislative 
process of the Protection of Personal Information Bill (B9-2009) which is still pending is open. 
All preparatory works for this Bill are accessible online from the South African Law Reform 
Commission’s website (//www.justice.gov.za/salrc/).  This made the researcher able to track the 
legislative process of the South African data privacy Bill since 2006, long before the formal 
commencement of this study. There was also a consideration of established local research 
contacts, in this case Professor Iain Currie and Professor Anneliese Roos, since 2006 and 2008 
respectively. As we shall see, these were instrumental during field research in South Africa. 
Moreover, South Africa is a multi-cultural society. It was considered that this peculiar feature of 
South Africa should be studied to discover how such multi-culturalism operated in favour or 
against the adoption and operation of a data privacy law. Connected to this but in contrast to the 
other countries in cluster two, the legislative process of a data privacy law in South Africa has taken 
more than a decade with serious discussions and considerations. This legislative process needed 
to be examined in order to understand competing interests in the process. It is important to 
underline that in the event the South African Protection of Personal Information Bill (B9-2009) 
is passed into law before the finalisation of this study, the analyses for this country case will be 
principally limited up to the stage such Bill is passed into law but before it is put into operation. 
There are two important reasons for this delimitation: first, the issues that this thesis investigates 
will largely remain unaffected by voting such Bill into law, second, it will require sometime 
before the actual operation and practice of the law can be studied. 
 
Tanzania was selected from cluster three. Three main considerations were taken into account for 
its inclusion as one of the country cases. First, it is imperative to note that Tanzania is one of the 
sub-Sahara African countries that practiced Ujamaa for a long time. Since Ujamaa is an ideology 
that is indispensable for collectivism it was considered that its development and likely impact on 
privacy issues be closely investigated. Second, considered for selection of Tanzania was the fact 
that the researcher had already undertaken two studies that culminated to the publication of two 
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journal articles: one relating to employees’ healthy privacy224 and the other privacy of individuals 
in the communication sector.225 These prior studies had made the researcher more familiar with 
the country’s legal system regarding privacy issues as well as the actual privacy practices. 
Commentators like Lipset argue, ‘“a person who only knows one country knows no countries” 
because it is only by looking across different societies that one can understand what is either 
typical or unique about one’s own.’226 Aware of this pitfall, comparing Tanzania with other 
jurisdictions became imperative. Third, Tanzania is the researcher’s homeland. Standing on this 
advantage, the selection of Tanzania minimised to a great extent field research costs that would 
have been incurred by the researcher had he chosen a foreign country. 
 
However excluded from considerations for choosing the scope and selection of case studies of 
this thesis were two factors. First, this research study was principally funded by the DAAD. It is 
DAAD’s sponsorship policy that funds to Africa are only granted to researchers from countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the policy does not restrict or control the nature and scope 
of research projects undertaken by researchers. Concomitantly, the limitation of this study to 
sub-Saharan African is by no means a reflection of the DAAD’s policy. Second, the choice of the 
geographical limit and ultimately the case studies did not take into account the classifications of 
African countries into their respective legal systems i.e. civil and common law. This is because, 
while legal systems have different traditions in many respects, in terms of privacy issues, they are 
similar. It is important to mention that despite the specific limitation of this study to the above 
case studies, reference in this work has been frequently made to the rest of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa as this is the overall geographical scope of this research study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
224 Makulilo, A.B., ‘You must take medical test: Do Employers intrude into Prospective Employees’ Privacy?’  
Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD), 8/2010, pp.571-575. 
225 Makulilo, A.B., ‘Registration of SIM Cards in Tanzania: A Critical Evaluation of the Electronic and Postal 
Communications Act, 2010’, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review (CTLR), 2011, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp.48-
54. 
226 See Francis Fukuyama’s remarks on Symour Martin Lipset(1922-2006), Journal of Democracy, 2007, Vol. 18, No. 
2, pp.185-188, at p. 188;  also referred in Makulilo, A.B., ‘State-Party and Democracy: Tanzania and Zambia in 
Comparative Perspective’, PhD Thesis, University of Leipzig , 2010, p. 178. See also, Lipset, S.M., ‘Pacific Divide: 
American Exceptionalism-Japanese Uniqueness’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 1993, Vol.5, No. 
2, pp.121-166, at p.121. 
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1.2.4 Methods  
 
Methods are the tools-the instruments, techniques and procedures - by which a science gathers 
and analyzes information.227 Like tools in other domains, different methods can do different 
things.228 Each method should be regarded as offering potential opportunities not available by 
other means, but also as having inherent limitations.229 Because of the inherent pitfalls in these 
methods, this study employed a qualitative hybrid research approach. By hybrid it simply means 
a combined or mixed research approach: doctrinal and non-doctrinal. To be precise, the 
methodologies simultaneously involved in this study are doctrinal, empirical and international 
comparative law. The last two categories fall under non-doctrinal. 
 
1.2.4.1 Doctrinal Research 
 
This is traditionally the sole methodology of legal research. It primarily focuses on what the law 
is, i.e. de lege lata as opposed to what the law ought to be, i.e. de lege ferenda.  Under doctrinal 
methodology a researcher’s main goal is to locate, collect the law (legislation or case law) and 
apply it to a specific set of material facts in view of resolving a legal problem. This is because the 
major assumption of doctrinal research is that the character of legal scholarship is derived from 
law itself.230 With this limitation, it is imperative to note that beyond an existing legal rule, 
doctrinal methodology is incapable of being used for legal analysis. To recapitulate, the main 
agenda of the present research is law reform. The research questions stated in 1.2.2 of this study 
have been formulated towards that broad agenda. In this context therefore, doctrinal research 
has limited application to the present study. The method is only applicable where interpretation 
of existing laws or at least a Bill is required. To be sure, the second research question identified 
in 1.2.2 requires to be approached by doctrinal research methodology. Similarly doctrinal 
research is used in evaluating statutory and case law in specific national jurisdictions referred in 
this study. 
 
 
 
                                                          
227 Mcgrath, J.E., ‘Methodology Matters: Doing Research in the Behavioural and Social Sciences’, in R. M. Baecker et 
al., (eds), Readings in Human-Computer Interaction: Toward the Year 2000, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1995, p. 
154.  
228 Ibid.  
229 Ibid. 
230 Chui, W.H and McConville, M (eds)., Research Methods for Law, Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p.4 
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1.2.4.2 Empirical Legal Research 
 
Owing to limitations of the doctrinal exposition described in 1.2.4.1 and in order to overcome 
them, the present research engaged empirical legal research (sometimes known loosely as non-
doctrinal or socio-legal or interdisciplinary research) as a supplement.231 This mixed approach is 
tandem to what academic lawyers such as Baldwin and Davis argue, ‘it is important to note that 
empirical legal scholarship is complementary to doctrinal research and both methodologies can 
be used simultaneously to examine legal issues.232 233As to what makes research empirical, Epstein 
and King state:- 
 
 ‘...is that it is based on observations of the world, in other words, data, which 
is just a term for facts about the world. These facts may be historical or 
contemporary, or based on legislation or case law, the results of interviews or 
surveys, or the outcomes of secondary archival research or primary data 
collection. Data can be precise or vague, relatively certain or uncertain, directly 
observed or indirect proxies, and they can be anthropological, interpretive, 
sociological, economic, legal, political, biological, physical, or natural. As long 
as the facts have something to do with the world, they are data, and as long as 
research involves data that is observed or desired, it is empirical.’234 
 
Since non-doctrinal legal research uses empirical data, it provides vital insights into the law in 
context, i.e. how the law works in the real world.235 In other words, non-doctrinal research deals 
                                                          
231 In considering further limitations of doctrinal research, Siems poses a question, ‘Why do we need other 
disciplines in order to answer these specific or general questions? Why is it not enough to do traditional legal 
research, in particular doctrinal research?’ He then answers himself, ‘The main reason is that traditional methods are 
often regarded as useful but too narrow. For instance, doctrinarism has been accused of being “rigid, dogmatic, 
formalistic and close-minded; of encouraging “intellectual tunnel-vision” through an unhealthy preoccupation with 
technicalities; of placing “an intellectual strait-jacket” and of impoverish[ing] the questioning spirit of both law 
student and teacher’, See, Siems, M.M., ‘The Taxonomy of Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Finding the Way out of 
the Desert’, Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal Education, 2009, Vol.7, No.1, pp.5-17, at p. 6. 
232 Baldwin, J and Davis, G., ‘Empirical Research in Law’ in P.Cane and M. Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Legal Studies, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.881 cited in Chui, W.H and McConville, M (eds)., Research 
Methods for Law, Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p.6. 
233 For more discussion about advantages and disadvantages of using empirical methodologies in legal research see, 
Burns, K and Hutchinson, T., The Impact of “Empirical Facts” on Legal Scholarship and Legal Research Training’, 
the Law Teacher, 2009, Vol.43, No.2, pp.166-168. 
234 Epstein, L and King, G., ‘Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules of Inference’ 
University of Chicago Law Review, 2002, Vol.69, No.1, pp.1-133, at pp.2-3 cited in Dobinson, I and Johns, F., 
‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in W.H Chui and M. McConville (eds)., Research Methods for Law, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010, p.18. 
235 See e.g., Razak, A.A., ‘Understanding Legal Research’, p.21, Department of Management and Marketing Faculty 
of Economics and Management, University Putra Malaysia,   
http://econ.upm.edu.my/researchbulletin/artikel/Vol%204%20March%202009/19-24%20Adilah.pdf, 
54 
 
with the externalities affecting the operation of law. As a result, empirical legal research is 
valuable in revealing and explaining the practices and procedures of legal, regulatory, redress and 
dispute resolution systems and the impact of legal phenomena on a range of social institutions, 
business and citizens.236 As noted, this research has a law reformist agenda. Because of this, it 
was imperative that empirical research be invoked. 
 
Sources of data for this research were mainly documents and interviews. Documents constituted 
the largest source while interviews were supplementary. Concomitantly, the collection, review 
and analysis of documents such as legislation, Bills, case law, decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, 
policies, hansards, reports, treaties and conventions, travaux préparatoires, journal articles, 
commentaries, reference books, newspapers, and magazines was central to the methodology of 
this study. However due to limitations affecting the currency, accessibility as well as reliability of 
some documents, a decision was made to engage unrepresentative, non-random sampling 
interviews to a limited scale. It must be underlined that while interviews were not the main 
source of data to the present thesis they were important and useful in supplementing the 
documentary source.  
 
In order to gain access to documentary source, libraries, bookstores and Internet sources were 
highly used. The researcher’s membership to the State and University Library Bremen (Staats- und 
Universitätsbibliothek Bremen) was vital to access data for this study. Moreover, being a member of 
freelance researchers’ team to the Law, Science Technology & Society Studies (LSTS) at the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel since 2009, the researcher has had access to this University library and more 
importantly its online resources. The researcher had also access to the University of Derby’s 
Digital Library. This library by far provided links to numerous databases such as Westlaw, Lexis 
Library (formerly known as LexisNexis), HeinOnline, Wiley Online Library, Taylor and Francis, 
SpringerLink journal collection, and SciVerse ScienceDirect. The researcher also accessed freely 
the African Journals Online, AJOL, (http://www.ajol.info/).237 The main goal of AJOL is to 
promote access to African research. This database helped a great deal in conducting literature 
review on privacy issues in African context. In South Africa, the researcher purchased temporary 
membership to the University of South Africa’s (UNISA) Library from 28 June 2011 to 29 June 
2011. He was similarly able to access freely online materials from UNISA Institutional 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
last visited 25/09/2011. 
236 Ibid. 
237 The African Journals Online (AJOL) is the world’s largest and pre-eminent of peer-reviewed, African-published 
scholarly journals. AJOL is a Non-Profit Organisation based in South Africa, see, http://www.ajol.info/). Most 
articles in AJOL are freely accessible and downloadable in pdf. format. 
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Repository via uir.unisa.ac.za. Apart from access to UNISA Library, the researcher purchased 
books and journal articles covering privacy and human rights issues from the University of 
Pretoria Bookstore. Important texts purchased there include Neethling’s Law of Personality, 
Second Edition; Neethling-Potgieter-Visser Law of Delict, Sixth Edition; Information and 
Communications Technology Law (Dana van der Merwe, et al); The Law of Delict in South 
Africa (Max Loubser and Rob Midgley (eds)) and the Rise and Fall of Apartheid (David Welsh). 
It deserves mention that the researcher received free of charge the Commentary on Promotion 
of Access to Information Act from one of its co-authors, Professor Iain Currie when he visited 
him for interview at the University of Witwatersrand (WITS). He equally received journal articles 
from Professor Anneliese Roos at UNISA. Moreover, in South Africa, the researcher gained free 
access to the South African Law Reform Commission’s website (//www.justice.gov.za/salrc/) 
where he was able to retrieve the Issue Paper, Discussion Paper and Report on Privacy and Data 
Protection in South Africa. These documents were the basis of preparation of the Protection of 
Personal Information Bill (B9-2009). To keep abreast with the discussions and deliberations on 
this Bill, the researcher requested and was granted free subscription to the South African 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s (PMG) website (http://www.pmg.org.za/). PGM has been 
monitoring South African Parliamentary Committees since 1996 to date. With such access, the 
researcher was able to follow closely all the proceedings and deliberations of the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development with regard to the Protection 
of Personal Information Bill after it was introduced in the South African Parliament on 25 
August 2009.  
 
The researcher obtained most information in Mauritius from the Data Protection Office at its 
current office located on the 4th Floor, Emmanuel Anquetil Building, along Corner Sir Virgil 
Naz & Sir William Newton Streets, in Port Louis. Many resources were also accessed from the 
Data Protection Office’s website. Such resources are freely accessible to anybody; anywhere, 
provided one has Internet connection. They include for example, the Data Protection Act, 2004, 
its amendments and all regulations made under it. Other important documents are industry 
codes of good practices, comprehensive list of data controllers, decisions of the Data Protection 
Commissioner over complaints lodged in her office, various forms to be used in lodging 
complaints, registering data controllers, etc as well as numerous presentations made by the Data 
Protection Commissioner to various public and private sector organisations over the operation 
of the Act. While in Mauritius, the researcher also gained access to the Supreme Court of 
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Mauritius Library with the aid of his research clearance. He was also given a free subscription to 
the Court’s online library. With such access, various legal materials were retrieved.  
 
Similarly, the researcher gained access to various documents from the Tanzania Communication 
Regulatory Authority (TCRA). He also accessed freely TCRA’s website (http://www.tcra.go.tz/) 
and retrieved legislation, regulations, reports, notices to the general public, etc. Apart from that, 
the researcher gained access to the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania’s website 
(http://www.lrct.go.tz/). With its limitation of materials to the present thesis, the researcher was 
able to retrieve only a Position Paper on Electronic Commerce law which very remotely 
addresses privacy issues. Other resource materials were limitedly obtained from the Library of 
the High Court of Tanzania, Commercial Division. The researcher also accessed a report for 
conciliation cases (1997-2007) from the Media Council of Tanzania. Some of these cases are 
relevant to privacy issues.  
 
Search engines were also instrumental to the data collection in the nature of documents. The 
most common tools for search of resources were the Google (http://www.google.com/) and 
Yahoo (http://www.yahoo.com/). Similarly, the researcher made significant use of Lexadin 
World Law Guide database to look for data privacy legislation and other laws regulating privacy 
across Africa. Europa databases238 played a useful role in obtaining official documents, legislation 
and treaties, ECJ decisions, policy papers, working papers, communications, etc for European 
Union (EU) institutions. Equally important were the Asia Pacific Economic-Cooperation 
(APEC) databases (http://www.apeccp.org.tw/) which provided access to similar documents as 
Europa databases. The researcher put much interest on the APEC Privacy Framework. It is 
important to note that the list of sources of documents provided here (accessed electronically or 
in print) is not comprehensive. It only serves as the main sources.  
 
The electronic sources of documents relied in this study have limitations. The first limitation is 
the determination of authority and authorship. With exception of official websites, materials 
accessed from either personal sites or blogs presented a great deal of difficulties in identifying the 
authority as well as authorship. In order to deal with such problems, the researcher scrutinised 
the sites as well as the materials using criteria set out in figure 1 of this thesis. In event the site or 
materials accessed from there failed to pass such criteria they were either discarded or read for 
                                                          
238 See the link at http://europa.eu/documentation/order-publications/databases-alphabetical/index_en.htm. 
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information only. However such materials could not be relied as authoritative sources worth of 
being cited in the study. 
 
The second limitation relates to the currency of information. It is important to note that not all 
old information is bad. Sometimes we need old information in order to trace the development of 
law or a particular phenomenon. Despite that, it is difficult sometimes to find the date of 
publication of information on materials posted on the Internet. This makes it even harder to tell 
the oldness or newness of the information. To deal with this problem, efforts were made to look 
for the date of publication of information and when that was last revised. When this was lacking, 
then a comparison of the source with other information already at hand was made to determine 
the currency of the information.239 Commentators suggest that in order to deal with the problem 
of currency, the date when the website carrying the information was last revised should be 
looked at.240 It is arguable that sometimes the date of the last revision of the website does not 
correspond with the information it contains. For example, although the Lexadin World Law 
Guide bears the 1 January 2011 as the last update for legislation in Seychelles, the website does 
not list Data Protection Act 2003241 242 as one of the country’s legislation. Faced with a situation 
like this, the researcher made alternative use of search engines especially Google.com to get 
some clues about the information searched. Again, in order to indicate the limitation of 
information the researcher always recorded the date on which he reviewed information from an 
Internet source.243 This was important to include when citing to the Internet resources because 
of their transitory nature.244 
 
There is also the problem of objectivity of the sources. This, of course, depends on the nature of 
topics and the main agenda of the sponsors of websites. For example, issues of politics, culture 
or religion attract a lot of biasness because of diversities of ideas, opinion, etc. Sometimes it may 
only be the sponsor of a website’s goals to perpetuate his or her agendas. With this in mind, and 
especially privacy issues concern as well people’s cultures, materials accessed were objectively 
evaluated using criteria set in figure 1.  
                                                          
239 Karanja, S.K., ‘Schengen Information System and Border Control Co-Operation: A Transparency and 
Proportionality Evaluation’, PhD Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, 2006, p.18. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Act No. 9 of 2003, the Seychelles comprehensive legislation regulating use of automatically processed 
information relating to individuals and provision of services in respect of such information. 
242See, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/country_profiles.nationalLaw?p_lang=en&p_country=SYC, 
last visited 27/09/2011. 
243 Watson, C. A., ‘Internet Research Methodology’, 2004 Presentations, Paper 8, p.7, 
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/speeches/8; See also http://works.bepress.com/carol_watson/4, 
last visited 26/09/2011. 
244 Ibid. 
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Apart from the above limitations, it is also important to note that some electronic materials are 
copyrighted and require a subscription. The subscription usually requires one to pay for user 
licence or subscribe in a manner that requires payment of licensing fee.  Faced with this situation, 
the researcher had first to consider the relevancy of the material to his study. This was done 
through reading the abstracts, preface of the materials or summary part of the source. Second, 
the material was checked from all the libraries and electronic sources the researcher had access 
to. If this was not found, then the researcher borrowed the materials through interchange library 
arrangements of those libraries he had membership. In extreme cases, the researcher had either 
to buy the material from bookstores or purchase the user licence to access the material online.  
 
However, despite its limitations, the Internet provided an important source of the materials used 
in this thesis. To ensure that such information was accurate, authentic, authoritative, objective, 
relevant and current, criteria set out in figure 1 were used to evaluate such information. 
Nonetheless, materials in print format accessed offline (non-electronic libraries and bookstores) 
were equally important in providing useful information required in the analyses of this study.  
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Figure 1: Assessment Criteria for the Quality of Internet Sources 
Criteria Description 
 
Authority 
o Credentials of the author or website 
o Author’s educational background 
o Past writing and experience in the field 
o Author’s institutional affiliation 
o Author’s contacts 
o Author’s signature on the work 
 
 
Authenticity 
 
o Look under links with titles like “More about us”, or “About this 
site. 
o Go to the home page of the site sponsor if the documentation is 
not evident on the page you enter the site.  
o If you cannot determine the author or publisher of a site, examine 
the structure of the web address. Many web addresses are readily 
identifiable by their extensions. For example: gov = government, 
edu = educational institution, org = nonprofit organization, com = 
commercial organization. Similarly a web address with a tilde (~) is 
primary evidence that the web page is an unofficial, unauthorized or 
personal page. 
 
 
Accuracy 
o Do you recognize the name of the publisher or author? If not, does 
the publisher provide verifiable evidence of its competency? 
o Are there citations to other published works, a corporate profile, 
and information about editorial standards? 
o If you have never heard of the author, does she supply an 
autobiography or curriculum vita containing verifiable evidence of 
her authority on the subject? 
o Examine the names of individuals or groups responsible for 
information supplied by the site. A credits and conditions statement 
might offer this information. 
 
Currency 
o Date of publication 
o Date of revision 
o What has been revised? 
 
 
Relevancy 
o Is there a bibliography? 
o Does it provide new/add to/substantiate information at hand? 
o Is the material primary or secondary? 
o Audience 
o Is the work reviewed or referred? 
o Able to verify through traditional edited print or electronic source? 
o Are there errors which may affect accuracy or information? 
 
 
Source: adopted partly from Karanja245 and Watson.246 
                                                          
245 Karanja, p.17, note 239, supra. 
246 Watson, note 243, supra. 
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Interviews for this research were carried out in Mauritius, South Africa and Tanzania between 28 
June and 16 September, 2011. These interviews were unrepresentative and non-random. Three 
categories of interviewees were involved: key informants (usually academics, researchers, national 
officials responsible for the law reform commissions, data privacy offices,  commissions for 
human rights, attorney general’s offices, judiciary and legislators), data controllers( public and 
private organisations as well as individuals), and data subjects. Initially a total number of 15 
respondents in each country case study reflecting the above categories were planned. However, 
in the course of field research and especially after interviewing key informants, adjustments were 
made to the plan.  
 
In South Africa, key informants interviewed were Professor Anneliese Roos at UNISA and 
Professor Iain Currie at WITS. The researcher has been in contact with Roos since September 
2008 by email communications. This was the time he was developing literature review of a 
project proposal of this thesis. So far the researcher is aware that Roos is the first to carry out 
scientific research on data privacy protection in Africa. Although her thesis is purely theoretical, 
‘The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical Study’,247 making 
comparison of South Africa’s legal system with regard to protection of personal data with three 
jurisdictions: United States of America, United Kingdom and Netherlands, it provides an in-
depth analysis of the South African system of data privacy protection. Interview with Roos 
provided abundant information for this thesis. As pointed out, Roos made also available to the 
researcher some of her published articles that were relevant to the present thesis. Equally 
important information was obtained through interview with Currie. The researcher came to 
know and contact Currie much earlier in September 2006. The researcher’s contact with Currie 
was facilitated by Professor Lee Bygrave. Since 2006, the researcher made follow up to the South 
African discussions about the development of the data privacy law. Apart from being 
academician at WITS, Currie was also a member of the South African Law Reform 
Commission’s project committee on privacy and data protection from 2001 to 2009.248 It was 
this committee which was responsible for all preparatory works which culminated to the 
Protection of Personal Information Bill (B9-2009), which is yet under consideration by the South 
                                                          
247 Roos, note 2, supra. 
248 South African Law Reform Commission, Privacy and Data Protection (Project 124), see also Currie, I., ‘The 
Protection of Personal Information Act and its Impact on Freedom of Information’, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, http://www.opendemocracy.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/The-Protection-
of-Personal-Information-Act-and-its-Impact-on-Freedom-of-Information-by-Iain-Currie.pdf, 
last visited 27/09/2011, footnote *. 
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African Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development.  
Similarly, Professor Currie made available to the researcher his publications on privacy. 
 
It imperative to note from the Discussion Paper249 of the Privacy and Data Protection Project 
124, that the South African Law Reform Commission made extensive efforts to publicise the 
Issue Paper250 and to solicit response from interested persons and organisations as well as from 
members of the public, as to their views and opinion over regulation of individual’s privacy. 
Written comments were received by the Commission from 34 persons and institutions.251 The 
researcher obtained access to all these written comments. It is worth noting that after receiving 
these written comments, the South African Law Reform Commission made numerous follow-up 
discussions, meetings and presentations all of them resulted into publication of the Discussion 
Paper. The Discussion Paper was also available to the researcher. As was the case with the Issue 
Paper, the Discussion Paper, with proposed draft privacy legislation, was published for general 
information and comments.252 During March and April 2006 the Commission held regional 
workshops countrywide where members of the Project Committee were present to explain and 
discuss the proposed options for the law reform and to note comments.253 The initial closing 
date for comments to the Discussion Paper was extended (on public request) from 28 February 
2006 to 30 September 2006.254 A total of 63 written comments were received by the 
Commission.255 The researcher got access to these written comments as well as the entire 
Commission’s report on Project 124. Apart from these documents, and as pointed out, the 
researcher obtained access to the written proceedings and deliberations of the South African 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development on the South 
African data privacy Bill. This access was through free subscription to the South African 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group.256 With this information at the disposal of the researcher, it 
was considered less fruitful to conduct extensive interviews as planned.   
 
                                                          
249 South African Law Reform Commission, Privacy and Data Protection, Project 124, Discussion Paper 109, 
October 2005, paragraph 1.4.1, http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/dpapers/dp109.pdf last visited 27/09/2011. 
250 South African Law Reform Commission, Privacy and Data Protection, Project 124, Issue Paper 24, September 
2003, http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/ipapers/ip24_prj124_2003.pdf last visited 27/09/2011. 
251
 South African Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper 109, paragraph 1.4.3. 
252 South African Law Reform Commission, Privacy and Data Protection, Project 124, Report, August 2009, 
paragraph 1.4.4,  
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/reports/r_prj124_privacy%20and%20data%20protection2009.pdf, 
last visited 27/09/2011. 
253 Ibid, paragraph 1.4.5. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Note that the researcher has continued to have this access to date. Because of this, he has been able to follow 
future proceedings and deliberations of the Portfolio Committee even after the field research period was over. 
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In Mauritius, the researcher’s key informant was the Data Protection Commissioner (Mrs. 
Drudeisha Madhub).257 She is the first Mauritian Data Protection Commissioner to be appointed 
to head the Data Protection Office.258 The researcher established contacts with Mrs. Madhub on 
26 January 2011. Interview with Mrs. Madhub was conducted on 4 July 2011 in her office in Port 
Lois. Most of her responses transcended the questions reserved for data controllers and subjects. 
Again, privacy complaints lodged with the Data Protection Commissioner by data subjects as 
well as decisions already passed by the Commissioner were sufficient to provide a broad light as 
to data subjects’ attitudes towards their privacy. The researcher was availed with all the decisions 
by the Commissioner. Since these decisions are also freely accessible online, the researcher has 
been able to access new decisions that were decided after the field research period was over. 
Moreover, the Commissioner availed the researcher all her written presentations made to public 
and private organisations as well as general public about the data protection Act. They were 
about twenty two presentations. Based on these resources, the researcher conducted few 
interviews with individuals in public places. 
 
In Tanzania, interviews were held with the following institutions: the Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Authority (TCRA), Law Reform Commission (LRC), Commission for Human Rights 
and Good Governance (CHRAGG), Zantel (a mobile communication company) and individuals. 
At TCRA, the researcher interviewed the Deputy Director (Consumer Affairs), Mr. Richard 
Kayombo. Since TCRA is the communication regulator, most information gathered from this 
interview concerned consumer privacy right in the communication sector. The researcher was 
also availed information about privacy complaints lodged with the authority. He also accessed 
various documents on consumer rights generally and on privacy in particular from the authority’s 
website. At LRC, the researcher interviewed the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Commission, 
Mr. Adam J. Mambi. Apart from being LRC’s Deputy Executive Secretary, Mr. Mambi served as 
a member of the Task Force that dealt with development of cyberlaws (including data privacy 
laws) in the East African Community. At CHRAGG, the Principal Computer System Analyst, 
Mr. Wilfred Warioba, was interviewed. At Zantel, the researcher interviewed the Company’s 
Data Manager, Mr. Abdillah Kiiza Abdillah. The information collected from these sources left 
the researcher with a little task of interviewing individuals.  
 
                                                          
257 Mrs. Madhub formerly worked with the Mauritian Attorney-General’s Office as a Senior State Counsel. 
258 One of the principal functions of the Commissioner is to enforce the Mauritian Data Protection Act 2004, see S. 
5. 
63 
 
As a whole, interviews with respondents were informal and semi-structured. Three set of pre-
designed questions for key informants, data controllers and data subjects were used as guides. 
Upon request, some interviewees were sent list of questions in advance for making thorough 
preparation. However during interview, supplementary questions were asked by the researcher. 
Such questions mostly emerged from the interviewees’ responses. Sometimes the researcher 
reserved sensitive questions for the actual interview session. It is worth noting that some 
interviewees preferred to fill pre-designed questions. Nevertheless, such interviewees were still 
willing to accommodate researcher’s new and supplementary questions. Finally, the interviewees 
were friendly and cooperative to the researcher.   
 
1.2.4.3 Comparative Legal Research  
 
Since its inception in the 20th Century, comparative law has played significant role in the science 
of legal interpretation in national courts, legal reforms as well as unification and harmonisation 
of laws.259 Summarising the role of comparative legal analysis Wilson posits, ‘by looking overseas, 
by looking at other legal systems, it has been hoped to benefit the national legal system of the 
observer, offering suggestions for future developments, providing warnings of possible 
difficulties, giving an opportunity to stand back from one’s own national system and look at it 
more critically, but not to remove it from first place on the agenda.’260 261 It is widely 
acknowledged that, data privacy issues are becoming more and more international. Article 25 of 
the EU Data Privacy Directive has to the greatest extent influenced the international character of 
data privacy law. It has imposed a condition for non-EU countries to implement mechanisms for 
protection of privacy that would be considered “adequate” by the EU if such countries were to 
continue to receive personal data from EU. This made it imperative to engage comparative legal 
analysis in order:- 
 
                                                          
259 For detailed discussion about the role and function of comparative law see, Hey, E. and Mak, E., ‘Introduction: 
The Possibilities of Comparative Law Methods for Research on the Rule of Law in a Global Context’, Erasmus Law 
Review, 2009, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp.1-3; Dann, P., ‘Thoughts on a Methodology of European Constitutional Law’, 
German Law Journal, 2005, Vol. 6, No. 11, pp.1461-1467; Church, J. et al., Human Rights from a Comparative and 
International Law Perspective, UNISA Press, Pretoria, 2007; Wilson, G., ‘Comparative Legal Scholarship’ in W.H 
Chui, and M. McConville, (eds), Research Methods for Law, Edinburgh University Press, 2010, pp. 87-103; Roos, 
pp.20-22, note 2, supra. 
260
 Wilson, p.87, note 259, supra. 
261 For critical works on comparative legal research, see for example, Kiekbaev, D.I., ‘Comparative Law: Method, 
Science or Educational Discipline?’, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 2003, Vol. 7.3,  
<http://www.ejcl.org/73/art73-2.html>, last visited 27/09/2011. 
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 To compare the regimes of data privacy at the international and regional level outside 
Africa. Such comparison was necessary to understand the legal principles incorporated 
in the international and regional data privacy instruments. 
 
 To compare the national systems of data privacy protection and practices in the three 
country case studies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
To achieve the above goals, the following instruments were reviewed: treaties, conventions, 
guidelines, directives, frameworks and agreements laying down the data protection and privacy 
principles at regional and international level. At national level comparison was made especially 
on constitutions, legislation, regulations, case law, Bills, and institutions of enforcement of 
privacy.  
 
1.2.5 Chapter Overview 
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 comprises the Introduction. It generally sets 
out the research agenda of the present study. Specific issues covered in this chapter include the 
research problem. This chapter also covers the research questions guiding this study as well as 
the methodology of research. Apart from that, it deals with literature survey relevant to the 
research problem. Chapter 2 is headed Concepts and Theories of Privacy. It revisits various concepts 
and theories underpinning privacy and data protection generally. Since there are myriad concepts 
and theories, chapter 2 delimits and rationalises the use of various concepts and theories in the 
context of this thesis. Chapter 3, Privacy and Data Protection in International Law, sketches the 
systems of privacy and data protection as provided for in the international and regional 
instruments. The rationale behind the inclusion of this chapter is that most national privacy and 
data protection legislation across the world owe their origins from the international and regional 
instruments. Because of this, the frameworks of these instruments are important as they lay 
down the foundation for discussion in subsequent parts of this thesis. Chapter 4, Privacy and Data 
Protection in Africa, addresses generally the origins and state of the right of privacy in Africa, the 
general social attitude of Africans towards privacy as well as factors affecting such attitudes, 
existing legislative protection and their limitations, sub-regional as well as national efforts 
towards adoption of data privacy legislation. Chapter 5 covers Data Protection in Mauritius. It 
focuses on Mauritian data privacy legislation. Moreover, chapter 5 briefly covers other legislative 
and non-legislative instruments regulating protection of privacy. The enforcement of the data 
65 
 
privacy legislation by the Data Protection Commission is discussed in detail to understand the 
data protection practice in the country. Chapter 6, Data Protection in South Africa, focuses on the 
South African Bill on protection of privacy. The legislative process of this Bill is fully discussed. 
Moreover, this chapter reviews the socio-economic political context of South Africa under the 
apartheid and assesses how such context has influenced the adoption of the privacy law in the 
country. Other statutes addressing privacy issues as well as common law are discussed as well. 
Chapter 7, Data Protection in Tanzania, deals with privacy and data protection in a jurisdiction 
which has neither a data privacy law nor Bill on such legislation. Ujamaa ideology is assessed here 
in the context of concerns for privacy. The current system of privacy protection is covered as 
well. Chapter 8, Comparative Conclusions, summarises the main points covered in the previous 
chapters and offers the major findings of the study. It also outlines the future research agenda. 
 
1.2.6 Conclusion 
 
Data protection in Africa is in a nascent growth. So far only eleven countries have implemented 
omnibus data protection legislation from 2001 to 2012. This number is likely to increase in a 
near future as some African countries are in the legislative process of such laws. Scholars have 
advanced various explanations as to the state of privacy in Africa. Central to them is the culture 
of collectivism. However other explanations advanced for the state of data privacy in Africa, 
particularly economic outsourcing, are external to the culture of collectivism. This study ventures 
to merge this lacuna in the discourse of data privacy in Africa. The research problem, research 
questions and methodology have been extensively and systematically covered to reflect the scope 
of the study. 
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2. Concepts and Theories of Privacy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines concepts and theories of privacy. Two key concepts namely privacy and 
data protection as prominently manifesting in the privacy and data protection discourse are 
primarily the focus in section 2.2. Other concepts considered here include data privacy, information 
privacy, informational autonomy, personal data, personal information, data subject, data controller, data processor 
and data processing. Apart from that, section 2.2 addresses the problem of nomenclature. Section 
2.3 sets out and discusses various theories of privacy. Although there are myriad theories on 
privacy, only six of them are examined since they overlap at some points. This section also 
canvasses the strengths and weaknesses of these theories. It is noteworthy that most of the 
theories covered here were postulated by Western scholars. This section leaves unexamined 
concepts and theories that specifically attempt to define data privacy in the African context. 
Discussion on the latter is purposely reserved for chapter four. Section 2.4 deals with choice of 
terminologies and theories as used in this thesis. Finally, section 2.5 concludes this chapter. 
 
2.2 Concepts and the Problem of Nomenclature 
 
Privacy and data protection are said to belong to the two sides of the Atlantic. While the term privacy 
is widely used in USA, Canada and Australia262 the term data protection is commonly used in 
European jurisdictions.263 Nevertheless, this territoriality use of the two terms is problematic for 
two reasons. First, it fails to tell the inherent similarities and differences between the two 
concepts. Second, at some point the two terms find their ways to the opposite side of the 
Atlantic, henceforth exist simultaneously side-by-side. With this situation, commentators strive 
to find clear-cut limits of these concepts without success. While some tend to view the two 
concepts as synonymous hence interchangeable others maintain the opposite views. Sometimes 
commentators end in frustration with a failure to clearly point out the differences between these 
concepts. For example, Kuner observes:- 
 
‘In European law, “privacy” includes issues relating to the protection of an 
individual’s “personal space” that go beyond data protection, such as “private, 
family and home life, physical and moral integrity, honour and reputation, 
                                                          
262 Note that although Australia does not belong to either side of the Atlantic in the strict sense of the term it 
employs the term ‘privacy’ largely because of the influence from the American and Canadian jurisprudence. 
263 Bygrave, p.1, note 24, supra. 
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avoidance of being placed in a false light, non-revelation of irrelevant and 
embarrassing facts, unauthorised publication of private photographs, 
protection against misuse of private communications, protection from 
disclosure of information given or received by the individual confidentially. In 
the United States, the US Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to 
protect, under the rubric of “privacy”, values that go beyond the protection of 
personal data, such as an individual’s constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, the right to make 
decisions about contraception, abortion, and other intensely personal areas 
such as marriage, procreation, child rearing, and education, and the right to 
associate free from government intrusion.’264 
 
He concludes that privacy can be seen as a concept which is both broader than and independent 
from data protection, though there can be a significant overlap between the two.265  
 
An attempt to demarcate the domains of the two concepts i.e. privacy and data protection is also 
undertaken by Cuijpers who raises a question, ‘is the right to data protection the same as the 
right to privacy?’266 In response, he subscribes his views to Peter Block that data protection and 
privacy are not the same. The two argue that since individual right to privacy safeguards an 
undisturbed private life and offers the individual control over intrusion of the private sphere, it is 
different from protection of the individual with regard to the processing of personal data which 
is not restricted to the private sphere of the individual.267 Accordingly, they conclude that the 
choice to link data protection to the right to privacy is unjustly made.268 Similarly but in somewhat 
confusingly manner, De Hert and Schreuders argue that although data protection and privacy share 
certain features and goals, and are frequently used as synonyms, they are not identical.269 They are 
therefore described as being ‘twins, but not identical’.270 These scholars continue to argue that 
although clearly engrained in privacy protection, data protection does not necessarily raise privacy  
                                                          
264 Kuner, C., ‘An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and Prospects’, Computer Law & 
Security Review, 2009, Vol. 25, No.4, pp.307-317, at p. 308. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Cuijpers, C., ‘A Private Law Approach to Privacy: Mandatory Law Obliged?’, SCRIPTed, 2007, Vol.4, No.4, 
pp.304-318, at p.312. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid. 
269 De Hert, P and Schreuders, E., ‘The Relevance of Convention 108’, 33,42, Proceedings of the Council of Europe 
Conference on Data Protection, Warsaw, 19-20, November, 2001 cited in ‘EU Study on the Legal Analysis of a 
Single Market for the Information Society’, November, 2009, Chapter 4, p.4.  
270 Ibid. 
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issues.271 Contrary to privacy rules, data protection rules are not prohibitive.272 Instead, they 
organise and control the way personal data can only be legitimately processed if some conditions 
pertaining to the transparency of the processing, the participation of the data subject and the 
accountability of the data controller are met.273 In the same vein De Hert and Gutwirth argue:- 
 
‘Data protection is a catch-all term for a series of ideas with regard to the 
processing of personal data. By applying these ideas, governments try to 
reconcile fundamental but conflicting values such as privacy, free flow of 
information, the need for government surveillance, applying taxes, etc. In 
general, data protection does not have a prohibitive nature like criminal law. 
Data subjects do not own data. In many cases, they cannot prevent the 
processing of personal data. Under the current state of affairs, data controllers 
(actors who process personal data) have the right to process data pertaining to 
others. Hence, data protection is pragmatic; it assumes that private and public 
actors need to be able to use personal information because this is often 
necessary for societal reasons. Data protection regulation does not protect us 
from data processing but from unlawful and/or disproportionate data 
processing.’274 
 
In further differentianting privacy from data protection, De Hert and Gutwirth observe:- 
 
‘Data protection’s real objective is to protect individual citizens against 
unjustified collection, storage, use and dissemination of their personal details. 
This objective seems to be indebted to the central objective of the right to 
privacy, to protect against unjustified interferences in personal life. Many 
scholars therefore hold data protection and privacy to be interchangeable.’275 
 
The authors argue that equating privacy and data protection on the basis of the objectives each 
wants to achieve is a narrow view. To the contrary De Hert and Gutwirth hold that there are 
                                                          
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid. 
274 De Hert, P and Gutwirth, S., ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalism 
in Action’, in Gutwirth, S et al (eds)., Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, 2009, pp.3-44 at p. 3. 
275 Ibid, p.4. 
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important differences between the two in terms of scope, goals and content.276 By subscribing to 
Bygrave’s views extracted from his article, ‘The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law’,277 De 
Hert and Gutwirth argue that while privacy obviously occupies a central place in data protection 
law, their characterisation of data protection law as solely or even essentially concerned with 
safeguarding privacy is misleading.278 Data protection laws serve a multiplicity of interests, which 
in some cases extend well beyond traditional conceptualisations of privacy.279  
 
Yet, between the two ends of the spectrum there are commentators who, in an attempt to 
reconcile the opposite views, have invented new concept data privacy.280 Bygrave argues that in 
contrast to the concept data protection which fails to indicate the central interests served by the 
norms to which it is meant to apply, data privacy is more appropriate as it better communicates 
the central interest(s) at stake and provides a bridge for synthesising North America and 
European policy discussion.281 While this view is meritorious, other commentators tend to use an 
alternative concept of information privacy for the above discussed sense. Karanja, for example, 
argues:- 
 
‘The concept “information privacy” is concerned with the protection of 
personal data. In Europe, the term “data protection” is used to refer to 
“information privacy”. Although the two concepts, information privacy and 
data protection, may differ somewhat in meaning and the scope of the former 
being wider than the latter (sic). Both expressions are used interchangeably to 
refer to the same thing-protection of personal data.’282 
 
In the Death of Privacy, Froomkin uses the concept information privacy as shorthand for the ability to 
control the acquisition or release of information about oneself.283 As it is explained in 2.3, 
Froomkin’s understanding of information privacy is a reflection of the privacy control theory. It is 
noteworthy that the use of information privacy in the context of data protection is an attempt to limit 
the broader concept of privacy. Such a broader concept of privacy is explained briefly by the 
                                                          
276 Ibid, p.9. 
277 Bygrave, L. A, ‘The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law’ University of New South Wales Law Journal, 2001, 
Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 277-283, at p. 282. 
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 De Hert and Gutwirth, p.10, note 274, supra. 
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280 Schwartz, P.M and Reidenberg, J.R., Data Privacy Law: A Study of United States Data Protection, Michie Law 
Publishers, Charlottesville, 1996, p.5. 
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Electronic Privacy Information Centre and Privacy International in their 2006 report on 
worldwide surveys of privacy and human rights.284 According to this report, privacy is classified 
into four aspects. These include: first, information privacy, which involves the establishment of rules 
governing the collection and handling of personal data such as credit information, and medical 
and government records. It is also known as data protection; second, bodily privacy, which concerns 
the protection of people’s physical selves against invasive procedures such as genetic tests, drug 
testing and cavity searches; third, privacy of communications, which covers the security and privacy of 
mail, telephones, e-mail and other forms of communication; and forth, territorial privacy, which 
concerns the setting of limits on intrusion into the domestic and other environments such as the 
workplace or public space. This includes searches, video surveillance and ID checks.285 From this 
classification, it is the first aspect, i.e. information privacy which is equated to data protection. The 
other aspects: bodily privacy, privacy of communications and territorial privacy are excluded from the 
purview of data protection. However, in contrast to the above, other commentators such as Kuhlen 
conceive the concept of privacy not primarily in the sense of data protection or of the ‘right to be let 
alone’ but of what in Germany is called informational autonomy (i.e. informationelle Selbstbestimmung).286 
The latter is understood as the capacity to choose and use autonomously knowledge and 
information in an electronic environment.287 
 
Attempts to demarcate the realm of privacy from that of data protection have also been made using 
case law of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) interpreting the 
right to privacy enshrined in Human Rights Treaties. The latter include Arts 17 and 8 of the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 1950 
respectively. Though there seems to be consensus among commentators on the limitations of 
the Strasburg privacy case law in spelling data protection principles, the reasoning has varied 
significantly. For example, in summing the limited scope of the Strasburg case law in relation to 
data protection, Bygrave argues:- 
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 Electronic Privacy Information Centre and Privacy International (PI), ‘Overview of Privacy’ in Privacy and 
Human Rights Report, 2006, https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/phr2006-overview-privacy last visited 
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Universitätsverlag Konstanz, Konstanz 2004 cited in Capurro, R., ‘Privacy: An Intercultural Perspective’, Ethics and 
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‘At present, the case law developed around the right to privacy in Art 17 of the 
ICCPR and Art 8 of the ECHR falls short of explicitly stipulating data 
protection guarantees as comprehensive as those found in instruments 
concerned specifically with data protection. Moreover, the case law is 
somewhat confusing: the principles for processing personal data which emerge 
from it are often sketchy and of little prescriptory value. This is so even with 
the relatively extensive body of case law developed around Art 8 of the 
ECHR. Too often there has been failure by the Commission and/or Court to 
make clear exactly which elements of the contested data-processing practice 
has interfered with the right under Art 8(1); too often has there been a 
concomitant failure to describe the threatened interest.’288 
 
However, Bygrave notes that the omitted prescriptory value of Art 8 case law in the field of data 
protection is not simply due to the Commission and Court.289 It is also due to the fact that a large 
proportion of the case law concerns data processing in a rather special context (i.e., secret 
surveillance activities by police or intelligence agencies), while almost none of it deals with 
private entities’ data-processing practices.290 Despite these limitations, Bygrave is optimistic that 
the willingness of the Strasburg organs to adopt data protection provisions which grow 
nationally and internationally, these organs will increasingly expand the right to privacy in the 
light of these laws.291 Bygrave’s optimisms became a reality seven years later. In his analyses of 
the case law of the ECtHR, Karanja summarises the value of this case law in relation to data 
processing practices as follows:- 
 
‘Going by the recent case decisions of the ECtHR, it is no longer doubtful 
that data protection is a human right although the Convention does not state 
this. As indicated above, the Court has boldly manifested data protection 
principles in its decisions by adopting the language of data protection law. But 
what still lacks in the Council of Europe human rights framework is a positive 
statement in the general human rights legislation that human rights protects 
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personal data. Such statement would give data protection the universal status 
enjoyed by human rights principles. The EU has cured the anomaly by 
enacting a data protection provision in its Charter of fundamental rights and 
the EU Constitution.’292 
 
It is noteworthy that the above views by Karanja are in sharp contrast to the observation of the 
European Court of First Instance in Bavarian Lager Co. Ltd v Commission.293 In this case the Court 
observed, ‘it should also be emphasized that the fact that the concept of “private life” is a broad 
one, in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and that the right 
to the protection of personal data may constitute one of the aspects of the right to respect of 
private life...does not mean that all personal data necessarily fall within the concept of “private 
life”.’294 Moreover, recently De Hert and Gutwirth have critically evaluated the case law of 
Strasburg only to find that such case law not only fails but also lacks any potential of embracing 
data protection principles. These scholars have advanced three reasons to support their claims. 
First, there are comparatively few Strasburg’s judgments that offer criteria for excessive, 
unnecessary and/or unjustified collection of personal data.295 According to them, this is owing to 
the fact that the Court makes overstretched focus on the legality requirement.296 Second, based 
on the scholars’ experience of this case law, they believe that many Court judgments allow 
processing authorities too much leeway.297 Only flagrant abuse or risky use of data which is easily 
used in a discriminatory way is very closely scrutinised, whereas other kinds of processing of data 
are left untouched ‘as long that there is no blood’.298 Third, the very basis of data protection 
recognition in Strasburg is not as solid as it looks.299 For example, the ECtHR has once stipulated 
that Art 8 of ECHR does not give a general right to access personal data contrary to the data 
protection instruments.300 Also, the Court has made a distinction between personal data that fall 
within the scope of Art 8 of the ECHR and personal data that do not.301 De Hert and Gutwirth 
thus observe that in the eyes of the Court there is processing of personal data that affects private 
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life and processing of personal data that does not affect the private life of individuals contrary to 
the general protection of all personal data offered by data protection regulations.302 
 
An overview of the understandings attempting to distinguish privacy from data protection reveals 
three important conclusions. First, in strict sense privacy and data protection are two distinct and 
separate concepts though they have overlapping objectives. The differences between the two 
concepts reside in their scope, goals and content. However, it is important at this juncture to 
argue that those attempts which differentiate privacy from data protection pointing out that the 
former is prohibitive while the latter is not, are illusive. For example, one of the mandatory legal 
preconditions for processing personal data in the Directive 95/46/EC is consent.303 The notion 
of consent is traditionally linked to the idea that the data subject should be in control of the use 
that is being made on his data.304 In turn, the notion of control is linked to the fact that the data 
subject should be able to withdraw his consent consequently preventing any further processing 
of the individual’s personal data by the data controller.305 Also, consent is related to the concept 
of informational self-determination making the autonomy of the data subject both a pre-
condition and a consequence of consent.306 In essence, consent gives the data subject influence 
over the processing of data.307 However, although consent is one of the legal preconditions for 
processing personal data, it is not absolute. Sometimes the data subject’s consent is difficult to 
attain in real life308 or it is subject to exemptions for purposes of public interests such as defence 
and national security. Notwithstanding, it is arguable that consent is prohibitive to data 
processing activities equating data protection to privacy to that extent. A slight but similar view is 
maintained by De Hert and Gutwirth though they generally view privacy as prohibitive as 
opposed to data protection. These scholars argue that data protection also prohibits certain 
processing of personal data, for instance ‘sensitive data’.309 The second conclusion drawn from 
the above discussion about privacy from data protection is that, the two concepts are increasingly 
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becoming synonymous and hence interchangeable in their daily uses. As rightly observed by 
Kuner:- 
 
‘Calls for an international framework have tended to mix the terms “data 
protection” and “privacy”. For example, the resolution approved at the 30th 
International Conference in Strasburg quoted above refers to “the rights to 
data protection and privacy”, while the principles adopted by the “Global 
Network Initiative”, a group formed by a number of companies, non-
governmental organizations, and academics, deal with “the internationally 
recognized human rights of freedom of expression and privacy”, thus focusing 
more on privacy than on data protection. The “Global Privacy Standard”, 
published in November 2006 by a working group led by Ontario Information 
and Privacy Commissioner, refers many times to “privacy”, but the principles 
themselves deal with topics such as consent, purpose limitation, and access 
rights, that have traditionally been thought to be key concepts of data 
protection law.’310 
 
The New Zealand Privacy Act 1993 is also instructive to illustrate the mixed use of the concepts 
privacy and data protection. Despite its reference to privacy in its short title, the Article 29 Working 
Party made key findings in its one of the most recent opinion on ‘adequacy’.311 First, the Privacy 
Act is the main New Zealand data protection legislation. The latter has been heavily influenced 
by the 1980 OECD Guidelines. Though the Privacy Act predates the Directive 95/46/EC, still the 
Working Party considered New Zealand to meet the ‘adequacy’ standard set to evaluate non-EU 
member states with regard to their data protection laws and practices. This means that the New 
Zealand Privacy Act contains data protection principles notwithstanding its privacy name. The 
third conclusion is that when the context in which the concepts privacy and data protection are used 
is not provided, one has to carefully scrutinise the contents of the principles covered, their scope 
and application. This is important because sometimes the true context in which these concepts 
are used need to be identified in order to ascertain consequential implications from their 
application. 
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Not all concepts in the privacy and data protection discourse present difficulties to define. The 
more obvious of them include data subject. It refers to an individual whose personal information 
is subject to data processing activities.312 In some jurisdictions the term data subject applies to 
firms and legal entities which in law enjoy legal personality.313 Data controller may be a natural 
person or legal entity which controls and determines the purpose and means of processing 
personal data belonging to data subjects.314 In practice a data controller engages other persons to 
carry out processing on his or her behalf. Such persons or legal entities processing personal data 
on behalf of a data controller are called data processors.315 However it must be pointed out that in 
2010, the Article 29 Working Party issued opinion trying to clarify the meaning of data controller 
and data processor. This opinion was triggered by organisational differentiation in the public and 
private sector, development of ICT as well as the globalisation of data processing, increased 
complexity in the way personal data are processed and call for clarifications of these concepts, in 
order to ensure effective application in practice.316 According to the Article 29 Working Party, 
the term data controller is autonomous, in the sense that it should be interpreted mainly according 
to Community data protection law, and functional, in the sense that it is intended to allocate 
responsibilities where the factual influence is, and thus based on factual rather than a formal 
analysis.317 As to data processor, the Article 29 Working Party notes that the same way of analyzing 
the data controller should be used.318 However, the existence of a data processor depends on a 
decision taken by the data controller, who can decide either to process data within his organization 
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or to delegate all or part of the processing activities to an external organization.319 Thus, the two 
basic conditions for qualifying as data processor are on the one hand being a separate legal entity 
with respect to the data controller and on the other hand processing personal data on his behalf.320 
Other criteria advanced by the Article 29 Working Party to assist determine the different roles of 
parties in the data processing activities include the level of prior instruction given by the data 
controller, the monitoring by the data controller of the level of service, the visibility towards data 
subjects, the expertise of the parties, the autonomous decision-making power left to the various 
parties.321 The ranges of operations and/or activities that are carried upon personal data are 
collectively known as data processing.322 The latter includes collection, recording, organisation, 
storage, adaptation, alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure, erasure, destruction, 
blocking, dissemination, etc. It is important to note that sometimes there are variations from one 
jurisdiction to another regarding these terminologies. Nonetheless, the roles and positions such 
terminologies occupy in data protection law are materially the same in most such cases. In that 
connection, for example, data medium323 or responsible party324 or data user325 has been used 
interchangeably with data controller. As to data processor the term computer bureau has been used 
instead in some jurisdictions.326 
 
Notwithstanding the seemingly relative ease with which concepts have been defined in the 
preceding paragraph, the associated concept of personal data or sometimes referred to as personal 
information has presented most difficulties to define. So far there is no settled legal position as to 
the precise scope and limit of what constitutes personal data. For example, Wacks argues that 
personal information/data is integral to the regulation of privacy and any definition of personal 
information must incorporate two key elements: the quality of the information and the 
reasonable expectations of the individual using it.327 He contends that personal information 
therefore must have both a normative and descriptive function because the notion of what is 
personal relates to a desired social norm (e.g. the ability to withdraw certain information about 
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oneself) and to describe something as personal accords the conditions of the desired social norm 
(e.g. information as personal information means an individual is granted control over it).328  
 
Whilst Wacks examines the normative elements of personal information, Bygrave identifies 
common conditions that make up personal information.329 Bygrave notes that generally, 
definitions of personal data found in international and regional instruments as well as domestic 
data protection legislation are broad.330 He argues that one can read into these definitions two 
cumulative conditions for data or information to be ‘personal’: first, the data must relate to or 
concern a person; secondly, the data must facilitate the identification of such a person.331 
Regarding the first condition, however, there is usually no requirement that the data relate to a 
particular (e.g., private, intimate) sphere of a person’s activity.332 Because of this, in most cases, it 
may not be appropriate to talk of two separate(though cumulative) conditions for making data 
‘personal’; the first condition can be embraced by the second in the sense that information will 
normally relate to, or concern, a person if it facilitates that person’s identification.333 In other 
words, Bygrave is saying, the basic criteria appearing in these definitions is that of identifiability; 
i.e., the potential of information to enable identification of a person.334 In determining whether 
information is ‘personal’ i.e. if it is capable of identifying an individual, Bygrave developed six 
criteria in interrogative form, though he admits that such criteria are inter-related hence the 
answer to one partly determines the others. The six criteria are: 1) what exactly is meant by the 
concept(s) of identification/identifiability?, 2) how easily or practicably must a person be 
identified from information in order for the latter to be regarded as ‘personal’?, 3) who is the 
legally relevant agent of identification (i.e., the person who is to carry out identification)?, 4) to 
what extent must the link between a set of data and a person be objectively valid?, 5) to what 
extent is the use of auxiliary information permitted in the identification process? Is information 
‘personal’ if it allows a person to be identified only in combination with other (auxiliary) 
information? and 6) to what extent must data be linkable to just one person in order to be 
‘personal’? 335 He concludes as follows:- 
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‘...it is clear that many of the definitions of personal data are capable in theory 
of embracing a great deal of data, including geographical and environmental 
data, which prima facie have little direct relationship to a particular person. At 
the same time as this capability has obvious benefits from a data protection 
perspective, it threatens the semantic viability of the notion of “personal 
data/information” and incurs a practical-regulatory risk that data protection 
laws will overreach themselves. Thus, in some jurisdictions, attempts have 
been made to limit this capability.’336 
 
From the above conclusion, there is no doubt that Bygrave advocates for a limited interpretation 
of the concept of personal data though of course that does not necessarily mean restrictively 
narrowing such interpretation. This view is also correctly echoed by Burdon and Telford who 
seem to observe: ‘He (Bygrave) argues that limitations are required to ensure the ‘semantic 
viability’ of the concept and the effective functioning of regulatory capacities required by 
information privacy laws’.337  
 
The difficulty in defining personal data has been further complicated by the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal in Michael John Durant v Financial Service Authority338 commonly referred 
to as the Durant case. This case was decided after Wacks and Bygrave’s postulations of personal 
data. One of the issues dealt by the Court of Appeal and which features prominently in the 
Court’s judgment was whether the information held by the Financial Service Authority(FSA) 
relating to the investigation of Durant’s complaint constituted personal data under the UK Data 
Protection Act 1998.339 In answering this question, the Court applied two tests cumulatively. 340  
First, is whether the information alleged to relate to a particular individual in a breach of privacy 
complaint is biographical in a significant sense. The latter means if such information is going 
beyond recording of such individual’s involvement in a matter or an event which has no personal 
connotations. Second, is the ‘focus’ test. This simply means that the information about a 
particular individual must be the ‘focus’ or rather central of processing and not otherwise. To put 
it differently, the ‘focus’ test requires that the individual complaining about breach of privacy 
must be adversely affected by the processing activities. After consideration of the parties’ 
arguments and application of the two tests, the Court held that information about which Durant 
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relied for his claim did not constitute personal data in the first place. This was despite the fact that 
the FSA investigation (from which Durant sought access) was triggered by the complaint lodged 
by Durant himself and also such information was retrievable by reference to his name.341  
 
Commentators across Europe and USA have continuously criticised the Durant case for 
narrowing the scope of personal data intended to be interpreted broadly by the drafters of the 
Directive 95/46/EC. Room argues that the Durant case has effectively introduced a ‘privacy 
filter’ into the interpretation of the Data Protection Act 1998 narrowing the scope of the 
meaning of personal data to such information that only affects that individual’s privacy.342As to 
why the Court preferred a narrow approach to the broad, he attributes that to the conservative 
attitude of the English judiciary which for quite some time has rejected the standalone notion of 
tort of privacy in the United Kingdom.343  Citing Wainwright v Home Office,344 Room subscribes to 
the line of argument taken by Helen Fenwick, in which case the author notes that the English 
conservative judicial attitude towards privacy has continued to prevail even after UK had 
adopted the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 1998 which embrace privacy 
as a central value to be protected.345 While Room’s rationale for the Durant’s narrow approach to 
the interpretation of the term personal data is not repeated by other authorities, generally, 
criticisms for the Court of Appeal’s understanding of what is personal data has been raised from 
several fronts, though without further rationalisation in some cases. Yet, before Durant was 
decided, the UK Information Commissioner had already commissioned a research study to 
investigate into the meaning, scope and limit of the term personal data.346 Unfortunately, before 
this study was completed the English Court of Appeal delivered its judgement in Durant. Perhaps 
if this were not the case, the Commissioner’s research study into the meaning of personal data 
would have been free from the Durant’s influence which seems to have affected its findings 
although the researchers promised not to undertake a commentary on the case. For example, the 
theoretical side of the commissioned study across Europe and beyond seems to have relied on 
the phrase ‘relating to...’ appearing in Art 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC to define personal data. 
Accordingly, the research revealed that personal data has two possible meanings: one that 
gravitates around the identification of an individual and the other simply requires an individual’s 
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interest to be engaged.347 The former is made difficult by the possibility of not only ‘direct’ but 
also ‘indirect’ identification.348 ‘Indirect’ identification, where an individual could be identified 
from the data or the data and other data, can only be made workable by a concept of 
reasonableness, as in Recital 26, but conceptually it threatens the possibility of anonymsing or 
pseudonymsing data effectively to remove it from personal data.349 As to the second limb of 
interpretation, data being personal by simply concerning an individual, makes almost all data 
(potentially) fall within the ambit of the Directive, moreover, it prompts extraordinary difficult 
questions about how such data could be prospectively defined.350 The research findings revealed 
that this interpretation, however, is more in line with the relationship between data and the 
construction of personal identity as found in the sociological and psychological literature.351 In 
this way the inclusion of the way an individual thinks about the data in the definition of personal 
data is important for such a definition.352 Indeed, the Directive allows for the inclusion of certain 
data as personal data simply because the data subject believes it to be so.353 Undoubtedly this 
yardstick for defining personal data by looking into what a data subject thinks or believes to be 
so is too broad and is likely to cause more difficulties to implement in practice. This is because, 
being a subjective criterion to be determined by reference to every individual on a case to case 
basis, it will make the law more uncertain and confusing until a data subject speaks out his or her 
mind as to what he or she believes the information to constitute personal data or not.  It is also 
important to point out the empirical side of the Commissioner’s research study. The latter was 
conducted across data protection authorities in Europe and outside. The study makes two key 
findings:- 
 
‘Between the jurisdictions surveyed there is confidence in understanding the 
terms found in the Directive, demonstrated by a lack of need for definition or 
by a lack of difficulty in defining or interpreting the terms. There is a large 
degree of similarity in defining “personal data”, with consistency in the use of 
terminology. Despite the “on paper” similarity of definitions covered, Data 
Protection Authorities demonstrate a remarkable lack of consistency in their 
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approaches to the classification of data types as “personal data”. These 
divergences in approach are to be found both within and outside the EU.’354  
 
However, despite the divergences revealed by the UK Information Commissioner’s research 
study in the above paragraph, the broad interpretation of the term personal data seems to be 
mostly preferred by the Data Protection Authorities in Europe (including UK Information 
Commissioner).355 This observation is well captured by the Article 29 Working Party (which is 
widely constituted by the Data Protection Authorities) in the aftermath of Durant.356 The first 
point to note is that the Article 29 Working Party cautions about overstretching or unduly 
restricting the definition of personal data from the one intended by the Directive 95/46/EC.357 
In other words, the Article 29 Working Party says in assigning meaning to the term personal data a 
broad approach should be preferred to a too broad or narrow interpretation. To ensure the 
interpretation stays within the ambit of a broad approach, the Article 29 Working Party opined 
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that in order to consider that the data ‘relate to’ an individual, a ‘content’ element or a ‘purpose’ 
element or a ‘result’ element should be present.358 The use of the word ‘or’ after each criterion 
makes the assessment not cumulative but rather each criterion should be independently assessed. 
Thus, the ‘content’ element is present in those cases where information is given about a 
particular person, regardless of any purpose on the side of the data controller or of a third party, or 
the impact of the information on the data subject.359 Under this criterion therefore information 
‘relates to’ a person when it is ‘about’ that person, and this has to be assessed in the light of all 
circumstances surrounding the case.360 Illustrating this point, the Article 29 Working Party says, 
for example, the results of medical analysis clearly relates to the patient, or the information 
contained in a company’s folder under the name of certain client clearly relates to him, etc. As to 
a ‘purpose’ element, this is considered to exist when data is used or is likely to be used, taking 
into account all the circumstances surrounding a precise case, with the ‘purpose’ to evaluate, treat 
in a certain way or influence the status or behaviour of an individual.361 When this is ascertained 
then data is said to ‘relate to’ an individual. A ‘result’ element exists in situations where the use of 
data is likely to have an impact on a certain person’s rights and interests taking into account all 
circumstances surrounding the precise case.362 The degree of impact is immaterial.363 It is only 
sufficient if the individual may be treated differently from other persons as a result of the 
processing of personal data.364 All what it means from a ‘content’ element, a ‘purpose’ element or 
a ‘result’ element is that the same piece of data could feasibly relate to different individuals.365 
The same information may relate to individual A because of the ‘content’ element (the data is 
clearly about A), and to B because of the ‘purpose’ element (it will be used in order to treat B in 
a certain way), and to C because of the ‘result’ element (it is likely to have an impact on the rights 
and interests of C).366 Commentators have similarly criticised the Article 29 Working Party’s 
interpretation of personal data as problematic. Applying a ‘content’ element, a ‘purpose’ element 
and a ‘result’ element in Durant, Marchini and Tebbut argue that, the ‘content’ element is not 
fulfilled because the Court found that the information complained by Durant was about his 
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complaint but not about himself.367 They also argue that Durant’s complaint would fair under the 
‘purpose’ element if the correspondences between FSA and Barclays (or internal FSA minutes) 
were used by FSA to determine how they would treat Durant.368 But that was not the case as the 
FSA processed the information for the purpose of investigating Durant’s complaints and, 
arguably, he was mentioned in the internal documents and correspondence at issue only as 
instigator of the complaint.369 As regard the ‘result’ element, this would be fulfilled only if the 
outcome of the complaint lodged by Durant would possibly have had such impact.370 The authors 
argue that this may also not be fulfilled because not all rights and interests that should be taken 
into consideration, but only those which impact the purpose of the Directive; namely the 
individual’s right to privacy(a consideration which the UK Court in Durant had firmly in mind).371  
 
Worthy important to mention is the fact that some commentators have attributed the Durant 
case narrow interpretation to the law itself and not its interpretation. For example, McCullagh 
argues that the definition of personal data in the UK legislation is narrower than the Directive 
95/46/EC as the UK law refers to ‘identified’ whereas the Directive refers to ‘identifiable’ and 
would potentially exclude the processing of a CCTV image where a specific individual could not 
be identified by name from the image.372 She notes that Durant did not consider the issue of 
‘identifiability’ of an individual in the definition of personal data set out in section 1(1) of the UK 
Data Protection Act 1998, instead, the Court concentrated on the meaning of ‘relate to’ in the 
definition.373 In contrast, Lindsay does not see if ‘identifiability’ was really at issue. He notes that 
‘identifiability’ was not an issue because the information in the manual files essentially concerned 
letters of complaint written by Durant and material generated in response to those complaints.374 
Furthermore and in contrast to McCullagh, Rempell argues that in the UK Data Protection Act 
1998 personal data definition is consistent with the Directive 95/46/EC requirements only that 
the English Court of Appeal flawed its interpretation.375 This view seems to be highly convincing 
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for two reasons. First, up to the point Durant was decided, criticisms about the scope and limit of 
the concept of personal data under the UK Data Protection Act 1998 were virtually absent. This is 
dispite the fact that the UK law uses only the term ‘identified’ as against the Directive 95/46/EC 
which embraces both two concepts ‘identified’ and ‘identifiable’ in the definition of personal data. 
Second, with exception of few commentators, majority of them are of the view that Durant only 
restrictively interpreted the term personal data. This is also the case with the Article 29 Working 
Party which attempted to clarify the meaning of the term personal data but did not address itself to 
the various ways in which Art 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC defining personal data has been 
transposed in the domestic legislation of the EU member states. 
 
Three submissions can be made in winding up this part. First, in the absence of interpretation 
from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which is more likely to be broader than Durant, there 
are absolutely thin chances that UK will change its judicial interpretation of the term personal data. 
This is because in William Smith v Lloyd TBS Bank plc376 the UK High Court, Chancery Division 
affirmed Durant presumably due to the common law doctrine of precedent which requires 
subordinate courts in a judicial hierarchy to follow principles set down by superior courts.377 
Similarly the Court of Appeal had itself reiterated its stance taken in Durant in David Paul Johnson v 
the Medical Defence Union.378 It is important to point out that the opportunity to correct Durant 
disappeared in 2008 following the House of Lords’ (UK Supreme Court) decision in Common 
Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner.379 Although this decision did not strictly uphold 
Durant its option to leave it untouched while such an opportunity to review it was available 
suggests that the Lords too support Durant as correct position of the law.380 This approach may 
partly reflect the conservative attitude of the UK judiciary towards protection of personal data as 
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claimed by Room.381 Second, there are little chances for the restrictive interpretation of personal 
data to be given by other courts in Europe, probably because of preventing further risk of 
disharmony between UK data protection law and the laws of other EU Member States.382 Third, 
despite the fact that Durant restrictive interpretation of the term personal data has accentuated the 
challenges facing EU Member States in their efforts to achieve harmonisation of data protection, 
that fact alone, cannot hamper such efforts to harmonise data protection laws, policies and 
practices across EU. Two reasons support this view. First, since Durant was decided, there is no 
any EU country that has attempted to offer narrow interpretation of the term personal data as 
revenge to UK for providing less protection to its citizen whose personal data have been 
processed in UK. Second, efforts have been exerted towards achieving a broad interpretation of 
the term personal data. Undoubtedly, the success of these efforts may only be clarified by the 
European Court of Justice through reference from national courts of the EU Member States. 
 
2.3 Philosophical and Legal Theories of Privacy 
 
The recognition of privacy as a concept worthy of distinct treatment by law is a relatively recent 
development and dates back to a seminal article by two Harvard academics at the end of the 
nineteenth century.383 Subsequently, theories of privacy began to emerge in different disciplines 
such as philosophy, law, sociology, psychology, science, informatics, political science, medicine, 
ethics, etc. There is consensus among commentators across these disciplines that privacy is a 
notoriously difficult concept to define as such there is no single, widely and commonly accepted, 
comprehensive theory of privacy.  This difficulty has been expressed in scholarly writings in a 
number of ways. Solove summarises the sentiments as underscored by some influential scholars 
in the following paragraph:- 
 
‘Time and again philosophers, legal theorists and jurists have lamented the 
great difficulty in reaching a satisfying conception of privacy. Arthur Miller has 
declared that privacy is difficult to define because it is exasperatingly vague 
and evanescent. According to Julie Inness, the legal and philosophical 
discourse of privacy is in a state of chaos. Alan Westin has stated that few 
values so fundamental to society as privacy have been so undefined in social 
theory...William Beaney has noted that even the most strenuous advocate of a 
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right to privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the 
essence and scope of this right. Privacy has a protean capacity to be all things 
to all lawyers. Tom Gerety has observed. According Robert Post privacy is a 
value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so 
engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair 
whether it can be usefully addressed at all.’384 
 
The difficulty to define privacy in the preceding paragraph has been explained based on a number 
of reasons. For example, Westin contends that no durable definition of privacy is possible 
because privacy issues are fundamentally matters of values, interests and power.385 Yet, Moore 
notes that privacy is a difficult notion to define in part because rituals of association and 
disassociation are cultural and specific-relative.386 He illustrates that opening a door without 
knocking might be considered a serious privacy violation in one culture and yet permitted in 
another.387 Liver associates the difficulty to define the notion of privacy to the difficulty of 
defining allied values such as liberty and equality.388 She contends that it is hard to define privacy 
because of the absence of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which would enable us to 
identify privacy and distinguish it from allied concepts suggesting that the fuzziness of our 
concepts of liberty, equality and rights may, themselves, explain why the boundaries of privacy 
are hard to fix.389 Liver’s reasoning implies that privacy is derivative of liberty and equality. 
Gutwirth posits that privacy is a difficult concept to define because it is not a tangible object that 
can easily be corralled into a confined definition.390 While taken together these explanations have 
merit, it is important to underline that other factors which have made the notion of privacy 
difficult to define precisely include, for example, various backgrounds of disciplines where the 
theorists belong. Accordingly, a legal definition of the notion of privacy becomes significantly 
different from the one in the medical field, etc. Also the many facets of privacy compounded by 
the development of modern technologies have increased the difficulty with which the notion of 
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privacy can be defined. In connection to this, Gutwirth raises a number of questions though he 
proposes not to answer them in his book:- 
 
‘The issue of computerised processing of personal data seems to monopolize 
the interpretation of privacy. Nowadays, privacy is often defined as the control 
of individuals over what happens with their personal information. Privacy is 
purely turned into a check on the gathering, linking, processing, distribution 
and communication of data on individuals. It merely sets the limits within 
which these daunting activities can take place. The question arises whether 
such a limited perspective is not problematic. Does it allow us to say 
something about the importance of privacy in our society? Does it allow us to 
reflect on privacy’s role as a core condition for a democratic constitutional 
state? Does this perspective allow us to tap into privacy’s rich history? Does 
this limited perspective create the risk that certain key questions will not be 
asked, allowing for the domination of an eroded concept of privacy? Doesn’t 
one run the risk of building on incomplete, skewed and tendentious 
preconceived notions? And, does one have to look for a –deliberate or 
unintentional-hidden agenda?... Is there no discrepancy between privacy 
invoked as a buffer against electronic personal data processing and privacy 
referred to by countless fundamental national and international norms? 
Doesn’t it raise suspicion that the loud and omnipresent privacy discourse-yes, 
even privacy cult-emerges at a time when the practice and technology of 
transparency, behavioural control and influencing is at its zenith of accuracy, 
de facto reducing privacy to very little indeed? And is this suspicion not 
further fed by politicians, legal scholars, business and banking officials using 
the media to pay lip service to the privacy cult? Or is it because “privacy laws” 
in fact allow for the wholesale processing of personal data? Does this not 
again raise the question to what extent the privacy discourse and the new 
legislation it entails are really aimed at protecting privacy, or whether they are 
aimed at providing the legal endorsement for the violation of privacy at the 
service of other interests?’391 
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Apart from the technological push, privacy continues to evolve time and again across different 
cultures because of the socio-economic and political developments. These transformations have 
added complication in defining privacy because previously the definitions of privacy were 
postulated with reference to Western cultures rich in individualistic perceptions. The case in 
point are the individualism-determinism theories discussed in chapter one. However other 
cultures like those in Japan, China, and Islamic states have made attempts to trace and locate 
privacy in their respective cultures in the context of prevailing socio-economic and political 
developments.  
 
Lack of precise definition of privacy is not only noticeable in the privacy theories but also in 
international and regional instruments as well as national legislation protecting privacy. In the 
latter case, usually no such definitions are offered. Courts, through case law, have too strived to 
define the concept of privacy in vain as in most cases such case law definitions go back to one or 
more theories of privacy which none of them is so far universally accepted as conclusive.  
Bygrave argues that lack of a precise definition of the concept of privacy in data protection laws 
should not necessarily be considered as a weakness in the data protection laws rather as a room 
for flexibility in their implementation.392 Also the vagueness of the privacy concept (and thereby 
data protection laws) helps to assimilate and address a range of fears related to increasingly 
intrusive data-processing practices.393 Moreover, letting in a large concept like privacy undefined 
in data privacy laws helps to offset an equally large rhetorical counter-claim: freedom of inquiry, 
the right to know, liberty of the press and so on.394 Yet, there are some disadvantages for failure 
to define privacy in the data protection laws. Such a failure has a cost in so far as it detracts from 
the capacity of those laws for prescriptive guidance.395 Also, it perpetuates the vulnerability of the 
privacy concept to the criticisms that it is incapable of definition, has no independent, coherent 
meaning and should be subsumed by other concepts.396  
 
Despite the pitfalls explained above in defining privacy, several attempts have been made to 
define it. Before examining these theories i.e. their main assumptions, strength and weaknesses, it 
is worth to highlight four important points that should provide guidance in assessing them. First, 
none of those privacy theories should be considered more superior or conclusive than the other. 
This is owing to the fact that it is difficult to resolve conclusively the privacy debate on definition 
                                                          
392 Bygrave, p.278, note 277, supra. 
393 Ibid. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid. 
89 
 
of privacy because such debate rests to a considerable extent on intuitive assessments of how 
privacy should commonly be understood.397 Gutwirth observes that the dispute over privacy’s 
definition cannot be settled leaving the question why a slew of intelligent and sophisticated legal 
scholars have tried, and continue to try, to come up with a precise description and a conclusive 
definition of the term.398 Consistent with this view, Liver argues that despite the difficulty in 
defining privacy, we will need to get behind such concept, and give it more shape and definition 
if we are to make progress in thinking about it.399 Second, the theories of privacy discussed below 
are either broad, narrow or slide back and forth between the two ends of the spectrum. Third, 
whether broad, narrow or in between the two ends, privacy theories are either normative or non-
normative/descriptive.400 401 The former makes references to moral obligations or claims while 
the latter refers to a state or condition where privacy obtains.402 Fourth, the privacy debate carries 
with it various dangers, including underplaying the multidimensional character of privacy and 
overlooking the fact that law and policy do not always need to operate with precise definitions of 
values.403   
 
There are several theories of privacy. While such theories seem to be different, they overlap and 
share common features. Because of this, commentators analyse these theories in their respective 
common groups. This approach helps to maintain a clear focus in analysis and facilitate their 
understanding. Yet, there are no agreed classifications for these theories. For example, Bygrave 
groups such definitions of privacy into four classes: information control, non-interference, 
limited accessibility and intimacy.404 Tavani classifies privacy theories into four groups as Bygrave 
but he uses somewhat different nomenclature: noninstrusion, seclusion, limitation, and control 
theories.405 Equally important to note is the fact that although the two sets of classifications are 
equal in number, they are different in contents. For example, while Bygrave’s classification 
includes intimacy Tavani’s excludes it. Also, Bygrave’s inclusion of non-interference can be 
equated with Tavani’s nonintrusion. However it is difficult to see the fitting of Tavani’s seclusion 
in Bygrave’s classification. Similar to Bygrave and Tavani, Davis maintains a four number 
classification of privacy theories: concepts of leaving alone, control, limited access and 
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possession of information.406 However, they are somewhat overlapping with those classifications 
by Bygrave and Tavani. Yet, Davis’ classification differs from Bygrave’s and Tavani’s in that the 
former includes possession of information theories while the latter do not. In contrast to the 
four classifications, Whitley classifies privacy theories into three groups: privacy as no access to 
the person or the personal ream, privacy as control over personal information and privacy from 
judgement or scrutiny by others.407 While the first two categories of Whitley’s classification of 
privacy theories fit into Bygrave’s and Tavani’s, the latter falls outside those theories. Yet, Solove 
groups privacy theories into six: the right to be let alone, limited access to the self, secrecy, 
control over personal information, personhood and intimacy.408 Solove’s classification overlaps. 
For example, the theories on secrecy and personhood transcend the ones on the right to be let 
alone and limited access to the self. This overlapping reduces his classification into four similar 
classes as Bygrave. The six classification of privacy theories are also adopted by the New 
Zealand’s Law Commission which groups these theories as reductionism, the right to be let 
alone, limited access to the self, concealment or control of personal information, personhood, 
intimacy and pragmatism.409 As can be noted, the New Zealand’s classification of the privacy 
theories follows closely Solove’s. There are however markedly differences. The New Zealand’s 
classification omits the theories on secrecy but adds the pragmatism which is Solove’s own 
theory. Since the above classifications possess some common features, of course with some 
differences too, the six classifications of the privacy theories which combine elements of the 
above are adopted here for purpose of this thesis. These include: information control, non-
interference, limited accessibility, reductionism, intimacy and pragmatism.  
 
2.3.1 Information Control Theory 
 
This theory has two main assumptions: first, an individual has power, whether direct or indirect 
over his or her personal information vis-a-vis the data controllers or data processors, second, but 
in alternative to the first assumption, an individual may influence whether directly or indirectly 
processing of personal information about him or her by data controllers or data processors. In 
effect, however, power and influence may be considered to be one and the same thing because the 
exercise of power automatically involves elements of influence and vice versa.  
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There are many variants of information control theory. However Westin’s classical theory has 
been widely cited by commentators because of the great influence it exerts in the privacy 
discourse. Perhaps because of this influence, sometimes the information control theory has been 
reduced to Western’s definition: ‘privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.’410 While this approach features prominently in privacy literature as it 
captures the essence of the entire theory, it tends to infuse and undermine other variants of the 
information control theory by subjecting them into Westin’s. Margulis argues that the variation 
in specific definitions reflects how the terms and the relationships among terms, in the formal 
definition, were interpreted within those definitions.411 Accordingly, he notes limitations of his 
own variant which states, ‘privacy, as a whole or in part, represents control over transactions 
between person(s) and other(s), the ultimate aim of which is to enhance autonomy and/or to 
minimize vulnerability’.412 Also important to note here is the fact that with the exception of other 
variants, Westin’s variant of information control theory defines privacy in terms of both 
individual and groups. This definition may have significant implication in such societies where 
groups are dominant over the individual. The other variants of information control theory are 
summarised by Tavani in the following paragraph:- 
 
‘According to Fried, privacy “is not simply an absence of information about us 
in the minds of others, rather it is the control over information we have about 
ourselves”(1990,54). Miller embraces a version of the control theory when he 
describes privacy as “the individual’s ability to control the circulation of 
information relating to him” (1971, 25). A version of the control theory is also 
endorsed by Westin...And Rachels appeals to a version of the control theory 
of privacy in his remarks concerning the connection between “our ability to 
control who has access to information about us and our ability to create and 
maintain different sorts of relationships”(1995, 297).’413 
 
The information control theory has also manifested itself in terms of concealment. An example 
of information concealment theorists is Posner who, while avoids defining privacy, he finds that 
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one aspect of privacy is the withholding or concealment of information.414 Equally important to 
note is the fact that the information control theory entails some elements of ownership rights 
over individual’s personal information. Parent provides a good example here. He defines privacy 
as, ‘...the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by 
others.’415  
 
Critics of the information control theory have raised a number of objections. First, they assert 
that the theory wrongly assumes that one looses privacy when he or she no longer has control 
over his or her personal information. Conversely, the critics view that there can be a loss of 
control without a loss of privacy and a loss of privacy without a loss of control.416 In other 
words, the information control theorists are criticised here because of lack of clarity as to which 
kinds of personal information one can expect to have control over and how much control one 
can expect to have over one’s personal information.417 Yet, this criticism has been countered by 
Shoemaker who asserts that such criticism seems to be unfair given that a control theorist could 
easily say that one’s privacy ranges over a specific domain of generally unrevealed information, 
and one has privacy to the extent one exercises control over access to that domain.418 Thus, if 
there is simply no unrevealed personal information left over which one could exercise control, 
one would have no privacy either.419 Nevertheless, the problem of vagueness still hovers over the 
control theory as it needs clearly to address what specifically counts as the relevant zone of 
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personal information(and why) and also the extent of control required.420Second, the information 
control theory and especially Westin’s variant has been criticised for being narrow in context. 
Westin’s definition of privacy presupposes that if there is a loss of privacy, then something has 
been communicated.421 Yet, not all losses of privacy involve communication.422 One of such 
instances where there is loss of privacy without communication of information is illustrated by 
Davis by assuming himself to be in his room naked and someone pees into the window.423 Here 
there is loss of privacy as the Peeping Tom has come to know what he looks like without his 
clothes yet nothing has been communicated to the Peeping Tom.424 Third, property rights have 
also raised many objections from critics of the information control theory. Moore argues that if 
property rights and privacy rights are both essentially about control, then maybe privacy rights 
are simply a special form of property rights.425Consistent with this view Solove observes:- 
 
‘Information can be easily transmitted, and once known by others, cannot be 
eradicated from their minds. Unlike physical objects, information can be 
possessed simultaneously in the minds of millions. This is why intellectual 
property law protects tangible expressions of ideas rather than underlying 
ideas themselves. The complexity of personal information is that it is both an 
expression of the self as well as a set of facts, a historical record of one’s 
behaviour....Personal information is often formed in relationships with others, 
with all parties having some claim to that information.’426 
 
To put it differently, property right concepts present significant challenges for being extended to 
information privacy. These challenges range from concepts to the principles of ownership of 
physical properties. Fourth, the information control theory has been challenged for its failure to 
make distinction between potential and actual violations of privacy.427 Elgesem argues that by 
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defining privacy as control over personal information, also threats of privacy violations seem to 
be counted as actual violations of privacy.428 
 
Despite the objections raised against the information control theory, it has been viewed to be 
directly applicable to the issues raised by the data-processing practices of organisations.429 The 
information control theory also harmonises fairly well with, and builds upon, many of the basic 
rules of data protection law, particularly those rules that enable persons to participate in, and 
influence, the processing of information about them.430 Furthermore the theory lends the 
concept of privacy considerable normative force, as it allows privacy advocates tapping into the 
dynamic ethical undercurrent associated with the idea of self-determination.431 
 
2.3.2 Non-interference Theory 
 
The non-interference theory or noninstrusion or seclusion, has its roots in the seminal article of 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis-‘the Right to be let Alone’. It is unsurprising that because of 
this background some commentators such as Solove simply refer to this theory as the right to be 
let alone.432 Yet, this reference of the non-interference theory to the right to be let alone is too 
simplistic because it leaves out other variants of the non-interference theory which do not 
specifically refer to the right to be let alone. Thus, reference to non-interference theory is 
preferred here to simply the right to be let alone. 
 
The main assumption of the non-interference theory is that an individual is considered to be in a 
state of privacy if and only if he or she is not interfered in any way by any person. Putting this in 
other way, an individual is considered to have privacy if no one tries to involve in and tries to 
influence or gain access to his or her personal information. As pointed out, the most prominent 
variant of the non-interference theory is the right to be let alone. It is widely acknowledged by 
commentators that the variant of the right to be let alone does not provide either a definition or 
a coherent conception of privacy.433 The non-interference theory also contains elements of a 
number of the other conceptions including limited access to the self, control over personal 
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information, and personhood.434 However, the main criticism against the non-interference theory 
and concomitantly the right to be let alone comes from Allen who argues that if privacy simply 
meant ‘being let alone’, any form of offensive or harmful conduct directed toward another 
person could be characterised as a violation of personal privacy.435 More so, a punch in the nose 
would be a privacy invasion as much as a peep in the bedroom.436 Tavani has attacked the non-
interference theory on two grounds: first, some versions of the nonintrusion theory tend to 
confuse the condition (or content) of privacy with a right to privacy.437 He notes this confusion 
in the variant of Brandeis and Brennan, and second, in defining privacy in terms of being free 
from intrusion, the nonintrusion theory confuses privacy with liberty.438 Solove simply criticises 
the right to be let alone as a rather broad and vague conception of privacy.439 Another criticism 
advanced against the right to be let alone is that it fails to distinguish normal ways of human 
interaction with intrusive ones. Its underlying assumption seems to be that people build their 
lives individually, and interferences from others are a hindrance at best.440 Arguably, this is a bit 
simplistic as people engage voluntarily in interactions and often need the attention of others for a 
satisfactory life.441 In practice, however, the right to be let alone often leads authors to the 
standpoint that any bit of information about you is a privacy concern and in the ideal world no 
information about you would be collected at all.442 
 
Despite the above pitfalls, the non-interference theory and more particularly the right to be let 
alone has its credit. The article by Warren and Brandeis in which the variant of the right to be let 
alone is contained was far ahead of its time, and it contained flashes of insight into a more robust 
theory of privacy.443 Also, Warren and Brandeis’s aim was not to provide a comprehensive 
conception of privacy but instead to explore the roots of a right to privacy in the common law 
and explain how such a right could develop.444 
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2.3.3 Limited Accessibility Theory 
 
The limited accessibility theory assumes that one has privacy when access to information about 
oneself is limited or restricted in certain contexts.445 In other words, the domain of information 
to which others have limited or no access simply constitutes one’s zone of privacy.446 Some 
commentators attribute the rise of the limitation theory to the worries about the information 
control theory.447 Yet, this view is doubtful for two reasons. First, some variants of the limitation 
theory emerged along the same period with the information control theory. Second, the elements 
of information control theory are still descendible in the limitation theory. Thus, the latter’s 
theory cannot claim to be purely independent from the information control theory. 
 
Under the limitation theory, Gavison’s variant appears to be the most dominant. According to 
her variant, privacy is a limitation of other’s access to an individual.448 She sees this limitation to 
consist of three elements namely secrecy, anonymity and solitude which work in dependency to 
each other.449 Three main objections have been raised against Gavison’s variant of limitation 
theory. First, the definition is too broad: that treating any physical access to a person, or 
attention paid to a person, or information gained about a person as a loss of privacy robs privacy 
much of its intuitive meaning.450 Second,  the limitation theory underestimates the role of control 
or choice that is also required in one’s having privacy; it does not take into account that someone 
who has privacy can choose to grant others access to information about himself or herself, as 
well as to limit( or even deny) others from access to that information.451 The theory also seems to 
imply that one has privacy only to the extent that access to information about oneself is limited 
or restricted.452 This in turn implies that the more one’s personal information can be withheld (or 
kept secret) from others, the more privacy one has. Accordingly, in the account of privacy 
offered in the limitation theory, privacy can easily be confused with secrecy.453  
 
However, the limitation theory has been credited on two aspects. First, it correctly recognises the 
importance of setting up contexts or ‘zones’ of privacy to limit or restrict others from access to 
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one’s personal information.454 Second, it avoids confusing privacy with autonomy, as well as with 
liberty and solitude.455 
 
2.3.4 Reductionism Theory 
 
The reductionism theory does not take privacy as an independent concept. The theorists in this 
camp assert that privacy is derived from other values or rights such as life, liberty and property 
rights. It is therefore difficult to isolate privacy from its associated rights. One variant of the 
reductionism theory is that postulated by Judith Jarvis Thompson. She advances two arguments: 
that what is commonly described as the right to privacy is a cluster of rights, and that it is unclear 
what properly belongs to this cluster; and there is no need to find that-which-is-in-common to all 
rights in the right to privacy cluster and no need to settle disputes about its boundaries.456 The 
other variant of reductionism theory was propounded by Davis, who argues:- 
 
‘If truly fundamental interests are accorded the protection they deserve, no 
need to champion a right to privacy arises. Invasion of privacy is, in reality, a 
complex of more fundamental wrongs. Similarly, the individual’s interest in 
privacy itself, however real, is derivative and a state better vouchsafed by 
protecting more immediate rights.’457 
 
The reductionism theory and more specifically Tompson’s variant has been criticised for two 
main grounds. Her definition is too broad for including rights not to be looked at or listened 
to.458 Second, even if privacy rights are derivative, they may still form a coherent cluster.459 Yet, it 
is important to note that privacy has some sort of connections with other rights. This explains 
why for example, although the American Constitution lacks express provision on protection of 
privacy, still the USA Supreme Court as well as the highest courts in various states have been 
able to derive the right to privacy from other rights expressly provided in the constitution. 
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2.3.5 Intimacy Theory 
 
Intimacy theory is relatively unpopular in data protection discourse mainly because intimacy-
oriented definitions of privacy are unable to anticipate and capture the process by which detailed 
personal profiles of individuals are created through combining disparate pieces of ostensibly 
innocuous information.460 The main thrust of this theory is that privacy only concerns about the 
exclusive realms of our personal lives that are ‘intimate’ or ‘sensitive’.461 Consequently, there is 
loss of privacy only when ‘intimate’ or ‘sensitive’ personal information is disclosed.462 Fried, one 
of the theorists under intimacy theory, posits:- 
 
‘Intimacy is the sharing of information about one’s actions, beliefs, or 
emotions which one does not share with all, and which one has the right not 
to share with anyone. By conferring this right, privacy creates the moral capital 
which we spend in friendship and love.’463 
 
Fried’s variant has been criticised by defining intimate information as information that 
individuals choose to reveal selectively, without explaining what it is in the particular relationship 
that makes it intimate.464 For example, information might be revealed to a psychoanalyst that 
would never be told to a friend or lover, but this does not make necessarily the patient-
psychoanalyst relationship an intimate one.465 Yet, Inness’s variant of intimacy theory appears to 
be the most influential under this head. According to Inness, privacy is the state of possessing 
control over a realm of intimate decisions, which includes decisions about intimate access, 
intimate information, and intimate actions.466 The strength of this definition is that it has 
expanded its scope beyond information to access and actions. However, four objections have 
been raised generally to the intimacy theory. First, privacy may make it possible to develop 
feelings of trust, love, friendship and caring, but these ends do not form a complete picture of 
what is commonly considered to be protected by privacy.467 A good illustration here is financial 
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information which is considered private, but is often not regarded as intimate.468 Second, 
intimate and/or private matters need not be characterised by love or caring: sexual partners may 
feel no sense of caring for each other, and relationships between siblings or ex-spouses may be 
characterised by hatred yet it can still be considered private.469 Third, intimacy-based conceptions 
of privacy may also fail to capture many of the concerns about building up detailed personal 
profiles ‘through combining disparate pieces of ostensibly innocuous information’, a process that 
is becoming ever easier with the increasing integration of information systems.470 Fourth, in 
some circumstances intimacy, far from being facilitated by privacy, may ‘suffocate privacy’.471 
This is particularly the case in small-scale societies where levels of intimacy may be high while 
levels of privacy are low.472 The relationship between privacy and intimacy posited by Inness and 
others appears to apply mainly in modern, individualist and predominantly urban societies.473 
 
2.3.6 Pragmatism Theory 
 
Otherwise known as ‘problem-solving’, the pragmatism theory is relatively the youngest privacy 
theory. Its proponent is Solove. His postulation appeared for the first time in his renowned 
article ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (cited in several parts of this chapter) and later his book 
Understanding Privacy474 which heavily relies on the former and other articles: ‘The Virtues of 
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections against Disclosure’ and ‘Taxonomy of Privacy’.475 
 
Before putting forward his theory, Solove makes a critical review of the existing theories of 
privacy which he collectively refers to them as ‘traditional accounts of privacy’ as opposed to his 
theory which he refers to it as A New Theory of Privacy.476 Solove’s criticisms of the traditional 
theories of privacy can be summarised in the following paragraph:- 
 
‘More generally many existing theories of privacy view it as a unitary concept 
with a uniform value that is unvarying across different situations. I contend 
that with a few exceptions, traditional accounts of privacy seek to 
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conceptualize it in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. In other 
words, most theorists attempt to define privacy by isolating a common 
denominator in all instances of privacy. I argue that the attempt to locate the 
“essential” or “core” characteristics of privacy has led to failure.’477 
 
Furthermore, Solove faults the traditional theories of privacy for being abstractive.478 He 
contends that privacy cannot be conceptualised by searching for a common denominator or 
essence of privacy.479 In contrast, he suggests conceptualising privacy in terms of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblances’.480 The latter notion simply means that certain 
concepts might not share one common characteristic, but might form ‘a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing.481 Accordingly, Solove advocates a bottom-up 
approach instead of a top-down to conceptualising privacy. The bottom-up approach, according 
to Solove, entails conceptualising privacy based on context-specific situations i.e. examining 
privacy violations as disruptions of particular practices: interference with peace of mind, 
intrusion on solitude, or loss of control over facts about oneself.482 Solove also argues that the 
value of privacy is also context-specific, in contrast to theories that try to establish an 
overreaching value of privacy such as protecting dignity or intimacy.483 Solove views that the 
value of privacy in particular contexts depends on the purposes of the practices involved, and the 
importance of those purposes.484 He argues that privacy should be valued instrumentally as a 
means of achieving other valuable ends.485 Reverting to his context-specific approach, he 
observes that ‘the landscape of privacy is constantly changing’, particularly as a result of 
technological developments, and that scholars and judges may be led astray by trying to fit new 
problems into old conceptions.486 He remarks:- 
 
‘We should seek to understand the special circumstances of a particular 
problem. What practices are being disrupted? In what ways does the 
                                                          
477 Solove, pp. 1090-1091, note 384, supra. 
478 Ibid, p.1095. 
479 Ibid, pp.1092-1093, 1096, 1098,1099,1126,1154. 
480 Ibid, p.1126. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Ibid, p.1130. 
483 Ibid, p.1143. 
484 Ibid, p.1144-1146. 
485 Ibid. 
486 Ibid, p.1146. 
101 
 
disruption resemble or differ from other forms of disruption? How does this 
disruption affect society and social structure?’487 
 
Solove’s A New Theory of Privacy has faced several objections. First, it still allows for large 
amounts of subjectivity.488 This is because; society must determine in this problem-based 
approach what rights privacy trump and which rights trump privacy.489 Thus coming to a general 
consensus about the value of privacy compared to other rights in varying situations seems almost 
impossible; this is because no person holds rights in the same ideological hierarchy.490 Second, 
Solove overlooks that at some point someone, most likely the legislature, will have to decide 
where privacy falls among various rights.491 Privacy issues looked at through the problem-based 
approach will be helpful to legislatures tackling this problem but will not be complete; the 
legislature must rely on some abstract omniscient definition of ‘privacy’ before the problem-
based application can begin.492 Thus if one attempts to divorce the exercise of ‘understanding 
privacy’ from any theory of rights, inevitably, he or she is likely to end right back in the same 
‘conceptual jungle’ he or she were in before.493 More so, Solove’s call to abandon from the 
traditional theories of privacy is a total misdirection because it attempts to close down the 
privacy debates which, he himself acknowledges that technological advancement is changing the 
ways we should look into privacy issues. Third, Solove’s theory fails to provide basis for 
establishing why some harms are privacy violations and others are not.494 Fourth, the pragmatism 
theory is in fact a way of conceptualising privacy violations rather than privacy itself.495 Solove’s 
focus on harms in the form of disruption of specific practices lends itself well to a legal and 
policy analysis based on the prevention or remedying of harms.496 
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Despite the above objections, Solove’s theory of privacy and especially his book Understanding 
Privacy has been credited for providing a deep understanding of the importance of privacy and 
the erosion of privacy that is currently taking place.497  
 
2.4 Choice of Terminologies and Preference of Theory 
 
The present thesis is about protection of personal data in sub-Saharan Africa. However privacy  
concept as opposed to personal data or data protection features prominently in the thesis. Sometimes 
one may be tempted to think that the appropriate title of the thesis would have been protection 
of privacy. Yet, there is no clear line of difference between the terms: privacy and personal data or 
data protection (see discussion in 2.2). Sometimes the latter may be referring to the former and vice-
versa. Therefore it is imperative to make clear which reference is employed in this thesis and why 
as well as which theory is mostly preferred in this thesis.    
 
Both concepts: privacy and personal data are used in this thesis interchangeably unless specific 
context excludes the use of the other. Moreover, any collective reference to privacy and data 
protection connotes either the former or latter term. The decision to maintain both terms has 
taken into account a number of reasons. First, the term personal data is relatively new in the 
privacy discourse in Africa. Scholars and non-scholars trouble to understand what is meant by 
personal data. During field research it transpired that most of the respondents interviewed had 
problems of understanding what it meant by the concept of personal data. Yet, when a clarification 
was made using the term privacy to refer to what is captured by the concept of personal data, the 
respondents became clear with the terminologies. As pointed out, the problem of conception of 
personal data was not only experienced by the general public but also scholars in academic 
institutions and beyond. This is not surprising because, data privacy law does not form part of 
curriculum in most universities in Africa. For example, at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA), Professor Anneliese Roos admitted during interview that she has to teach other 
subjects, especially law of succession, despite the fact that her research interests are in data 
privacy law.498 This is because such subject is not on offer. The case has also been for Mauritius, 
where data privacy law is yet part of the curriculum at the University of Mauritius. This is despite 
the fact that Mauritius has already implemented comprehensive data privacy law. Tanzania has 
the same experience though with slight difference. The oldest and largest university in Tanzania, 
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i.e. the University of Dar es Salaam, does not offer data privacy law in its curriculum. However 
from 2009, the Open University of Tanzania started to teach data privacy law in its newly 
established master of law in information technology and telecommunications (LL.M IT & T). It 
is submitted that data privacy law is an emerging discipline not only in Africa but across the 
world. However in Europe and America the subject is widely taught in universities as compared 
to elsewhere. Second, the term privacy appears in most national constitutions in African countries 
and statutory laws. Thus, although it has not become into regular use, it is easier to communicate 
it than personal data. Third, although this thesis is intended for a global audience, it specifically 
bears legal reformist agenda to the sub-Saharan Africa. Hence it does not seem appropriate to 
deploy a terminology that is unfamiliar to many in Africa. Fourth, the need to maintain the use 
of personal data has been motivated by the fact that the development of data privacy law in Africa 
is largely influenced by the European law which uses the term personal data. Thus, in order to 
keep dialogue between the North and South in as far as data privacy policies and regulations are 
concerned, it is important to have some minimum common understanding of various concepts. 
 
As pointed out in 2.3, privacy theories can largely be reduced into six main groups. Yet none of 
them should be considered superior or universally acceptable due to the limitations surrounding 
each. However, despite that, it is still possible to make preference of a particular theory to suit 
particular context. This approach will not undermine other theories as such preference may not 
fit other specific contexts in which other theories will do. In this thesis therefore, the limited 
accessibility theory is preferred because it is in accord with what most data privacy law principles 
are tailored. As it has been noted, the limited accessibility theory defines privacy in terms of 
conditions as against rights or claims. The former fits well the data privacy laws which lay down 
conditions under which personal data processing can be considered to be in compliance with 
law. However, it must be clearly pointed out that other theories manifest in the data privacy laws 
as well although with some limitations. For example, the information control theory explains 
well the requirements of consent as one of the pre-conditions for processing personal data. 
However, not all processing of personal data must be sanctioned by a data subject. Moreover, 
with the advancement of modern technologies and particularly the booming of social networks, 
it has been difficult for data subjects to exercise control over their personal information. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
The discourse of data and privacy law is full of concepts and theories. There are agreements and 
disagreements with regard to the meanings, scope and ambit of such concepts and theories due 
to various reasons. However, it is important that some common conceptual understandings are 
attained. For example, the Durant’s restrictive interpretation of the term personal data has been 
widely criticised.  This indicates that there are possibilities for some concepts to be commonly 
understood in a particular region or beyond. Yet, in certain cases the common way of 
understanding concepts is extremely difficult to achieve. This is the case with the term privacy. 
Several theories have been postulated to explain what privacy means. However, none of them has 
precisely defined it in a manner that is agreed by everyone. While conflicting theories over privacy 
continue to emerge with some adverse effects to the value sought to be protected, they have 
their advantages as well as disadvantages as discussed above.  
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3. Privacy and Data Protection in International Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The internationalization of modern privacy and data protection law is a recent phenomenon that 
has taken place since 1980s. This development which started by European nations owes largely 
to an attempt by such nations to remove potential obstacles to the flows of information across-
nations in order to foster internal market policies and regulations as well as ensuring a high level 
of its protection.499 Prior to this internationalization, unilateralism, which means pursuing data 
protection issues singly and without due regard to other nations, was considered an affair limited 
within national competency and territoriality. Yet, in certain cases national legislation had/has 
extra-territorial application.500 However by 1980s it was vivid that legislative restrictions of 
transfer of personal data beyond the territory of a particular state were leading to economic 
barriers and isolation as well as provision of weak protection of personal information. To obviate 
and address those challenges, bilateral agreements and subsequently harmonization of privacy 
and data protection policies and legislation regionally and internationally provided new avenues.  
 
This chapter provides an overview of privacy and data protection as it manifests in international 
law. By ‘international law’ as used in this context it means that law whether binding or non-
binding, negotiated at the supranational bodies and as a result of which its territorial reach goes 
beyond national sovereignty. Thus the legal and regulatory instruments adopted to govern 
processing of personal data across worldly nations or within particular regions provide the basis 
for discussion and limitation in this chapter. The former shall be referred to as ‘universal system’ 
which means frameworks of laws developed under the auspices of the United Nations (UN)501 
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while the latter ‘regional system’ which means frameworks of laws developed under the auspices 
of regional organizations. Left unexamined in this chapter are instruments that regulate specific 
sectors as such instruments tend to follow the broad principles found in the general 
instruments.502 However, general reference may be made to these instruments where necessary. 
Also, this chapter leaves unexamined the regional system of data privacy in Africa. Discussion of 
the latter is reserved for the next chapter (chapter four). It is also important not to confuse 
‘international law’ in the sense referred here with the ability of national data privacy legislation to 
regulate transfer of personal data in other jurisdictions or to exercise some controlling hand on 
facilities located outside the national territory where such facilities are used to process personal 
data concerning individuals in that nation. This extra-territoriality of the national law is excluded 
from the purview of this chapter. Two reasons account for this exclusion. First, the principles 
enshrined in the national legislation are most invariably a transposition of the international law. 
Yet, the exercise of influence in the privacy field has not been unidirectional, flowing only from 
the international to the national plane.503 National regulatory regimes have also inspired and 
shaped many international initiatives.504 Second, as there are variations in the practices of national 
data privacy laws, it is difficult to transcend across those practices successfully. With these 
limitations, this chapter will make only general reference to national data privacy legislation 
where necessary to illustrate how broad principles under international law permeate the national 
domain.  
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Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine 1997; World Health Organisation 
Declaration on the Promotion of Patients’ Rights in Europe 1994; Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector(O.J.L 24, 
30 January 1998, pp. 1-8);   Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and 
the protection of privacy in the electronic telecommunications sector(O.J.L 201, 31 July 2002, pp. 37-47); Regulation 
(EC) 45/2001 of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
by the institutions and bodies on the Community and on the free movement of such data(O.J.L 8, 12 January 2001, 
pp.1-22); Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (O.J.L 105, 13 April 2006, pp.54-63); ILO, Protection of Workers’ Personal 
data, an ILO Code of Practice, Geneva, 1997; ILO, HIV/AIDS and the World of Work, an ILO Code of Practice, 
Geneva, 2001.  
503 Bygrave, L.A., ‘International Agreements to Protect Personal Data’ in G.Greenleaf and J.B. Rule(eds)., Global 
Privacy Protection: The First Generation, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham,UK/Northampton, 
MA,USA, 2008, pp.15-49, at p. 17. 
504 Ibid. 
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3.2 Universal Systems 
 
The universal systems of protection of privacy and personal data trace back their origins to the 
end of the Second World War (World War II) in 1945. With the exception of the United nations 
Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files 1990505 (UN Guidelines), the 
rest of the instruments made under the umbrella of UN and discussed here took the form of 
human rights treaties. The latter were partly negotiated and made as a response to the traumas of 
fascist oppression prior to and during World War II.506 As the fascist regimes depended largely 
on personal information under their control to target and attack humanity, it was important that 
such information be protected in these treaties.507 Of significance for discussion here are the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948508 (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966509 (ICCPR or Covenant) and UN Guidelines. 
 
3.2.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
 
This is the first international human right treaty to be adopted by the United Nations after the 
end of World War II. The UDHR was actually preceded by the Nuremberg Trials510 which saw the 
                                                          
505 A/RES/45/95 adopted on 14/12/1990. 
506 Salmer, K.S., ‘Elekronisk databehandling og rettssamfunnet’, in Forhandling ved Det 30. Nordiske juristmøtet, Oslo 15-17. 
august 1984(Oslo: Det norske styret for De nordiske jurstmøter, 1984), Part II, 41,44 cited in Bygrave, pp.108-109, 
note 24, supra. 
507 Hilbergy observes the following with respect to the persecution of Jews in Germany under the Nazi regime: ‘The 
whole identification system, with its personal documents, specifically assigned names, and conspicuous tagging in 
public, was a powerful weapon in the hands of the police. First, the system was an auxiliary device that facilitated 
enforcement of residence and movement restrictions. Second, it was an independent control measure in that it 
enabled the police to pick up any Jew, anywhere, anytime. Third, and perhaps most important, identification had a 
paralyzing effect on its victims. The system induced the Jews to even more docile, more responsive to command 
than before. The wearer of the star was exposed; he thought that all eyes were fixed upon him. It was as though the 
whole population had become a police force, watching him and guarding his actions. No Jew, under those 
conditions, could resist, escape, or hide without first ridding himself of the conspicuous tag, the revealing middle 
name, the telltale ration card, passport, and identification papers. Yet the riddance of these burdens was dangerous, 
for the victim cold be recognised and denounced. Few Jews took chance. The vast majority wore the star and, 
wearing it, were lost.’, Hilberg, R., The Destruction of the European Jew, Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York, 
pp.173-180. 
508 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, New York, United Nations, 
Resolution 217A (III), U.N.Doc A/810 at 71(1948). 
509 United Nations General Assembly, ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966’, New York, 
United Nations, Resolution 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999, 
U.N.T.S 171, entered into force on 23/03/1976. 
510
 The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military tribunals, held by the victorious Allied forces of World War II, 
most notable for the prosecution of prominent members of the political, military, and economic leadership of the 
defeated Nazi Germany. The trials were held in the city of Nuremberg, Bavaria, Germany, in 1945–46, at the Palace 
of Justice. The first and best known of these trials was the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT), which tried 24 of the most important captured leaders of Nazi Germany, though several 
key architects of the war (such as Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, and Joseph Goebbels) had committed suicide 
before the trials began, see, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_Trials last visited 6/12/2011. 
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prosecution of the perpetrators of the World War II most of them officials and soldiers under 
the Nazi regime. The Universal Declaration therefore constitutes a recognition of and pledge to 
basic human rights for the international community.511 This pledge is reflected in the second and 
fifth recitals in the preamble of the UDHR:- 
 ‘Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous 
acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a 
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and 
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of 
the common people; ....Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the 
Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and 
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom.’  
As its name suggests, the UDHR was not meant to be a legally binding instrument but rather a 
declaration in human rights. Structurally the Universal Declaration has a total number of eight 
recitals and thirty articles. Art 12 of the UDHR specifically declares privacy as a basic human 
right. This provision states, ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’ The language of Art 
12 leaves it clear that only arbitrary interference with the right to privacy is prohibited as such 
not all infringements of privacy are necessarily prohibited.512  
 
Besides Art 12, there are other provisions in the UDHR which more generally address privacy 
issues. This can be illustrated by Art 27(1) which clearly states, ‘everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits.’ The phrase ‘freely to participate’ in this provision reflects principles 
of consent which are quite often necessary in conducting health scientific researches. 
 
Although Articles 12 and 27(1) of the UDHR afford protection of an individual’s privacy they 
are not absolute. The two are subject to the general limiting clause of the UDHR. This limitation 
                                                          
511 Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), ‘Selected International Legal Norms on the Protection of 
Personal Information in Health Research’ December, 2001, p. 6, ISBN 0-662-31428-IN, http://www.cihr-
irsc.gc.ca/e/documents/protection_pi_e.pdf last visited 6/12/2011. 
512 Ibid. 
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is provided in Art 29 (2).  The latter states, ‘in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone 
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the 
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.’  The 
rationale behind these limitations is to attempt to balance the provisions on privacy with the 
other rights in the Universal Declaration. However actual limitations have to be provided in the 
national legislation taking into account issues of morality, public order and the general welfare in 
a democratic society. 
 
It is pertinent to note that since the Universal Declaration is not legally binding, it provides for no 
mechanism to enforce it. Yet, the UDHR has been cited quite often in judgments of regional and 
national courts as the normative foundation of basic human rights.513 
 
3.2.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
 
The ICCPR is the second international human rights instrument to be made under the umbrella 
of the United Nations. Unlike the UDHR, ICCPR is a legally binding international instrument 
which was intended to elaborate on, and give legal effect and implementation to, the principles 
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration.514 515 The ICCPR is essentially a convention of civil and 
political rights. It has five recitals that reflect the spirit of the UDHR and fifty three articles. 
 
Article 17 of the ICCPR protects the right to privacy. This provision states, ‘17(1) no one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to 
attacks upon his honour and reputation.’ It further underlines in 17(2), ‘everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’ Certainly because of consolidating 
the spirit of the Universal Declaration, Article 17 of the ICCPR adopts verbatim the language of 
Art 12 of the UDHR. Yet, in contrast to the latter, the Convenant does not contain the general 
                                                          
513
 See generally, O’Donnell, M.K., ‘New Dirty War Judgements in Argentina: National Courts and Domestic 
Prosecutions of International Human Rights Violations’, New York University Law Review, 2009, Vol.84, pp.333-
374; see also Messele, R., ‘Enforcement of Human Rights in Ethiopia’, Research Subcontracted by Action 
Professionals’ Association for the People(APA), 31st August 2002, Chapter 3, 3.1, Implementation of International 
Human Rights Instruments, http://www.apapeth.org/Docs/ENFORCEMENT%20OF%20HR.pdf last visited 
6/12/2011.  
514 CIHR, p.8, note 511, supra. 
515 The general status with respect to the parties to the ICCPR is that up to 4/01/2010 there were 165 parties; see 
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1966/1966-international-covenant-on-civil-and-political-rights-iccpr/ last visited 6/12/2011. 
However as of October 2011, this number has increased to 167 parties, 67 of which have signed and ratified the 
treaty while the rest by accession or succession. The rest five parties have only signed but have not yet ratified the 
treaty, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Covenant_on_Civil_and_Political_Rights last visited 6/12/2011. 
110 
 
limiting clause similar to Art 29 of the UDHR. Moreover in contrast to the Universal Declaration 
which indirectly (Art 27(1)) upholds the spirit of the Nuremberg Code 1947,516 Art 7 of the 
ICCPR expressly states:- 
 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected to medical or 
scientific experimentation.’ 
 
The implementation of the ICCPR is primarily left to the states parties.517 At international level, 
the ICCPR provides for the establishment of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) as its 
oversight and complaints handling body.518 The latter’s jurisdiction is limited only to those states 
parties which have declared expressly to recognize the competency of the HRC.519 Moreover, 
before a state party submits communications/complaints to the HRC, it has to ensure that all 
available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter.520 Only after such 
attempts have failed a state party is allowed to submit the unresolved dispute to the HRC. If, 
after attempts by the HRC to resolve the dispute parties are still not satisfied then by prior 
consent they may appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission (CC) to resolve the matter.521 In 
case parties do not still agree to the outcome of the conciliation made under the CC, they have to 
notify the HRC.522 It is interesting to note that the views reached by the HRC in any of the 
complaints submitted under its jurisdiction are not binding under international law yet they carry 
a great deal of weight.523 These views, along with the Committee’s reports and general comments 
                                                          
516 The first principle of the Nuremberg Code states, ‘the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely 
essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to 
be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, 
overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the 
elements of the subject matter involved as to be enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision.  
This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there 
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by 
which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his 
health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment. The duty and responsibility for 
ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the 
experiment.’ 
517 For detailed discussion on implementation of the ICCPR at national level see e.g., Frowein, J.A and Wolfrum, 
R(eds)., ‘Domestic Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights to its article 2 para 2’, 
Max Plunk Yearbook of United Nations Law, 2001, Vol.5, pp.399-472. 
518 ICCPR, Art 28(1). 
519 Ibid, Art 41 (1). 
520 Ibid, Art 41 (1) (c). 
521 Ibid, Art 42(1), (a). 
522 Ibid, Art 42 (7), (c) & (d). 
523 Bygrave, p.248, note 288, supra. 
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to states parties under Art 40 (4) of the ICCPR, provide authoritative guidance on the scope of 
the Covenant’s provisions.524 
 
Also noteworthy is that the HRC is not a judicial body. As a result, the enforcement mechanism 
under the ICCPR remains relatively weak.525 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also lacks 
jurisdiction to deal with disputes arising from breaches of the ICCPR despite the fact that the 
ICCPR is a Convention made under the umbrella of the United Nations.526 Judicial remedies 
with regards to matters provided in the ICCPR are only reserved for national courts.527 
 
3.2.3 UN Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files 1990 
 
In contrast to the UDHR and ICCPR, the UN Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized 
Personal Data Files constitute the first efforts by the United Nations to develop concrete rules 
for protection of personal data.528 The UN Guidelines were preceded by two regional instruments 
specifically made to regulate processing of personal data: the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), Guidelines on the Protection on Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data 1980529 (OECD Guidelines) and the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981530 
(CoE Convention 108/1981). Perhaps because of this, the UN Guidelines are influenced by its 
predecessors more particularly the OECD Guidelines.  
 
Two main objectives are at the core of the UN Guidelines: supply of broad minimum guarantees 
that should be incorporated in the national legislation of the member states531 and encouraging 
governmental and non-governmental international organizations to apply the Guidelines in 
                                                          
524 Ibid. 
525 Ibid. 
526 Ibid; see also, Art 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 last visited 7/12/2011; Crook, J.R., ‘The International Court of 
Justice and Human Rights’, Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights, 2004, Vol.1, pp.1-8, 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v1/2/Crook.pdf last visited 7/12/2011. 
527 ICCPR, Art 2(3) (b). 
528 Historically the UN Guidelines can be traced from the UN General Assembly Resolution 2450 of December 1968( 
Doc E/CN.4/1025) in which the UN Secretary-General was invited to examine the impact of technological 
developments on human rights, including consideration of individuals’ right to privacy ‘in the light of advances in 
recording and other techniques’. The resulting study by the Secretary-General led to the publication of a report in 
1976 urging states to adopt privacy legislation covering computerised personal data systems in the public and private 
sectors, and listing minimum standards for such legislation, Bygrave, p.29, note 503, supra.  
529 OECD Doc. C (80)58/FINAL, adopted on 23 September 1980. 
530 ETS No. 108; opened for signature 28 January 1981; in force 1 October 1985. 
531 UN Guidelines, PART A. 
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processing personal data.532 To achieve the two objectives, the UN Guidelines lay down general 
principles concerning processing of personal data held in computerized files. These principles are 
provided in the form of non-legally binding guidelines. The responsibility of developing concrete 
detailed regulations for regulating personal data is left to states taking into account the principles 
spelt in the UN Guidelines as the minimum standard.  
 
Structurally, the UN Guidelines contain ten provisions. There is neither a preamble preceding 
these provisions nor definition of terms in the Guidelines. Such omissions diminish considerably 
the Guidelines’ practical utility.533  
 
The scope and application of the principles provided in the UN Guidelines is primarily limited to 
the processing of personal data of natural persons in the public and private sector with respect to 
computerized files.534 This limited scope can also be depicted from the long title of the Guidelines. 
However two exceptions may also apply. First, the principles contained in the UN Guidelines may 
be extended subject to appropriate adjustments to manual files.535 Second, such principles may 
be exceptionally extended to files on juristic persons especially when they contain information on 
individuals.536  
 
The UN Guidelines contain seven fair information processing principles of computerized personal 
files: lawfulness and fairness, accuracy, purpose specification, disclosure limitation, interested 
personal access, non-discrimination and security. These are usual principles of personal 
information processing found in most data privacy protection regulatory instruments (see 3.3). It 
is imperative to note that, there are interdependence in these principles. The implementation of 
one principle in practice requires the existence of the other. Thus although attempts to analyze 
these principles is made on each, one should not be mislead to think that each principle exists  
independently.  
 
The first principle, principle of lawfulness and fairness, requires that information about persons should 
not be collected or processed in unfair or unlawful ways, nor should it be used for ends contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.537 This principle embodies 
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two criteria at a time, lawfulness and fairness. Lawfulness criterion is relatively self-explanatory.538 
It may simply mean that before any processing activity can take place the data controller must 
ensure that the intended processing is backed by an enabling instrument or consent from the 
data subject.539 Unlike lawfulness criterion, fairness is more complicated to explain. Part and parcel 
of this complexity is the fact that fairness cannot be achieved in the abstract.540 Also, general 
agreement on what is fair is inevitably subject to change.541 Yet, despite these hurdles, fairness 
can generally mean the following: taking into account of data subjects’ interests and reasonable 
expectations in the course of processing their personal information; unduly pressurizing data 
subjects to disclose information about them or accepting such information to be used for other 
particular purposes; transparency of the personal data processing activities; direct collection of 
personal data from the data subjects; abstaining from re-use of personal information collected 
for one purpose for other purposes than the one specified during collection; etc.542   
 
The second principle is the principle of accuracy.  According to this principle, persons responsible 
for the compilation of files or those responsible for keeping them have an obligation to conduct 
regular check on the accuracy and relevancy of the data recorded and to ensure that they are kept 
as complete as possible to avoid errors of omission and that they are kept up to date regularly or 
when information contained in a file is used as long as they are being processed.543 Four criteria 
can be isolated from this principle: accuracy, relevancy, completeness and up-to-datedness. 
Information is considered accurate as long as it is correct and true in every detail and in any case 
it does not contain errors. This may entail a number of things. For example, to ensure that 
personal information is collected directly from data subjects; there are no omissions in such 
information in which case information becomes complete and most important such information 
is updated. As for relevancy of information, this criterion is linked to other principles. The 
purpose specification is one of such principles. At the same time both the requirements of 
relevancy and purpose specification operate to limit information collected to a minimum.544   
                                                          
538 Bygrave, p.58, note 24, supra. 
539 See e.g Kalliopi Nikolaou v. Commission, Case T-259/03, European Court of First Instance, Luxembourg where 
the Commission was held in breach of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data after disclosing leak information 
concerning Nikolaou which in the eyes of the Court constituted unauthorised transmission. 
540 Bygrave, note 538, supra. 
541 Ibid. 
542 Ibid, pp.58-59. 
543 UN Guidelines, Para 2. 
544 Bygrave argues that the UN Guidelines does not contain any express provision on the information minimality 
principle yet such requirement can be red into the more general criterion of the fairness as set out in Principle 1 of 
the UN Guidelines; Bygrave, p.60, note 24, supra. 
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The third principle is the purpose specification. This principle states that the purpose for which a file 
is to serve and its utilization in terms of that purpose should be specified, legitimate and, when it 
is established, receive a certain amount of publicity or be brought to the attention of the person  
concerned, in order to make it possible subsequently to ensure that all personal data collected 
and recorded remain relevant and adequate to the purpose so specified;  no disclosure of such 
information is made without consent of the person concerned and for purposes incompatible 
from those specified and the period for which such data is kept does not exceed achievement of 
the purpose specified.545 The purpose specification principle is a cluster of many requirements. In 
the first place it requires the purpose for collection of personal data to be specified. This ensures 
to determine if such information is really relevant to achieve a specified purpose. Apart from that 
the purpose itself needs to be legitimate. The bulk of data protection instruments comprehend 
legitimacy prima facie in terms of procedural norms hanging on a criteria of lawfulness( e.g., that 
the purpose for which personal data are collected should be compatible with the ordinary, lawful 
ambit of the particular data controller’s activities).546 There is also a requirement of publicity or 
notification of data processing to the personal concerned. This requirement intends to ensure 
that data processing remains transparent to the persons concerned so that they can be able to 
ascertain if it is compatible with the purpose of its collection. Also it facilitates data subject’s 
participation in the data processing activities. 
 
The fourth principle is the disclosure limitation.547 This principle is expressly embedded in the third 
principle above-i.e. purpose specification. It is also linked to the interested-person access which ensures 
that all disclosures of a data subject’s personal information are brought into his or her attention 
with the purpose of seeking consent where applicable. 
 
The fifth principle, interested-person access, provides that everyone who offers proof of identity has 
the right to know whether information concerning him is being processed and to obtain it in an 
intelligible form, without undue delay or expenses, and to have appropriate rectifications or 
erasures made in the case of unlawful, unnecessary or inaccurate entry and, when it is being 
communicated, to be informed of the addressees. This principle further states that provision 
should be made for a remedy, if need be with the supervisory authority. The costs of any 
rectification shall be borne by the person responsible for the file. Further that it is desirable the 
provisions of this principle should apply to everyone, irrespective of nationality or place of 
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residence.548 ‘Access’ under this principle entails that a data subject possesses knowledge of 
processing of personal data about him or her. This includes knowing which information about 
him or her is held by the data controller and how such information is being used and for what 
purpose. The right of access is also being made meaningful if the data subject can cheaply in 
terms of both time and cost obtain in an intelligible form such information about him or her and 
the manner it is being used and processed by the data controller. Also part and parcel of the right 
of access is the ability of a data subject to demand rectification or erasure of such information 
which has been unlawfully obtained, irrelevant or contains inaccuracies. Moreover, the right of 
access entails that a data subject is specifically informed of the recipients of information about 
him or her. This is important because of controlling re-use of personal information for purposes 
other than those specified during collection. The interested- person access principle also requires 
that a person concerned is able to obtain appropriate remedy for correction or eraser at the 
expense of the data controller. Also important to note is the fact that the UN Guidelines require 
the right of access to apply to everyone irrespective of one’s nationality or place of residence. 
This partly gives the UN Guidelines its universal character.  
 
The sixth principle is non-discrimination. This principle requires that data likely to give rise to 
unlawful or arbitrary discrimination, including information on racial or ethnic origin, colour, sex 
life, political opinions, religious, philosophical and other beliefs as well as membership of an 
association or trade union, should not be compiled.549 However exceptions for this rule are 
acceptable only within the framework of the provisions of the International Bill of Human 
Rights and other relevant instruments in the field of protection of human rights and prevention 
of discrimination.550 Unlike other instruments (see 3.3) which deal with the same principle under 
sensitivity, the UN Guidelines deploy the term non-discrimination. Perhaps because of this, the latter 
does not address health information in its list while the former does. Also, the latter goes far to 
deal with discrimination on membership of an association in general while the former only stops 
at trade-union membership. 
 
The seventh principle is about security. Accordingly appropriate measures are required to be taken 
to protect the files against both natural dangers, such as accidental loss or destruction and human 
dangers, such unauthorized access, fraudulent misuse of data or contamination by computer 
viruses. Worthy note is that while security and privacy issues are not identical limitations on data 
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use and disclosure must be reinforced by security safeguards.551 The measures envisaged under 
this principle include use of appropriate and up-to-date software, physical measures (e.g. looked 
doors and identification cards), trainings, pre-employment vetting and adoption of security 
codes.552 
 
It is important to underline that the UN Guidelines does not specifically contain the principle of 
minimality as a standalone principle. This is in sharp contrast to other instruments (see 3.3) which 
deal with minimality as an independent principle. Nevertheless, the minimality requirement in 
processing personal data can still be read into other principles of the Guidelines more particularly 
accuracy, fair processing and purpose specification. 
 
To ensure that the above principles are complied with, the UN Guidelines calls every country to 
designate a supervisory authority to offer supervision.553 The Guidelines sets three attributes for 
such authorities: impartiality, independence vis-à-vis persons or agencies responsible for 
processing and establishing data and technical competence.554 Also the supervisory authorities 
have to be empowered as part and parcel of such enforcement to inflict criminal sanctions as 
well as appropriate individual remedies in case of breaches of the above principles.555 Aware of 
variations of domestic legal systems, the Guidelines directs that the designation of supervisory 
authorities must be fitting into such systems. Some jurisdictions have designated the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) authorities as also discharging the function of data protection 
authorities.556 Others have separated the two authorities to keep clear lines between them.557 Yet, 
it must be admitted that even in such latter case there are intersection between the enforcement 
authorities hence cooperation between them is necessary. 
 
There are also provisions as to regulation of transboder data flows in the UN Guidelines.558 The 
Guidelines requires that when two countries in the context of transfer of personal data have 
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‘comparable’ safeguards in their laws regulating privacy information should be left to circulate 
freely in the two countries.  Yet, if there are no reciprocal safeguards, the Guidelines require that 
such circulation may not be imposed unduly and only in so far the protection of privacy 
demands. Few questions may arise here. Who is to determine the comparability of safeguards? 
Certainly the supervisory authorities in the countries concerned. What are the criteria/parameters 
of comparison? What are the criteria that countries concerned should take into account not to 
impose unduly restrictions to the free flow of circulation of personal data? The Guidelines are 
silent on all these questions. Undoubtedly this silence may result into practical difficulties in their 
implementation. 
 
An overview of the universal systems of privacy protection leads to the following conclusions. 
First, although the UDHR and ICCPR do not expressly spell principles of data protection they 
offer strong normative roots for the data protection laws in regional and national jurisdictions.559  
This normativity can well be noticed expressly or impliedly from the preambles and recitals of 
such regional and national legislation dealing with data protection. At national level, frequent 
reference to the UDHR and ICCPR in the preamble of the constitutions generally affirms the 
universal recognition and acceptance of these international documents within domestic legal 
systems. Since the right to privacy is incorporated in the Bill of Rights of such constitutions, it 
serves to domesticate the right to privacy found in the UDHR and ICCPR. Second, under the 
universal system only the UN Guidelines deals with data protection more specifically. Nonetheless 
such Guidelines have received relatively little attention as compared to the regional instruments on 
data protection specifically those in Europe (see 3.3). This is partly because the Guidelines are not 
legally binding and seem to have had little practical effect relative to the other instruments.560 
Indeed, the Guidelines tend to be overlooked in much data protection discourse, at least in 
Scandinavia.561 The other reasons that may have significantly reduced the practical effect of the 
UN Guidelines is the fact that they came later in the 1990 after the OECD Guidelines 1980 and  
CoE Convention 108/1981 had been in place and already influenced adoption of data protection 
legislation in many countries. Of course, this reason though may seem weak in the context of the 
adoption of Directive 95/46/EC in 1995 well after the UN Guidelines were already in place, it has 
to be understood that the scope of the former in terms of elaboration of the principles, binding 
                                                          
559 See e.g., Bygrave, p.45, note 503, supra; Bygrave, p. 332, note 25, supra; Bygrave, p.180, note 27, supra; Kuner, 
p.309, note 264, supra. 
560 Bygrave, p. 33, note 24, supra; Bygrave, note 533, supra; Karanja, p.126, note 239, supra; Greenleaf, G., ‘Asia-
Pacific Developments in Information Privacy Law and Its Interpretation’, New Zealand Privacy Issues Forum, 
2006, pp.1-25, at pp5-6. 
561 Bygrave, p. 33, note 24, supra. 
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nature and enforcement institutions generally exceed far the latter. Moreover, the Directive 
95/46/EC seems to incline more to the OED Guidelines and CoE Convention 108/1981 than to the 
UN Guidelines. Third, the efforts to achieve a legally binding global data privacy treaty are far 
from reality. Calls for such an instrument are increasingly made, and work is underway to draft 
an appropriate set of international rules on point.562 Yet, while there is clearly a need for a global 
legal approach in the field, there are, realistically, scant chances of say, a UN-sponsored 
convention being adopted in the short term.563 This is partly because the differences in cultural, 
historical and legal approaches to data protection mean once one descends from the highest level 
of abstraction, there can be significant differences in details.564 
 
3.3 Regional Systems 
 
3.3.1 Europe 
 
In relative terms data protection regimes in Europe are more developed than elsewhere in the 
world. These regimes have been produced under the initiatives of three main organizations: the 
Council of Europe,565 OECD566 and European Union.567  Some instruments developed under the 
                                                          
562 Bygrave, p.181, note 27, supra. 
563 Ibid; see also, Bygrave, p.333, note 25, supra; Bygrave, pp.48-49, note 503, supra; Kuner, pp.310-317, note 264, 
supra.  
564 Kuner, p.310, note 264, supra.  
565 The Council of Europe is an international organisation promoting co-operation between all countries of Europe 
in the areas of legal standards, human rights, democratic development, the rule of law and cultural co-operation. It 
was founded in 1949, has 47 member states( Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Mecedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom) 
with some 800 million citizens, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_of_Europe last visited 12/12/2011. The 
headquarters of the Council of Europe are in Strasbourg, France. 
566 As an international organisation, OECD was officially established on 30 September 1961, the date when it came 
into force. Currently the organisation has a total number of 34 member countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States). Historically, OECD grew out of 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was established in 1947 to run the US-
financed Marshall Plan for reconstruction of a continent ravaged by WW II. By making individual governments 
recognise the interdependence of their economies, it paved the way for a new era of cooperation that was to change 
the face of Europe. Encouraged by its success and the prospect of carrying its work forward on a global stage, 
Canada and the US joined OEEC members in signing the new OECD Convention on 14 December 1960;  
http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3746,en_36734052_36761863_36952473_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
last visited 12/12/2011. The headquarters of the OECD are in Château de la Muette, Paris (France). 
567The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union of 27 member states which are located primarily in 
Europe. These countries include: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. The EU traces its origins from the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), formed by six 
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auspices of these organizations address privacy issues in the same manner as the UDHR and 
ICCPR. This is the case with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950568 (European Convention of Human Rights or ECHR), Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000569(the Charter or CFR) which was later 
repealed and replaced by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2010570 and 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004.571 In all these instruments, privacy 
protection issues are dealt remotely. Yet, their significance lies in the normative force they 
provide as the legal foundations for data privacy laws. However, there are three specific 
instruments which were developed under the initiatives of the Council of Europe, OECD and 
EU to regulate data protection issues. These include the OECD Guidelines on the Protection on 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 1980, Council of Europe (CoE) Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981 
(CoE Convention 108/1981) and Directive 95/46/EC. Up until recently, these regimes more than 
anything else have exerted enormous influence to non-European countries to adopt data privacy 
legislation in the European style. This influence has been elaborated in a number of influential 
scholarly works: ‘The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards outside Europe: 
Implications for Globalisation of Convention 108’,572 ‘The EU Data Protection Directive: An 
Engine of a Global Regime’,573 ‘The European Union Data Privacy Directive and International 
Relations’,574 and ‘International Data Protection Conference: Convention 108 as a Global Privacy 
Standard?’575 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
countries in 1958. In the intervening years the EU has grown in size by the accession of new member states, and in 
power by the addition of policy areas to its remit. The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union under its 
current name in 1993. The latest amendment to the constitutional basis of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon, came into 
force in 2009; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union last visited 12/12/2011. The headquarters of the 
European Union are in Brussels (Belgium). 
568 CETS No.: 005, opening for signature on 4 November 1950, entry into force 3 September 1953; The Treaty is 
open for signature by the member States of the Council of Europe and for accession by the European Union. 
569
 O.J.C364, 18 December 2000, pp. 1-22. 
570 O.J.C83, 30 March 2010, pp.389-403. 
571 O.J.C310/01, 16 December 2004, pp.1-474. 
572 Greenleaf, G., ‘The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards outside Europe: Implications for 
Globalisation of Convention 108’, International Data Privacy Law, 2012, Vol.2, No.1; also cited as UNSW Law 
Research Paper No. 39, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1960299 last visited 12/12/2011. 
573 Birnhack, M. D., ‘The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime‘, Computer Law & Security 
Report, 2008, Vol.24, No.6, pp.508-520;  
574 Salbu, S.R., ‘The European Union Data Privacy Directive and International Relations’, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 2002, Vol.35, pp.655-595. 
575 Polakiewicz, J., ‘Convention 108 as a Global Privacy Standard?’, Polakiewicz, J (2011) ‘Convention 108 as a global 
privacy standard?’, International Data Protection Conference, Budapest, 17 June 2011 (Head of Human Rights 
Development Department, Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Council of Europe, yet the 
paper is written in a personal capacity as such it does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Council of 
Europe), available from Council of Europe website Data Protection Home Page.  
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3.3.1.1 European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
 
The Council of Europe adopted the ECHR just two years after the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948. The circumstances and context in which the ECHR arose were the same as 
those for the UDHR: healing the past experience of totalitarianism in Western Europe. Because 
of this, the ECHR reaffirms in its preamble (recitals 1, 2 and 3) the value entrenched in the 
UDHR.  
 
The ECHR is the Council of Europe’s treaty as such it was open for signature and ratification 
only to its members. All the 47 members of the Council of Europe have signed and ratified the 
instrument. They are therefore bound by it. Worthwhile to keep in mind is that while all EU 
member countries are also members of the Council of Europe, the European Union itself is not 
part of the Council of Europe hence not legally bound by the ECHR. 
 
Structurally, the ECHR has a preamble of five recitals and fifty nine articles. Article 8 of the 
ECHR governs the protection of the right to privacy. This provision states:- 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.  
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.  
 
In contrast to Art 12 of the UDHR and Art 17 of the ICCPR which are formulated in terms of 
prohibition on ‘interference with privacy’, Art 8 of the ECHR is framed in terms of a right to 
‘respect for private life’.576 Yet, sub-article 2 of Art 8 of the ECHR expressly provides for the 
prohibition on interference with ‘respect for private life’ except under specific conditions. There 
                                                          
576 Bygrave, p. 249, note 288 supra; for detailed discussion of what is meant by ‘private life’ read Arostegui, H.T., ‘ 
Defining “Private Life” Under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by Referring to Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy and Personal Choice’, California Western International Law Journal, 2005, Vol.35, No.2, 
pp.153-202. 
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are also general derogations in Arts 17 and 18 of the ECHR. However these may not be 
applicable with respect to Art 8 of the ECHR since the latter has been provided with specific 
derogative conditions. It is arguable that the different ways in which Arts 12 and 17 of the 
UDHR and ICCPR respectively as well as Art 8 of the ECHR are formulated have little practical 
implication on the way they have been interpreted.577 
 
Originally the ECHR established the European Commission of Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as its enforcement bodies in event of breaches.578 However in 
1998 major reforms into the two bodies were carried out.579 Such reforms saw the abolition of 
the European Commission of Human Rights. At the same time the reforms streamlined the 
ECtHR in terms of the composition of the Court, tenure of judges, jurisdiction of the Court, etc. 
All such reforms meant to increase the efficiency of the ECtHR in delivering justice. It is 
important to note that the enforcement body in the ECHR is stronger than those in the 
ICCPR.580 
 
With regard to the protection of privacy under Art 8 of the ECHR, the ECtHR has so far 
delivered substantial case law. This case law has received extensive scholarly comments (see 
paragraph 2.2 of this thesis).581 Suffice to say that the Strasbourg case law is far from sufficiently 
reading in the data protection principles in Art 8 of the ECHR, as a result while such potential to 
embrace core data protection principles exists, currently such case law falls short of the data 
protection law standards.  
 
3.3.1.2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000 
 
The CFR is yet another effort by the European Union to consolidate respect of fundamental 
rights within the EU. The Charter sets out in a single text, for the first time in the European 
Union’s history, the whole range of civil, political, economic and social rights of European 
                                                          
577 See paragraph 2.2 of this thesis. 
578 ECHR, (original) Art.19. 
579 ECHR (new) Art.19 after adoption of Protocol No.11 (ETS No. 155) to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, entered into force 1 November 1998; see also Drzemczewski, A., ‘The European Human Rights 
Convention: Protocol No. 11 Entry into Force and First Year of Application’, Documentação e Direito Comparado, 
1999, nos 79/80, pp.219-247. 
580 See the jurisdiction of the ECtHR in Art. 32 of the ECHR. 
581 For detailed discussion about the interpretation of Art. 8 of the ECHR read Bygrave, pp.247-284, note 288, 
supra; Karanja, Chapter 4(pp.86-124), note 239, supra; De Hert and Gutwirth, pp.3-44, note 274, supra; Taylor, N., 
‘State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy’, Surveillance & Society, 2002, Vol.1, No.1, pp.66-85; Connelly, A.M., 
‘Problems of Interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 1986, Vol.35, pp.567-593. 
122 
 
citizens and all persons residing in the EU.582 Its legal status is binding to all 27 EU member 
states. Interestingly the CFR, unlike the ECHR, does not specifically make reference in its 
preamble to the UDHR and ICCPR. Instead it specifically reaffirms the ECHR, Social Charters 
adopted by the European Union and the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (ECJ) and of the European Court of Human Rights.583 Also 
important to note here is that the Charter is subject to interpretation by the courts of the Union 
(i.e. ECtHR and ECJ) and member states.584 This is slightly different from the ECHR which is 
strictly speaking subject to the ECtHR although the ECJ takes also into account case law 
developed by the former in its interpretation of some other instruments, e.g. the Directive 
95/46/EC. 
 
The Charter has a preamble of six recitals and a total number of fifty four articles. Of particular 
relevance to the present thesis are Arts 7 and 8. The former i.e. Art 7 of the CFR is framed in 
terms of a right to ‘respect for private life’ similar to Art 8 of the ECHR. This provision states, 
‘everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications.’ Yet, two important differences can still be noticed. First, whereas Art 8 of the 
ECHR uses the term ‘correspondence’ Art 7 of the CFR uses ‘communications’ instead. The 
former seems to be narrower in scope by confining to such things as written correspondence 
(e.g. Campbell v. United Kingdom585) and telephone conversations (e.g. Malone v. United Kingdom586). 
On the other hand the term ‘communications’ in Art 7 of the CFR envisages wide range forms 
of communications including the modern communications technologies.587 The second 
difference between Art 7 of the CFR and Art 8 of the ECHR is that the latter contains a 
limitation clause in its sub-Article 2 on the exercise of the right in Art 8(1) while the former does 
not. Yet, Art 7 of the CFR is not absolute. It is subject to the general limitations put in Art 52. It 
is interesting to note that in Art 52(3), the CFR clearly spells that in case it contains 
corresponding rights to those provided in the ECHR, then the meaning and scope of those 
rights in the CFR shall be the same as those in the ECHR. This implies that the limitations put in 
Art 8(2) of the ECHR also apply to Art 7 of the CFR because Art 7 of the CFR and 8(1) of the 
ECHR are materially the same. 
                                                          
582 Karanja, p.79, note 264, supra. 
583 CFR, Recital 5. 
584 Ibid. 
585 (1993) 15 EHRR 137. 
586 (1984) 7 EHRR 14. 
587 House of Lords-European Union Committee, Eighth Report, 1999-2000 cited in Karanja, p.81, note 264, supra; 
see also, Dossow, R., ‘The Interception of Communications and Unauthorised Access to Information stored on 
Computer Systems in the Light of the European Convention on Human Rights’, pp.1-8, at p.3,  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/temp/20010322/dossowcoe.pdf last visited 14/12/2011. 
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The most important innovation of the CFR is its incorporation of Art 8 which specifically covers 
protection of personal data. This has never been the case with the previous human rights treaties. 
To be sure Art 8 of the CFR states:- 
 
1. Everyone has the right to protection of personal data concerning him or 
her. 
 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis 
of consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been 
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority.  
 
The above provision declares protection of personal data as a right in itself. This has the effect 
of lifting and giving data protection a human rights status.588 Moreover, it lays down albeit in 
brief the data protection principles to wit: fair processing, purpose specification, lawful 
processing requiring authorization either by consent of the person concerned or law, rights of 
access and rectification. Although these principles do not expressly reflect entirely the eight data 
protection principles found in the Directive 95/46/EC and national legislation in EU member 
countries, other principles can still be read into such four principles. For example, the purpose 
specification can also embrace the limitation and data subject participation principles. Also the 
relevancy and non-disclosure principles can be read in the purpose specification. The CFR puts a 
requirement for introduction of independent regulatory authorities to control compliance with 
the data protection principles similar to most national data protection legislation. Apart from 
raising the status of data protection law to human rights status, the incorporation of Art 8 in the 
CFR which now exists side-by-side with Art 7 on protection of the right to privacy ‘may also 
signal a separation of the right to privacy and data protection.’589 
 
 
 
                                                          
588 Karanja, p.81, note 264, supra. 
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3.3.1.3 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004 
 
Also known as the European Constitution or Constitutional Treaty, the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe 2004 (TCE) which stands to date unratified presents a big blow to the 
elevation of the status of human rights and protection of personal data to a constitutional level in 
the European Union. Signed in Rome (29 October 2004) by the heads of states and governments 
of the EU member states, the European Constitution aimed at consolidating into a single text 
with some adjustments various pre-existing treaties regulating different matters in Europe with a 
view of fostering integration.590 Summarizing this broad aim Piris posits:- 
 
‘The Constitutional Treaty aimed at “One Treaty, One Legal Personality and 
One Pillar.” It repealed the two main existing Treaties-that is the EC and EU 
Treaties, as well as the previous Treaties and Protocols. The substance of all 
these Treaties was to be merged into a single “Constitutional Treaty”. Only the 
Euratom Treaty would remain separate.’591 
 
Worthwhile to note, the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty crumbled following the 
rejection of the text by two historic referendums in May 2005 and June 2005 in France and the 
Netherlands respectively. Despite that, it is still important to review the Constitutional Treaty for 
two reasons. First, is to analyze the would be implications of the Treaty on protection of human 
rights and personal data in the Union had it been successfully ratified. Second and equally 
important is to understand the implications of the failure of such ratification process on the 
same aspects. This second reason is further reinforced by the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
2007592 in the aftermath of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. In other words, to what 
extent the Lisbon Treaty 2007 retained the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty in as far as 
human rights and data protection is concerned? What are the effects of such retention? These 
questions need to be explored not just for academic purpose but to underscore if the Lisbon 
Treaty has any meaningful implications to the protection of human rights and data protection in 
                                                          
590 For detailed discussion on the origin, negotiations and adoption of the Constitutional Treaty see e.g., Toops, 
E.E., ‘Why is there No EU Constitution? An Analysis of Institutional Constitution-Making in the European Union’, 
B.A Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2010; Phinnemore, D., ‘The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: 
An Overview’, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2004, pp.1-23; Archick, K., ‘The European Union’s 
Constitution’, Congressional Research Service(CRS) Report for Congress, 2005, pp.1-6; Qvortrup, M., ‘The Three 
Referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005’, The Political Quarterly, 2006, Vol.77, No.1, pp.86-97; 
Zoller, E., ‘The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and the Democratic Legitimacy of the European 
Union’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 2005, Vol.12, No.2, pp.390-408. 
591 Piris, J.C., The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2010, p.21. 
592 O.J.C 306, 17 December 2007, pp.1-271; entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
125 
 
the European Union. Yet before venturing into such discussion the structure of the Treaty needs 
a brief examination. 
 
The Constitutional Treaty is the longest Treaty in Europe. Structurally, it has a preamble of 
seven recitals, four hundred and forty eight Articles and thirty six Protocols. The substantive 
parts of the Treaty are divided into four parts comprising many Titles in each. Of direct 
relevance for discussion here are some of the provisions in Title II and IV of Part I of the 
Treaty. Art I-9(1) under Title II gives the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) the status of 
binding primary Union law. Worthwhile to keep in mind is that when the CFR was adopted in 
2000 it was not legally binding to the Union. The Charter itself is wholly incorporated in the 
Constitutional Treaty (Arts II-61 to II-114). Apart from recognizing the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the Constitutional Treaty goes further to require the European Union in Art I-9(2) to 
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR). As pointed out the ECHR was not binding on the European Union as such 
but on its member countries. In this way, the Constitutional Treaty had the effect of upgrading 
both the CFR and ECHR to the binding Union law at a constitutional level.593  
 
In the context of the protection of privacy and personal data, the upgrading of both the CFR 
and ECHR to the Union law would have had a wide range of implications. First, the provision of 
Art 8 of the ECHR and the case law developed thereon by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg would have found their way in the European Union. This equally means 
that the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Court for the European Union, which formerly 
did not pay sufficient attention to the case law of the ECtHR would now be compelled to do so 
by the Treaty.594 Second, the entirely integration of the CFR into the Treaty would have given the 
CFR a binding force meaning that the provision of Art 7 on protection of privacy which is quite 
similar to Art 8 of the ECHR and which corresponds to Art II-67 of the Constitutional Treaty 
would have settled the old conflict between the European Parliament, some EU member states 
and the ECJ on the accession of the EU to the ECHR.595 At the same time Art 8 of the CFR on 
protection of personal data which corresponds to Art II-68 of the Constitutional Treaty would 
have also acquired a binding force. Moreover, it would have raised the protection of personal 
                                                          
593 Morjn, J., ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and 
Omega in the Light of the European Constitution’, European Law Journal, 2006, Vol.12, No.1, pp.15-40, at p.17. 
594 See the hand-offs approach of the ECJ with regard to the interpretation of ECHR in Morjn, p.19, note 593, 
supra. 
595 Karanja, p.82, note 239, supra. Also see Art I-9(2) of the Constitutional Treaty which states, ‘The Union shall 
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such 
accession to the Convention shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Constitution’. 
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data to the constitutional status taking into account that currently the specific right to the 
protection of personal data as a right under the national constitutions is found in only a handful 
EU member states.596 The Constitutional Treaty would have also transcended the Pillar systems 
in as far as data protection issues are addressed in the Union laws. It has to be noted that in EU 
data protection covers mainly matters falling under the First Pillar as internal market related 
issue. The Second and Third Pillars relating to the areas of police and judicial cooperation on the 
one hand and common foreign and security policy on the other respectively are generally 
excluded from the application of Directive 95/46/EC (see 3.3.1.6). The Constitutional Treaty 
would have therefore merged the First and Third Pillars though of course it is still unclear how 
rigorously the European Court of Justice would be willing to examine issues previously treated as 
Third Pillar issues.597 Moreover, the Treaty would have also extended its application to issues in 
the Second Pillar.598  
 
Another reference to the protection of personal data in the Constitutional Treaty is found in 
Title IV of Part I in Art I-51. This provision states:- 
 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him 
or her. 
 
2. European laws or framework laws shall lay down the rules relating to the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by 
Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member States 
when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of the Union law, 
and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with 
these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities. 
 
Worthwhile to keep in mind is the fact that the above provision seems to be influenced by an 
already existing regulation in the European Union: the Regulation (EC) No.45/2001 on 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by Community 
                                                          
596 Cannataci, J.A and Bonnici, J.P.M., ‘Data Protection Comes of Age: The Data Protection Clauses in the 
European Constitutional Treaty’, Information & Communications Technology Law, 2005, Vol.14, No.1, pp.5-15, at 
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597 Ibid, p.12. 
598 TCE, Part I, Title V, Arts I-40 & I-41; see also Hijmans, H and Scirocco, A., ‘Shortcomings in EU Data 
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Review, 2009, Vol.46, pp.1485-1525, at p.1498; see also Di Fabio, D., ‘The European Constitutional Treaty: An 
Analysis’, German Law Journal, 2004, Vol.5, No.8, pp.945-956, at p.945 for further discussion about the abolition of 
the pillar systems in EU laws by the Constitutional Treaty. 
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institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. The reinstatement of this 
Regulation in the Constitutional Treaty had similar effect of elevating it to a constitutional level. 
 
As pointed out, the Constitutional Treaty did not take effect because of the French and Dutch 
rejection in their referendums. After this failure a ‘renegotiation’ of the Constitutional Treaty 
manifested in the process initially under the German six-month presidency of the European 
Union that culminated in the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, also known as the Reform 
Treaty and Treaty on European Union(TEU or simply EU Treaty). The latter Treaty was signed 
on 27 December 2007 and came into force on 1 December 2009 after the process of ratification 
was fully completed by the member states. Majority analysts have assessed that over 90% of the 
substance of the Constitutional Treaty had been preserved in the Lisbon Treaty.599 Alexander 
Stubb, the then Finnish foreign minister and expert who represented the Finnish Government in 
the intergovernmental conferences of the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional 
Affairs leading to the Lisbon Treaty raised this per cent to 99.600  
 
With regard to issues of protection of human rights and personal data the Lisbon Treaty brought 
about two important elements. First, the Treaty left out the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (CFR) which was previously inserted in the Constitutional Treaty. Instead, 
it only made reference to CFR while at the same time making it legally binding instrument.601 
Some commentators like Bonde appears to argue that there is no real difference in publishing the 
Charter as an independent Part II of the Constitution and leaving it in a Treaty Article, as is done 
in the Lisbon Treaty.602 The Charter’s provisions would be made legally binding in exactly the 
same way as if they were explicitly set out in the Treaty itself.603 Arguably, this view misses one 
point: in the Constitutional Treaty the Charter of Fundamental Rights would have had a 
constitutional status over and above being made legally binding. In support of this view Somek 
argues:- 
 
‘As regards fundamental rights, the muddle created by Article I-9 
Constitutional Treaty remains unresolved (Article 6 EU Treaty). In fact, it is 
                                                          
599 Archick, K and Mix, D.E., ‘The European Union’s Reform Process: The Lisbon treaty’, Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 2009, pp.1-9, at p.3. 
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exacerbated by the fact that the Charter now remains outside the ambit of the 
document.’604 
 
The second element brought by the Lisbon Treaty is the duality of systems of interpretation of 
human rights in Europe. Art 6(2) requires EU member countries to accede to the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) just like it was under the 
Constitutional Treaty.605 Moreover, it makes fundamental rights emanating from the ECHR and 
constitutional traditions of member states the general principles under the Union law.606 Under 
the Lisbon Treaty the European Union got for the first time a code of common fundamental 
rights of its own just as with other states.607 In this case, the supreme interpreter of fundamental 
rights will now be the European Court of Justice, just as it is the case with supreme courts in the 
EU member states.608 Now if there is conflict between European human rights standards as laid 
down in the ECHR and the interpretation by the ECJ, then the EU will prevail.609 As the Lisbon 
Treaty ousts the jurisdiction of national courts of EU member states by requiring them to lodge 
complaints against other countries or itself through the ECJ, there is therefore risks of having 
two kinds of human rights in Europe: those that apply to all the European countries that have 
acceded to the ECHR and to its Court in Strasbourg; and those that only apply in the European 
Union and its own Court in Luxembourg.610 This would have not been the case had the 
Constitutional Treaty been successfully ratified. While the same effect would still be present, in 
the Constitutional Treaty, that would have been somewhat mitigated given the great force the 
Constitution would exert towards the national courts as well as across Europe.  
 
3.3.1.4 OECD Guidelines on Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data 1980 
 
The OECD Guidelines comprises the first clearest international efforts towards regulation of 
personal data. There were three main catalysts that led to the adoption of these Guidelines on 23 
September 1980. Michael Kirby, the Chairman of the OECD Expert Group that worked on the 
formulation of the Guidelines, explains these catalysts in his most recent article, ‘The History, 
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Achievement and Future of the 1980 OECD Guidelines on Privacy’611 to comprise the following: 
the international character of transborder data flows (TBDF) which necessitated for an 
intercontinental solution; the rise and fast changing technology of informatics with its capacity to 
expand and expedite the analysis of personal data and to create connections not otherwise 
perceived was recognized as presenting new problems for privacy as that notion  was to be 
understood in its wider, modern sense; and the changing nature of law in the latter part of the 
twentieth century as a discipline of nation states with territorial application to international law 
and policy. All these factors operated in interdependence. For example, the TBDF was actually 
fueled by the development of technology. Faced with these challenges the OECD resorted into 
developing the OECD Guidelines.  
 
a) Philosophical Basis 
 
In order to clearly understand the nature, character and scope of the OECD Guidelines and their 
fair information principles, it is imperative to underscore the philosophical basis underpinning 
the Guidelines. As pointed earlier (see footnote 566) the OECD is an international organization 
which grew out of efforts of economic reconstruction that was heavily destructed by the World 
War II. Its central tenets therefore lay in recognition of economic interdependence. Although 
OECD draws its members within and outside of Europe, it is worth to point out that majority of 
OECD member countries are European. Outside of Europe there are other influential countries 
such as the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Korea.612 Seen from this 
context, the OECD body is a mix of different countries brought together under economic co-
operation. Because of this, the philosophical basis of the OECD Guidelines is rooted in economic 
orientation rather than human rights sentiments. Jon Bing, the influential Norwegian professor 
at Norwegian Research Centre for Computers and Law (NRCCL), pounds this point by positing 
that the OECD, as its name applies, is principally interested in trade and the economic aspects of 
cooperation between member countries.613 The OECD Guidelines therefore focuses on data 
protection and its impact on international trade and economic cooperation.614 Similar views are 
lauded by Roger Clarke, one of the most critics of the OECD Guidelines, who argues that the 
Organization  for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD), formed in 1961, is a ‘club 
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of like-minded countries that provides governments a setting in which to discuss, develop and 
perfect economic and social policy’.615 In practice, its focus is much more on economic rather 
than on social matters, with just one of its 15 Committees and associated Directorates addressing 
all of Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs.616 The philosophical perspectives of 
the OECD are also well captured by Kirby himself where he stresses that ordinarily the OECD 
is not concerned with human rights protection.617 In different occasions Kirby has repeatedly 
held:- 
 
‘It was the fear that local regulation, ostensibly for privacy protection, would, 
in truth, be enacted for purposes of economic protectionism, that led to the 
initiative of the OECD to establish the expert group which developed its 
Privacy Guidelines. The spectre was presented that the economically beneficial 
flow of data across national boundaries might be impeded unnecessarily and 
regulated inefficiently producing a cacophony of laws which did little to 
advance human rights but much to interfere in the free flow of information 
and ideas.’618 
 
It is interesting to note that in his book Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and 
Limits619 Bygrave took a different view from that of Kirby who wrote its foreword. Based on the 
empirical study conducted by Ellger, he (Bygrave) argues that very little solid evidence has been 
provided to back up the allegations of economic protectionism.620 Bygrave illustrates concerns 
behind adoption of national data protection legislation in Norway, Germany, Austria, Sweden, 
France and the UK as not solely lying in the protectionism theory. He, however, admits that 
protectionism theory can less easily be refuted with respect to the adoption of the Directive 
95/46/EC. Much evidence exists to indicate that the EC Commission, together with the Council 
of Ministers, first took up the issue of data protection in the 1970s largely out of concern for 
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fostering development of the internal market and European IT-industry.621 In rejecting the 
influence of protectionism arguments (aired mainly from the North American quarters) with 
regard to the emergence of the OECD Guidelines, Bygrave has recently argued that the Guidelines 
urge member states in paras 2 and 6 to take legal measures for ‘the protection of privacy and 
individual liberties.’622 Yet, the language of ‘protection of privacy and individual liberties’ is 
merely a disguise of the economic motivations which seem to feature prominently in the 
Guidelines and in the title of the OECD Guidelines themselves: ‘Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data’. Moreover, the incorporation of the language of ‘the 
protection of privacy and individual liberties’ may reflect the tensions that occupied the 
negotiation table by the Expert Group and an attempt to reconcile them in favour of the 
European member states in the OECD whose memories of the World War II were still fresh. 
Kirby’s narration of these memories deserves to be recorded here:- 
 
‘Before and during the work of the expert group, numerous seminars and 
conferences were held in Paris and elsewhere concerned with aspects of the 
problems that led to the creation of the group. One of these was a large 
conference in Paris attended by the then President of the French Republic 
(Mr. Valéry Girscard d’Estaing). In the course of that conference, to which I 
contributed, the powerful feeling that lay behind the European response to the 
dangers to privacy was brought home to me in a vivid way. During an interval 
for public participation, an audience member leapt to his feet. I knew that his 
contribution would be unusual. His appearance was arresting. He had a long 
beard and his eyes gleamed as he spoke.’623 
 
The unnamed audience whose contribution was appealing to the strong memories of the World 
War II posited:- 
 
‘Why, Mr. President, did so many refugees in France survive during the War? 
Why did so few resistance fighters and Jews survive in The Netherlands?, he 
said. ‘It happened because, in the 1930s, The Netherlands government, with 
typical efficiency, had devised an identity card with a metal bar installed 
through the photograph. In France, we had an ordinary photograph, pasted on 
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cardboard. It was easily imitated. Upon that difference hung the lives of 
thousands of good people. In France, they survived. In The Netherlands they 
perished. Efficacy is not everything. A free society defends other values. 
Personal control over data is one such value.’624 
 
The above statements clearly indicate that the OECD Guidelines are not grounded in human 
rights. It is therefore unsurprising that the Guidelines do not make sound reference to the major 
international human rights treaties such as the UDHR and ICCPR as its normative roots.  
 
b) Structure and Nature  
 
Traditionally what are referred to as the OECD Guidelines are mere Annex to the OECD 
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data adopted on 23 September 1980. This Recommendation 
categorically restates in its preamble the foundations of the OECD by stating:- 
 
‘The Council, Having regard to articles 1(c), 3(a) and 5(b) of the Convention 
on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development of 14th 
December, 1960… (stating) 
Article 1 
The aims of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(hereinafter called the ‘Organisation’) shall be to promote policies designed: (c) 
to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-
discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations. 
Article 3 
With a view to achieving the aims set out in Article 1 and to fulfilling the 
undertakings contained in Article 2, the Members agree that they will: (a) keep 
each other informed and furnish the Organisation with the information 
necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks; 
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Article 5 
In order to achieve its aims, the Organisation may: (b) make recommendations 
to Members.’  
 
To this Recommendation, there are the OECD Guidelines. These Guidelines are divided into five 
Parts. Part one deals with general definitions as used in the Guidelines as well as their scope. In 
total part one has six paragraphs (1-6). Part two which is central to the Guidelines deals with the 
basic principles of national application. The fair information practice principles are comprised in 
this part which has eight paragraphs (7-14) corresponding to the eight data protection principles. 
Part three addresses basic principles of international application. It is this part which contains 
regulations on transborder data flows (TBDF). Part three has four paragraphs (15-18). Part four 
deals with national implementation in just a single paragraph (19). Part five has three paragraphs 
(20-22). This part deals with matters of international co-operation.  
 
Apart from the Guidelines which are the integral part to the Council Recommendation, there is 
also the Explanatory Memorandum (OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum or EM). The 
major aim of the Memorandum is to provide explanation and elaboration to the contents of the 
Guidelines which are broadly formulated to reflect the debate and legislative work which had been 
going on for several years.625 As the Guidelilines, The Explanatory Memorandum was also 
developed by the Expert Group. In total, the Explanatory Memorandum has two main parts 
with 77 numbered paragraphs. Part I deals with the general background leading to the adoption 
of the OECD Guidelines. Part II is subdivided into sub-parts A and B. The former addresses the 
purpose and scope of the Guidelines while the latter deals with detailed comments. It is important 
to mention that the Explanatory Memorandum serves only as a tool of interpretation for the 
OECD Guidelines. It does not in itself vary the meaning of the Guidelines.626 In any case, it is 
subordinate to the Guidelines.627 
 
The OECD Guidelines, as its name suggests, are not legally binding upon OECD member states. 
This non-binding nature of the Guidelines is not accidental. They were indented to be so. Kirby 
puts forward three main reasons why the OECD decided not to adopt a legally binding treaty or 
convention. First, by 1978, it was already obvious that the largest player in the processing of 
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automated data (including for airlines, hotels, business, insurance, and banking information) was 
the United States of America.628 Securing the agreement of that major economic player to a 
binding treaty presented two apparently inseparable obstacles: the need, in the ratification of any 
such treaty, for the concurrence of the United States Senate, traditionally suspicious of such 
engagements and the strong affirmation of free flows of information expressed in the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.629 Undoubtedly these difficulties became real in 
1990s when the United States with all its muscles resisted the pressure of the European Directive 
95/46/EC which requires third countries to develop legislation which provides ‘adequate’ level 
of protection of personal data to the EU law. This resistance resulted into negotiation of the 
weak Safe Harbor Agreement (see 3.3.2). Second, for the European member countries, 
impairment of personal privacy was not a theoretical danger.630 It was one deeply remembered 
from the misuse of personal data by security and military personnel during the Second World 
War, still a comparatively recent memory in 1978.631 Third, there was suspicion by several non-
European countries that the European treaty approach to protecting privacy was heavy-handed 
with bureaucracy; potentially expensive to implement; insufficiently sensitive to the values of 
TBDF; and (even possibly) motivated by economic protectionism so as to strengthen the 
European technology of informatics behind legally established data protection walls.632 At the 
same time, Europeans were suspicious that the non-European member states would insist on a 
‘toothless tiger’.633 They would give the appearance of agreement; but without any real or 
practical effectiveness.634 In the above context of a wide range of conflicting interests the Expert 
Group’s solution resided in the adoption of the non-legally binding Guidelines.  
 
c) Objectives and Scope 
 
The objectives for adoption of the OECD Guidelines can be read in the preamble of the 
Recommendation of the Council, where the Guidelines are annexed and from part two of the 
Guidelines themselves. The Explanatory Memorandum 25 summarizes these objectives into four:- 
 
First, is to achieve acceptance by member countries of certain minimum standards of protection 
of privacy and individual liberties with regard to personal data. Second, is to reduce differences 
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between relevant domestic rules and practices of member countries to a minimum. The third 
objective of the Guidelines is to ensure that in protecting personal data consideration is given to 
the interests of other member countries and the need to avoid undue influence with the flows of 
personal data between member countries. Fourth, is to eliminate as far as possible, reasons 
which might induce member countries to restrict transorder flows of data because of the 
possible risks associated with such flows. 
 
The OECD Guidelines have a broad ambit. They apply to the private and public sectors including 
the police and national security agencies.635 However, in the later case, the Guidelines explicitly 
provide exceptions in Para 4 that may be made based on national sovereignty, national security 
and public policy. Such exceptions are subject to two conditions: they must be as few as possible 
and be made known to the public.636 In terms of content, the Guidelines extend their reach to 
both manual and electronic processing of personal data.637 Explanatory Memorandum 37 clearly 
affirms this wide scope of the application of the Guidelines by providing that the principles for the 
processing of privacy and individual liberties expressed in the Guidelines are valid for the 
processing of data in general, irrespective of the particular technology employed. The Guidelines 
can therefore be expressed in the technological neutral terms.638 639 Yet, Para 3(c) of the Guidelines 
still permit member states to restrict the application of the OECD Guidelines only to automatic 
processing of personal data. However, the latter must be taken as exception and not the general 
rule in itself.640 
 
The scope of the OECD Guidelines is also delimited by terminologies employed by them. Seen 
that way, the OECD Guidelines are based wholly on the basic concept of personal data as opposed 
to many national data privacy legislation including the Council of Europe Convention 108/1981 
which are based on the concept of personal data system.641 Yet, the Guidelines also presume some 
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restructuring of the data; they therefore do not apply to single data elements.642 They define 
personal data as any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual (data subject).643 
The Explanatory Memorandum elaborates further that personal data and data subject serve to 
underscore that the Guidelines are concerned with physical (natural) persons.644 They allude to 
their extension to legal (juristic) persons more obliquely.645 Paragraph 3 suggests that the 
Guidelines should be applied flexibly.646 Although this paragraph contains no explicit reference to 
legal persons, the Explanatory Memorandum states, ‘protection may be afforded to data relating 
to groups and similar entities whereas such protection is completely nonexistent in another 
country.’647 An equally important terminology to understand apart from personal data is data 
controller. The latter is defined in Para 1(a) of the OECD Guidelines as a party who, according to 
domestic law, is competent to decide about the contents and use of personal data regardless of 
whether or not such data are collected, stored, processed or disseminated by that third party or 
by agent on its behalf. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the definition of a data 
controller attaches responsibility for activities concerned with the processing of personal data. The 
data controller may be legal or natural person, public authority, agency or any other body but 
excludes (a) licensing authorities and similar bodies which exist in some member countries  and 
which authorise the processing of data but are not entitled to decide( in the proper sense of the 
word) what activities should be carried out and for what purposes; (b) data processing service 
bureaux which carry out data processing on behalf of others; (c) telecommunications authorities 
and similar bodies which act as mere conduits; and (d) ‘dependent uses’ who may have access to 
data but who are not authorised to decide what data should be stored, who should be able to use 
them, etc.648 The final terminology which has implications on the scope of the OECD Guidelines 
is transborder flows of personal data. This term means movements of personal data across national 
border.649 It restricts the application of certain provisions of the Guidelines to international data 
flows and consequently omits the data flow problems particular to federal level.650 
 
One point has to be made in connection with definitions of terminologies in the Guidelines. The 
list of such terminologies is kept short. The OECD Guidelines define only three terminologies. 
Important terms such as data processing remain undefined as such reference to data processing has 
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been frequently associated to data collection. This may have the effect of undermining the 
implementation of the Guidelines in practice.  
 
d) Data Protection Principles 
 
The OECD Guidelines contain eight data protection principles. These need to be treated as a 
whole because there is some degree of duplication and the distinctions between different 
activities and stages involved in the processing of data which are assumed in the principles are 
somewhat artificial.651 
 
Collection limitation principle forms the first data protection principle in the OECD Guidelines. It 
requires that there should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be 
obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the 
data subject.652 The collection limitation principle is a cluster of three other principles: the principle of 
‘lawful collection’, the principle of consent by the data subject and the principle that there should 
be some limits to the collection of personal data, which means no general license should be 
given, not even to certain public agencies.653 The Explanatory Memorandum limits the collection 
limitation principle to two main aspects: limitation to the collection of data of which, because of the 
manner in which they are to be processed, their nature, the context in which they are to be used 
or other circumstances, are regarded as specially sensitive and requirements concerning data 
collection methods.654 Worthwhile to keep in mind is the fact that the Guidelines do not include 
explicit principles regarding sensitive data. The reason may be the difficulty of deciding what data 
really are sensitive, as the assessment would differ depending on the political system, the 
traditions and general sentiment of a culture or a country.655 However, reference to sensitive 
personal data can still be impliedly inferred in Para 2 of the Guidelines which says the former 
apply to personal data which pose a danger to privacy and individual liberties, including dangers 
due to the ‘nature or the context’ in which the data are used. Also important to keep in mind is 
that the Guidelines do not hinder the effectiveness of sensitive and non-sensitive data 
classification found in national laws.656 
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The second principle of data protection in the OECD Guidelines is the data quality principle. The 
latter states that personal data which are collected should be relevant to the purpose for which 
they are to be use, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete 
and kept up-to-date.657 The data quality principle has four aspects: relevancy, accuracy, 
completeness and up-to-dateness. All of them must be evaluated within the purpose context for 
which data was collected.658 The ‘purpose test’ often requires the involvement of the problem of 
whether or not harm can be caused to data subjects because of lack of accuracy, completeness 
and up-dating.659 
 
The third principle is the purpose specification principle. This principle provides that the purposes for 
which personal data should be specified not later than the time of data collection and the 
subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not 
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.660 
As it can be noted, the purpose specification principle is directly linked to the data quality principle 
(the second principle) as well as the use limitation principle (the fourth principle). The Guidelines 
require as a pre-condition that the purpose for which personal data is collected must be 
identified. Perhaps, it is interesting to note that in contrast to all other international instruments 
regulating processing of personal data which are silent as to when such purpose should be 
identified, the OECD Guidelines clearly say that purpose must be identified before any data 
collection takes place, and in any case not later than the time of collection. Also underlined in the 
Guidelines is that later changes of purposes should also be specified before actual changes of 
purposes are effected.661 Even in situations where changes from the original purposes are 
permitted, they are still required not to be incompatible with those original purposes and also not 
to be introduced arbitrarily.662 The Explanatory Memorandum lays down a number of 
possibilities through which the purpose specification identification can be brought into the 
attention of the data subject: public declarations, information to data subjects, legislation, 
administrative decrees and licenses provided by supervisory bodies.663 The purpose specification 
principle further requires that data should be destroyed (erased) or anonymised when they no 
longer serve the purpose for which they were collected. The reason is that control over data may 
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be lost when data are no longer of interest; this may lead to risks of theft, unauthorized copying 
or the like.664 
 
The use limitation principle is the fourth data protection principle. It states that personal data should 
not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in 
accordance with Para 9(the third principle) except: - (a) with the consent of the data subject; or 
(b) by the authority of the law.665 This principle deals with uses of data that deviate the original 
purpose of collection. Yet, it envisages exceptions such as the consent of the data subject or 
his/her representative and the authority of the law including licenses granted by supervisory 
bodies.666  
  
The OECD Guidelines also contains the security safeguards principle. The latter is the fifth principle in 
the Guidelines. Accordingly personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards 
against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of 
data.667 Yet, no absolute standard of data security is imposed by the Guidelines since the 
appropriate standard would depend upon the risks involved.668 The Guidelines only requires the 
taking of ‘reasonable’ security measures. The Explanatory Memorandum 56 lists by way of 
examples various measures that are envisaged under the security safeguards principle. These include 
physical measures (e.g. locked doors and identification cards); organizational measures (e.g. levels 
with regard to access to data) and informational measures, particularly in computer systems. The 
Explanatory Memorandum further elaborates ‘loss’ of data to include cases as accidental erasure 
of data, destruction of data storage media and destruction of such storage media. ‘Modified’ is 
construed to cover unauthorized input of data while ‘use’ covers unauthorized copying. 
 
The sixth principle is the openness principle. According to this principle there should be a general 
policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data.669 
Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and 
the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data 
controller.670 Three criteria are laid down in this principle: establishing the existence and nature 
of personal data, knowing the purpose of the data controller’s use of such data and obtaining the 
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identity and address of the data controller. These criteria serve realization of other rights 
especially those in Para 13. The Explanatory Memorandum 57 lists a number of ways (just by 
way of examples) how openness can be achieved in practice. These include regular information 
from the data controllers on a voluntary basis; publication in official registers of descriptions of 
activities concerned with the processing of personal data and registration with public bodies. The 
phrase ‘readily available’ is construed to mean individuals should be able to obtain information 
without unreasonable effort as to time, advance knowledge, travelling and without unreasonable 
cost. Yet, clearly the ‘openness principle’ of the OECD Guidelines has always been one of the 
weakest.671 
 
The seventh principle is the individual participation principle. It states that an individual should have 
the right(a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the 
data controller has data relating to him; (b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him, 
(i)within reasonable time, (ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive, (iii) in a reasonable manner 
and (iv) in a form that is readily intelligible; (c) to be given reasons if a request made under 
paragraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial and (d) to challenge data 
relating to him and, if the challenge is successful, to have the data erased, rectified, completed or 
amended.672 Broadly, the individual participation principle entails a buddle of three rights: the access 
rights, right to reasons and the right to challenge. The access right requires generally that there 
should not be cumbersome procedures or unnecessary bureaucracies in gaining access to one’s 
personal data held by data controllers.673 Geographical distances, costs, etc should not be 
invoked by data controllers to deny access. In any case, response to requests for personal data by 
data controllers to the data subject must be made within reasonable time.674 Upon receipt of 
his/her personal data, the data subject has the right to challenge their validity.675 Through this, 
the data subject may require erasure, rectification, completeness or amendment.676 The data 
subject has various avenues to pursue his/her challenge: through the data controller, 
administrative and professional bodies or courts of law depending on the laws and procedures in 
a member state.677 However, this challenge cannot be leveled against the type of remedy or reliefs 
given as such are determined by domestic law and legal procedure.678 With regard to the right to 
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reasons, this is narrowly limited to those situations where requests for information are refused.679 
In all other situations, data subjects cannot enforce their rights to be given reasons. This is one 
of the areas of weakness of the OECD Guidelines. 
 
The eighth and last principle of data protection in the OECD Guidelines is the accountability 
principle. This principle requires that a data controller should be accountable for complying with 
measures which give effect to the principles stated above.680 The Explanatory Memorandum 62 
asserts that the obligation to comply with the data privacy principles are primarily placed over 
the data controllers because they are the ones who benefit from the data processing activities 
carried out by them. This obligation extends to service bureau personnel especially with regard to 
breaches of confidentiality obligations. Furthermore the accountability envisaged under the 
accountability principle does not only support legal sanctions but also compliance to the codes of 
conduct. 
 
e.) Transborder Data Flows 
 
Transborder Data Flows or simply TBDF is broadly defined as the electronic movement of data 
between countries.681 As pointed out, regulation of the movement of personal data following the 
development of computer technology had posed challenges to the continued sustainability of the 
objectives for which OECD was established.682 To address those challenges the OECD Guidelines 
introduced four main principles in Part three under the name ‘basic principles of international 
application: free flow and legitimate restrictions.’ 
 
Para 15 of the Guidelines obliges member countries to take into consideration the implications for 
other member countries of domestic processing and re-export of personal data. This is expressed 
in the Explanatory Memorandum as ‘respect by Member countries for each other’s interest in 
processing personal data and individual liberties of their nationals and residents.’683 The 
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obligations imposed by Para 15 are geared towards cubing liberal policies which are contrary to 
the spirit of the Guidelines and which attempt to circumvent or violate protective legislation of 
other member countries.684 Also the need to respect envisaged in Para 15 carries with it an 
obligation to support each other’s efforts to ensure that personal data are not deprived of 
protection as a result of their transfer to territories and facilities for the processing of personal 
data where control is slack or non-existent.685 Para 16 obliges member states to take all 
reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that transborder flows of personal data, including 
transit through a member country, are uninterrupted and secure i.e. protected against 
unauthorized access, loss of data and similar events.686 Para 17 permits restrictions to TBDF 
subject to four conditions: where a member state to where data is to be transferred does not yet 
substantially observe these Guidelines; where re-export of such data would circumvent its 
domestic privacy legislation; where regulation of certain categories of personal data is required 
and the same is supported by domestic privacy regulations and where the other member country 
does not provide ‘equivalent protection’. Para 18 urges member states to avoid developing laws, 
policies and practices in the name of the protection of privacy and individual liberties, which 
would create obstacles to transborder flows of personal data that would exceed requirements for 
such protection. This paragraph ensures that a meaningful balance between privacy protection 
interests and TBDF is achieved.687  
 
Worthwhile to keep in mind, the Guidelines do not explicitly address the issue of conflict of laws 
and jurisdiction. The only reference to the issue is found in the Guidelines, in which member 
countries agree to work towards the development of principles to govern the applicable law in 
cases of transborder data traffic.688 
 
f.) National Implementation 
 
As pointed out, the OECD Guidelines are not legally binding on member states. Nevertheless, the 
members of the OECD consider to be practically binding, demonstrated by their adoption with 
reservations by certain countries-an act which might otherwise be thought superfluous for a non-
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688 OECD Guidelines, Para 22; Explanatory Memorandums 74, 75 and 76; OECD Declaration on Transborder Data 
Flows 1985(Adopted on 11 April 1985); see also Bing, p.284, note 613, supra. 
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binding instrument.689 In this way, the practical significance of the Guidelines on member states 
depends on the level of details of implementation by such members. The implementation of the 
Guidelines may take various forms ranging from the adoption of data privacy legislation to self-
regulations.690 Those instruments must provide adequate sanctions and remedies as well as 
ensure that there is no unfair discrimination against data subjects.691 Also in implementing the 
Guidelines at national level, member states are encouraged to set up supervisory authorities, rely 
on courts, public authorities or already established facilities to enforce the privacy laws.692 Part 
and parcel of the duties of these bodies are to provide advice to data controllers, give them legal 
aid and resolve complaints and disputes.693 
 
g.) International Cooperation 
 
To ensure collectivism in implementing the OECD Guidelines Para 20 urges member states to 
exchange information upon request regarding observance of principles set out in the Guidelines. 
In order to facilitate such exchange of information member states are also urged to establish 
procedures for such purposes.694  
 
Final points should be made with regard to the OECD Guidelines. The most important is that for 
the past thirty years the Guidelines have been influential in the adoption of data protection 
legislation within OECD and beyond. Australia, New Zealand, Japan serve as non-exhaustive list 
of countries which have been influenced by the OECD Guidelines in adopting data privacy 
legislation. Another illustration of such influence which deserves mention here is the Asia-Pacific 
Privacy Framework 2004 or APEC Privacy Framework (see 3.3.3). Though of course there are 
still significant departures from the Guidelines, the APEC Privacy Framework owes much to the 
former.695 However with the rapid development of technologies in the past thirty years, the 
Guidelines have been made practically difficult to implement. Michael Kirby, the chairperson of 
the Expert Group which formulated the Guidelines has in several occasions openly made 
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admission to this difficult.696 To illustrate some of the issues repeatedly raised by Kirby are the 
application of the use limitation principle and the purpose specification principle. He has noted for 
instance, that, social networks have arisen in the past ten years. That has raised challenges in use 
limitation and purpose specification. The notion of ‘consent’ has also been challenged with the 
new technology not envisaged by the Expert Group.  
 
3.3.1.5 CoE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data 1981 
 
The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data 1981(ETS 108 or Convention 108) was adopted by the Council of 
Europe in response to the growing volume of automatic processing of personal data as a 
consequence of advancements in information technology and means of keeping and processing 
information in digital forms.697 The Convention 108 was open for signature on 28 January 1981 
and officially entered into force on 1 October 1985. Currently forty-three out of forty-seven 
Council of Europe countries are a party to the Treaty and three others have signed it.698 States 
outside of the Council of Europe can be invited to accede to the Convention 108.699 Undoubtedly, 
it is because of this and certainly to better underline the ample scope of accession to the 
Convention by non-European states the instrument’s title is described as ‘Convention’ as opposed 
to ‘European Convention.’700 Yet, the accession clause in the Convention does not envisage 
accession by developing countries including those from African continent but rather the non-
European member countries to the OECD as clearly stated in Explanatory Report 90.701 
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Historically, the Convention 108 traces its origins from two Council of Europe Resolutions of the 
Committee of Ministers: Resolution (73) 22 on the Protection of Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis 
Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector 1973702 and Resolution (74) 29 on the Protection of 
the Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Public Sector 1974.703 
Compared to the OECD in this context, the European Council seems to have started taking 
serious efforts towards regulation of processing of personal data much earlier. Yet, it was not 
until 1981 when the Contention was signed only one year after the OECD Guidelines were adopted.  
 
The circumstances which necessitated the Council of Europe to adopt specific regulations for 
processing personal data at that time can be explained in the deficiencies of privacy protection in 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) 1950. First, it was clear that the ECHR applies to relations between individuals and 
public authorities and not those of private parties inter se, e.g. an insurance company.704 Second, it 
was also revealed that the ECHR protects two fundamental rights in the field of information 
which may conflict each other: the right to respect of one’s private life and family (Art 8) and the 
right to freedom of information (Art10).705 The Convention does not say where the balance should 
be struck.706 Third, the potential for computer abuse covers a much broader range than the 
Convention’s protection against the right to privacy.707 Apart from the deficiencies in the ECHR, it 
was also apparent to the Council of Europe that many of its member states had no adequate laws 
for protection of personal data.708 To address those challenges in the context of the rapid 
development of technology, adoption of general principles of protection of personal data was 
the only viable option. Also important to note is the fact that cross-border transfer of personal 
data catalyzed the need of adopting common rules that would harmonise the level of protection 
of personal data across member states. 
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a) Philosophical Basis 
 
The Council of Europe has traditionally been a human rights organization, though it has moved 
into such areas as social welfare and penal legislation.709  The organization has even a Committee 
on Legal Data Processing, which is mainly concerned with legal information services.710 As 
already explained, the objectives for which the Council of Europe came to be established were 
largely influenced by abuses of human dignity during the World War II. Such abuses were 
facilitated by misuse of personal information. To address the traumas of the War, the Council of 
Europe became established to foster co-operation among European countries in the areas of 
legal standards, human rights, democratic development, the rule of law and cultural cooperation.  
Regulation of personal data processing is just one of such areas that fall within the competence 
of the Council of Europe. In such context and in contrast to the OECD Guidelines, the preamble 
to the Convention 108 reaffirms the value of human rights protection and fundamental freedoms 
of the individuals as the basis upon which it was developed. Hence the Convention focuses on the 
human rights aspects of the traditional privacy concept.711 
 
b) Structure and Nature 
 
Structurally, the Convention 108 comprises the preamble of four recitals and seven chapters with 
twenty seven articles. The latter stipulate the substantive law provisions in the form of basic 
principles, special rules on transborder data flows and mechanisms for mutual assistance and 
consultation between the parties.712 The Convention has been amended once since it came into 
force to accommodate the accession of the European Union.713 Also important to note is that it 
has one Protocol 714(Additional Protocol or Protocol) which has to be read in conjunction with 
the former. Moreover, since its adoption, fourteen sector specific Recommendations have been 
issued under the Convention in an attempt to partly respond to the uniqueness of different sectors 
and challenges of technologies that came subsequently.715 While these recommendations are not 
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strictly binding in a legal sense, they carry considerable weight when the various detailed 
regulations are prepared.716 Thus, they supplement and amplify the rules of the Convention.717 
Apart from the above, there is also the Explanatory Report to the Convention similar to the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the OECD Guidelines. Although it does not constitute an 
instrument providing an authoritative interpretation of the text of the Convention it facilitates the 
understanding of the provisions contained in it.718 The Explanatory Report itself has ninety three 
paragraphs structured in such nature as to provide background information to the adoption of 
the Convention and interpretation of its provisions.  
 
In contrast to the OECD Guidelines, the Convention 108 is a legally binding international treaty 
concerning data protection issues. Yet, it does not provide, of itself, as set of rights directly 
enforceable in national courts rather it requires contracting states to incorporate its principles in 
their domestic legislation to become enforceable.719 As such, it exerts more force on its members 
and has since influenced the adoption of the Directive 95/46/EC in the European Union and 
beyond as amply demonstrated at the 33rd international conference of data protection and 
privacy commissioners, Mexico City, 2-3 November 2011 where the Council of Europe pointed 
to its data protection as the global standard.720 
 
c) Objectives and Scope  
 
The object and purpose of the Convention 108 is set out in Art 1. The same is formulated in broad 
terms as ‘to secure in the territory of each Party for every individual, whatever of his nationality 
or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to 
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privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him otherwise known as 
data protection’. As it can be noted from this provision, the Convention aims to set standards for 
data protection at the national level.721 The expression ‘whatever of his nationality or residence’ 
means that any restrictions in the national legislation by member states conferring rights to 
individuals on accounts of their nationality or legally resident aliens shall be regarded as 
incompatible to the spirit of the Convention.722 Consequently this requirement extends the scope 
of the Convention to every individual.723 However, apart from seeking to set standards for data 
protection at the national level, the Convention also sets standards that ensure the free flow of 
information across member states is not unnecessarily interrupted.724 This second aim intends 
further to prevent states from adopting such policies as economic protectionism.725 
 
The above objectives and purpose delineate the scope of the Convention in both broad and 
restrictive terms. Art 3 (1) of the Convention states, ‘the Parties undertake to apply this Convention 
to automated personal data files and automatic processing of personal data in the public and 
private sectors.’ In its broad scope the Convention binds both the public and private sectors. 
However it avoids repeating this requirement in the other provisions partly because these terms 
may have a different meaning in different countries.726 Also the deliberate omission to use the 
public-private dichotomy approach in the other provisions of the Convention plays the role in the 
declarations which the parties may make with regard to its scope.727 Yet, in its restrictive sense 
the Convention applies only to ‘automated data file’.  By ‘automated data file’ it means any set of 
data undergoing ‘automatic processing’.728 The latter concept (i.e. automatic processing) includes 
the following operations if carried out in whole or in part by automated means: storage of data, 
carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on those data, their alteration, erasure, 
retrieval or dissemination.729 However with the exceptions of Arts 5(a) and 12, the collection of 
information falls outside the notion of ‘processing’.730 Also important to keep in mind is that 
both concepts ‘automated data file’ and ‘automatic processing’ must be linked to two other 
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concepts ‘personal data’ and ‘controller of the file’ in order to assign their proper interpretation. 
The former means any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual otherwise 
known as ‘data subject’.731 The notion ‘identifiable individual’ in this definition means a person 
who can be easily identified: it does not cover identification of persons by means of very 
sophisticated methods.732 However this definition is problematic. First, it is practically difficult to 
assess the ‘easy’ with which identification can be made as this varies relatively from one data 
controller to another. Second but somewhat linked to the first reason is that the level of 
sophistication of methods is also dependant on the means (e.g. technology) and resources 
available to each data controller. As to ‘controller of file’ it means the natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or any other body who is competent according to the national law to 
decide what should be the purpose of the automated data file, which categories of personal data 
should be stored and which operations should be applied to them.733 
 
Worthwhile to keep in mind is that Convention 108 permits states to undertake exceptions in their 
national legislation. Such exceptions have the effect of narrowing the broad scope considered 
above. At the same time the exceptions may broaden the restrictive scope already considered. 
For example, while in its restrictive sense the Convention seems to apply on natural person data 
subjects, states are also permitted to stipulate provisions in their laws which extend such 
application to legal entities or what are also known as juristic persons.734 Also, states may provide 
in their national legislation that manual files or files which are not processed automatically shall 
be covered.735  States may further exclude application of the Convention to certain categories of 
automated data files provided a list of such categories shall be deposited.736 The latter must only 
constitute categories of data files which are not or not yet subject to data protection legislation 
domestically.737 Also important to note is the broad range of ambit in Art 11 of the Convention 
which categorically states, ‘none of the provisions of this chapter( Chapter II-Basic Principles for 
Data Protection) shall be interpreted as limiting or otherwise affecting the possibility for a Party 
to grant data subjects a wider measure of protection than that stipulated in the Convention.’ It is 
arguable that Art 11 is limited to the extent of the application of the provisions of Chapter II of 
the Convention and does not in any way stipulate beyond the general scope of the Convention in Art 
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3, otherwise to read the former as exceeding the ambit of the latter is to invite internal conflicts 
of the provisions of the Convention. 
 
d) Data Protection Principles 
 
The Convention contains eight data protection principles similar to those enshrined in the OECD 
Guidelines. While some of such principles are explicitly stated in the Convention others may only be 
implied in other formulations. 
 
The first data protection principle is the fair and lawful processing. The principle stipulates that 
personal data ‘shall be obtained and processed fairly and lawfully.’738 The basic criteria underlying 
this principle are ‘fairness’ and ‘lawfulness’. While the former term may be difficult to determine 
it may roughly be examined based on a number of other criteria such as whether the processing 
involves a legitimate reason for doing that; whether the processing of personal data is in itself 
transparent; whether data was obtained without coercing the data subject or by using trickery 
means unknown to the data subject; abstinence from re-using personal data for purposes other 
than those specified during data collection.739 The list given here is not exhaustive rather it serves 
as examples of what envisages ‘fairness’. The ‘lawfulness’ criterion presupposes authorization of 
the data protection process by law or consent from the data subject. 
 
The second principle is the purpose specification. The latter requires that personal data ‘shall be 
stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those 
purposes.’740 There are three basic criteria in this principle: specific and legitimate purpose as well 
as compatible use. Reference to ‘purpose’ in this principle indicates that data controllers should 
not be allowed to store data for undefined purposes.741 The Convention leaves in the mandate of 
states to specify the different ways in which the legitimate purpose should be formulated in their 
national legislation.742 Interestingly, it does not include any explicit reference nor contain a 
specific principle limiting the dissemination of data, although an implicit limitation may be 
derived from the expression ‘…not used in a way incompatible with those purposes.’743 
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The third principle is minimality. It requires that personal data ‘shall be adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored.’744 The minimality principle is 
further amplified by the other requirement that personal data ‘shall be preserved in a form which 
permits identification of the data subjects for no longer than is required for the purpose for 
which those data are stored.’745 Yet the Explanatory Report interprets the time-limits requirement 
for the storage of data in their name-linked form does not mean that data should after some time 
be irrevocably separated from the name of the person to whom they relate, but only that it 
should not be possible to link readily the data and the identifiers.746 It is submitted that, although 
this requirement requires anonymization of data, it is highly possible to re-link the names to their 
respective identifier at a later stage. This possibility is exacerbated by the fact that the separation 
between the names and their corresponding identifiers only needs to be made in such a away that 
it is not quickly and without difficulty to link them. 
 
The fourth principle is the adequate information quality. It states that personal data ‘shall be 
adequate, accurate and relevant in relation to the purposes for which they were processed.’747 By 
limiting processing of personal data to what is adequate, accurate and relevant to achieve a 
specified purpose, the adequacy information quality plays a significant role in facilitating the 
functioning of others principles such as the fair and lawful processing, purpose specification and 
minimality.  
 
The fifth principle is sensitivity. According to this principle, personal data revealing racial origin, 
political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or 
sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides appropriate 
safeguards.748 The same shall apply to personal data relating to criminal convictions.749 While the 
risk that data processing is harmful to persons generally depends not on the contents of data but 
on the context in which they are used, there are exceptional cases where the processing of certain 
categories of data is as such likely to lead to encroachments on individual rights and interests.750 
It is these categories that are envisaged in the sensitivity principle. However, it is important to 
underline that the expression ‘revealing…political opinions, religious or other beliefs’ covers also activities 
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resulting from such opinions or beliefs.751 Also important to note is the term ‘personal data 
concerning health’ which includes information concerning the past, present and future, physical 
or mental health of an individual.752 Such information may relate to a person who is sick, healthy 
or deceased.753 Reference to the expression ‘domestic law’ has to be understood in its wide sense 
including but not limited to legislation, specific regulations, and administrative directives as long 
as the necessary level of protection is secured.754 Worthwhile to keep in mind ‘criminal 
conviction’ in the sense of the sensitivity principle should be understood as convictions based on 
criminal law and the framework of a criminal procedure.755 
 
The sixth principle is data security. The principle states that appropriate security measures shall be 
taken for the protection of data stored in automated data files against accidental, unauthorized 
destruction, accidental loss as well as against unauthorized access, alteration or dissemination.756 
This principle seeks to prevent unauthorized access to the automated data file as well as cases of 
accidental distortion. The security measures envisaged in the data security principle must be 
adapted to the specific function of the file and the risks involved.757 Moreover they should be 
based on the current state of the art of data security methods and techniques in the field of data 
processing.758 The problem that is likely to arise in the implementation of this provision is how 
to determine whether such methods reflect the current state of the art of the data security and 
techniques in the field of data processing. 
 
The seventh principle is transparency. The latter states that any person shall be enabled to establish 
the existence of an automated personal data file, its main purposes, as well as the identity and 
habitual residence or principal place of business of the controller of the file.759 At the same time 
such person shall be enabled to obtain at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or 
expense confirmation of whether personal data relating to him are stored in the automated data 
file as well as communication to him of such data in an intelligible form.760  
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756 Convention 108, Art 7. 
757 Explanatory Report 49. 
758 Ibid. 
759
 Convention 108, Art 8(a). 
760 Ibid, Art 8(b). 
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The eighth principle is rectification. It states that any personal shall be enabled to obtain, as the 
case may be, rectification or erasure of such data if these have been processed contrary to the 
provisions of domestic law giving effect to the basic principles set out in Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Convention.761 Also such person shall be enabled to have a remedy if a request for confirmation 
or, as the case may be, communication, rectification or erasure as referred to in paragraphs 8(a) 
and 8(b) of Article 8 is not complied with.762 
 
As it can be noted, the operation of the transparency and rectifications principles depends on each 
other. This is because both are designed to enable a data subject to defend his rights vis-à-vis 
automated data files.763 In essence, transparency facilitates the realization of the rectification 
rights.  
 
It is important to underline that the functioning of the above principles is subject to certain 
exceptions and restrictions provided under the Convention.  More specifically, departures from 
those principles are permitted so long states meet the criteria set out in Arts 9 and 11. The 
former state that derogations from the provisions of Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention shall 
be allowed when such derogation is provided for by the law of the part and constitutes a 
necessary measure in a democratic society in the interests of: (a) protecting State security, public 
safety, the monetary interests of the State or the suppression of criminal offence; (b) protecting 
the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others. The derogations in Art 11 have already 
been considered in 3.3.1.5 (c) above.  
 
Criticizing the effectiveness of the above data protection principles contained in Chapter II of 
the Convention, Lee A. Bygrave argues:- 
 
‘The Chapter II principles are formulated in general, abstract way and many 
key words are left undefined-also by the Convention’s Explanatory Report. 
While this has certain advantages, the diffuseness of the principles detracts 
from their ability to harmonise the laws of the contracting states. This 
weakness is exacerbated by the Convention otherwise permitting discretionary 
derogation on numerous significant points (see, for example, Articles 3,6 and 
9). This, in turn, has undermined the ability of the Convention to guarantee 
                                                          
761 Ibid, Art 8(c). 
762 Ibid, Art 8(d). 
763 Explanatory Report 50. 
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the free flow of personal data across national borders. At the same time, the 
abstract nature of the principles undercuts their ability to function as practical 
“rules for the road” in concrete situations.’764 
 
Despite the above criticisms, the Convention 108 remains the legally binding international treaty 
which has influenced adoption of data privacy legislation within and outside of Europe. 
 
e.) Transborder Data Flows 
 
As pointed out, ensuring free flow of personal data across member states remains one of the 
primary object and purpose of the Convention. To ensure there is cross-jurisdictional free flow of 
personal information, the Convention incorporates a number of principles in Art 12. The basic rule 
here is that a state party shall not restrict flows of personal data to the territory of another state 
party unless the latter fails to provide ‘equivalent protection’ for the data.765 A major gap in 
Chapter III of the Convention is the absence of rules of flow of personal data from a party to non-
party state.766 In 2001, the Council of Europe remedied the anomaly by adopting an Additional 
Protocol767 which incorporates in its Art 2 provisions on data flow from party to non-party states 
similar to those found in the Directive 95/46/EC.768 It is interesting to note that the Convention 
applies different criteria in the transfer of personal data across countries. The first criterion is the 
‘equivalent protection’ in Art 12 of the Convention while the second is the ‘adequate level of 
protection’ provided in Art 2 of the Convention’s Additional Protocol. The former is invoked 
when the transfer of personal data is concerning inter-parties to the Convention while the latter 
applies when transfer of personal data involves a party and a non-party state to the Convention. 
Arguably this is a weakness to the Convention and may still raise questions as to whether the 
Council of Europe intends to facilitate economic protectionism policies against non-party states. 
 
Also important to keep in mind is that neither the Convention nor its Protocol contains choice of 
law rules. This is similar to what befall the OECD Guidelines. However the omission is mitigated 
somewhat by the provision in Chapter V for establishing a Consultative Committee which is 
                                                          
764 Bygrave, note 716, supra. 
765 Bygrave, p.23, note 503, supra. 
766 Ibid. 
767 See note 714, supra. 
768
 Bygrave, pp.23-24, note 503, supra. 
155 
 
charged with developing proposals to improve application of the Convention.769 Yet at present no 
any concrete choice of law rules have ever been developed by this body.  
 
f.) National Implementation 
 
When the Convention 108 was originally adopted, it did not provide how at the national level it 
would be supervised. This omission left states to adopt different strategies which in the long run 
risked the harmonization of data protection legislation across member states. To remedy the 
situation in 2001, the Council of Europe incorporated in the Convention’s Protocol specific 
provisions regarding supervisory authorities.770 Yet such provisions fall short of mandating that 
each contracting state establish a special control body in the form of a data protection authority 
or the like.771 Also they fail to specify minimum requirements regarding the competence and 
independence of each authority.772 
  
g.) International Cooperation 
 
Articles 13-17 of the Convention regulate international cooperation. To facilitate such cooperation 
each party is required to designate the authority and its competence.773 In this cooperation parties 
may at requests of each other supply information on law and administrative practices in the field 
of data protection.774 Moreover, each party is obliged to assist any person resident abroad to 
exercise the rights conferred by its domestic law giving effect to the principles set out in Art 8 of 
the Convention.775 
 
In conclusion, it is important to point that when the Convention was adopted, the computer was 
not as it is today. Moreover, the subsequent rise in the Internet in the 1990s brought profound 
challenges to issues of data protection. After thirty years of being in force several challenges have 
occurred which make the implementation of the Convention practically difficulty especially in the 
areas of technology. The Council of Europe is currently engaging in a process of revising its 
                                                          
769 Ibid, p.24. 
770 Additional Protocol, Art 2. 
771 Bygrave, note 769. 
772 Ibid. 
773 Convention 108, Art 13(2). 
774 Ibid, Art 13(3). 
775 Ibid, Art 14(1). 
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Data Protection Convention to meet and overcome these challenges.776 However while the 
Convention is being overhauled the review aims at ‘modernizing’ the Convention without altering its 
basic principles, but looking at adding new ones such as those of proportionality and privacy by 
design.777 The review process is set to end in 2012. While it is too early to predict the contents of 
the final draft of the ‘modernized’ Convention 108, it is important to underline that based on the 
submission of comments to the Expert Committee most of the pitfalls highlighted above have 
been widely commented. It is interesting to note that Lee A. Bygrave whose above critics to the 
Convention are most appealing have had opportunity to be onboard of the review process under 
the CSLR. 
 
3.3.1.6 European Directive on Protection of Personal Data 1995 
  
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, commonly cited as Directive 95/46/EC; sets comprehensive regulations 
for protection of personal data in the European Union. It officially came into force on 24 
October 1998, the last date given to member states to transpose the law into their domestic legal 
systems.778 Also important to bear in mind is that the Directive has been incorporated into the 
1992 Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) such that states which are not EU 
members but are party to the EEA Agreement (i.e. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) are 
legally bound by the Directive.779 
 
The adoption of the Directive was largely attributed by the deficiencies in the Council of Europe 
Convention 108/1981. Peter Blume asserts that the purpose of the Convention is the promotion of 
                                                          
776 See, Comments submitted by the Computer Law and Security Review(CLSR) together with the International 
Association of IT Lawyers(IAITL) and the Institute for Law and the Web(ILAWS) in response to the Expert 
Committee’s public on the document titled ‘BEFORE THE EXPERT COMMITTEE SET UP UNDER THE 
CONVENTION 108: MODERNISATION OF CONVENTION 108’, p.1.,  
http://www.soton.ac.uk/ilaws/newsandevents/2011/CONVENTION_108-CLSR.pdf last visited 29/12/2011; see 
also European Privacy Association(EPA), ‘FEEDBACK TO THE MODERNISATION OF CONVENTION 
108’, http://www.europeanprivacyassociation.eu/public/news/Contribution%20-%20Modernisation%20108%20-
%20final%20for%20EPA%20and%20%20APEP.pdf last visited 29/12/2011; CoE, ‘THE CONSULTATIVE 
COMMITTEE OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD 
TO AUTOMATIC PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA: MODERNISATION OF CONVENTION 108 
PROPOSALS’, T-PD-BUR(2011)27_en, Strasbourg, 15 November 2011,  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/tpd_documents/T-PD-BUR_2011_27_en.pdf last 
visited 29/12/2011. 
777 Ibid, (CLRL),(IAITL),(ILAWS). 
778 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 32. 
779 Bygrave, p.31, note 503, supra. 
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transborder data flow on the basis of equivalent levels of protection in the different countries. 780 
For many reasons this purpose has not been fulfilled to a satisfactory extent, and as personal 
information has become more and more internationalized, the necessity of more efficient legal 
instruments has become clearer. Accordingly, the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC was just a 
step in that direction. Blume’s assertion finds support of Charles Raab and Colin Bennett, who, 
in their joint article observe:- 
 
‘However, practice has revealed several drawbacks to the Convention itself as 
an adequate basis for protecting privacy across borders. Many questions about 
definition and scope have taxed the minds of data protectors. Divergences 
among countries in the enactment and implementation of common principles, 
as well as uncertainties about which country’s jurisdiction should apply in 
particular instances, increasingly present problems for international activity. In 
general, then, however influential the Convention has been, it has not effected 
a closer harmonization in practice amongst ratifying countries.’781 
 
The correctness of the above assertions is reflected in the Directive’s own provisions which 
state, ‘the principles of the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, notably the right 
to privacy, which are contained in the Directive, give substance to and amplify those contained 
in the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Data Processing of Personal Data.’782 Yet, harmonization problems 
pinpointed in the preceding paragraphs need not be exaggerated. The reason is that even after 
the adoption of the Directive 95/46/EC such problems have never been resolved as empirically 
observed by Karen McCullagh who argues that although the Directive aimed at promoting 
harmonization of data protection within EU, preliminary findings suggest that such aim remains 
much more apparent than real.783 It is largely because of this that the Directive is in the reform of 
being overhauled and replaced by the Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation).784 Subsequent reference to this instrument shall be Regulation or GDPR 
                                                          
780 Blume, P., ‘Privacy as a Theoretical and Practical Concept’, International Review of Law Computers & 
Technology, 1997, Vol.11, No.2, pp.193-202, at p.199. 
781 Raab, C.D and Bennett, C.J., ‘Protecting Privacy across Borders: European Policies and Prospects’, Public 
Administration, 1994, Vol.72, pp.95-112, at pp.101-102. 
782
 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 11. 
783 McCullagh, note 499, supra. 
784 Note that this instrument is still a work in progress. In December 2011 the researcher got the final draft of the 
proposed law which was leaked to the press in the beginning of December 2011 prior to its official publication by 
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to ease citation. Yet, despite the proposed reform of the European data protection law, this 
thesis proceeds to offer a detailed discussion of the Directive and only a general discussion of 
the Regulation for the following reasons:- 
 
First, although the Directive is proposed to be repealed by the Regulation, the latter law retains 
most of the general principles of data protection in the former. Hence the case law developed by 
the ECJ on the Directive and other practices by Data Protection Authorities in member states 
continue to be relevant. Second, it will take sometime for the Regulation to be formerly put in 
practice. Initially it was proposed that the Regulation would come into force in 2014. However, it 
is unlikely for the new law to be operational at that date as the Regulation is still under intense 
debate by EU member states.Because of this, any detailed and deeper analysis of the Regulation 
at this stage is pre-mature as the practice of the law is yet to be observed. Third, since the 
Regulation came about as a result of the mischief which befell the Directive, it is likely that in the 
implementation and interpretation of the former the latter law be considered as the starting 
point. Fourth, during transition period, the Directive will continue to be in force. 
 
In order to maintain focus, the Directive is considered first then the Regulation follows. This 
helps to appreciate the problems and challenges which necessitated the repeal of the former law. 
Also, it facilitates to clearly understand the proposed law: what is proposed, what has been 
retained, and what has been discarded. 
 
a.)  Philosophical Basis  
 
Like the Council of Europe Convention 108, Directive 95/46/EC has its foundation in the human 
rights treaties and national constitutions of member states. This is reflected in various recitals of 
the preamble to the Directive which frequently refer to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for its normative base.785 Moreover the 
philosophical basis of the Directive in the human rights can further be derived from the object 
and purpose clause in Art 1(see 3.3.1.6 c). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the European Commission; see Version 56 of 29/11/2011; see also, Linkomises, L., ‘EU regulation planned to 
harmonise national laws’, Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 2011, No. 114, pp. 1, 3-4. 
785 See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, Recitals 1, 2,3,10,33,34,37. 
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b.)  Structure and Nature 
 
Compared to Convention 108 and OECD Guidelines, the Directive is the longest and more detailed 
text. The latter has a preamble of seventy two recitals. Its substantive provisions are contained in 
seven chapters comprising a total number of thirty four articles. The length of details contained 
in the preamble has served as a reference point in making interpretation of the substantive 
provisions of the Directive.786 The Directive lacks explanatory memorandum or report similar to 
those accompanying the Convention and the Guidelines. As a result the travaux préparatoires to the 
Directive have served significant role as interpretation references. 
 
Directive 95/46/EC is a legally binding instrument just like the Convention 108. Hoewver, to 
amplify its binding character, the Directive is enforceable at the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).  Although in this case the ECJ’s jurisdiction is limited to determination of references by 
member states for preliminary rulings, it has given the Directive a far greater margin of its 
enforcement compared to the Convention.787  
 
c.)  Objectives and Scope 
 
The Directive has two objectives. First, is to ‘protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal 
data.’788 The second objective of the Directive is to promote free flow of personal data within the 
European Union.789 It is formulated in the negative, ‘member states shall neither restrict nor 
prohibit the free flow of personal data between member states for reasons connected with the 
protection afforded under paragraph one.’790 Reference to ‘the protection afforded under 
paragraph 1’ means that member states should not impede the free flow of personal data by 
advancing reasons related to implementation of the first objective. The second objective appears 
                                                          
786 It is interesting to note that in the English common law legal system preambles to constitutions are not 
considered as part and parcel of the substantive provisions of such constitutions unless expressly provided to the 
contrary (see e.g., notes 126,128,129,130,131 and 132, supra). Hence courts do not rely on such preambles as 
interpretative aids to constitutions. 
787 A preliminary ruling is a decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the interpretation of European 
Union law, made at the request of a court of a European Union member state. The name is somewhat of a 
misnomer in that preliminary rulings are not subject to a final determination of the matters in question, but are in 
fact final determinations of the law in question. Preliminary rulings can also be made, in certain circumstances, by 
the European General Court, although most are made by the ECJ, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preliminary_ruling 
last visited 30/12/2011. 
788 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 1(1). 
789 Ibid, Art 1(2). 
790 Ibid. 
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to outweigh the first. In any case it serves to offer evidence that the Directive is ultimately 
concerned with realizing the effective functioning of the EU’s internal market, and only 
secondarily with human rights.791  
 
Similar to the OECD Guidelines but contrary to Convention 108, the initial scope of application of 
the Directive is broad. First, it applies to processing of personal data in both public and private 
sectors.792 Yet, it does not apply in public sector on matters falling outside the Community law793 
such as those relating to processing of personal data in the context of public security, defence, 
state security and the activities of the state in areas of criminal law.794 Also, the Directive excludes 
its application from the domain of the private sector involving processing of personal data by a 
natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.795 The expression ‘in the 
course of purely personal or household activity’ was interpreted by the ICJ in Lindqvist796 to mean 
the processing of personal data carried out by a natural person in the exercise of activities which 
are exclusively personal or domestic, correspondence and the holding records of addresses but 
does not include say, for example, publication on the Internet so that those data are made 
accessible to an indefinite number of people.797  
 
Apart from the public-private coverage, the Directive applies to both automatic and manual 
processing of personal data.798 However, it limits this scope to the structured ‘filing systems’ 
excluding unstructured and any other categories of manual files.799 By ‘personal data filing 
system’ or simply ‘filing system’ it means any structured set of personal data which are accessible 
according to specific criteria, whether centralized or dispersed on a functional or geographical 
basis.800 Also worth to note is to whom the Directive intends to protect. The initial scope is 
limited to the ‘identified or identifiable natural person.’801 However the Directive does not affect 
in any way legislation in member states which concern processing of data relating to legal/juristic 
                                                          
791 Bygrave, p.32, note 503, supra. 
792 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 25. 
793 There is, strictly speaking, a distinction between European Community law ( EC law) and the European Union 
law(EU law). The former covers primarily matters pertaining to the internal market; it does not extend to police and 
judicial co-operation in criminal matters or to common foreign and security policy. The latter range of matters falls, 
however, under two other ‘pillars’ of the EU system; see Bygrave, p.34, note 503, supra. 
794 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 3(2). 
795 Ibid; see also Recital 12. 
796 See note 21,supra.  
797 Ibid, Paras 46 and 47 of the Judgement. 
798
 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 27. 
799 Ibid. 
800 Ibid, Art 2(c). 
801 Ibid, Art 2(a); see also detailed discussion in 2.2 of this thesis. 
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person.802 The other point setting the limit of the application of the Directive is expressed in the 
form of obligations placed on ‘controller,’803 ‘processor’804 and ‘third party’805 in relation to 
‘processing’806 of personal data.  
 
d.)  Data Protection Principles 
 
The basic principles in the Directive parallel those laid down in the other international codes, 
especially the Council of Europe Convention 108.807 Yet many of the principles in the Directive go 
considerably further than those in the other codes.808 As such, discussion made over such codes 
is also relevant here although it is not reproduced. Generally, the Directive contains similar eight 
data protection principles. While such principles are not numbered in the Directive the present 
thesis numbers them only to facilitate their analyses and discussion. 
 
The first principle requires that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully.809 For the 
processing of data to be fair, the data subject must be in a position to learn of the existence of a 
processing operation and, where data are collected from him, must be given accurate and full 
information, bearing in mind the circumstances of the collection.810 The ‘lawfully’ criterion 
relates to the authorization of the data processing either by law or data subject’s consent. 
 
The second principle states that personal data must be collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.811 
Further processing of data of historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered 
                                                          
802 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 24; see also detailed discussion in 2.2 of this thesis. 
803 ‘Controller’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly 
with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means 
of processing are determined by national or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for 
his nomination may be designated by the national or Community law, see Directive 95/46/EC, Art 2(d); see also 
detailed discussion in 2.2 of this thesis. 
804 ‘Processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes personal 
data on behalf of the controller, see Directive 95/46/EC, Art 2(e); see also detailed discussion in 2.2 of this thesis.  
805 ‘Third party’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body other than the data 
subject, the controller, the processor and the persons who, under the direct authority of the controller or the 
processor, are authorised to process data, see Directive 95/46/EC, Art 2(f). 
806 ‘Processing of personal data or processing’ means any operation or set  of operations which is performed upon 
personal data, whether or not by automatic means such as collection, recording, organisation, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction, see Directive 95/46/EC, Art 2(b); see also detailed 
discussion in 2.2 of this thesis. 
807 Bygrave, p.35, note 503, supra. 
808 Ibid. 
809 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 6(1),(a). 
810 Ibid, Recital 38. 
811 Ibid, Art 6(1),(b). 
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as incompatible provided that member states provide appropriate safeguards.812 This principle is 
otherwise known as the purpose specification. It is important to mention that Art 7 lists the 
purposes for which the processing of personal data are considered to be legitimate. These criteria 
are listed in the alternative, if, (a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or (b) 
processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in 
order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or (c) 
processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; 
or (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or (e) 
processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
existence of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are 
disclosed; or (f) processing is necessary for the purpose of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such 
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject 
which require protection under Article 1(1). The criteria laid down in Art 7 do not put very clear 
limits to the processing of personal data.813 Yet the last two clauses are worth noting, because in 
Art 14, the data subject is given the right to object the processing of personal data under 
conditions (e) and (f).814 The processing of personal data for commercial purposes is a central 
example of group (f).815 
 
It is instructive at this juncture to introduce the most recent judgment of the European Court of 
Justice interpreting Art 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC. The context of interpretation was prompted 
by the Spanish Tribunal Supremo which lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ 
on 28th September 2010 at the instance of Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de 
Crédito(ASNEF) v Administración del Estado.816 The gist of ASNEF’s complaint was that Spanish 
law adds, to the condition relating to the legitimate interest in data processing without the data 
subject’s consent, a condition, which does not exist in Directive 95/46, to the effect that data 
should appear in public sources.817 In the Tribunal’s view, that restriction constitutes a barrier to 
the free movement of personal data that is compatible with Directive 95/46 only if the interest 
of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject so require.818 Hence the only way to 
                                                          
812 Ibid. 
813 Elgesem, p.285, note 427, supra. 
814 Ibid. 
815 Ibid. 
816 ECJ, C-468/10 and C-469/10). 
817 Ibid, Paragraph 17; see also generally Burgos, C and Pavón, B., ‘Spanish Supreme Court provides Limited Relief 
for Data’, Computer Law & Security Review, 2011, Vol.27, No. 1, pp.83-85. 
818 Ibid, Paragraph 20. 
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avoid a contradiction between Directive 95/46 and Spanish law is to hold that the free 
movement of personal data appearing in files other than those listed in Article 3(j) of Organic 
Law 15/1999819 infringes the interest or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data 
subject.820  However being uncertain of its interpretation, the Tribunal Supremo referred two 
questions to the ECJ:- 
 
1. Must Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 24 October 1995, on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data be interpreted as precluding the application of 
national rules which, in the absence of the interested party’s consent, and to 
which processing of his personal data that is necessary to pursue a legitimate 
interest of the controller or of third parties to whom the data will be disclosed, 
not only require fundamental rights and freedoms not to be prejudiced, but also 
require the data to appear in public sources?821  
 
2. Are the conditions for conferring on it direct effect, set out in the case-law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, met by the above-mentioned 
Article 7(f)?822 
 
In its judgment dated 24 November 2011, the ECJ answered both questions in the affirmative.823 
The paramount considerations given by the Court in its judgment were based on harmonization 
of the data protection laws across EU member states. With respect to the first question the ECJ 
drew its attention and reasoning on the object of the Directive. Essentially the Court upheld the 
second object in Art 1(2) which prevents member states from restricting or prohibiting the free 
                                                          
819 Article 3(j) of Organic Law 15/1999 sets out ‘public sources’ in an exhaustive and restrictive list ‘...those files that 
can be consulted by any person, unhindered by a limiting provision or by any requirement other than, where 
relevant, payment of a fee. Public source are, exclusively, the electoral roll, telephone directories subject to the 
conditions laid down in the relevant regulations and lists of persons belonging to professional associations 
containing only data on the name, title, profession, activity, academic degree, address and an indication of 
membership of the association. Newspapers and official bulletins and the media are also public resources.’ See also 
ECJ, C-468/10 and C-469/10), Paragraph 9. 
820 Note 818, supra. 
821 Ibid, Paragraph 22. 
822 Ibid. 
823 Ibid, Paragraphs 49 and 55: ‘In light of those considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 7(f) of 
Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as precluding national rules which, in the absence of the data subject’s consent, 
and in order to allow such processing of that data subject’s personal data as is necessary to pursue a legitimate 
interest of the data controller or of the third party or parties to whom those data are disclosed, require not only that 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject be respected, but also those data should appear in public 
resources, thereby excluding, in a categorical and generalised way, any processing of data not appearing in such 
sources...The answer to the second question is therefore that Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46 has direct effect.’ 
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flow of personal data between member states by advancing reasons connected with protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy in the 
first object in Art 1(1). In its interpretation the ECJ cited recitals 7,8 and 10 which all of them 
carry the spirit of harmonization of member states’ data protection laws. In finding affirmatively 
to the second question( which has also relevancy with the harmonization requirement) the ECJ 
relied on the settled case-law of the Court that whenever the provisions of a Directive appear, so 
far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be 
relied on before national courts by individuals against the state where the latter has failed to 
implement that Directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has 
failed to implement that Directive correctly.824 The latter alternative applied to the Spanish data 
protection law in which case it imposed additional criterion which is incompatible with the 
Directive and has the effect of distorting harmonization of the EU data protection laws.825 
 
The third principle is that personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 
to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed.826 This principle is 
sometimes known as the minimality principle. It seeks to limit the amount of personal data 
under the control of data controllers to only what is necessary to achieve the purposes of such   
collection or further processing. The minimality principle is further reinforced by the 
requirement that personal data must be kept in a form which permits identification of data 
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for 
which they are further processed.827 Accordingly, member states are obliged to lay down 
appropriate safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or 
scientific use.828 
 
The fourth principle requires that personal data must be accurate and, where necessary, kept up-
to-date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or 
incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are 
further processed, are erased or rectified.829 This is otherwise known as the information quality 
                                                          
824 See ECJ, C-203/10 Direktsia Obzhalvane i upravlenie na izpalnenieto Varna v Auto Nikolovi OOD [2011] ECR 
I-0000, paragraph 61; see also ECJ, C-468/10 and C-469/10), Paragraphs 51-55, note 816, supra. 
825 For the possible wide implications of the ECJ decision, see Alonso, C et al., ‘ECJ Decision on Spain has Europe-
wide Implications’, Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 2011, No.114, pp.1,6-7. 
826 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 6(1),(c). 
827 Ibid, Art 6(1),(e). 
828 Ibid. 
829 Ibid, Art 6(1),(d). 
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principle. It has nexus to the minimality principle. Erasure and rectification are the primary 
remedies in case personal data are inaccurate or incomplete. 
 
The fifth principle is sensitivity. This principle states that member states shall prohibit the 
processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or 
sexual life.830 There are however exceptions to this general principle in which case sensitive 
personal data can still be processed where the data subject has given explicit consent to the 
processing of personal data;831 or processing is necessary in carrying out the obligations and 
specific rights of the controller in the field of employment law;832 or processing is necessary to 
protect vital interests of the data subject or of another person where the data subject is physically 
or legally incapable of giving his consent;833 or processing is carried out in the course of its 
legitimate activities with appropriate guarantees;834 or the processing relates to data which are 
manifestly made public by the data subject or is necessary for the establishment, exercise or 
defence of legal claims.835 
 
The sixth principle requires member states to provide that the data controller must implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or 
unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular 
where the processing involves the transmission of data over a network, and against all other 
unlawful forms of processing.836 This principle is also known as information security principle. It 
further requires that where the data controller has engaged a processor to carry out data 
processing the former has to execute a contract or legal act binding the latter.837 The contract or 
such legal act must stipulate that the processor shall act only on instructions from the controller 
and that the obligations set out in Art 17(1) as defined in the national legislation of the member 
state in which the processor is established shall also be incumbent to the processor.838 For 
purposes of proof, the parts of the contract or legal act relating to data protection and the 
                                                          
830 Ibid, Art 8(1). 
831 Ibid, Art 8(2),(a). 
832 Ibid, Art 8(2),(b). 
833 Ibid, Art 8(2),(c). 
834 Ibid, Art 8(2),(d). 
835 Ibid, Art 8(2),(a). 
836 Ibid, Art 17(1); see also Recital 46. 
837
 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 17(3). 
838 Ibid. 
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requirements relating to measures referred in Art 17(1) need to be in writing or in another 
equivalent form.839 
 
The seventh principle is transparency. This principle entails that the data controller and/or his 
representatives must identify themselves to the data subject without the latter’s efforts to search 
or seek such identity.840 Apart from disclosing their identity, the data controller and/or his 
representatives are obliged to notify the data subject the purposes of the processing for which 
the data are intended.841 Also, they are obliged to provide further information such as the 
recipients or categories of recipients of the data; whether replies to the questions are obligatory 
or voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of failure to reply; the existence of the right of 
access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him-whether further information is 
necessary, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the data are processed, to 
guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject.842 The transparency principle also 
imposes obligations on the data controller or his representatives to notify the supervisory 
authority established in accordance of a member state’s national legislation before carrying out 
wholly or partly any automatic processing operation or set of such operations intended to serve a 
single purpose or several related purposes.843 The contents of the information required in the 
notification include identity of the data controller or his representatives, the purpose of the 
processing, description of the categories of the data subject and data relating to them, the 
recipient to whom the data might be disclosed, proposed transfers of data to third countries and 
a general description regarding preliminary assessment of the security of the processing.844 
Exemptions to the requirement of notification to supervisory authority are only allowed at a 
limited level.845 The other obligation imposed on the data controller with respect to transparency 
is the registration requirement with the supervisory authority in a member state. All notifications 
by data controllers are required to be registered and be made subject of inspection by members 
of the public unless this poses security risks.846 
 
Similar to automatic processing operations in relation to transparency principle are automated 
individual decisions.  Article 15 of the Directive prohibits the data subject to be made subject of 
                                                          
839 Ibid, Art 17(4). 
840 Ibid, Arts 10(a) and 11(a). 
841 Ibid, Arts10 (b) and 11(b). 
842 Ibid, Arts 10(c) and 11(c). 
843 Ibid, Art 18(1); see also Recital 54. 
844 Ibid, Art 19(1). 
845 Ibid, Art 18(2). 
846 Ibid, Art 21. 
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a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is 
based solely on automated processing of personal data intended to evaluate certain personal 
aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, 
etc. However, this principle is subject to exceptions such as where there is a contract or law 
which safeguards the legitimate interests of the data subject.847 The automated individual decision 
has been sometimes viewed as an independent data protection principle in the Directive.848 
 
The eighth principle is data subject’s participation. This right ensures that a data subject is placed 
in such a position as to influence the processing of information about him. Apart from that, the 
data subject’s participation principle enables a data subject to protect his legitimate interests in 
the processing of his personal data. As such, the right entails that a data subject has access to the 
information about him held by the data controller or his representative;849 that having gained 
such an access he is able to rectify or correct the information in case of any incompleteness or 
inaccuracies;850 that he can object processing of any information about him (of course subject to 
the limitations of the national laws as allowed by the Directive)851 and finally he has appropriate 
remedy in enforcing the mentioned rights.852 
 
e.)  Transborder Data Principles 
 
As pointed out in 3.3.1.6 c, one of the objectives of the Directive is to ensure that there is a free 
flow of personal data between member states. Yet, circulation of personal information within the 
member states alone cannot foster international trade with non-member states (third countries). 
In realization of this limitation and possibly to resolve it, the Directive incorporates special rules 
of transfer of personal data to third countries in chapter IV comprising Arts 25 and 26.853 The 
chief aim of these rules is to hinder data controllers from avoiding the requirements of data 
                                                          
847 Ibid, Art15 (a) and (b). 
848 Bygrave, note 807, supra; for detailed discussion of automated individual decisions see generally Bygrave, 
Chapters 17 and 18, note 24, supra; Bygrave, L.A., ‘Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection 
Directive and Automated Profiling’, Computer Law & Security Report, 2001, Vol.17, No.1, pp.17-24; Schermer, 
B.W., ‘The Limits of Privacy in Automated Profiling and Data Mining’, Computer Law & Security Review, 2011, 
Vol. 27, No.1, pp. 45-52; Papakonstantinou, V., ‘A Data Protection Approach to Matching Operations among 
Public Bodies’, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 2001, Vol.9, No.1, pp. 39-64. 
849
 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 12(a). 
850 Ibid, Art 12(b). 
851 Ibid, Art 14. 
852 Ibid, Arts 22, 23 and 24. 
853 These two provisions must be read in conjunction with Recitals 56-60 in ascertaining their meaning.    
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protection laws by shifting their processing operations to countries with more lenient 
requirements (so-called ‘data heavens’).854 
  
The main rule for TBDF in the Directive is provided in Art 25(1). It states that transfer of 
personal data to a third country which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing 
may take place only if the third country in question ensures an ‘adequate level of protection’. In 
case the third country does not ensure ‘adequate level of protection’ the transfer of data to such 
country must be prohibited.855 While the Directive does not define what is meant by ‘adequate 
level of protection’, it provides criteria for its assessment. Accordingly, Art 25(2) provides that 
the ‘adequacy of the level of protection’ afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light 
of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations 
taking into account in particular the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed 
processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the 
rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the 
professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that country. What clearly 
emerges from here is that Art 25 is not directed so much to the general provisions of the law in a 
third country, but the actual level of protection which will be accorded in a particular case.856 
This view is further cemented by the Article 29 Working Party who says, ‘Article 25 envisages a 
case by case approach whereby assessment of adequacy is in relation to individual transfers or 
individual categories of transfers.’857 Usually this assessment lies firstly with the data exporters (or 
transferors) and secondly with national data protection authorities in the EU/EEA.858 However, 
the European Commission is empowered under Art 25(6) to make general determinations of 
‘adequacy’ which are binding on EU (and EEA) member states.859 In comparison with the data 
transferors and national supervisory authorities, the Commission is in a better position to assess 
                                                          
854 Ellger, R., Der Datenschutz im grenzüberschreitende Datenverkehr: eine rechtsvergleichende und kollisions-
rechtliche Untersuchung, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990, p87, cited in Bygrave, pp.79-80, note 24, supra. 
855 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 25(4), Recital 57. 
856 Aldhouse, F., ‘The Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries under EU Directive 95/46/EC‘, International 
Review of Law Computers & Technology, 1999, Vol.13, No.1, pp.75-79, at p.76. 
857 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Discussion Document: First Orientations on Transfers of Personal 
Data to Third Countries - Possible Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy’, XV D/5020/97/ EN, WP 4, (adopted 
on 26th June 1997), p.1. 
858 Bygrave, p.81, note 24, supra; see also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, p.2, note 857, supra. 
859 Bygrave, note 858, supra; note also that the Commission does not make such decisions on its own but with input 
from (i) the Data Protection Working Party( which may deliver a non-binding opinion on the proposed 
decision(Art. 30(1)(a) & (b); the Article 31 Committee (whose approval of the proposed decision is necessary and 
which may refer the matter to the Council for final determination (Art. 31(2)); and (iii) the European Parliament( 
which is able to check whether the Commission has properly used its powers), see Bygrave(footnote 317), note 858, 
supra; see also European Commission., ‘Commission decisions on the adequacy of the protection of personal data 
in third countries’, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/thridcountries/index_en.htm last visited 7/1/2012. 
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the adequacy of data protection.860 Such a holistic approach is cost efficient.861 Moreover, it 
relieves member states as they do not have to assess the same cases, and differences between 
national assessments can be avoided.862 Similarly, this approach increases certainty and 
predictability for data transferors.863 As a result, the overall effect of the Commission’s positive 
determinations is to allow free flow of personal data from the 27 EU member states and three 
EEA member countries (Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland) to that third country without any 
further safeguard being necessary.864 Currently the European Commission has recognized 
Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Australia, Faeroe Islands, 
Andorra, Israel, the US Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, and the 
transfer of Air Passenger Name Record to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection as providing adequate protection.865 Also important to bear in mind is that in all cases 
where a member state or the Commission considers that a third country does not ensure an 
adequate level of protection of personal data within the meaning of Art 25(2), such information 
                                                          
860 Kong, L., ‘Data Protection and Transborder Data Flow in the European and Global Context’, The European 
Journal of International Law (EJIL), 2010, Vol. 21, No.2, pp.441-456, at p. 445. 
861 Ibid. 
862 Ibid. 
863 Ibid. 
864 European Commission, note 859, supra. 
865 COMMISSION DECISION pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the adequate protection of personal data provided in Switzerland, 2000/518/EC of 26 July 2000 - O. J. L 215/1, 
25/8/2000; COMMISSION DECISION pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently 
asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, C(2000) 2441 of 26 July 2000- O. J. L 215/7, 
25/8/2000; COMMISSION DECISION pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided by the Canadian Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act, C(2001) 4539 of 20 December 2001- O.J. L 2/13, 4/1/2002; COUNCIL DECISION 
on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the 
processing of API/PNR data, 2006/230/EC of 18 June 2005-O.J.L 82/14, 21/3/2006; COMMISSION 
DECISION  pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate 
protection of personal data in Argentina, C(2003) 1731 of 30 June 2003 – O.J.L 168, 5/7/2003; COMMISSION 
DECISION on the adequate protection of personal data in Guernsey, C(2003) 4309 of 21 November 2003 – O.J.L 
308, 25/11/2003; COMMISSION DECISION on the adequate protection of personal data in the Isle of Man, 
C(2004) 1556 of 28 April 2004-O.J. L 151/48, 30/4/2004; COMMISSION DECISION on the adequate protection 
of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection, C(2004) 1914 of 14 May 2004, COMMISSION DECISION on the adequate 
protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the Canada 
Border Services Agency, C(2005) 3248 of 6 September 2005; COMMISSION DECISION pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data in Jersey, 
C(2008) 1746 of 8 May 2008 - OJ L 138/21, 28/5/2008; COUNCIL DECISION on the signing, on behalf of the 
European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of 
European Union-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs Service, C 
2008/651/CFSP/JHA of 30 June 2008, O.J.L213/47, 08/08/2008; COMMISSION DECISION pursuant to 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection provided by the 
Faeroese Act on processing of personal data, C(2010) 1130) of 5 March 2010 – O.J.L58/17, 9/3/2010; 
COMMISSION DECISION pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the adequate protection of personal data in Andorra, C(2010) 7084 of 19 October 2010 – O.J. L 277/27, 
21/10/2010;  and COMMISSION DECISION pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by the State of Israel with regard to automated 
processing of personal data, C(2011) 332 of 31 January 2011- O.J.L 27/39, 1/2/2011. 
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is required to be shared across member states. Yet, it is doubtful if in the former case the 
notification may have a binding effect on the other member states. 
 
The second set of rules of TBDF relates to the derogations from the above main rule. These 
derogations are provided in Art 26. They apply where a third country does not provide ‘adequate 
level of protection’ to transfer of personal data. Art 26(1) lays down six criteria in the alternative 
to be fulfilled before a transfer of personal data to such third country can be permitted (a) that 
the data subject has given consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer; or (b) the transfer is 
necessary to perform certain contracts between the data subject and the controller or the 
implementation of pre-contractual measures taken in response to the data subject’s request; or 
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract with a third party; or 
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest grounds, or for the 
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or (e) the transfer is necessary to protect the 
vital interests of the data subject;866 or (f) the transfer is made from a register which according to 
laws or regulations is intended to provide information to the public and which is open to 
consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate 
interest. 
 
Art 26(2) provides another possibility of derogation. In this case, transfer of personal data may 
be authorized by a member state where the data controller adduces ‘adequate safeguards’ with 
respect to the protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and 
as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights; such safeguards may in particular result from 
appropriate contractual clauses. The ‘adequate safeguards’ referred in this provision are not in 
any way less than the ‘adequate protection’ standard which consists of a series of basic data 
protection principles together with certain conditions necessary to ensure their effectiveness.867 
Also to ensure that these arrangements do not weaken the level of protection of personal data, a 
member state which has so authorized transfer of personal data in accordance with Art 26(2) is 
required to notify the other member states and Commission.868 If upon such notification a 
member state or the Commission objects the assessment on justified grounds the latter will take 
                                                          
866 The expression ‘vital interest’ of the data subject has a restrictive meaning to mean ‘which is essential for the data 
subject’s life’, see Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 31. 
867 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document on Transfer of Personal Data to Third 
Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive’, DG XV D/5025/98/WP 12, 
(adopted on 24th July 1998), p.17. See also 3.3.1.6.e (i), (ii) and (iii) of this thesis for discussion of the data protection 
principles and mechanisms of their enforcement as envisaged by the Article 29 Working Party.  
868 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 26(3). 
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appropriate measures in which case member states shall comply with it.869 Finally, the 
Commission may decide that certain standard contractual clauses offer sufficient safeguards in 
terms of Art 26(2). 
 
The implementation of Arts 25 and 26 have generated intense debates and commentaries. Yet, 
up to recently various interpretations and commentaries of these provisions have failed to offer 
proper scope with certainty. This has significantly reduced the practical utility and complicated 
the enforcement of the Directive. For example, the Article 29 Working Party and Commission 
have issued various documents attempting to interpret and how to implement Arts 25 and 26, 
yet these have not resolved the difficulties in actual practice. Two main sets of such documents 
may be identified as general and specific guidance. The former sort of documents include 
Discussion Document: First Orientations on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries - 
Possible Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy,870 Working Document on Judging Industry Self-
Regulation: when does it make a meaningful contribution to the level of data protection in a 
third country?,871 Working Document on Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries: 
Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive872 and Working Document on 
a Common Interpretation of Article 26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995.873  On 
the other hand, specific documents adopted by the Article 29 Working Party and Commission 
include: Working Document: Preliminary Views on the Use of Contractual Provisions in the 
Context of Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries,874 Opinion 1/2001 on the Draft 
Commission Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to 
Third Countries under Article 26(4) of Directive 95/46,875 Opinion 7/2001 on the Draft 
Commission Decision(Version 31 August 2001) on Standard Contractual Clauses for the 
Transfer of Personal to Data Processors established in Third Countries under Article 26(4) of 
Directive 95/46,876 Commission Decision of 27 December 2001 on Standard Contractual 
Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Processors established in Third Countries, under 
Directive 95/46/EC,877 Working Document on Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries: 
Applying Article 26(2) of the EU Data Protection Directive on Binding Corporate Rules for 
                                                          
869 Ibid. 
870 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, note 857, supra.  
871 DG XV D/5057/97/ WP 7, (adopted on 14th January 1998). 
872 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, note 867, supra. . 
873 2093/05/EN, WP 114, (adopted on 25th November 2005). 
874 DG XV D/5005/98, WP 9, ( adopted on 22nd April 1998). 
875 5006/02/EN, WP 38, (adopted on 26th  January 2001). 
876 5061/01/EN, WP 47, (adopted on 13th  September 2001). 
877 Commission Decision, (EC) 2002/16/EC, O.J.L 6, 27 December 2001, pp.52-62.  
172 
 
International Data Transfer,878 Opinion 8/2003 on the Draft Standard Contractual Clauses by a 
Group of Business Associations (‘the Alternative Model Contract’),879 Recommendation 1/2007 
on the Standard Application of Binding Corporate Rules for the Transfer of Personal Data,880  
Working Document setting up a table with the elements and principles to be found in the 
Binding Corporate Rules,881 Working Document setting up a Framework for the Structure of 
Binding Corporate Rules,882 Working Document on Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) related 
to Binding Corporate Rules,883 Opinion 3/2009 on Draft Commission Decision on Standard 
Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Processors established in Third 
Countries, under Directive 95/46/EC (Data Controller to Data Processor),884 Commission 
Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Processors 
established in Third Parties under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council,885 FQAs in order to address some issue raised by the entry into force of the EU 
Commission Decision 2010/87/EU of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the 
Transfer of Personal Data to Processors established in Third Countries under Directive 
95/46/EC,886 Opinion 7/2010 on European Commission’s Communication on the Global 
Approach to Transfers of Passenger Name Record(PNR) Data to Third Countries,887 and 
Opinion 10/2011 on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Use of Passenger Name Records Data for Prevention, Detention, Investigation 
and prosecution of Terrorist Offences and Serious Crimes.888 
 
Apart from the above list of specific documents, there is a long list of specific documents on 
TBDF between the European Union and the United States of America. The latter are considered 
in 3.3.2 of this thesis. 
 
Worthwhile to note is that more than any other document in the above list Working Document on 
Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection 
                                                          
878 11639/02/EN, WP 74, (adopted on 24th  October 2002). 
879 11754/03/EN, WP 84, (adopted on 3rd June 2003). 
880 WP 133, (adopted on 1st January 2007). 
881 1271-00-00/08/EN, WP 153, (adopted on 24th June 2008). 
882 1271-00-01/08/EN, WP 154, (adopted on 24th June 2008). 
883 1271-04-02/08/EN, WP 155 rev.04, (adopted on 24th June 2008, last revised on 8th April 2009). 
884 00566/09/EN, WP 161, (adopted on 5th March 2009). 
885 Commission Decision, (EC) 2010/87/EU, O.J.L 39, 5 February 2010, pp.5-9. For a detailed discussion of the 
Commission’s Decision, see Wojtan, B., ‘The new EU Model Clauses: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?’, 
International Data Privacy Law, 2011, Vol.1, No.1, pp. 76-80. 
886 00070/2010/EN, WP 176, (adopted on 12th July 2010). 
887 622/10/EN, WP 178, (adopted on 12th November 2011). 
888 00664/11/EN, WP 181, (adopted on 5th April 2011). 
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Directive889 or simply WP 12 contains detailed methodological criteria of assessment of ‘adequacy’ 
requirement. It is therefore interesting to examine such methodology as it cuts across all other 
documents. Also, the examination alerts non-EU countries which have not so far adopted data 
protection legislation or which have adopted such legislation but have not yet been accredited by 
EU as having adequate data protection regulations and practices to appreciate what is expected 
from them by EU if they wish to continue to exchange personal data with the latter. 
  
WP 12 sets out two levels of assessment of ‘adequate level of data protection’ with regard to 
transborder flow of personal data to third countries. The first level of assessment relates to 
‘content’ principles while the second ‘procedural/enforcement’. In principle, the former are 
modified version of the data protection principles contained in the of Directive 95/46/EC ( see 
3.3.1.6 d) while the latter mirror the enforcement mechanisms envisaged to a large extent under 
chapters  VI of the Directive( see 3.3.1.6 f). 
 
i. Substantive Content Principles 
 
 The Purpose Limitation Principle 
 
Data should be processed for a specific purpose and subsequently used or further communicated 
only insofar as this is not incompatible with the purpose of the transfer. The only exemptions to 
this rule would be those necessary in a democratic society on one of the grounds listed in Article 
12 of the Directive. 
 
 The Data Quality and Proportionality Principle 
 
Data should be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. The data should be adequate, 
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are transferred or further 
processed. 
 
 The Transparency Principle 
 
Individuals should be provided with information as to the purpose of the processing and the 
identity of the data controller in the third country, and other information insofar as this is 
                                                          
889 See notes 867 and 872, supra. 
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necessary to ensure fairness. The only exemptions permitted should be in line with Articles 11(2) 
and 13 of the Directive. 
 
 The Security Principle 
 
Technical and organizational security measures should be taken by the data controller that are 
appropriate to the risks presented by processing. Any person acting under the authority of the 
data controller, including a processor, must not process data except on instructions from the 
controller. 
 
 Rights of Access, Rectification and Opposition 
 
The data subject should have a right to obtain a copy of all data relating to him/her that are 
processed, and a right to rectification of those data where they are shown to be inaccurate. In 
certain situations he/she should also be able to object to the processing of the data relating to 
him/her. The only exemptions to those rights should be in line with Article 13 of the Directive. 
 
 Restrictions on Onward Transfers 
 
Further transfers of the personal data by the recipient of the original data transfer should be 
permitted only where the second recipient (i.e. the recipient of the onward transfer) is also 
subject to rules affording an adequate level of protection. The only exceptions permitted should 
be in line with Article 26(1) of the Directive. 
 
ii. Additional Principles to be applied to Specific Types of Processing  
 
 Sensitive Data 
 
Where ‘sensitive’ categories of data are involved (those listed Article 8 of the Directive), 
additional safeguards should be in place, such as a requirement that the data subject gives his/her 
explicit consent for the processing. 
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 Direct Marketing 
 
Where data are transferred for purposes of direct marketing, the data subject should be able to 
‘opt out’ from having his/her data used for such purposes at any stage. 
 
 Automated Individual Decision 
 
Where the purpose of the transfer is the taking of an automated decision in the sense of Article 
15 of the Directive, the individual should have the right to know the logic involved in this 
decision, and other measures should be taken to safeguard the individual’s legitimate interest. 
 
iii. Procedural/Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
In Europe the enforcement mechanism of data protection laws rest with the national supervisory 
authorities (see 3.3.1.6 f). However since in most non-EU member states the existence of 
comprehensive data protection legislation and concomitantly the supervisory authorities are 
lacking, the WP 12 adopts an evaluation method that is flexible. This entails first, identification 
of the underlying objectives of a data protection procedural system, and second judgment of 
different judicial and non-judicial procedural mechanisms used in third countries. Accordingly 
WP 12 identifies three main objectives of a data protection system:- 
 
 Delivery of a good level of compliance with the rules 
 
A good system is generally characterized by a high degree of awareness among data controllers 
of their obligations, and among data subjects of their rights and means of exercising them. The 
existence of effective and dissuasive sanctions can play an important role in ensuring respect for 
rules, as of course can systems of direct verification by authorities, auditors, or independent data 
protection officials. 
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 Provision of support and help to individual data subjects in the exercise of 
their rights 
 
The individual must be able to enforce his/her rights rapidly and effectively, and without 
prohibitive cost. To do so there must be some sort of institutional mechanism allowing 
independent investigation of complaints. 
 
 Provision of appropriate redress to the injured party where rules are not 
complied with 
 
This is a key element which must involve a system of independent adjudication or arbitration 
which allows compensation to be paid and sanctions imposed where appropriate. 
 
In winding up this part, it is imperative to highlight key points relating to TBDF under Arts 25 
and 26 of the Directive 95/46/EC. First, more than any other rules of TBDF contained in the 
international codes of data protection, Art 25 and 26 have exercised strong political pressure on 
non-EU member states to adopt comprehensive data protection legislation in the EU-style.890 
Second, although in principle an ‘adequate level of data protection’ can be attained through self-
regulation it is hardly possible for a third country to be generally considered as satisfying the 
required level of adequacy merely on the basis of self-regulations. This is not surprising because 
self-regulations are restrictive in their application. They only cover and bind particular sectors or 
members of specific professions as such an individual falling outside cannot enforce his or her 
rights and obtain appropriate remedies. The other limitation facing self-regulations is the lack of 
sound enforcement mechanisms.891 Third, given that under Directive 95/46/EC there are two 
different types of assessment of ‘adequate level of data protection’: the general assessment by the 
European Commission which may cover either the entire third country or specific sectors within 
such country and specific assessments relating to each specific transfer determined by controllers 
or national supervisory authorities, the likelihood of divergences of assessments are bound to 
                                                          
890 All of these provisions give an impression that the EU, in effect, is legislating for the world; Bygrave, p. 334, note 
25, supra. 
891 Blume, P., ‘Transborder Data Flow: Is there a solution in sight?’, International Journal of Law and International 
Technology, 2000, pp.65-86, at p.70; see also The Working Group-Latin America Data Protection Network, ‘Self-
Regulation and Personal Data Protection’, Conference at Santa Cruz De La Sierra-Bolivia, 3-5 May 2006, pp.1-13, 
http://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/english_resources/regulations/common/pdfs/Autorregulacion_Ingles.pdf , 
last visited 9/01/2012, where self-regulation was clearly held to be ineffective means of achieving adequate data 
protection; see also Gellman, R and Dixon, P., ‘The History of failed Self-Regulation in the United States’, Privacy 
Laws & Business International Report, 2011, No.114, pp.10-12. 
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occur. The likelihood is further made a reality with the different ways EU member states have 
transposed the Directive which allows them some margins of maneuvering the general principles 
laid down there. Fourth, although the Article 29 Working Party has attempted to lay down legally 
non-binding rules for assessment of ‘adequate level of data protection’ in the third countries 
particularly those found in WP 7 and WP 12, in practice, it has taken into account extraneous 
latent considerations not envisaged by the Directive itself. For example, the Article 29 Working 
Party commissioners have considered and hence taken on board political considerations in the 
assessment. In their view ‘some third countries might come to see the absence of a finding that 
they provided adequacy protection as politically provocative or at least discriminatory, in that the 
absence of a finding is as likely to be the result of their case not having been examined as of a 
judgment on their data protection system.’892 Performing the adequate assessment on these fears 
has rendered ‘political considerations an obstacle for a sound evaluation, as not placing a country 
on the white list is similar to blacklisting it’.893 Yet, in mitigating the chances of occurrence of 
diplomatic and political tensions with third countries, the EU has in most cases awaited third 
countries to initiate the process of accreditation.894 In such cases even if at the first instance the 
Commission finds problems with the data protection regulations and practices in a third country, 
it normally engages such countries and facilitates improvement of their regulations and practices 
until a required level is reached.895 In such approach the Article 29 Working Party, the technical 
group of EU which advises the Commission, more often adopts its official opinion on the level 
of adequacy after the third countries have addressed a number of areas of concerns. Because of 
this, most of its adopted opinions have had favorable outcome on third countries (except the US 
Safe Harbor Agreement and the Passenger Name Records which present a different story, see 
                                                          
892 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, p. 27, note 867, supra; see also Kong, note 860, supra. 
893 Blume, note 891, supra. 
894 See e.g., Ringou, N., ‘Data Protection: European Adequacy Procedure’, presentation made in ‘Twinning Project 
IS/2007/ENPAP/JH/01: Strengthening Data Protection in Israel’ 30 September 2009, Israel, (23 slides, at slide 
no.17),http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/A31C13F2-3554-4086-929C- 
2CFF6D31462C/21169/DataProtectionIsrael.pdf last visited 11/01/2012. 
895 Ibid, slide no.18; see e.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 6/2009 on the Level of Protection 
of Personal Data in Israel’, 02316/09/EN, WP 165, (adopted on 1st December 2009), pp.17-18 where even after the 
Article 29 Working Party had made a finding that Israel’s system of data protection law meets the adequate level of 
data protection under the Directive, the former proceeded to encourage the latter to specifically improve its system 
in future legislative development in the following aspects: the extension of application of the Israeli legislation to 
manual databases; the express inclusion of the proportionality principle in relation to the totality of personal data 
processing carried out by the private sector, and incorporation of interpretation of the exemptions in international 
data transfers online envisaged in Article 26(1) of the Directive. This was also the case for Argentina where the 
Article 29 Working Party says, ‘the Working Party encourages the Argentinean authorities to take the necessary steps 
to overcome some remaining weaknesses in the present legal instruments, as identified in this opinion and requests 
the Commission to continue the dialogue with the Argentinean Government with that purpose. In particular the 
Working Party urges the Argentinean Authorities to ensure the effective enforcement of the legislation at 
provisional level by means of the creation of the necessary independent control authorities where they do not exist 
yet and, in the mean-time, to look for appropriate temporary solutions in accordance with the Argentinean 
Constitutional order.  
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3.3.2).896 Yet, where the Article 29 Working Party had a negative opinion as to the ‘adequate level 
of data protection’ in a third country it used a ‘neutral’ language in its opinion to avoid passing a 
direct ‘verdict’ but only through expressing its dissatisfaction by drawing the attention of the 
Commission to take into account key areas of concerns when making its decision. This was the 
case, for example, with the determination of ‘adequacy’ of the Canadian Personal Information 
and Electronic Documents Act 2000.897 However in those cases where express negative opinion 
is issued this has never been publicized. In this connection Professor Graham Greenleaf argues:- 
 
‘There could be significantly more adequacy findings outside Europe if the EU 
was more pro-active and more transparent about its processes. Where the EU 
has made positive adequacy decision it has publicized the reasons, but where it 
has considered “applications” from other countries but concluded that their 
protections were not yet adequate, it has not generally publicized the reasons 
for these negative conclusions. There has therefore been much less 
information available about what does and what does not constitute 
“adequacy” than is desirable.’898 
 
The approach is different in some occasions where external consultants had been hired by the 
Commission to undertake analysis of the adequacy of data protection in a third country. Here a  
                                                          
896 The list of the Article 29 Working Party opinion since the adoption of the Directive up to January 2012(excluding 
those on USA) include: ‘Opinion 5/99 on the Level of Protection of Personal Data in Switzerland’, 5054/99, WP 
22, (adopted on 7th June 1999); ‘Opinion 6/99 on the Level of Personal Data Protection in Hungary’, 5070/EN/99, 
WP 24, ( adopted on 7th September 1999); ‘Opinion 3/2001 on the Adequacy Level of the Canadian Personal 
Information and Electronic Documents Act’, 5109/00/EN, WP 39, (adopted on 26th January 2001); ‘Opinion 
3/2001 on the Level of Protection of the Australian Privacy Amendment(Private Sector) Act 2000’, note 164, supra; 
‘Opinion 4/2002 on the Level of Protection of Personal Data in Argentina’, 11081/02/EN, WP 63, (adopted on 3rd 
October 2002); ‘Opinion 5/2003 on the Level of Protection of Personal Data in Guernsey’, 10595/03/EN, WP 79, 
(adopted on 13th October 2003); ‘Opinion 6/2003 on the Level of Protection of Personal Data in the Isle of Man’, 
11580/03/EN, WP 82, (adopted on 21st November 2003); ‘Opinion 1/2004 on the Level of Protection of Personal 
Data ensured in Australia for the Transmission of Passenger Name Record Data from Airlines’, 10031/03/EN, WP 
85, (adopted on 16th January 2004); ‘Opinion 3/2004 on the Level of Protection ensured in Canada for the 
Transmission of Passenger Name Records and Advance Passenger Information from Airlines’, 10037/04/EN, WP 
88, (adopted on 11th February 2004); ‘Opinion 1/2005 on the Level of Protection ensured in Canada for the 
Transmission of Passenger Name Record and Advance Passenger Information from Airlines’, 1112/05/EN, WP 
103, (adopted on 19th January 2005); ‘Opinion 8/2007 on the Level of Protection of Personal Data in Jersey’, 
02072/07EN, WP 141, (adopted on 9th October 2007); ‘Opinion 9/2007 on the Level of Protection of Personal 
Data in the Faroe Islands’, 02107/07/EN, WP 142, (adopted on 9th October 2007); ‘Opinion 6/2009 on the Level 
of Protection of Personal Data in Israel’, note 893, supra; ‘Opinion 7/2007 on the Level of Protection of Personal 
Data in the Principality of Andorra’, 02317/09/EN, WP 166, (adopted on 1st December 2009); ‘Opinion 6/2010 on 
the Level of Protection of Personal Data in the Eastern Republic of Uruguay’, 0475/10/EN, WP 177, (adopted on 
12th October 2010); and ‘Opinion 11/2011 on the Level of Protection of Personal Data in New Zealand’, note 311, 
supra.  
897 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, p.7, note 896, supra. 
898 Greenleaf, G., ‘Do not dismiss “Adequacy”: European Standards entrenched’, Privacy Laws & Business 
International Report, 2011, No.114, pp.16-18, at pp.16-17. 
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more direct language has been used in those instances of negative findings. For instance, the 
conclusive view of the consultants (Research Centre in IT and Law, University of Namur, 
Belgium) in case of Tunisia’s analysis of adequacy level of data protection is that ‘the Tunisian 
regime regarding the protection of personal data is to be considered inadequate, at the present 
time, and on the basis of our comprehension of the Act in force.’899 Perhaps because of this, in 
those cases reports on adequacy have either been treated confidential allegedly on account of 
contractual confidentiality clauses between the consultant and the Commission900 but in reality to 
prevent the so called ‘political provocation’ which the Article 29 Working Party has openly 
admitted in its guidelines for assessing the level of adequacy of data protection in third countries 
                                                          
899 CRID (Centre de Recherches Informatique et Droit), University of Namur (Belgium)., ‘Analysis of the Adequacy of 
Protection of Personal Data provided in Tunisia-Final Report’, 2010, at p. 123, 
http://alexandrie.droit.fundp.ac.be/GEIDEFile/6544.pdf?Archive=192619191089&File=6544_pdf, 
last visited 10/01/2012. It is interesting to note that in similar assessment of adequacy for India, CRID avoided to 
explicitly say that India does not provide adequate level of data protection though the impression left in the 
conclusion is meant to be so; see CRID, University of Namur (Belgium)., ‘First Analysis of the Personal Data 
Protection in India-Final Report’, 2005, pp.70-71,  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/final_report_india_en.pdf last visited 15/01/2012. For a 
detailed discussion about Indian conception of privacy and possibly why it is slow in enacting data protection similar 
to EU see e.g., Basu, S., ‘Policy-Making, Technology and Privacy in India’, The Indian Journal of Law and 
Technology, 2010, Vol.6, pp.65-88. 
900 The confirmation of this claim was made to the researcher via email on 10/01/2012 by Prof. Cécile de 
Terwangne when the former requested from the latter supply of CRID., ‘Analysis of the adequacy of protection of 
personal data provided in Mauritius: draft final report, 2010’, prepared by Claire Gayrel, Florence de Villenfagne, 
Cécile de Terwangne who declined to make such a supply but advised the researcher to make a direct request from 
the European Commission. The researcher also received similar response from the Commissioner of Data 
Protection in Mauritius by email sent on 10/01/2012 when he requested the same report. However, the 
Commissioner promised to send the second report to the researcher a month later suggesting that report may have a 
favourable assessment from EU authorities. The confidentiality syndrome has featured in other reports of the CRID 
expressly marked as confidential: CRID., ‘First analysis on the personal data protection law in Albania to 
determinate whether a second step has to be undertaken : final report (confidentiel), 2006’, prepared by  
Cécile de Terwangne, Florence de Villenfagne, Franck Dumortier, Virginie Fossoul, Yves Poullet, Artur Asslani, 
Gianluca Carlesso; CRID., ‘First analysis of the personal data protection law in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to 
determinate whether a second step has to be undertaken (confidentiel), 2006’, prepared by  Cécile de Terwangne, , 
Florence de Villenfagne, Franck  DumortieR, Virginie Fossoul, Yves, Poullet; CRID., ‘First analysis of the personal 
data protection law in Fyrom in order to determinate whether a second step has to be undertaken (confidentiel), 
2006’, prepared by Cécile de Terwangne, Florence de Villenfagne, Franck Dumortier, Virginie Fossoul, Yves Poullet, 
Neda Korunovska; CRID., ‘Analysis of the adequacy of protection of personal data in the Faeroe Islands 
(confidentiel), 2006’, prepared by Permille Wegener Jessen, Evelyne Beatrix Cleff, Cécile de Terwangne, Florence de 
Villenfagne, Franck Dumortier,  Yves Poullet; CRID., ‘First analysis of the personal data protection law in Israel in 
order to determinate whether a second step has to be undertaken (confidentiel), 2006’,  prepared by Cécile de 
Terwangne, Florence de Villenfagne, Franck Dumortier, Virginie Fossoul, Yves Poullet, Michael Dan Birhack; 
CRID., ‘First analysis of the personal data protection law in Japan in order to determinate whether a second step has 
to be undertaken (confidentiel), 2006’, prepared by Cécile de Terwangne, Florence de Villenfagne, Franck 
Dumortier, Virginie Fossoul, Yves Poullet, Masao Horibe; CRID., ‘First analysis of the personal data protection law 
in Kosovo in order to determinate whether a second step has to be undertaken : final report (confidentiel), 2006’, 
prepared by Cécile de Terwangne, Florence de Villenfagne, Franck Dumortier, Virginie Fossoul, Yves Poullet; 
CRID., ‘First analysis of the personal datat protection in Montenegro to determinate whether a second step has to 
be undertaken : final report (confidentiel), 2006’,  prepared by Cécile de Terwangne, Florence de Villenfagne, Franck 
Dumortier, Virginie Fossoul, Yves Poullet, Sasa Gajin; and CRID., ‘First analysis of the personal datat protection in 
Serbia to determinate whether a second step has to be undertaken : final report (confidentiel), 2006’, prepared by 
Cécile de Terwangne, Florence de Villenfagne, Franck Dumortier, Virginie Fossoul, Yves Poullet, Sasa Gajin; 
http://alexandrie.droit.fundp.ac.be/Record.htm?Record=19129086157919472689&idlist=6 last visited 12/01/2012. 
It is important to note that while the list of these reports is available at CRID website, their contents are not 
accessible. 
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as a potential risk to diplomatic relations.901 Yet, only rarely such reports have been made 
public.902 The other extraneous criterion considered by the Article 29 Working Party in its 
opinion is the economic importance of a third country to Europe and concomitantly the amount 
of data of Europeans likely to be transferred there. This can well be demonstrated by the recent 
clearance of New Zealand by the Article 29 Working Party as providing adequate level of data 
protection despite several weaknesses in the New Zealand’s data protection regime. It is evident 
that the clearance was prompted by ‘the New Zealand’s relative geographical isolation; the 
limited EU-sourced data likely to be transferred to New Zealand (which minimizes the problem 
of onward transfers); and the reciprocal lack of direct marketing into the EU that could be 
expected from NZ’.903 It can thus be generally concluded ‘that the standard of adequacy is in 
inverse proportion to proximity, provided that “proximity” is considered to include the 
economic and social, not only the geographical’.904 Also significant, the Article 29 Working Party 
has taken into consideration the interests of EU citizens at the expense of those in the third 
country when assessing the adequacy of the data protection system. Accordingly ‘it is the effect 
of a third party’s laws on EU citizens that counts toward adequacy, not the effect on the 
country’s own citizens’.905 Finally, the EU has double standard in terms of the criteria for transfer 
of personal data: the ‘equivalency’ criterion applies to EU member states while the ‘adequacy’ is 
invoked against third countries. Arguably, this is likely to result into unnecessary disparities in 
implementation of the Directive. 
  
Linked to TBDF are conflicts of laws issues. As noted, none of the previous international codes 
regulating protection of personal data (notably the OECD Guidelines, Convention 108 and UN 
Guidelines) contains applicable law rules (also known as conflict of laws, choice of law, interlegal 
issues or private law issues). In contrast, Art 4 of Directive 95/46/EC contains the first and the 
only set of an international data protection instrument to deal specifically with the determination 
of applicable law.906 Art 4 reads:- 
 
                                                          
901 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, note 892, supra. 
902 See e.g., CRID, note 899. 
903 Greenleaf, G and Bygrave, L.A., ‘Not entirely adequate but far away: Lessons from how Europe sees New 
Zealand data protection’, Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 2011, No.111, pp.8-9, at p. 9. 
904 Ibid. 
905 Ibid. 
906 Bing, J., ‘Data Protection, Jurisdiction and the Choice of Law’, Privacy Law & Policy Reporter, 1999, Vol. 6, No. 
6, pp. 92-98. This article is no longer downloadable in pdf format from http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/journals/PLPR/1999/65.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=Bing#disp1 where it was first 
published hence difficult to cite the specific page number referred. However the same paper is available in html at 
https://www.pco.org.hk/textonly/english/infocentre/files/bing-paper.doc last visited 13/01/2012, pp. 1-11, at p. 
7; see also Bygrave, note 500, supra. 
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‘Article 4: National law applicable 
 
1. Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant 
to this Directive to the processing of personal data where: 
(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an 
establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State; 
when the same controller is established on the territory of several 
Member States, he must take necessary measures to ensure that each 
of these establishments complies with the obligations laid down by the 
national law applicable; 
(b) the controller is not established on the member State’s territory, but in 
place where its national law applies by virtue of international public 
law; 
(c) the controller is not established on the Community territory and, for 
purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment, 
automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member 
State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes of transit 
through the territory of the Community. 
 
2. In the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1(c), the controller must 
designate a representative established in the territory of the Member State, 
without prejudice to legal actions which could be initiated against the 
controller himself.’ 
 
The above provisions of Art 4 have generated quite substantial but conflicting interpretations 
from commentators, national supervisory authorities in EU member states and the Article 29 
Working Party. As can be noted, Art 4 contains two sets of rules of applicable law: those relating 
to EU member states and those relating to third countries. Both sets have some interactions at 
some points; hence any discussion of Art 4 must not be made in isolation of the other. However, 
before analyzing these rules it is important to underscore the rationale behind their incorporation 
in the Directive.  
 
The rationale behind Art 4 can generally be traced from the aims of the Directive: to ensure 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individuals as well as free flow of 
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information across the EU member states. Based on these objectives several principles were 
incorporated in the Directive. One category of these principles relate to enforcement-i.e. 
institutions of enforcement such as supervisory authorities, courts and other administrative 
bodies; remedies and sanctions. In practice, enforcement is impossible if there is uncertainty as 
to which law individuals are subject to. In that regard, Art 4 was adopted to determine which law 
applies when and to whom. Also, the adoption of Art 4 was to ensure there is harmonization in 
application of the law across EU reflecting the overall purpose of Directive 95/46/EC. This has 
been explained in the travaux préparatoires in the following words, ‘that the same processing 
operation might be governed by the laws of more than one country’907 hence disparities in the 
level of protection. The other rationale explained in the travaux préparatoires of the Directive is to 
prevent data controllers in EU to circumvent the EU data protection regime by relocating their 
processing activities to third countries-the so called ‘data havens’. As a result of this 
circumvention, the data subject might find himself outside any system of protection.908 It can be 
argued, at least contrary to Lokke Moerel’s view,909 that although the final version of Directive 
95/46/EC abandoned the ‘country of origin principle’ to which the Explanatory Memorandum 
to the Amended Proposal of the Original910 version was meant for, the former (i.e. the final 
version of the Directive) sought to continue to retain the spirit of the objective of Art 4 in the 
Amended Proposal. In other words, the final version of the Directive only changed the method 
or approach of applicable law from the ‘country of origin principle’ to ‘territoriality principle’. 
Confirmation of this view can be derived from two sources. First is the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Original version of Directive 95/46/EC itself which Moerel overlooked to 
refer and focused on the Explanatory Memorandum of the Amended Proposal. According to the 
former, the objectives of Art 4 as incorporated in the Original version of the Directive were 
explained in the following words:- 
 
                                                          
907 Commission of the European Communities., ‘Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data’, COM (92) 422 
final, 15 October 1992, p.13; see also Bygrave, p.253, note 50, supra. 
908 Ibid. 
909 ‘Some commentators (referring to Lee A. Bygrave in his article-Determining Applicable Law Pursuant to 
European Data Protection Legislation-see note 906, supra and Jon Bing in his article-Data Protection, Jurisdiction 
and the Choice of Law-see note 906, supra) interpret Article 4(1)(a) as leading to the applicability of the law of the 
Member State where the controller is established. Some quote in support of this interpretation the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Commission ( referring to Bygrave and Bing), where the Commission gives the second 
rationale for the applicability rule of Article 4(1)(a) “to avoid that one and the same data processing would be 
governed by the law of more than one country”. As noted above, this Memorandum was published in respect of the 
Amended Proposal, therefore at the time the country of the origin principle was still contained in the proposed 
Directive, a point these commentators have overlooked’-Moerel, L., ‘Back to Basics: When does EU Data 
Protection Law apply?’, International Data Privacy Law, 2011, Vol.1, No.2, pp. 92-110, at p.103. 
910 See, note 907, supra. 
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‘This article specifies the connecting factors which determine the application 
in each Member State of the Directive’s provisions. The choice of factors in 
paragraph 1 is motivated by the desire to avoid a situation in which the data 
subject is completely unprotected owing, mainly, to the law being 
circumvented. The factual criterion of the place in which the file is located has 
therefore been adopted. In this connection, each part of a file which is 
geographically dispersed or divided among several Member States must be 
treated as a separate file. The desire to protect the data subject in the event of 
relocation is at the root of a provision which requires a user consulting a file 
located in a third country from a terminal located in a Member State to comply 
with the Directive’s provisions…This Article is also designed to avoid any 
overlapping of applicable laws.’911 
 
The above paragraph was replicated in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Amended Proposal 
with only a change of connecting factor from ‘location of the file’ to ‘place of establishment of 
the controller’ but with the retention of the ‘country of origin principle’ and the objective behind 
it. The second source of confirmation of the continuity or rather retention of the objective 
behind Art 4 is recitals 19 and 20 of the preamble to the final version of the Directive. Recital 19 
reflects the prevention of any possible circumvention of the national rules. It reads:- 
 
‘Whereas establishment on the territory of a Member State implies the 
effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements; whereas the 
legal form of such an establishment, whether simply branch or subsidiary with 
a legal personality, is not the determining factor in this respect; whereas, when 
a single controller is established on the territory of several Member states, 
particularly by means of subsidiaries, he must ensure, in order to avoid any 
circumvention of national rules, that each of the establishments fulfils the 
obligations imposed by the national law applicable to its activities’ 
 
Recital 20 relates to the objective of ensuring respect for rights and obligations provided in the 
Directive. It provides:- 
 
                                                          
911 Commission of the European Communities., ‘Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data’, COM (1990), final-SYN 287, 13 September 1990, pp. 21-
22. 
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‘Whereas the fact that the processing of data is carried out by a person 
established in a third country must not stand in the way of the protection of 
individuals provided for in this Directive; whereas in these cases, the 
processing should be governed by the law of the Member State in which the 
means used are located, and there should be guarantees to ensure that the 
rights and obligations provided for in this Directive are respected in practice.’ 
 
Moreover, cases I-V cited and discussed by Moerel (as Opinion 2-i.e opposing interpretation to 
what is envisaged under Art 4)912 seem not to be justified on objectives of Art 4 as explained in 
the Explanatory Memorandum to the Amended Proposal of the Directive although some of the 
views are in line with Bygrave and Bing. This weakens any proposition that the misinterpretation 
of Art 4 of the Directive is linked to reckoning the objective of Art 4 on the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Amended Directive.  
  
In substance, the Directive’s applicable law is wholly based on the ‘territoriality’ principle. This 
principle applies regardless of whether processing of personal data has taken place within EU 
member states or in relation to international processing (i.e. involving third countries). Art 4 lays 
down two connecting factors to the ‘territoriality principle’. The first, and which commentators 
have widely cited as main default rule, is ‘the context of the activities of an establishment of the 
controller on the territory of the Member State’ in Art 4(1)(a). Accordingly it is not ‘the place of 
establishment’913 but the ‘the place where the activities of an establishment of the controller’ has 
taken place on the territory of a member state which is considered. The difference between the 
two criteria is that while the former relates such activities to the seat or place of incorporation of 
a controller (i.e. referring to the application of the ‘country of origin principle’) the latter relates 
only to the place where the activities of the controller has direct bearing without physically being 
established there. Lokke Moerel distinguishes these two criteria by relating the former to ‘being 
established’ and the latter ‘having an establishment’.914 According to this author, the concept 
‘being established’ refers to the primary establishment of the controller and serves the country of 
                                                          
912 Moerel, pp.103-106, note 909, supra. 
913 For contrary view see e.g., Bygrave, note 907 who argues, ‘ It can be seen that, under Art 4, the principle criterion 
for determining applicable law is the data controller’s place of establishment, largelrly irrespective of where the data 
processing occurs.’ Similar view is held by Bing, pp.6-7, note 906, supra. Yet in a subsequent article, Bing, J., ‘The 
identification of applicable law and liability with regard to the use of protected material in the digital context’, 
ECLIP Research Report, 2000, pp.236-258, at 248, the author( Jon Bing) appears to shift from his earlier position as 
to the applicability of Art 4 where he argues, ‘This does not, perhaps, make it quite clear what an “establishment” 
implies but it would clearly include subsidiaries, branch offices, and perhaps also agents or similar representation. In 
any case, the criterion is based on the activity of the controller.’ 
914 Moerel, p. 94, note 909, supra. 
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origin principle while ‘having an establishment’ which is the basis for the applicability rule of the 
Directive, includes the primary establishment but especially refers to secondary establishments 
like subsidiaries, branches, and agencies.915 In this context therefore, the applicable law is the law 
of the country in which the controller’s data processing activities relate to and not the law of the 
country where it has its primary establishment. The Directive seems to declare a national data 
protection law already applicable if the data processing takes place in the context of the activities 
of an establishment of a controller that is located on its territory.916 There is yet another criterion 
under Art 4(1)(a) where the same controller is established on the territory of several member 
states. In such a situation each of the establishments of a controller has to comply to the national 
law applicable in respective territories. Accordingly, the laws of more member states may apply 
to a processing of personal data (i.e. commutation of applicable laws).917 
 
Where the controller is not established on the territory of the member state two rules apply but 
not cumulatively. The first, which is less problematic, is Art 4(1)(b). This is the instance where 
according to the rules of public international law, the national law of a state applies. This rule 
extends to the field of application of public law.918 Suffice to say that there has been little 
discussion on this provision presumably because it has not caused much difficulty to apply. 
Much more complex application and accordingly commentaries have arisen with respect to Art 
4(1)(c). It has sometimes tempted commentators to regard this as the second main default rule of 
applicable law under Art 4 leaving out entirely Art 4(1)(b). The connecting factor for making Art 
4(1)(c) applicable is ‘use of equipment’ located on the territory of a member state. ‘Transit’ 
through such ‘equipment’ is excluded from ‘use of equipment’. The latter expression is not 
defined in the Directive. Yet, when one reads Art 4(1)(c) of the Directive in conjunction with 
Recital 20, it leaves no doubt that reference to ‘equipment’ is not confined to ‘something 
materially substantial and solid’ especially when considering the use of the term ‘means’ as 
opposed to ‘equipment’ in Recital 20 and other language version of the Directive.919 In any case, 
the term ‘equipment’ must be given a broad interpretation. This is in accord to the rationale 
behind Art 4(1)(c): to prevent a controller that has its activities within EU from circumventing 
the protection afforded by the Data Protection Directive by relocating its place of establishment 
                                                          
915 Ibid, p.95; see also Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 19. 
916 Ibid, p.93. 
917 Ibid, p.97. 
918 Bing, p.249, note 913,supra. 
919 See e.g., Bygrave, p.254, note 500, supra; Moerel, L., ‘The long arm of EU Data Protection law: Does the Data 
Protection Directive apply to processing of personal data of EU citizens by website worldwide?’, International Data 
Privacy Law, 2011, Vol.1, No.1, pp.28-46, at p.33. 
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outside the EU.920 To further realize the spirit of Art 4(1)(c) and ‘in order to ensure that the data 
subjects can effectively exercise their data protection rights against such a non-EU controller, Art 
4(2) of the data Protection Directive subsequently provides that a non-EU controller that uses 
equipment on Community territory must designate a representative established on the territory 
of the relevant member State’.921  
 
Many criticisms have been raised against Arts 4 generally and 4(1)(c) in particular. One of such 
criticisms is based on what is known as ‘protection gap’ i.e. a situation where certain matters are 
left unprotected by law. It is contended that Art 4(1)(c) provides for applicability of the Directive 
in situations where the controller is not established within EU.922 However, Art 4(1)(a) does not 
apply in the reverse situation ( that the controller is established within the EU) but applies only if 
the processing ‘is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the 
controller’.923 The other criticisms raised is the possible rise of ‘regulatory overreaching’ in an 
online environment. By ‘regulatory overreaching’ it means a situation in which rules are 
expressed so generally and non-discriminatingly that they apply prima facie to a large range of 
activities without having much of a realistic chance of being enforced.924 The frequently cited 
instance in which Art 4(1)(c) has been seen to have resulted into  ‘regulatory overreaching’ by 
commentators is the operation of ‘cookies’.925 926 The controversy which arises in relation to the 
application of ‘cookies’ by Websites’ operators hinges around on ‘cookies’ from non-EU 
websites. Bygrave,927 Kuner928 and Moerel929 share similar views that ‘cookies’ from non-EU 
websites should not be subject to the application of Art 4(1)(c) of the Directive lest ‘regulatory 
overreaching’ of the Directive will result. Yet, a different view has been consistently held by the 
                                                          
920 Dammann, U and Smitis, S., EG-Datensschutzrichtlinie, Normos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997, at p. 129 cited in 
Moerel, note 919, supra. 
921 Moerel, p.32, note 919, supra. 
922 Ibid, p.35. 
923 Ibid. 
924 Bygrave, p.255, note 500, supra. 
925 Ibid; see also Kuner, C., ‘Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2)’, 
International Journal of Law and Information technology, 2010, Vol.18, No.3, pp.227-247, at p.229; Moerel, pp.39-
43, note 919, supra. 
926 As to what are ‘cookies‘and how they function in respect to processing of personal information of individuals, 
see e.g., Zimmerman, notes 18,19 and 20 supra; Moerel, note 925, supra. 
927 Bygrave, note 924, supra-‘If a Web site operator based in, say, India were to set “cookies” on to the browser 
programs of persons situated within the EU, then the operator’s actions would arguably meet the criteria in Art 
4(1)(c)-i.e. the operator would be processing personal data making use of equipment( broadly construed) situated on 
the territory of the EU Member State. This would mean that processing would be governed by the data protection 
law of the EU Member State concerned.’  
928 Kuner, note 925, supra. 
929 Moerel, p.40, note 919, supra. 
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Article 29 Working Party in several of its opinions.930 In case of ‘regulatory overreaching’ or 
‘exorbitant jurisdiction’931 in which case the jurisdictional scope of the law is much broader than 
the chance that the law will be enforced, there is a risk that respect for the law will be 
diminished.932 The resulting low chance of enforcement may cause controllers to regard data 
protection rules as a kind of bureaucratic nuisance rather than as ‘law’.933 Much more 
complication in the application of Art 4 generally and 4(1)(c) in particular results from the recent 
development of ‘cloud computing’ technology.934 In the ‘cloud’ it is difficult to locate the place of 
establishment of the controller or at least the scope of the activities of the establishment of the 
controller on a particular territory as such the data protection regime may be complicated to 
enforce.935 This, as we shall see shortly, is among the reasons that made the revision of Directive 
95/46/EC inevitable. 
                                                          
930 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document on Processing of personal data on the Internet’, 
5013/99/EN/final, WP 16, (adopted on 23rd February 1999); Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working 
Document on Privacy on the Internet: An Intergraded EU Approach to Online Data Protection’, 
5063/00/EN/FINAL, WP 37, (adopted on 21st November 2000); Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
‘Working Document on Determining the International Application of EU Data Protection Law to Personal Data 
Processing on the Internet by Non-EU based Websites’, 5035/01/EN/Final, WP 56, (adopted on 30th May 2002), 
pp.10-12; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2008 on Data protection Issues related to Search 
Engines’, 00737/EN, WP 148, (adopted on 4th April 2008) and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 
5/2009 on Online Social Networking’, 01189/09/EN, WP 163, (adopted on 12th June 2009). It can be noted from 
this list that while most of these documents address issues of ‘cookies’ rather generally, WP 56 is very specific to 
such issues and similar technologies. Detailed comments on the Article 29 Working Party opinion over ‘cookies’ and 
related technologies in relation to applicability of Art 4(1)(c) are covered by Moerel, note 925, supra. 
931 Kuner defines ‘exorbitant jurisdiction’ as improper or excess jurisdiction, see Kuner, p.227, note 925, supra. 
932 Ibid, p.235. 
933 Ibid, p.236. 
934 The term ‘cloud computing’ has been variously defined by commentators. This thesis adopts the definition of 
Simon Bradshaw, Christopher Millard and Ian Walden as it is elaborative of the main feature of ‘cloud computing’ 
and neutral. According to these scholars, ‘cloud computing’ is defined in terms of three things: First, provision of 
flexible, location-independent access to computing resources that are quickly and seamlessly allocated or released in 
response to demand; second, abstraction and typical visualisation of services( especially infrastructure), by being 
generally allocated from a pool of shared as a fungible resource with other customers; and third, charging, where 
present, is commonly on an access basis often in proportion to the resources used; see Bradshaw, S et al., ‘Contracts 
for clouds: Comparison and Analysis of the Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services’, International 
Journal of Law and Information technology, 2011, Vol.19, No.3, pp. 187-223, at p.189. This article is also appears as 
‘Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 63/2010’ at Social Science Research Network 
(SSRN), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662374 last visited 16/01/2012.  
935 See e.g. Kuan Hon, W et al., ‘The Problem of “Personal Data” in Cloud Computing: What information is 
regulated?-the Cloud of Unknowing’, International Data Privacy Law, 2011, Vol.1, No.4, pp.211-228; Dhillon, G 
and Kolkowska, E., ‘Can a Cloud Be Really Secure? A Socratic Dialogue’, in Gutwirth, S et al (eds)., Computers, 
Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice, Springer, Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York, 2011, 
pp.345-360; Ruiter, J and Warnier, M., ‘Privacy Regulation for Cloud Computing: Compliance and Implementation 
in Theory and Practice’, in Gutwirth, S et al (eds)., Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice, 
Springer, Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York, 2011, pp.361-376; Poullet, Y et al., ‘Data Protection in 
Clouds’, in Gutwirth, S et al (eds)., Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice, Springer, 
Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York, 2011, pp.377-409; Casola, V et al., ‘Access Control in Cloud-on-Grid 
Systems: The PerfCloud Case Study’, in Gutwirth, S et al (eds)., Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element 
of Choice, Springer, Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York, 2011, pp. 427-444; Pieters, W., ‘Security and 
Privacy in the Clouds: A Bird’s Eye View’, in Gutwirth, S et al (eds)., Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an 
Element of Choice, Springer, Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York, 2011, pp. 445-457, at p.452; Hustinx, P., 
‘Data Protection and Cloud Computing under EU Law’, Third European Cyber Security Awareness Day BSA, 
European Parliament, 13 April 2010, pp.1-7, at pp.3-4 (Peter Hustinx is the European Data Protection Supervisor),  
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To address the above criticisms, commentators have advanced several recommendations. First, 
in order to reduce ‘regulatory overreaching’ Art 4(1)(c) has to be read down such that its 
application is limited to two situations: where the controller attempts to circumvent the law of an 
EU member state by relocating his/her/its establishment to a third country( but still uses means 
situated in the EU) and where the controller him-/her-/itself (who is located in a third country) 
transmits data to a third country for further processing( again using means situated in the EU).936 
Second, given the problem that data subjects have to cope with foreign legal systems in 
enforcing their rights, this could be remedied if applicable law were to be made the law of the 
State in which the data subject has his/her domicile.937 Such a rule would parallel existing 
European rules on jurisdiction and choice of law in the case of consumer contracts.938 Third, is 
the need for greater harmonization of the law; cooperation between regulatory authorities; 
technical solutions; development of a theory of comity or reasonableness and greater interaction 
between the jurisdiction and data protection worlds.939 Interesting to note is that commentators 
have often addressed their solutions to choice of law issues as only means to ‘reduce’ such 
problems and not to completely eliminate them. This approach is sensible because it is practically 
difficult to completely eradicate choice of law disputes especially given the fact that: technology 
is constantly evolving; there are jurisdictions without completely data protection regimes which 
make it difficult to enforce the law there and even in those with such regimes there are still 
disparities in their formulation and implementation. With the upcoming of the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, it is to be seen to what extent these recommendations have been taken on 
board.  Also important to wait and see is how the Regulation is going to be put in practice. This 
is because, adopting a law is one thing yet its practice is another thing. The two may or may not 
match however well the laws are drafted. 
 
f.) National Implementation 
 
Any meaningful system of data protection law must be supported by a sound mechanism of its 
implementation. Such mechanism ensures that the rights and obligations of the data subjects and 
data controllers respectively are realized. To achieve this, Directive 95/46/EC requires every 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2010/10-
04-13_Speech_Cloud_Computing_EN.pdf last visited 16/01/2012. Hustinx’s views are that principles of EU 
law(including applicable law) remain relevant and fully applicable to the provision of cloud computing services-
although there are some challenges in the way such principles apply, ( see p. 6 of his speech). 
936 Bygrave, p.256, note 500, supra. 
937 Ibid. 
938 Ibid. 
939 Kuner, pp. 242-246, note 925, supra. 
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member state to establish one or more public authorities to monitor within its territory of the 
provisions of the national laws adopted by the member states under the Directive.940 These 
authorities must act ‘with complete independence’ in exercising the functions entrusted to 
them.941 The expression ‘with complete independence’ does not mean that such authorities 
should be established outside the government’s structure. The independence referred here 
should be interpreted in the context of the functions of the authorities, hence functional 
independence. Care must be taken to ensure that the authorities’ inevitable dependence on other 
bodies (e.g. through budget and personnel allocations) does not undermine the functional 
independence they are otherwise supposed to have.942 Moreover, administrative and legal 
frameworks which leave open even a small possibility of a data protection authority being 
instructed by another administrative body on how to exercise its functions, most probably do 
not satisfy the criteria of Art 28(1).943 Recently the meaning of ‘with complete independence’ has 
been a subject of a judicial dispute in European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany,944 where in 
its judgment delivered on 9th March 2010 the European Court of Justice said:- 
 
‘In relation to public body, the term “independence” normally means a status 
which ensures that the body concerned can act completely freely, without 
taking any instructions or being put under any pressure. Contrary to the 
position taken by the Federal Republic of Germany, there is nothing to 
indicate that the requirement of independence concerns exclusively the 
relationship between the supervisory authorities and the bodies subject to that 
supervision. On the contrary, the concept of “independence” is 
complemented by the adjacent “complete”, which implies a decision-making 
                                                          
940 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 28(1). 
941 Ibid. 
942 Bygrave, p.70, note 24, supra; for detailed discussion as to how non-structural dependence affects the operation 
of the Data Protection Authorities see, Stewart, B., ‘A Comparative Survey of Data Protection Authorities-Part1: 
Form and Structure’, Privacy Law and Policy Reporter, 2004, Vol.11, No.2, 
http://corrigan.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/2004/30.html last visited 19/03/2012; Stewart, B., ‘A 
Comparative Survey of Data Protection Authorities-Part2: Independence and Functions’, Privacy Law and Policy 
Reporter, 2004, Vol.11, No.3, 
http://corrigan.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/2004/39.html last visited 19/03/2012; Kuner, C et al., ‘The 
Intricacies of Independence’, International Data Privacy Law, 2012, Vol.2, No.1, pp.1-2; Greenleaf, G., 
‘Independence of Data Privacy Authorities(Part I): International Standards’, Computer & Security Review, 2012, 
Vol.28, No.1, pp.3-13. 
943 Bygrave, note 942, supra. 
944 ECJ C-518/07. 
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power independent of any direct or indirect external influence on the 
supervisory authority.’945  
 
The rationale of the notion of ‘complete independence’ of supervisory authorities, was explained 
by the ECJ as follows:- 
 
‘The guarantee of the independence of national supervisory authorities is 
intended to ensure the effectiveness and reliability of the supervision of 
compliance with the provisions on protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and must be interpreted in the light of that aim. It 
was established not to grant a special status to those authorities themselves as 
well as their agents, but in order to strengthen the protection of individuals 
and bodies affected by their decisions. It follows that, when carrying out their 
duties, the supervisory authorities must act objectively and impartially. For that 
purpose, they must remain free from any external influence, including the 
direct or indirect influence of the State or the Länder, and not of the influence 
only of the supervised bodies.’946  
 
It is intriguing to note that a ‘mere risk’ of the scrutinizing body that it may exercise political 
influence over the decisions of the supervisory authorities is sufficient to encroach the latter’s 
‘independence’ as clearly observed by the ECJ:- 
 
‘Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the mere risk that the scrutinizing 
authorities could exercise a political influence over the decisions of the 
supervisory authorities is enough to hinder the latter authorities’ independent 
performance of their tasks. First, as was stated by the Commission, there 
could be ‘prior compliance’ on the part of those authorities in the light of the 
scrutinizing authority’s decision-making practice. Secondly, for the purposes of 
the role adopted by those authorities as guardians of the right to private life, it 
                                                          
945 Ibid, Paragraphs 18-19; see also Raab, C.D., ‘Roles and Relationships of Data Protection Authorities’, 
Presentation at the Conference on ‘The Hungarian Parliamentary Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom 
of Information 1995 – 2011’ Budapest, 28 September 2011, pp. 1-24, http://abiweb.obh.hu/abi/abi_1995-
2011/doc/Charles_D_Raab.ppt last visited 12/01/2012;  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights(FRA)., 
Data Protection in the European Union: the Role of the National Data Protection Authorities, Publications Office 
of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2010, pp.19-20. 
946 Ibid, Para 25. 
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is necessary that their decisions, and therefore the authorities themselves, 
remain above any suspicion of partiality.’947 
 
Another point clearly made out by the ECJ in this case is that the mode of appointment of the 
supervisory authorities either by executive or parliament does not ipso facto deprive such 
authorities of their statutory mandates of acting with ‘complete independence’ as envisaged 
under Art 28(1) of Directive 95/46/EC.948 After taking all the above principles into account, the 
ECJ held the Federal Republic of Germany in breach of Art 28(1) ‘by making the authorities 
responsible for monitoring the processing of personal data by non-public bodies and 
undertakings governed by public law which compete on the market (öffentlich-rechtliche 
Wettbewerbsunternehmen) in the different Länder subject to State scrutiny, and by thus 
incorrectly transposing the requirement that those authorities perform their functions ‘with 
complete independence.’949 
 
Within their ‘complete independence’ the data protection authorities are endowed with a wide 
range of functions and powers. Art 28(2) of the Directive puts a requirement that whenever 
administrative measures or regulations relating to protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms 
with regard to processing of personal data are being drawn the supervisory authorities must be 
consulted. This requirement assumes that the supervisory authorities are staffed with personnel 
possessing technical expertise to be able to properly advise general and specific issues relating to 
administrative measures and regulations on processing of personal data. Apart from this advisory 
role, data protection authorities are also vested with power of investigation, of intervention and 
of engagement in legal proceeding and hear and determine complaints.950 In the latter case the 
decisions of supervisory authorities may be appealed against through the courts.951 The Directive 
also puts some obligations on supervisory authorities to ensure smooth discharge of functions 
                                                          
947 Ibid, Para 36. 
948 Ibid, Paragraphs 43-46, the ECJ said, ‘Admittedly, the absence of any parliamentary influence over those 
authorities is inconceivable. However, it should be pointed out that Directive 95/46 in no way makes such an 
absence of any parliamentary influence obligatory for the Member States. Thus, first, the management of the 
supervisory authorities may be appointed by the parliament or the government. Secondly, the legislator may define 
the powers of those authorities.  Furthermore, the legislator may impose an obligation on the supervisory authorities 
to report their activities to the parliament. In that regard, a comparison may be made with Article 28(5) of Directive 
95/46 which provides that each supervisory authority is to draw up a report on its activities at regular intervals 
which will then be made public.  In view of the foregoing, conferring a status independent of the general 
administration on the supervisory authorities responsible for the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data outside the public sector does not in itself deprive those authorities of their democratic 
legitimacy.’ 
949 Ibid, Para 56. 
950 Directive 95/46/EC, Arts 28(3) and 28(4). 
951 Ibid, Art 28(3). 
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entrusted on them. Art 21(2) places the obligation to maintain a register of processing operations 
which may be inspected by any person. Also, the supervisory authorities are required to draw up 
reports at regular intervals.952 Such reports are required to be public.953 Under Art 28(7) members 
and staff of supervisory authorities are duty bound to maintain professional secrecy with regard 
to confidential information to which they have access during and after their employment has 
ended. 
 
In the exercise of their powers to hear and determine complaints lodged to them, the supervisory 
authorities are empowered to impose sanctions and order compensation for damages. Although 
the Directive does not explicitly provide for imposition of sanctions and orders of compensation 
for damages such competence would clearly be compatible with the Directive.954 In fact the 
Directive leaves specific details on sanctions, remedies and liability to be supplied by member 
states in their national data protection laws.955 
 
g.)  International Cooperation 
 
Two sets of provisions can be identified under this sub-heading. First, there are those provisions 
in the Directive which create institutions or allocate functions to the institutions of the EU 
mostly those relating to supervisory duties over the implementation of the Directive. The second 
set relates to the relationships among the national supervisory authorities in member states. 
 
Under the first category, the Directive establishes and/or allocates functions on four EU 
institutions: the Council of the European Union (or Council),956 European Commission (or 
Commission),957 Committee of Representatives of EU member states (or the Committee)958 and 
                                                          
952 Ibid, Art 28(5). 
953 Ibid. 
954 Bygrave, p.72, supra, note 24. 
955 Directive 95/46/EC, Arts 22, 23 and 24. 
956 Also informally known as the EU Council, this is where national ministers from each EU country meet to adopt 
laws and coordinate policies. This body should not be confused with: European Council – another EU institution, 
where EU leaders meet around 4 times a year to discuss the EU’s political priorities or Council of Europe – not an 
EU body at all, see http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm last visited 
17/01/2012. 
957The European Commission is one of the main institutions of the European Union. It represents and upholds the 
interests of the EU as a whole. It drafts proposals for new European laws. It manages the day-to-day business of 
implementing EU policies and spending EU funds. The Commission is composed of 27 Commissioners, one from 
each EU country providing the Commission’s political leadership during their 5-year term. Each Commissioner is 
assigned responsibility for specific policy areas by the President; see http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-
bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm last visited 17/01/2012. 
958 The Committee is established under Art 31 of Directive 95/46/EC. 
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the Article 29 Working Party.959  The Commission is essentially the supervisory body as such it is 
required to report to the Council and the European Parliament at regular intervals on the 
implementation of the Directive.960 The Commission’s report may, where necessary contain as 
attachments, suitable proposals for amendments of the Directive taking into account of 
developments in information technology and in the light of the state of progress in the 
information society.961 This report is required to be made public.962 Moreover, the Commission is 
required to inform the Working Party, in a report, of the action it has taken in response to its 
opinions and recommendations.963 Such report is further required to be forwarded to the Council 
and European Parliament.964 It has to be made public.965 Also, the Commission is required to 
enter into negotiations with third countries regarding the level of adequacy protection personal 
data as required in Art 25.966 
 
The Committee, which is composed by representatives of the member states and chaired by the 
representative of the Commission, is mainly set up to assist the Commission.967 The Committee 
is required under the Directive to render its opinion on drafts of measures proposed to be taken 
by the Commission.968 In case of any disagreement, the matter has to be taken up by the Council 
for a decision.969 
 
As already mentioned in previous sections, the Article 29 Working Party which is mainly 
composed of representatives of national supervisory authorities from each member state, is a 
‘technical group’ which advises the Commission on a number of issues regarding the 
implementation of the Directive.970 Most of its advice or recommendations may be given upon 
request by the Commission or on its own initiatives. Its opinion or decisions are not binding on 
the Commission.971 
                                                          
959 The Article 29 Working Party is established under Art 29 of Directive 95/46/EC. 
960 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 33. 
961 Ibid. 
962 Ibid. 
963 Ibid, Art 30(5). 
964 Ibid. 
965 Ibid. 
966 Ibid, Art 25(5). 
967 Ibid, Art 31(1). 
968 Ibid, Art 31(2). 
969 Ibid. 
970 Ibid, Art 30(1) and 30(2). 
971 Ibid, Art 30(3). 
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The Directive also places obligation on part of the national supervisory authorities to cooperate 
with one another.972 This cooperation is required to the extent necessary for the performance of 
their duties, in particular by exchanging all useful information.973 
 
From the above, it can be submitted that in contrast to the OECD Guidelines, Convention 108 and 
UN Guidelines, the Directive puts in place mechanisms to ensure harmonization of the 
Community’s data protection regimes is achieved. However, whether this objective has been 
achieved or not is a different issue which needs to be examined (see 3.3.1.7).  
 
3.3.1.7 General Data Protection Regulation 2012 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the new data protection regime in Europe. 
It was officially announced on 25 January 2012 and was set to come into force two years after its 
publication. Since the Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the European Union 
on 20 February 2012 it was supposed to enter into force on 20 February 2014. The Regulation 
repeals Directive 95/46/EC and partly amends Directive 2002/58/EC. Although the review 
process that culminated to its adoption was officially launched in 2009, in reality the foundation 
of such process goes far back to numerous discussions, commissioned and non-commissioned 
reports, conference proceedings, commentaries by researchers, academics and practitioners, case 
law of the European Court of Justice, practices of national data supervisory authorities, etc 
between 1995 and 2009.974 These sources provide clear signals that the Directive’s revision was 
inevitable.    
 
(a) Need for Regulatory Reforms 
 
The revision of the Directive came about after one decade and a half of its adoption. Viviane 
Reding, the Vice-President of European Commission, EU Commissioner responsible for Justice, 
Fundamental rights and Citizenship has specifically pointed out three main trends as catalysts for 
                                                          
972 Ibid, Art 28(6). 
973 Ibid. 
974 See e.g., European Commission Justice’s Studies, Decisions, Reports and Surveys, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/index_en.htm last visited 18/01/2012; Article 29 Working 
Party on data Protection 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th ,6th , 7th ,8th ,9th ,10th ,11th ,12th and 13th Annual Reports, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/annual-report/index_en.htm 
last visited 18/01/2012; Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection’s Opinions, Working Documents and 
Recommendations( 1997-2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm 
last visited 18/01/2012; also see various publications previously referred in this thesis making general or specific 
comments on Directive 95/46/EC. 
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regulatory reforms: modern technologies, globalized data flows and access to personal data by 
law enforcement authorities.975 As regards modern technologies-the growth in mobile Internet 
devices, web-user generated contents, the outburst of social networking sites and above all the 
cloud computing technologies have been identified as new trends which postdate the Directive 
95/46/EC. Because the latter law was adopted while the Internet was just at its embryonic stages 
in 1990s, the recent technological developments have strained its operation. The modern 
technological developments have in turn increased globalised data flows at a ‘rocketing’ rate. 
Accordingly, globalization of technology has seen an increased role of third countries relating to 
data protection, and has also led to a steady increase in the processing of personal data of 
Europeans by companies and public authorities outside the European Union.976 As a result, it has 
been difficult to precisely allocate responsibility, liability and accountability of various parties 
notably data controllers, processors as well as joint data controllers and processors. Also these 
cross-border flows of data to third countries have posed great challenges on how Europeans can 
enforce their data protection rights in non-EU jurisdictions. Besides these two trends, the 
growing appetite for personal data for reasons of public interest, in particular for public security 
matters, is also an important challenge for data protection.977 While ‘the collection and 
processing of personal information can be very valuable in order to secure important and 
legitimate public and public interests-if done in a way which fully respects the requirements of 
legality, necessity, and proportionality’,978 its reverse may be disastrous to individuals’ control of 
their personal data.  
 
The totality of the above trends exerted pressure to the need for revising the Directive. Such 
revision aimed at achieving the following objectives: strengthening the rights of data subjects; 
enhancing the internal market dimension; reinforcing data controllers’ responsibility; revising the 
rules on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; improving, strengthening and 
streamline the current procedures for international transfers in the context of global dimension 
of data protection and providing better enforcement of data protection rules.979 
 
 
                                                          
975 Reding, V., ‘The Upcoming Data Protection Reform for the European Union’, International Data Privacy Law, 
2011, Vol.1, No.1, pp.3-5, at p.3. 
976 Ibid. 
977 Ibid. 
978 Ibid. 
979 Ibid, pp.3-5;see also, European Commission., ‘A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the 
European Union’, COM (2010)609 final, Brussels, 4 November 2010, pp.1-19, at pp.5-16. 
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(b) Review Process 
 
The review process of Directive 95/46/EC has to be viewed broadly in the light of discussions, 
assessments, comments, recommendations and practices of EU member states as analysed by 
academics, practitioners, researchers, Article 29 Working Party, the Commission, etc between 
1995 and 2009. However it is imperative to highlight the formal review process that led to the 
adoption of the Regulation. This is important for a number of reasons. First, it helps to 
understand which stages were involved; second, examining the review process shows who were 
involved in the process and how competing interests were identified and resolved; third, the 
examination may also shed some light to what extent the review process was transparent; fourth 
and especially for non-EU countries which may or may have not enacted data protection 
legislation, the examination of the review process may provide a lesson for legal reforms when 
reviewing or adopting their legislation. However this does not suggest that the EU review 
process approach is the best model to be followed. Non-EU countries, while following their 
legal reform traditions, may still learn from EU because the latter has relatively longer experience 
in data protection law practices and in fact the adoption of most data protection legislation in 
such non-EU countries were inspired by Europe. 
 
 The Korff and Brown Report 2010 
 
The Directive 95/46/EC formal review process was initiated by the European Commission by 
commissioning a study: ‘New Challenges to Data Protection’.980 This study is commonly known 
as Korff and Brown Report 2010 after the names of its lead consultants Professor Douwe Korff 
of the London Metropolitan University and Professor Ian Brown of the University of Oxford-
Oxford Internet Institute. A special team of experts who provided assistance to the lead 
consultants included: Professor Peter Blume (University of Copenhagen, Denmark), Professor 
Graham Greenleaf ( University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia), Chris Hoofnage-Senior 
Fellow( University of California, Berkeley, California, USA), Lilian Mitrou-Assistant Professor ( 
University of the Aegean, Mytilene, Greece), and Filip Pospíšil, Helena Svatošová, Marek Tichy-
researchers( NGO Iuridicum Remedium, Prague, Czech Republic). Also in the team were advisors: 
Professor Ross Anderson (University of Cambridge, UK), Caspar Bowden (Microsoft 
                                                          
980 European Commission DG Justice, Freedom and Security., ‘Comparative Study on Different Approaches to 
New Privacy Challenges, in particular in the light of Technological Developments’, Contract Nr: JLS/2008/C4/011-
30-CE-0219363/00-28; Final Report, 20 January 2010,ttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1636706 
last visited 18/01/2012. 
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Corporation, UK), Professor Katrin Nyman-Metcalf (University of Tallinn, Estonia) and Paul 
Whitehouse (Former Chief Constable, Head of Police Force, Sussex Police (rtd), UK).  
 
The study leading to the Korff and Brown Report was carried out from October 2008 to August 
2009. However the final report of the study was preceded by an Inception and Interim Reports 
submitted in December 2008 and March 2009 respectively. The purpose of the Korff and Brown 
study was to identify the challenges for protection of personal data produced by current social 
and technical phenomena such as the Internet; globalization, the increasing ubiquity of personal 
data and personal data collection; the increasing power and capacity of computers and other 
data-processing devices; special new technologies such as RFID, biometrics, face-(etc) 
recognition, etc; increased surveillance (and ‘dataveillance) and increased uses of personal data 
for purposes for which they were not originally collected, in particular in relation to national 
security and the fight against organized crime and terrorism.981 The other purpose of the study 
was to produce a report containing a comparative analysis of the responses that different 
regulatory and non-regulatory systems (within the EU and outside it) offer to those challenges.982 
Finally, it was the purpose of the study to provide guidance on whether the legal framework of 
the main EC Directive on data protection (Directive 95/46/EC) still provides appropriate 
protection or whether amendments should be considered in the light of best solutions 
identified.983 
 
In response to the three main purposes of the study, the Report has revealed that at the bottom 
of the challenges inhibiting the effectiveness of the application of the Directive to its desired 
goals are two interwoven strands: the challenges caused by technical developments and those 
resulting from social and political changes and choices.984 Accordingly the study has found that 
the exponential increases in technologies and their sophistication have radically increased the 
ability of organizations to collect, store and process personal data.985 Illustrations provided by the 
Report include CCTV, mobile phone technology, biometric and electronic identifiers. Also 
individuals are using social networking sites to share information about themselves and their 
family, friends and colleagues.986 Similarly, governments are increasingly analyzing and 
                                                          
981 Ibid, p.9 (Para 3). 
982 Ibid. 
983 Ibid. 
984 Ibid, p.12 (Para 6). 
985 Ibid, (Para 7). 
986 Ibid, (Para 8). 
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exchanging information on their citizens in response to fears of terrorist attacks.987 Moreover, it 
has been found that both technology and government policies have tended to globalize data 
collection and dissemination and to diffuse data storage.988 
 
The Korff and Brown Report has pointed out a number of limitations of the current Directive to 
address the above challenges.  Some matters brought about by the technological developments 
as well as social and political changes and choices have fallen outside the Directive or national 
laws implementing it.989 Those exclusions are more problematic in the new Web 2.0 environment 
in particular.990 There are also still major conflicts of law, even within the EU/EEA, but 
especially in relation to controllers in non-EU/EEA countries; and these conflicts will grow 
strongly.991 The study further discovered wide difference in the application and interpretation of 
basic data protection concepts and rules, within the EU/EEA, and wide differences still between 
EU/EEA and other countries; in a generally-internationalized world of data processing, these 
differences will be increasingly problematic.992 These differences are partly due to inadequate or 
deficient implementation of the Directive and partly due to differences in interpretation of the 
Directive.993 It has been noted by the study that the EU Commission has not sufficiently 
forcefully pursued enforcement action against member states that have not properly 
implemented the Directive.994 Also, the mechanisms in the Directive which were laid down with 
the aim of achieving greater harmonization have not been sufficiently used. In some instances 
such procedures and mechanisms were found to be deficient in themselves.995  With regard to 
the findings of ‘adequacy’ the Report revealed that the EU Commission has used the procedure 
to issue ‘adequacy findings’ in only limited number of countries.996 Globally, the procedure has 
therefore had a more limited impact than would have been hoped; and the development of 
strong data protection laws in non-U/EEA countries has consequently been less strongly 
promoted than that might have been the case.997 Even in the EU/EEA, enforcement by the 
national Data Protection Authorities is not strong or comprehensive. Enforcement in non-
European countries including the USA is even weaker.998 Supplementary and alternative means 
                                                          
987 Ibid. 
988 Ibid, p.14, (Para 12). 
989 Ibid, p.16, (Para 17). 
990 Ibid. 
991 Ibid. 
992 Ibid. 
993 Ibid. 
994 Ibid. 
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996 Ibid. 
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to enhance data protection, including technical means such as encryption, anonymisation, 
identity management tools and other PETs-are still rather undeveloped, often weak in their 
implementation and effect.999 Despite all these limitations, the study found that the challenges 
highlighted above have effect to matters of application; interpretation and effectiveness of 
enforcement/assumption of rights: the basic data protection principles are not challenged, but 
rather, need reasserting and fuller practical application.1000 
 
The major recommendations of the Korff and Brown Report include the following. First, the 
Report recommends for the review of the Directive. However it recommends further that data 
protection law in the EU should continue to rest on the basic data protection principles and-
criteria set out in the Directive 96/46/EC.1001 While the application of these broad standards 
needs to be clarified they themselves do not require major revision in order to meet the new 
challenges.1002 The Report also recommends the abolition of the pillar system in the Directive 
especially for matters falling under the first and third pillars as the issues governed in each of 
these pillars are increasingly intertwined with each other.1003 With regard to the matters of 
‘applicable law’ the Report recommends the same to be based upon the ‘country of origin’ 
principle (as contained in the Original proposals of the Directive)1004 as opposed to the current 
‘territoriality principle’. The radical recommendation of the Report as to issues of harmonization 
of substantive law is the replacement of the main Directive with a (directly applicable) Regulation 
(something that had been originally considered in the drafting of the main Directive).1005 The 
recommendation on cooperation with non-EU/EEA countries, especially the ‘adequacy’ finding 
is rather vague, but adds the possibility of adopting a system of ‘provisional rulings’ as the 
current procedure takes long.1006 With regard to supervisory and enforcement, the Report 
recommends that there should be ‘prior checking’ of all population-scale systems in the member 
state.1007 On matters of individual rights and remedies the Report recommends that individuals 
should be able to obtain effective redress, as well as interim and permanent injunctions, in speed, 
simple and cheap processes before competent, independent and impartial fora.1008 Finally, the 
                                                          
999 Ibid, pp.16-17,(Para 17). 
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1007 Ibid, p.45, (Para 108). 
1008 Ibid, (Para 110). 
200 
 
Report recommends use of supplementary and alternative measures to protection of personal 
data.1009 Such means include for example the Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). 
 
 May 2009 Stakeholders’ Conference on Data Protection 
 
Subsequent to receipt of the Interim Korff and Brown Report in March 2009, the European 
Commission organised a conference and the same was held in Brussels in Belgium from 19 to 20 
May 2009.1010 The theme of the conference was ‘Personal data - more use, more protection?’ The 
purpose of the conference was to give opportunity to various stakeholders to express their views 
and questions on the new challenges for data protection and need for an information 
management strategy in Europe.1011  Moreover the Conference formed part of the Commission’s 
open consultation on how the fundamental right to protection of personal data could be further 
developed and effectively respected, in particular in the area of freedom, justice and security.1012 
Some of the papers presented and discussed in the Conference touched upon issues such as: 
profiling, transparency and notification in the age of Internet, role of supervisory authorities and 
rights of data subjects, awareness and public opinion, globalisation, digital data protection and 
issues of freedom of information.1013 
 
 First Public Consultation 
 
As a follow-up to the Data Protection Conference held on 19-20 May 2009 in Brussels, the 
European Commission launched a wider public consultation in July 2009.1014 The official title of 
the consultation was: ‘Consultation on the legal framework for the fundamental right to 
protection of personal data.’1015 The period of the consultation was set from 9 July 2009 to 31 
December 2009.1016 The objective of this consultation was to obtain views on the new challenges 
                                                          
1009 Ibid, p.46, (Para 114). 
1010 European Commission., ‘Personal data-more use, more Protection?’ Press Release from the Commission 
inviting stakeholders to register and attend the Data Protection Conference, 19-20 May 2009, in Brussels, Belgium, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/events/conference_dp_2009/press_release_en.pdf last visited 18/01/2012. 
1011 Ibid. 
1012 Ibid. 
1013 Ibid. 
1014 European Commission., ‘Summary of Replies to the Public Consultation about the Future Legal Framework for 
Protecting Personal Data’ Brussels, 4 November 2010, pp.1-22, at p.2; 
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/summary_replies_en.pdf last visited 18/01/2012. 
1015 European Commission Website,  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0003_en.htm last visited 18/01/2012. 
1016 Ibid. 
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for personal data protection in order to maintain an effective and comprehensive legal 
framework to protect individual’s personal data within the EU.1017 
In this public consultation, the Commission asked three main questions to wit:  please give us 
your views on the new challenges for personal data protection, in particular in the light of new 
technologies and globalisation; in your views, the current legal framework meets these 
challenges?; and what future action would be needed to address the identified challenges?1018  In 
response to these questions, the Commission received 168 responses, 127 from individuals, 
business organisations and associations and 12 from public authorities.1019 
 Second Public Consultation 
 
Based upon the Korff and Brown Report, stakeholders’ views collected from the Conference on 
Data Protection: May 2009 and the First Public Consultation published at ‘Your Voice in 
Europe’, the European Commission developed ‘A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data 
Protection in the European Union.’1020 The Commissioner’s proposed approach was put into the 
second public consultation: ‘Consultation on the Commission’s comprehensive approach on 
personal data protection in the European Union.’1021 The period of consultation was scheduled 
from 4 November 2010 to 15 January 2011.1022 The objective of the consultation was to obtain 
views on the Commission’s ideas - as highlighted in the Communication attached to the 
consultation - on how to address the new challenges for personal data protection (e.g. fast 
developing technologies and globalisation).1023 It aimed to ensure an effective and comprehensive 
protection of individual personal data within the EU.1024 The total number of responses received 
to this consultation was 305.1025 54 responses were received from individuals (citizens), 31 from 
public authorities and 220 responses were received from private organization (business 
associations and non-governmental organizations). 
 
 
                                                          
1017 Ibid. 
1018 Ibid. 
1019 European Commission, note 1014, supra. Note that the confidential responses are not included in this list. 
1020 European Commission., pp.1-19, note 979, supra. 
1021
 European Commission Website, 
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/opinion/101104_en.htm last visited 18/01/2012. 
1022 Ibid. 
1023 Ibid. 
1024 Ibid. 
1025 Ibid (note that only 288 responses are indicated on the Commission’s Website. But the full number of responses 
of 305 appears in the Explanatory Memorandum to the First Draft Proposal of the Regulation, p.2). 
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 Approval of the Commission’s Approach on Personal Data Protection 
 
By its unanimously adopted resolution of 6 July 2011, the European Parliament approved the 
Commission’s approach to reforming the data protection framework in Europe.1026 Earlier on 24 
February 2011 the Council of the European Union had adopted its conclusions in which it 
broadly supported the Commission’s intention to reform the data protection framework and 
agreed to many elements of the Commission’s approach.1027 Similar expressions of support came 
from the European Economic and Social Committee.1028 
 
 Surveys, Targeted Consultations, Seminars and  Conferences 
 
The review process also included surveys, the most important one being the Eurobarometer 
Survey held in November-December 2010 in which European citizens were consulted on 
number of issues regarding privacy and data protection.1029 Apart from the Korff and Brown 
which was a specifically commissioned study into issues which came to be the foundation of the 
Commission’s approach to the revision of the Directive, other studies were parallel launched.1030 
Also important to mention is that throughout 2010 and 2011, various targeted and specific 
consultations (apart from the two public consultations) were conducted with key stakeholders-
member state authorities, private stakeholders, as well as privacy, data protection and consumers’ 
organizations.1031 Moreover there were a series of dedicated workshops and seminars on specific 
issues held in 2011.1032 Conferences were similarly organized during the review period. Three of 
these conferences deserve mention. The first was a co-organized high level conference by the 
European Commission and the Council of Europe on 28 January 2011(Data Protection Day).1033 
In this conference various issues related to the reform of the EU legal framework as well as the 
need for common data protection standards worldwide were discussed. The second and third 
                                                          
1026 European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2011 on a comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the 
European Union (2011/2025(INI))http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-
2011-0323&language=EN&ring=A7-2011-0244 last visited 19/01/2012. 
1027 Explanatory Memorandum to the First Draft Proposal of the Regulation, p.5. 
1028 Ibid. 
1029 European Commission, ‘Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Union’, Special 
Eurobarometer 359, November-December 2010,  
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf last visited 19/01/2012. 
1030 Explanatory Memorandum to the First Draft Proposal of the Regulation, p.4. 
1031 Ibid. 
1032 Ibid. 
1033 Ibid. 
203 
 
conferences on data protection were hosted by the Hungarian and Polish Presidencies of the 
Council on 16-17 June 2011 and on 21 September 2011 respectively.1034  
 
 Adoption of the Regulation 
 
The review of Directive 95/46/EC was expected to come to an end with the adoption of the 
Regulation by the European Parliament and the Council. However, it is not certain when the 
Regulation will be adopted as it is still a work in progress. 
 
(c) Main Elements of the Regulation 
 
Like its predecessor, the Data Protection Regulation is grounded on the same philosophical basis 
and objectives as the Directive i.e. human rights philosophy and accordingly the twin objectives 
of the Regulation are to protect fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons particularly 
their rights to protection of personal data and to ensure free flow of information within the 
European Union. Similarly the scope of the Regulation has remained the same as the Directive. 
It applies, as at its initial point, on processing of personal data of natural person in both public 
and private sector regardless of the technology employed.1035 This means both manual and 
automatic processing of personal data are covered by the Regulation. Structurally, the Regulation 
is a longer and more detailed text than the Directive. The former has a preamble containing one 
hundred and eighteen recitals. It also contains eleven chapters with a total number of ninety one 
Articles. 
 
The central element of the Regulation is its retention of the basic principles of data protection in 
Directive 95/46/EC. However to make such principles apply smoothly, additional elements are 
introduced notably the transparency principle, clarification of the data minimization principle 
and establishment of a comprehensive responsibility and liability of the controller.1036 The criteria 
of lawful processing have remained the same as in the Directive only that the balance of interest 
criterion has to be applied. Also the Regulation clarifies the conditions regarding re-purposing of 
the processing as well as conditions of consent with regard to processing of personal data.  
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1035 Regulation, Arts 1 and 2. 
1036 Explanatory Memorandum to the First Draft Proposal of the Regulation, p.8. 
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On issues of data subject’s rights, the Regulation retains same rights as the Directive. However 
their scope has been far clarified. The principle of transparency is at the root of the exercise of 
such rights. It is interesting to note in this regard that the Regulation has introduced a new right, 
‘the right to be forgotten’ which simply mandates a data subject to direct the controller or processor, 
as the case may be, to erase and destroy completely any information relating to him or her, 
especially when its purpose or period required has expired or consent has been withdrawn. 
 
The Regulation clarifies issues of controller and processor’s obligations in data processing. Joint 
data controllers are also clarified. It is imperative to note that the Regulation introduces in clear 
terms the ‘principle of accountability’ as an obligation on the part of data controllers and 
processors. Controllers and processors are also obliged to carry out a data protection impact 
assessment prior to risky processing operation. Also important to note is that the Regulation 
puts obligation on data controllers and processors to employ Data Protection Officers (DPO) 
whom will be required to possess knowledge on issues of data protection law and regulations. 
The officer is required to discharge his or her duties with some levels of independence.  
 
The general principles of trasnborder flow of personal data to third countries and international 
organizations are still maintained by the Regulation. The criteria and procedures for the adoption 
of an ‘adequacy’ decision by the Commission are based on Arts 25 and 26 of the Directive: rule 
of law, judicial redress and independent supervisory authority. However, the Regulation makes it 
clear that there is a possibility for the Commission to assess the level of protection afforded by a 
territory or a processing sector within a third country. Also binding corporate rules and standard 
contractual clauses are clearly spelt as means to be considered in the ‘adequacy’ assessment of 
data protection levels in third countries. 
 
Choice of law rules have been radically changed in the Regulation. While in the Directive, the 
choice of law rules were based upon the ‘territoriality principle’ in the Regulation, such rules are 
based upon the ‘country of origin’ principle. 
 
The Regulation clarifies a number of enforcement measures to be available for data subjects to 
enforce their rights. Sanctions and compensations have been enhanced. Previously the Directive 
did not clarify these issues as they were only left to the member states to provide them in their 
national data protection legislation.  
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Some definitions in the Directive have been taken out from the Regulation. Others have been 
retained by being complemented with additional elements in order to broaden their scope or to 
clarify them. In some instances, completely new definitions not part of the Directive have been 
introduced in the Regulation. Most of these definitions have been dealt with in such ways they 
address the challenges of modern technologies. 
 
The Regulation has replaced the Article 29 Working Party with the European Data Protection 
Board. Yet the Board is similarly composed of representatives (i.e. heads) of national supervisory 
authorities of each member state. Members of the Commission are no longer part of the Board, 
although they may attend its meetings, etc. The Regulation clarifies the independence of the 
Board, and describes its responsibilities and roles. 
 
Finally, and as its name suggests, the Regulation has a binding force upon EU/EEA member 
states and direct effect on them. The rationale for adopting a Regulation instead of a Directive 
(which has to be implemented or transposed by each member) is to achieve harmonization of 
the rules and practices.  
 
(d)  Regulation’s Implications 
 
The implications of the Data Protection cannot be fully drawn at this stage. As pointed out, any 
assessment of the impact of a law depends on a vast array of factors-chiefly among them is 
sufficient practice of the law itself. Since the Regulation is still a work in progress, any thorough 
assessment on how it will actually function in practice is premature. Yet, some minimum 
assessment can still be made especially on provisions which were retained by the Regulation 
from the Directive and whose adjustments are not radical.  This thesis limits early assessment to 
matters of transfers of data to non-EU/EEA countries (i.e. third countries) for two reasons. 
First, the provisions on transfer of personal data to third countries incorporated in the 
Regulation (i.e. Arts 37 and 38) have ramifications on legal reforms to third countries including 
sub-Saharan Africa (the focus of the present thesis). Second, the third research question of this 
study is built upon transborder flows of data from Europe to third countries, accordingly it is 
important to comment on those provisions.  Also important to bear in mind is that the 
provisions on ‘adequacy’ in the Regulation are patterned to Arts 25 and 26 of the Directive. 
However in making preliminary assessment one difficult must be revealed. The primary criterion 
of transfer of personal data to third countries originating from EU/EEA is the ‘adequacy’ level 
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of protection of personal data afforded by a third country in question. However, when assessing 
whether such ‘adequacy’ standard is met, automatically the other provisions of the Regulation 
(both substantive and procedural) have to be considered. Aware of this imminent risk, it is 
important to limit as low as possible thorough assessment of the provisions of the Regulation on 
TBDF. Suffice to point that non-EU/EEA countries or specific sectors within such countries 
which had already been declared by the Commission as providing adequate level of data 
protection may find themselves required to revise their laws or principles in line with the 
Regulation. Moreover those third countries which are still under the process of ‘clearance’ are 
likely to be provided with additional criteria in adjusting their laws. It remains to be seen what 
effect the Regulation will bring about to third countries when it comes into application.  
 
3.3.2 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor 
 
The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework (SH) is an agreement negotiated between the two sides of 
the Atlantic with the view of sustaining continued flow of personal information on both sides.1037 
The context in which the SH came about can be explained in the requirements of the European 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC that any international transfer of personal data to non-
EU/EEA countries (the so called ‘third countries’) should meet the ‘adequacy’ test under Arts 25 
and 26 lest flow of information to such foreign destinations should be stopped. Since the United 
States fall outside EU/EEA, it became a direct victim of the ‘adequacy’ requirement. Given that 
U.S.A and Europe have two conflicting philosophies and approaches to privacy protection, 
which in any case it would be difficult to reconcile, negotiation for a compromise to take into 
account these varying approaches became necessary.  
 
As seen above, the European approach towards data protection is grounded in the concept of 
privacy as a fundamental human right.1038 In this conception, a just and free society results only 
when individuals are able to interact with self-determination and dignity.1039 Accordingly, Europe 
has always taken a proactive role to comprehensively regulate the protection of personal data 
through national legislation even prior to Directive 95/46/EC. The United States’ approach is 
sharply different. Americans tend to be more trusting of the private sector and the free market to 
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 Safe Harbor Policy Principles, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp last visited 21/01/2012. 
1038 Long, W.J and Quek, M.P., ‘Personal Data Privacy Protection in an Age of Globalisation: the US-EU Safe 
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protect personal privacy-fearing more the invasion of privacy from the state not the market.1040 
In the latter case it has generally been viewed that a ‘marketplace of ideas’ allows only minimum 
restrictions on flows of information, including personal information.1041 Driven by market 
philosophical ideals, the United States has dealt with privacy protection from an ad hoc sectoral 
approach.1042 This legislative approach to protection of privacy has never changed despite the 
increasing rate and amount of personal information processed by public and private sectors and 
also individuals as a result of modern technologies. Instead, U.S.A has up to present resisted all 
calls for omnibus or comprehensive legal rules for fair information practice in the private 
sector.1043 From the EU point of view, and even from the Americans self-assessment, the latter’s 
approach to protection of personal data would not be adequate within the meaning of Arts 25 
and 26 of the Directive even prior to any assessment and assigning the ‘adequacy’ label. 
 
Apart from the contrasting legislative philosophies behind privacy protection, the compromise 
of EU-U.S standards forging SH has to be broadly viewed from an economic perspective. Both 
EU and U.S are the world’s two most powerful and highly independent, economic entities.1044 
Together, the European Union and United States account for over one-half of world GDP.1045  
The EU is the United States’ largest trading partner: in 1999(one year after Directive 95/46/EC 
became operational) the United States had US Dollar 350 billion in trade with the EU.1046 
Moreover U.S-controlled affiliates based in Europe sell an even greater quantity of goods and 
services-estimated at US Dollar 1.2 trillion.1047 These U.S firms were most vulnerable to a 
potential restriction on transborder data flow.1048  
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(a) Negotiating Safe Harbor Framework 
 
Formal discussions between EU and U.S.A on Safe Harbor started in 1998 six months earlier 
than the official date the Directive became operational. In these discussions, the United States 
was represented by the U.S Department of Commerce while for the European Union, the role 
was played by the European Commission. The competence of these two bodies was called into 
question.1049 Yet, they went ahead to the finalization of the SH. However contrary to the 
previous or subsequent approach, the finding of U.S.A as providing ‘adequate’ level of 
protection of personal data in the context of SH did not end with the European Commission. It 
also required consultations and/or decisions from the Article 31 Committee, Council of the 
European Union as well as the European Parliament. 
 
The SH discussions involved chiefly direct discussions and exchange of letters. There were many 
challenges in the negotiation process reflecting various interests at stake. Initially, discussions 
were frustrating.1050 The European Union maintained that it was interested only in legislation 
drafted to provide adequate protection to the data of European citizens which had been 
exported, while the U.S sought to postpone the implementation of the Directive, and to gain 
recognition of adequacy for the U.S system as it then stood.1051 However, a suggestion by David 
L. Aaron (Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade) that the adequacy judgment 
need not extend to the entire U.S system, but rather to a set of firms which had voluntarily 
agreed to embrace a set of privacy principles, provided to be the basis for a potential 
compromise.1052 Nonetheless, the principles of privacy proposed by U.S.A to EU were continued 
to be put under scrutiny for more than a year later.1053 
 
Other interests which operated for or against SH discussions came from the domestic politics 
within the U.S itself.1054 The main contending groups were the U.S administration, concerned 
                                                          
1049 See e.g., Hubbard, A., ‘Does the Safe Harbor Agreement have a future? If so, what kind?’, A Tutorial Paper 
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businesses and business organizations, and consumer groups.1055 In the interest of e-commerce, 
the administration generally advocated a hardline position which would seek to force the EU to 
back down.1056 Although with some division, the business which had/has strong relationship 
with the U.S administration lobbied heavily while the Directive was working its way through the 
EU decision-making process. It had been successful in persuading lawmakers to water down 
some of its requirements.1057 The U.S consumer organizations favoured strong legislation to 
protect individual privacy, both in the online and offline worlds.1058 Also important to note is 
that the other set of interests for or against SH came from within the European Union itself.1059 
The Commission was interested to negotiate with the United States in order to try to reach an 
adequacy finding which would allow firms to comply with the Directive.1060 This interest seems 
to have been developed out of fear that many firms in the EU would ignore the Directive and 
continue to transmit personal information to the United States, because it was necessary to their 
business, and because the benefits outweighed the risks of being caught.1061 In any case, this 
would have undermined the intent and credibility of the Directive.1062 Similarly, member states 
had different position. For example, the UK and Ireland had no difficulties in principle with a 
self-regulation, non-legislative compromise of the sort that finally emerged.1063 Germany and 
France, in contrast were more skeptical about self-regulation, and more difficult to persuade.1064  
The European Parliament was also split.1065 A lot of concerns were raised on the effectiveness of  
self-regulation to offer adequate protection of personal data. There was finally the Article 29 
Working Party which, although advisory body in its role, it has influence on the decisions of the 
European Union institutions particularly the European Commission. The Working Party was 
                                                          
1055 Ibid, p.110. 
1056 Ibid, p.111. 
1057 Regan, P., ‘American Business and the European Data Protection Directive: Lobbying Strategies and Tactics’, in 
Bennett, C and Grant, R (eds)., Visions of Privacy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1999 cited in Farrell, note 
1056, supra. 
1058 Farrell, note 1056, supra. 
1059 Ibid, p.109. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Ibid. 
1062 Ibid. 
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Ibid; it is also interesting to note that in 2010( almost ten years after the adoption of SH have lapsed) Germany 
Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) decided that data exporters may not exclusively rely on the Safe Harbor List in 
determining if U.S. data importers afford an adequate level of protection to personal data. The decision was taken 
on April 28/29, 2010, in the so-called Düsseldorfer Kreis, which is a joint working committee of all German DPAs. 
According to the decision, German data exporters must carry out certain minimum checks to ensure that the chosen 
data importer is not only formally self-certified but also adheres to the Safe Harbor Principles in practice. Data 
exporters who fail to carry out such checks can be held liable and might face sanctions in the absence of an adequate 
level of data protection at the U.S. data importer’s end, see Schmidl, M and Krone, D., ‘Germany DPAs Decide EU-
U.S. Safe Harbor May Not Be Relied Upon Exclusively’, http://www.bnai.com/GermanyDpas/default.aspx last 
visited 24/01/2012; This article appeared first on World Data Protection Report in May 2010 issue. 
1065 Farrell, note 1055, supra. 
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deeply skeptical of the proposition the ‘patchwork of narrowly-focused sectoral laws and 
voluntary self-regulation’ that characterized the U.S could provide comprehensive protection to 
the data of European citizens.1066 It is unsurprising to find that, throughout i.e. before, during 
and after the adoption of SH, the Article 29 Working Party had/has always found the U.S 
providing inadequacy level of protection of personal data.1067 
 
SH took nearly two years of negotiations. The full agreement came into existence in 2000. It 
comprises two sets of documents. The first set includes documents issued by the United States 
and published in the Federal Register on 24 July 2000 and 19 September 2000.1068 The second set 
includes documents published by the European Commission on 28 July 2000.1069 The other 
documents which are part and parcel of the SH Framework are the European Commission’s 
finding of adequacy, exchange of letters between the U.S Department of Commerce and the 
European Commission on specific issues such as enforcement, and letters from the U.S 
Department of Transportation and Federal Trade Commission on the agencies’ powers to 
enforce the policy.1070 
                                                          
1066 Ibid. 
1067 See e.g., Opinion 1/99 concerning the level of data protection in the United States and the ongoing discussions 
between the European Commission and the United States Government, 5092/98/EN/final, WP 15, (adopted on 
26th January 1999); Opinion 2/99 on the Adequacy of the ‘International Safe Harbor Principles’ issued by the U.S 
Department of Commerce on 19th April 1999, 5047/99/EN/final, WP 19, (adopted on 3rd May 1999); Opinion 
4/99 on the Frequently Asked Questions to be issued by the U.S Department of Commerce in relation to the 
proposed ‘Safe Harbor Principles’, 5066/99/EN/final, WP 21, (adopted on 7th June 1999); Working Document on 
the current state of play of the ongoing discussions between the European Commission and the United States 
Government concerning ‘the International Safe Harbor Principles’, 5075/99/EN/final, WP 23, ( adopted on 7th July 
1999); Opinion 7/99 on the Level of Data Protection provided by the ‘Safe Harbor’ Principles as published together 
with the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and other related documents on 15 and 16 November 1999 by the 
U.S Department of Commerce, 5146/99/EN/final, WP 27, ( adopted on 3rd December 1999); Opinion 3/2000 on 
the EU/U.S dialogue concerning the ‘Safe Harbor’ arrangement, 5019/00/EN/FINAL, WP 31, (adopted on 16th 
March 2000); Opinion 4/2000 on the level of protection provided by ‘Safe Harbor Principles’, CA07/434/00/EN, 
WP 32, (adopted on 16th May 2000); Opinion 6/2002 on Transmission of Passenger Manifest Information and 
other Data from Airlines to the United States,  11647/02/EN, WP 66, (adopted on 24th  October 2002); Opinion 
8/2004 on the Information for Passengers concerning the Transfer of PNR Data on Flights between the European 
Union and the United States of America, 11733/04/EN, WP 97, (adopted on 30th September 2004); Opinion 
5/2006 on the Ruling by the European Court of Justice of 30 May 2006 in Joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 on 
the Transmission of Passenger Name Records to the United States, 1015/06/EN, WP 122, (adopted on 14th June 
2006); Opinion 7/2006 on the Ruling by the European Court of Justice of 30 May 2006 in Joined Cases C-317/04 
and C-318/04 on the Transmission of Passenger Name Records to the United States and the urgent Need for a new 
Agreement, 1612/06/EN, WP 124, (adopted on 27th September 2006); Opinion 5/2007 on the Follow-up 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of 
Passenger Name Record(PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security 
concluded in July 2007, 01646/07/EN, WP 138, (adopted on 17th August 2007); Joint Opinion on the Proposal for 
a Council Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger Name Record(PNR) for Law Enforcement Purposes, 
presented by the commission on 6 November 2007, 02422/07/EN, Art 29 WP ref: WP 145, WPPJ ref: 01/07, 
(adopted on 5th December 2007). 
1068 See U.S Department of Commerce, Export Portal ‘Helping U.S Companies Export’, 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018493.asp last visited 21/01/2012. 
1069 Ibid. 
1070 Ibid; see also Hubbard, note 1049. 
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(b) Safe Harbor Principles 
 
The Safe Harbor Framework policy has seven principles.1071 In addition, it is accompanied by 
fifteen ‘Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)’ and their corresponding answers.1072 The latter 
provide guidance on interpretation and implementation of the entire framework policy. 
 
 Notice 
 
Notice reflects the purpose specification principle found in most data protection instruments. 
Essentially it requires that U.S firms receiving personal data from the European Union must 
inform the individuals about the purpose for which such information was collected, its uses, 
including further transfer to third parties. Also ‘notice’ requires that the details about the firm 
collecting information and how it may be contacted be made available to the individuals. More 
details required to be availed to individuals include information about inquiries, complaints and 
directions on use limitation. In case of change of original purpose or transferring of individuals’ 
to third parties, the notice must be communicated before. 
 
 Choice 
 
Choice requires organisations processing information to give data subjects options to choose or 
opt out whenever the controller intends to disclose the information to third parties or change 
use from the original purpose. The choice must be clearly brought into the attention of the data 
subject, and should not be costly in terms of the means to exercise it. Stringent rules apply in 
case of sensitive personal information. Here affirmative or explicit (opt in) option must be given 
if there are plans to disclose such information to third parties or change of use is anticipated. 
 
 Onward Transfer  
 
This principle restricts transfer by the receiving organisation of personal information from 
Europe to third parties except where they meet the adequate data protection. Compliance to the 
SH meets the adequacy test. Also, transfer may be made to any other third party in a country 
where the European Commission has made a finding of adequacy protection. Contractual 
                                                          
1071 Safe Harbor Policy Principles, note 1037, supra. 
1072 Ibid. 
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clauses can also be used to transfer data to third party in a country which has not been found to 
provide adequate level of data protection by the European Commission. If the receiving third 
party does not process data in accordance with the required standards, the sending firm is not 
held responsible as long as it was not aware of inappropriate processing of such information. Yet 
it is duty bound to stop the transfer. 
 
 Security 
 
This principle puts under obligation firms which process personal information to take reasonable 
steps to secure such information against loss, misuse, unauthorised access, disclosure, alteration 
and destruction. 
 
 Data integrity 
 
Data integrity requires collection of only relevant information to the purpose for which such 
information is sought to be collected. This principle puts obligation on firms to ensure that data 
under their control is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete and current. 
 
 Access 
 
Individuals must have access to personal information about them that an organization holds and 
be able to correct, amend, or delete that information where it is inaccurate, except where the 
burden or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual’s 
privacy in the case in question, or where the rights of persons other than the individual would be 
violated. The ‘access’ principle depends upon the principle of ‘notice’ in that the data subject 
must be aware of who holds his/her personal information and how to contact him/her before 
any exercise of the rights of correction, amendment or deletion.  
 
 Enforcement 
 
In order to ensure compliance with the SH principles, there must be (a) readily available and 
affordable independent recourse mechanisms so that each individual’s complaints and disputes 
can be investigated and resolved and damages awarded where the applicable law or private sector 
initiatives so provide; (b) procedures for verifying that the commitments companies make to 
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adhere to the SH principles have been implemented; and (c) obligations to remedy problems 
arising out of a failure to comply with the principles. Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to 
ensure compliance by the organization. Organizations that fail to provide annual self certification 
letters will no longer appear in the list of participants and SH benefits will no longer be assured. 
 
(c) Adequacy and Subsequent Evaluation and Monitoring 
 
In 2000 the European Commission issued its decision declaring that the Safe Harbor Framework 
meets the adequacy test of data protection set out in Directive 95/46/EC.1073 The Commission’s 
decision was in sharp contrast with the opinion of the Article 29 Working Party which 
throughout opined that the U.S approach to data protection would not provide such adequate 
protection.1074 At least this was a rare opportunity the Article 29 Working Party’s negative 
opinion had been direct and publicized, especially for world’s most superpower like the United 
States. More probably, the Working Party’s opinion was based on the overall U.S tradition and 
approach towards privacy protection i.e. self-regulation of the private sector. This view can 
further be understood in another context where the Article 29 Working Party issued a negative 
opinion on the U.S Passenger Name Records (PNR) for an arrangement which U.S authorities 
required transmission of airline passenger manifests of all people travelling from Europe to U.S 
immediately after the aircrafts leave European airports.1075 Yet, the Commission proceeded to 
issue an adequacy label to the arrangement.1076 Subsequently, the European Court of Justice 
nullified the agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on 
PNR,1077 though based on the competency of the matters transacted, it is still doubtful if on 
merit, the ECJ would still hold that such an agreement does not infringe the provisions of 
Directive 95/46/EC. It is interesting to note that a renewal of the earlier agreement after 
adjustments has remained unsigned to date since 2007, presumably reflecting the unsatisfactory 
level of protection of privacy in the U.S.1078  
 
                                                          
1073 Commission Decision, C (2000), 2441, note 865, supra; see also, Greenleaf, G., ‘Safe Harbor’s Low Benchmark 
for “adequacy”: EU sells out Privacy for US$’, Privacy Law & Policy Reporter, 2000, Vol. 7, No.3, pp.45-49. 
1074 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, note 1067, supra. 
1075 Ibid. 
1076 Commission Decision, C (2004), 1914, note 865, supra. 
1077 European Parliament v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 
Joined Cases C-317/04 and 318/04 (judgement delivered on 30 May 2006). 
1078 Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
(2007 PNR Agreement), O.J.L204/16 of 4.08.2007, approved the signing of the Agreement but to date it has never 
been signed. 
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Two points can be made regarding the positive adequacy finding for the SH and certainly PNR. 
First, the finding reflects the economic mighty of U.S globally and its large share in the EU-U.S 
trade relationship.  Second, the two sides of the Atlantic have ‘relatively comparable bargaining 
powers’1079 in which case it is difficult for one of them to dictate terms on the other. This further 
suggests that where the relative powers of the clashing parties are comparable, a more co-
operative form of policy co-ordination can result.1080 Hence only a compromise is necessary. It 
can safely be submitted that the adequacy finding on SH and PNR were no more than ‘adequacy 
by affirmative action’ or ‘adequacy without qualification’ which EU may not be prepared to forge 
another SH by any other non-EU/EEA country. 
 
However, despite the adequacy finding label of the SH by the Commission in 2000, subsequent 
evaluation and monitoring has revealed compliant deficits. Some of these deficits are inherent in 
the SH Framework compromises themselves while others are external, largely arising from the 
failure by the U.S firms and authorities to abide to the SH principles. For instance, the scope of 
the SH is limited to electronic data and does not apply to personal information in manual filing 
system.1081 This means privacy violations in the manual filing system are left outside the ambit of 
the SH policy. Also, the SH Framework applies only to a limited number of firms falling under 
the enforcement jurisdiction of the U.S Department of Transportation or under the Federal 
Trade commission.1082 All other business sectors (e.g. health care and banking) are not eligible.1083 
Moreover, the policy framework is self-certifying. Companies choose whether or not to enter the 
SH. This undermines the whole rationale for which the SH was adopted. Additionally, the timing 
of the protection is based on the date that the company certifies its compliance to both the U.S 
Department of Commerce and public announcement of its entry into the program.1084 
Interestingly, the Department of Commerce does not further verify the information in the self-
certification form. Yet, all data flows after public announcement and self-certification filing are 
protected by the Safe Harbor provision. Consequently, the Commission waives the requirement 
for prior authorization by a data protection body for transfers to the U.S or requires prompt or 
                                                          
1079 Long and Quek, note 1044, supra. 
1080 Ibid, p.340; see also, Shaffer, G., ‘Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New 
Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements’, Columbia 
Journal of European Law, 2002, Vol.9, No.1, pp.29-78; Roos, M., ‘Definition of the Problem: The Impossibility of 
Compliance with both European Union and United States’, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 2005, 
Vol.14, No.3, pp.1137-1162; May, B.E et al., ‘The Differences of Regulatory Models and Internet Regulation in the 
European Union and the United States’, Information & Communications Technology Law, 2004, Vol.13, No.3, 
pp.259-272. 
1081Hubbard, p.6, note 1049, supra. 
1082 Ibid, p.5. 
1083 Ibid. 
1084 Ibid, note 1081, supra. 
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automatic approval of the transfer.1085 Also important to note, the SH includes three sets of 
explicit exceptions where compliance with its provisions may be limited: for reasons such as 
national security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements; by statute, government 
regulation or judicial determination that creates conflicting obligations or explicit authorizations, 
provided that the derogations are narrowly tailored; or if the Directive or member state law 
allows exceptions or derogations. These sets of exceptions are quite extensive and practically 
render the protection afforded by the policy severely limited.  
 
The above limitations in the SH Framework and those manifesting out of its implementation are 
partly reflected in the subsequent reports and opinions by the European Commission and Article 
29 Working Party regarding the operation of SH.1086 Although those reports and opinions 
suggest that the SH may be subjected into review it is unlikely that this will happen in the near 
future. The pain and difficulties EU and U.S went through in negotiating the SH are the factors 
that may partly operate against any soonest review process. Yet the adoption of the General Data 
Protection Regulation by EU, which though may not significantly alter the basic data protection 
principles under the Directive, may be used by EU to pull the United States into negotiating 
table. However, this may take sometime especially after the Regulation has become operational 
and possibly produced some negative effects in the operation of the SH. On the side of U.S, 
some efforts are being made to regulate processing of personal data like proposing the 
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011;1087 nevertheless these efforts are seen as mostly 
‘for show’1088 possibly to tell their EU counterpart that they are taking privacy seriously. One of 
the reason for this view is the over dominance of incorporation of ‘self-regulation’ and ‘multiple 
safe harbors’ in the proposed Bill. In her recent speech towards the end of the year 2011, Viviane 
Reding (the Vice-President of the European Commission, EU Justice Commissioner) openly 
criticized the U.S Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights that the U.S ‘self-regulation’ may not be 
sufficient to achieve full interoperability between the EU and U.S.1089 This comment clearly 
indicates that the two sides of the Atlantic are still far apart in terms of data protection policies 
and it may be difficult to completely reconcile their approaches. It has to be seen as events 
                                                          
1085 Ibid. 
1086 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party., ‘Working Document on Functioning of the Safe Harbor Agreement’, 
11194/02/EN, WP 62, (adopted on 2nd July 2002); European Commission., ‘Commission Staff Working Document 
on the Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the adequacy protection of personal data 
provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and related Frequently Asked Questions issued by the U.S 
Department of Commerce’, SEC82004) 1323, Brussels, 20.10.2004. 
1087 A Bill to establish a regulatory framework for the comprehensive protection of personal data for individuals 
under aegis of the Federal Trade Commission, and for other purposes, April, 12, 2011. 
1088 Gellman and Dixon, p.10, note 891, supra. 
1089 Reding, V., ‘The Future of Data Protection and Transatlantic Cooperation’, Speech at the 2nd Annual European 
Data Protection and Privacy Conference (SPEECH/11/851), Brussels, 6 December 2011, pp. 1-4, at p.4. 
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unfold-especially the need for more commercial relationship between EU and the United States, 
development of modern technologies particularly ‘cloud computing’, enhancement of the EU 
data protection policies and laws in response to the need for further protection of personal data, 
increased security, etc if the EU and U.S policies on privacy protection will finally converge. 
 
3.3.3 Asia-Pacific Region 
 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an economic forum of twenty one member 
economies drawn from Asia, North America, South America and Australia.1090 The forum was 
established in 1989 with three main goals: to develop and strengthen the multilateral trading 
system; to increase the interdependence and prosperity of member economies and to promote 
sustainable economic growth.1091 The APEC has more than 2.7 billion people and represents 
approximately 54 percent of the world real GDP and 44 percent of world trade.1092 In contrast to 
most world’s regional groupings, APEC operates on the basis of open dialogue and respect for 
views of all participants.1093 All economies have equal say and decision-making is reached by 
consensus.1094 There are no binding commitments; compliance is achieved through discussion 
and mutual support in the form of economic and technical cooperation.1095 These features have 
far reaching implications to almost every aspect of the APEC’s operations. 
 
In November 2004 APEC adopted the APEC Privacy Framework- through a process that had 
taken the forum two years to complete. Given the diversities of economies, social and political 
levels of developments as well as different cultural backgrounds, one would have expected the 
negotiations of the APEC Privacy Framework to have taken a longer period. Yet, that was not 
the case partly because the Framework is non-binding and compliance is voluntary. Moreover, it 
may be viewed that the adoption of the APEC Privacy Framework was geared towards counter-
balancing the bureaucratic burden and ‘adequacy’ requirements of European Union’s Directive 
95/46/EC rather than creating strong commitment to protection of personal data hence no 
                                                          
1090 Currently APEC has the following members: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia,   
Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, USA, and Vietnam. These members are commonly described as  ‘economies’ because the APEC 
cooperative process is predominantly concerned with trade and economic issues, with members engaging with one 
another as economic entities; see APEC Website, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-
Economies.aspx last visited 26/01/2012.  
1091 APEC., ‘APEC at Glance 2011’, http://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1077 last visited 
26/01/2012. 
1092 Ibid. 
1093 Ibid. 
1094 Ibid. 
1095 Ibid. 
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serious privacy concerns were driving force behind the Framework.1096  However this attempt 
which was ideologically synchronized by Australia and the U.S.A to form an ‘APEC block’ that 
either explicitly rejected or ignored any European privacy standards has not yet succeeded in 
fashioning APEC into any such thing.1097 Also important to note, the process leading to the 
adoption of APEC Privacy Framework did not take long perhaps because APEC reproduced, 
without any serious discussion, most of the privacy principles found in the OECD Guidelines with 
only minor differences which often lead to provision of weaker standards. This reproduction has 
quite often received negative commentaries.1098 The chief criticism is the fact that the OECD 
Guidelines upon which the APEC Privacy Framework is based were twenty years old and had 
little, if any, reference to modern technologies at the time the Framework was adopted.   Hence 
reliance on them would not in any case result into a regulation that has taken into account 
possibilities of privacy infringements committed using modern technologies. 
 
Another point that needs to be made clear with respect to the process leading to the adoption of 
the APEC Privacy Framework in 2004 is that, the latter was still a work-in-progress. In 2004, 
when adopted, the Framework incorporated four major parts: Preamble (Part I); Scope (Part II); 
APEC Information Privacy Principles and the Commentary (Part III) and Implementation (Part 
IV). The latter part (i.e. Part IV) was incomplete as it only contained ‘Guidance for Domestic 
Implementation’ under Section A. Section B on cross-border rules was still missing. This section 
was completed in September 2005 following the incorporation of ‘Guidance for International 
Implementation’. 
                                                          
1096 For an opposite view see e.g., Tan, J.G., ‘What effect is the APEC Privacy Framework likely to have in the 
struggle between the EU and APEC states to establish global standards for data protection?’, A Tutorial Paper 
presented at the Norwegian Research Centre for Computers and Law (NRCCL), Spring, 2006, pp.1-9, at p.2, who 
argues that the emergence of the APEC Privacy Framework should not be viewed as a struggle between EU and 
APEC states. Rather the APEC Framework paves the way for further dialogue on the emergence of a global 
standard for data protection. 
1097 Ford, P., ‘Implementing the Data Protection Directive - An Outside Perspective’, Privacy Law & Policy 
Reporter, 2003, Vol. 9, pp. 141-149 cited in Greenleaf, p.17, note 560, supra. 
1098 See e.g., Greenleaf, G., ‘Australia’s APEC Privacy Initiative: The Pros and Cons of “OECD Lite”’ Privacy Law 
& Policy Reporter, 2003, Vol.10, pp. 1-6; Greenleaf, G., ‘APEC Privacy Principles Version 2 - Not quite so Lite, and 
NZ wants OECD full strength’, Privacy Law & Policy Reporter, 2003, Vol. 10, pp. 45-49; Greenleaf, G., ‘APEC 
Privacy Principles: More Lite with every version’, Privacy Law & Policy Reporter, 2003, Vol.10, pp. 105-111; 
Greenleaf, note 695, supra; Greenleaf, G., ‘Criticisms of the APEC Privacy Principles (Version 9), and 
recommendations for improvements’, Working Paper, March 2004, 
 http://www2.austlii.edu.au/%7Egraham/publications/2004/APEC_V9_critique/APEC_V9_critique.html last 
visited 29/01/2012; Greenleaf G., ‘APEC’s Privacy Framework: A new low standard’, Privacy Law & Policy 
Reporter, 2005, Vol. 11, pp.121-124; IT Law Group., ‘Neither a Floor nor a Ceiling: the APEC Privacy Framework 
fails to harmonize the Privacy Regime in the Asia Pacific Region’,  
http://www.itlawgroup.com/resources/articles/142-marketing-and-sales.html last visited 29/01/2012; Munir, A.B., 
‘Implementation of the APEC Privacy Framework in National Regulation’, Paper Presentation during Workshop on 
International Data Sharing and Biometric Identification, Royal Plaza Hotel, Singapore, 2-3 July 2009, 
http://www.hideproject.org/downloads/ws-singapore/HIDE_WS-Annex_IIId-
Presentation_Abu_Bakar_Bin_Munir-20090702.pdf last visited 29/01/2012. 
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Generally, the objectives served by the APEC Privacy Framework and the philosophy behind it 
are rooted in the APEC’s broader objectives for its establishment. The Framework states in its 
preamble that its broad aims are to promote electronic commerce and ensure free flow of 
information within the APEC economies. Also it sets out as its main agenda to protect privacy. 
Nevertheless, economic concerns are clearly dominant.1099 The Framework scarcely, if at all, 
alludes to privacy safeguards as fundamental rights.1100 Undoubtedly, because of this omission 
which is attributed by different histories and experiences between the West and Asia-Pacific 
countries; the entire Framework fails to measure up the European instruments on protection of 
privacy, more particularly the Directive 95/46/EC which treats and protects privacy as a 
fundamental right. 
 
The scope of the APEC Framework is similar to that of the OECD Guidelines and the Directive 
95/46/EC. The former extends its application to processing of personal data of natural persons, 
in both public and private sectors with regard to automated or manual data files.1101 It excludes 
processing of family or household activities such as keeping address books and phone lists or 
preparing family newsletters.1102 Also excluded from the application of the Framework are 
matters of public available information and those touching national security, public safety and 
public policy.1103 
 
Unlike the OECD Guidelines, the APEC Framework has nine information privacy principles. The 
latter has left out the principle of ‘openness’ from the set of eight principles found in the OECD 
Guidelines. Yet, it added the principles of ‘preventing harm’ and ‘notice’. Similarly the scope and 
formulations of these principles differ significantly in some places from the OECD. The nine 
APEC information privacy principles are:- 
 
 Preventing Harm 
 
The preventing harm principle seeks to protect individuals against wrongful collection or misuse 
of their personal data. Under this principle privacy protections are required to be designed to 
achieve these aims. Also, the principle requires adoption of the appropriate remedies which are 
proportionate to the likelihood and severity of the risk of harm.   
                                                          
1099 Bygrave, p.44, note 503, supra. 
1100 Ibid. 
1101 APEC Privacy Framework, Paras 9 and 10. 
1102 Ibid, Para 10. 
1103 Ibid, Paras 11, 13 and Part III. 
219 
 
 Notice 
 
This principle imposes an obligation on the party of the data controller to notify data subjects a 
range of information. The latter includes what information is collected and for what purposes it 
was collected; persons/ organizations to whom personal information might be disclosed; identity 
and location of the controller; choices and means the controller offers individuals for limiting 
use and  disclosure as well as accessing and correcting their information. Furthermore, this 
principle places additional obligation on the controller to take reasonably practical steps to 
provide notice either before or at the time of collection, or as soon after as is practicable. 
 
 Collection Limitations 
 
The collection limitation principle requires that only relevant information that is related to the 
specified purpose should be collected. Also, it places the obligation on controllers to obtain 
personal information from data subjects by lawful and fair means. Where it is appropriate the 
collection must be commenced with notice to, or consent of, the individual concerned. 
 
 Uses of Personal Information 
 
This principle imposes limitations on the use of personal information only to fulfill the purposes 
of collection and other compatible related purposes. 
 
 Choice 
 
The choice principle requires that where it is appropriate individuals should be provided with 
affordable mechanisms to exercise choice in relation to the collection, use and disclosure of their 
personal information. 
  
 Integrity of Personal Information 
 
The principle of integrity of personal information states that personal information should be 
accurate, complete and kept up-to-date to the extent necessary for the purposes of use. 
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 Security Safeguards 
 
This principle places obligation on data controllers to apply appropriate safeguards that will 
protect personal information against risks such as loss or unauthorized access to personal 
information, or unauthorized destruction, use, modification or disclosure of information or other 
misuse. It also requires that such safeguards should be proportional to the likelihood and severity 
of the harm threatened the sensitivity of the information, and the extent in which it is held, and 
should be subject to periodic review and assessment. 
 
 Access and Correction 
 
Individuals should be afforded rights to access to their personal data and challenge its accuracy, 
and as appropriate request rectification, completeness, amendment or deletion of such personal 
information. 
 
 Accountability 
 
The accountability principle requires that data controllers comply with measures that give effect 
to the principles under the Framework. In event of data transfers by data controllers whether 
domestically or internationally, they must ensure those recipients of such data protect the 
received personal information in a manner consistent with these principles. 
 
Domestically, the implementation of the APEC Privacy Framework is left at discretion and 
flexibilities of the member economies. Member economies may opt to protect privacy through 
legislation, administrative means, industry self-regulations or a combination of these methods.1104 
The Framework also requires its implementation be flexible in such manner as to accommodate 
various methods including central authorities, multi-agency enforcement bodies, a network of 
designated industry bodies, or a combination of these methods.1105 Similarly, the Framework  
takes into account that some member states may have already adopted domestic privacy 
protection prior to the Framework. In such cases member economies are urged to take all 
reasonable steps to identify and remove unnecessary barriers to information flows and avoid the 
                                                          
1104 APEC Privacy Framework, Para 31. 
1105 Ibid. 
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creation of any such barriers.1106 The Framework incorporates requirements for educating and 
publicizing domestic privacy protections;1107 cooperation between private and public sectors;1108 
provision of appropriate remedies in situations where privacy protections are violated;1109 and 
mechanisms for reporting domestic implementation of the APEC Privacy Framework through 
completion of and periodic updates to the Individual Action Plan (IAP) on information 
privacy.1110 
 
International implementation of the APEC Privacy Framework envisages information sharing 
among member economies;1111 cross-border cooperation in investigation and enforcement;1112 
and cooperative development of cross-border privacy rules.1113 The Framework does not contain 
any specific rules that regulate international transfers of personal data from the APEC region to 
non-APEC member economies (i.e. third countries). It is also important to note that in order to 
facilitate the goals of the APEC Privacy Framework and more particularly to ensure smooth 
cross-border flows of personal information, the APEC Ministers endorsed the establishment of 
the APEC Data Protection Pathfinder in 2007 to carry out a number of projects.1114 Recently the 
APEC Ministers, through the Pathfinder’s roles, have adopted and endorsed Cross-Border 
Privacy Rules (CBPR) similar but slightly different from the EU’s Binding Corporate Rules(BCR) 
scheme. 1115 
 
In relative terms, the APEC Privacy Framework has received many criticisms. Most of them 
have been raised by Professor Graham Greenleaf, who perhaps, more than any other 
commentators in the field, has closely followed the development of the Framework since its 
preparation, inception to practice and published extensively on APEC Framework. In summary 
these criticisms are based on the broad scope of the Framework’s information privacy principles; 
vagueness and imprecise definitions; ignoring regional experience; incorporation of potentially 
retrograde new principles; ignoring EU compatibility; adopting and further weakening OECD 
                                                          
1106 Ibid, Para 30. 
1107 Ibid, Paras 35 and 36. 
1108 Ibid, Para 37. 
1109 Ibid, Para 38. 
1110 Ibid, Para 39. 
1111 Ibid, Paras 42 and 43. 
1112 Ibid, Paras 44 and 45. 
1113 Ibid, Paras 46,47 and 48. 
1114 APEC Data Privacy Pathfinder; http://apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/Electronic-
Commerce-Steering-Group.aspx last visited 30/01/2012. 
1115 For shorter analysis of these rules see e.g., Stewart, B., ‘Towards Global Solutions: APEC Ministers endorse 
Cross-Border Privacy Rules Scheme’, Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 2011, No.114, pp.14-15. 
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principles.1116 With regard to implementation, many commentators including Greenleaf fault the 
APEC Privacy Framework for its failure to forbid data exports to countries without APEC-
compliant laws or explicitly allow restrictions on data exports to countries without APEC-
compliant laws or at least require data exports to be allowed to countries that have APEC-
compliant laws.1117 Accordingly, Greenleaf argues that the APEC Privacy Framework is 
extremely non-prescriptive in relation to data exports, consistent with its general non-
prescriptive nature.1118 His overall assessment of the impact of the Framework in the APEC 
region is that the former has been too weak to stimulate privacy regulation.1119 Greenleaf has 
rated the European Directive 95/46/EC as the most influential in the APEC region.1120 Its 
influence has been felt in a number of jurisdictions such as India, Macao, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, China and New Zealand.1121 The latter is about to be confirmed by EU as providing 
‘adequate’ level of data protection. Next to the Directive, the author rates the OECD Guidelines 
whose influence has already been seen in Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan and 
Indonesia.1122 On the other end of the spectrum, there are authors who have been uncritical to 
the APEC Framework. These have argued that while at first glance there appears to be 
deficiencies in the APEC Framework, its value should not be overlooked.1123 The APEC 
Framework represents a consensus between countries who come from different legal systems, 
different values and are at different stages of enacting their privacy legislation.1124 These 
commentators also argue that the Framework involves countries who have not been previously 
party to any international agreement regarding data protection and privacy but who are likely to 
be players in the world economy in the near future.1125 Yet, there are authors who have 
attempted to take a balanced position between the critical and uncritical commentators. For 
example, Waters argues that the APEC Privacy Framework is neither a particular good 
alternative model for balancing privacy protection and free flow of information nor a major 
                                                          
1116 Greenleaf, pp.8-21, note 560, supra; see also, Kennedy, G et al., ‘Data Protection in the Asia-Pacific Region’, 
Computer Law & Security Review, 2009, Vol.25, No.1,  pp.59-68. 
1117 Greenleaf, p.16, note 560; see also, Bygrave, note 1099, supra. 
1118 Greenleaf, note 117, supra. 
1119 Greenleaf, p.13, note 695, supra.  
1120 Ibid. 
1121 Ibid. 
1122 Ibid. 
1123 Tan, p.8, note 1096, supra; see also Tan, J.G., ‘A Comparative Study of the APEC Privacy Framework-A New 
Voice in the Data Protection Dialogue?’, Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 2008, Vol.3, No.1, pp.1-44, at p.31; 
Bulford, C., ‘Between East and West: The APEC Privacy Framework and the Balance of International Data Flows’, 
I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 2008, Vol.3, No.3, pp.705-722, at pp.719-722. 
1124 Ibid. 
1125 Ibid. 
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threat to existing levels of privacy protection.1126 For Waters, the differences between the APEC 
Framework and the other international privacy instruments are not as great as has been 
suggested, while the deficiencies and obstacles to effective implementation are very similar.1127 
  
The conflicting opinions over the efficacy of the APEC Privacy Framework reveal one major 
problem: the lack of an ‘ideal standard’ which in any case is difficult to set across different 
cultures, economic and political systems. As it can be noted, from European regulatory point of 
view which is rooted in human rights sentiments, the APEC Framework provides weak standard 
while from the APEC member economies which place commerce at the forefront and privacy as 
just as secondary issue the Framework offers a more flexible and perfect scheme. This explains 
further the problem of achieving global policies and regulatory frameworks for protection of 
privacy and personal data. However through dialogue at the global level policies and frameworks 
which set common minimum standards can be forged. Yet, as many commentators opine, the 
adoption of such policies and frameworks is a process which is still far away. 
 
3.3.4 Organization of the Islamic Cooperation 
 
The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 1128(CDHRI or Islamic Charter) is the human 
rights instrument for the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) formerly known as the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The latter was established on 25 September 1969 
with the objective of safeguarding and promoting the interests of the Muslim world in diverse 
number of issues: fraternity and solidarity; common interests and support of legitimate causes; 
self-determination; sovereignty and territorial integrity; participation in the global decision-
making processes; inter-state relations; support of the rights of peoples as stipulated in the 
United Nations and international law; Palestinian self-determination; intra-Islamic economic and 
trade cooperation; human development and economic well-being; Islamic teachings and values; 
defending true image of Islam; enhancement and development of science and technology; 
protection of family; safeguarding rights of Muslim communities and minorities in non-member 
states; common interests in international fora; combating terrorism; humanitarian emergences; 
                                                          
1126 Waters, N., ‘The APEC Asia-Pacific Privacy Initiative-A New Route to Effective Data Protection or a Trojan 
Horse for Self-Regulation?’, SCRIPTed, 2009, Vol.6, No.1, pp.74-89, at p.88; see also Connolly, C., ‘Asia-Pacific 
Region at the Privacy Crossroads’, World Data Protection Report, 2008, Vol.8, No.9, pp.8-16. 
1127 Waters, note 1126, supra. 
1128 U.N. Doc. A/45/421/5/21797, p.199, (adopted on 5th August 1990). 
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and cooperation in social, cultural and information.1129 OIC is the second largest inter-
governmental organization after the United Nations.1130 At present, it has fifty seven member 
states scattering in four world’s continents.1131 Some member states are secular while others are 
non-secular and have declared Islam as the state religion with sharia as the supreme law superior 
even to the states’ constitutions.1132 
 
CDHRI guarantees the right to privacy in Art 18(b) as follows: ‘everyone shall have the right to 
privacy in the conduct of his private affairs, in his home, among his family, with regard to his 
property and his relationships. It is not permitted to spy on him, to place him under surveillance 
or to besmirch his good name. The state shall protect him from arbitrary interference.’  
 
Although the above provision seeks to protect privacy just like the other international codes, its 
formulation and the entire environment in which it operates (more specifically in Islamic states) 
has sparked much debates critical and uncritical and those sought a compromise. These debates 
have centered around the compatibility of Islamic practices and the legal tradition on sharia with 
the human rights and values which originated from the Western European cultures.1133 More 
debates have recently been raised with regard to the ability of data protection legislation to 
effectively secure individuals’ rights to privacy in Islamic states.1134 
 
3.3.5 League of Arab States  
 
The Arab Charter of Human Rights 20041135(ACHR) is the main human right instrument for the 
League of Arab States (informally known as the Arab League). The latter was founded on 22 
                                                          
1129 OIC, Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 2008(replacing the original Charter registered the 
United Nations on 1st February 1974), Art 1. 
1130 OIC, Website, http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52 last visited 31/01/2012. 
1131 Azerbaijan, Jordan, Afghanistan, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Uganda, Iran, Pakistan, 
Bahrain, Brunei-Darussalam, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso,  Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Chad, Togo, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Syria, Suriname, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Oman, Gabon, 
Gambia, Guyana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Palestine, Comoro, Kyrgyz, Qatar, Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Malaysia, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, and 
Yemen; see OIC, Website,  http://www.oic-oci.org/member_states.asp last visited 31/1/2012. 
1132 See e.g. the North African Arab states: Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt. Note that, this is not the 
exhaustive catalogue of such OIC’s states which are Islamic and the Shari’ ah as their supreme source of law.   
1133 See e.g., Qureshi, Ezzat, Talbi, Ahmad and McCrea, note 197, supra; Cannataci, pp.5-6, note 29, supra; Arzt, 
D.E., ‘The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States’, Human rights Quarterly, 1990, Vol.12, 
No.2, pp.202-230. 
1134 See e.g., Caurana and Canataci, note 152, supra; Azmi, note 158, supra; Hayat, note 161, supra; Kusamotu, note 
164, supra and Bonnici, note 167, supra. 
1135 The Arab Charter on Human Rights was initially adopted in 1994 but it did not come into force because of 
criticisms which only saw one ratification (Iraq) out of the 22 members hence insufficiency number of ratification. 
The new version (Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004) was adopted in 2004 and came into force 15th March 2008. 
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March 1945 earlier than the United Nations.1136 The Arab League has twenty two members 
including Syria which was suspended on 16 November 2011.1137 All of the states in the Arab 
League are also members to the OIC. The main objectives for which the Arab League was 
establish are to strengthen ties among its members, coordinate their policies and promote their 
common interests.1138 
 
Article 21 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights protects privacy. This provision states that no 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with regard to his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or his reputation. To safeguard 
this right, the Charter provides further that everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks. 
 
Undoubtedly, Article 21 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights reproduces verbatim Article 12 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 which secures the right to privacy. It is 
widely viewed by commentators that this reproduction has been necessitated by an attempt to 
avoid the potential criticisms similar to those waged against the Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam.1139  Yet, privacy is a right in the ACHR. Its effective protection depends on the 
wider environment in which it operates and also on other provisions of protection of human 
rights. As pointed out, there are difficulties of the operation of human rights in the Arab League. 
Part and parcel of them are the fact that majority of the member states practice sharia law, 
Islamic religion and Arab culture-all of them complicating the environment for the operation of 
the right to privacy.1140 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The review of privacy and data protection codes at the international plane depicts some common 
and divergent trends. First, almost all international human rights catalogues contain the right to 
privacy. Although such a right is broadly framed hence cannot secure protection of personal data 
                                                          
1136 Pact of the League of the Arab States (22nd March 1945). 
1137 Other members of the Arab League are Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, State of Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen, see Website of the League of Arab States. 
1138 See Art 1 of the Alexandria Protocol (7th October 1944) signed by the heads of governments of Egypt, Trans-
Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon (among the six founders of the Arab League); see also Art 2 of the Pact of the 
League of the Arab States.  
1139 Cannataci, p.6, note 29, supra. 
1140 See e.g., Rishmawi, M., ‘The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights: A Step Forward?’, Human Rights Law 
Review, 2005, Vol.5, No.2, pp.361-376; Rishmawi, M., ‘The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab 
States: An Update’, Human Rights Law Review, 2010, vol.10, No.1, pp.169-178. 
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as such, it has provided strong normative force for the existence of data protection laws. Second, 
there is no single approach to protection of personal data. In Europe a comprehensive approach 
with a set of data protection principles and centralized supervisory authorities has been mostly 
favored. Yet, in some other places more particularly the United States, industry self-regulation is 
mostly preferred. In the Asia Pacific region, the approach is too pragmatic. In the last two cases 
‘market’ rather than human rights sentiments are the driving forces behind such approaches. The 
OIC and the Arab League have not yet developed concrete policy and regulatory framework 
regarding the protection of personal data. Third, since countries have different regional and 
international commitments there are cross-cutting effects of the data protection policies and 
frameworks, as such, although some countries in particular regions are dominantly relying on 
‘market’ to self-regulate personal data, they have not escaped the influence of regions which rely 
on comprehensive regulation of personal data. Yet, this effect has mainly not been in reverse. 
Fourth, of all international codes of data protection, the EU Directive 95/46/EC has been the 
most influential catalyst for adoption of data privacy legislation in Europe and to non-European 
countries. Part and parcel of this influence is generated by the exterritorial reach of the Directive 
through the requirement of limitation of transfer of personal data from EU/EEA to non-
EU/EEA countries (i.e. third countries) where such countries do not provide ‘adequate’ level of 
data protection similar to the Directive itself. This requirement which has affected the 
relationship between Europe and the third countries particularly in trade has exerted enormous 
pressure on the latter to adopt comprehensive data privacy law in the European style in order to 
sustain trade relationships. Sometimes ‘adequacy’ requirement has compelled Europe to make a 
number of compromises. In order to ensure third countries have complied with the required 
‘adequacy’ level of data protection, Europe has institutionalized the accreditation process. 
Through this procedure third countries ‘voluntarily’ make application to European institutions 
for accreditation. The latter assess the level of data protection using a set of criteria which are 
transparently known to third countries. Yet, extraneous criteria only known to European 
institutions are frequently invoked. This has rendered the whole process not only cumbersome 
but also unpredictable in its outcomes.  
 
Based on the above trends, and in particular, the over dominance of the European Directive 
95/46/EC worldly, this study selects it as the policy and regulatory framework informing 
subsequent discussions and analyses. There are two more reasons which have influenced this 
choice. Recently (2012), the European Union is carrying out legislative process for adopting the 
General Regulation of Data Protection to enhance the effects of the Directive’s ‘adequacy’ 
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requirements. As such the influence of the European law to non-European countries will be 
accelerated and is likely to have far reaching impacts. Second, the emerging legislative trend of 
data protection in Africa reveals that the same has closely followed the EU-style under Directive 
95/46/EC. Moreover, some of these jurisdictions have gone a step further to apply and seek 
accreditation with the European Union’s institutions (see chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). 
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4. Privacy and Data Protection in Africa 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter serves as a general introduction to chapters 5, 6 and 7 which are case studies of the 
present research. It canvasses a set of three interrelated issues. The first set generally surveys the 
socio-economic and political context of the African continent in order to lay down foundation 
for subsequent discussion. The rationale for undertaking this general survey is simply that 
privacy is not entirely independent from economic, political and technological forces. To 
accomplish this, a historical perspective of the changing epochs is engaged. The second set of 
issues covers African societal norms, particularly the norm of privacy.  Understandably, it is risk 
to undertake a generalised approach on the norm of privacy in this second set because of lack of 
homogeneous socio-economic, political and technological perspectives across Africa. Yet, some 
minimum common traits and characteristics are still possible to analyse. The third and final set of 
issues addressed in this chapter relates to the regulation of privacy and personal data. Both policy 
and regulatory frameworks are broadly covered. The latter are considered at regional, sub-
regional and national levels. Yet, specific and detailed discussions on national policies and 
regulatory frameworks are kept at minimum. These discussions are reserved for detailed analyses 
in chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
4.2 Political and Economic Context 
 
Africa is the world’s second largest continent in terms of size and population after Asia. It is 
made up of fifty four independent states.1141 Its total area covers about 11,677,239 square miles. 
Africa’s population as recorded by the World Bank in 2010 was 853.6 million (excluding North 
Africa).1142 In the same year the United Nations recoded Africa’s population at 1,022,234,000 
(over 1 billion) with an inclusion of North Africa.1143 The average growth rate of this population 
is approximately 2.5 per annum.1144 However its settlement population pattern is such that by 
2011 more Africans were still living in rural areas than in urban centers. While in the former case 
                                                          
1141 See a complete list of these countries in notes 194 and 195 supra. 
1142 World Bank’s Website,  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTPUBREP/EXTSTATIN
AFR/0,,menuPK:824057~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:824043,00.html last visited 3/02/2012. 
1143 See United Nations' World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_continents_by_population last visited 3/02/2012. 
1144 World Bank, note 1142, supra. 
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the population was 60% in the latter was only 40%.1145 Yet the urban population growth rate 
currently stands at 3.4% a year.1146 Accordingly it is estimated that 60% of African people will be 
living in cities by 2050.1147 At least 14 African countries are expected to be at least 80% urbanized 
by 2050.1148 Although the reasons for this growth are a mixture of factors, the rural to urban 
migration plays a significant role. Lack of employment, access to services and perceived 
opportunities of cities are widely considered to encourage people to migrate from rural areas to 
cities.1149 
 
Politically, African states especially those found in south of the Sahara have presidential system 
of government where the president is both the head of the state and head of government. 
Politics in these countries is practiced through liberal multi-party political system although not 
without constraints such as lack of impartial electoral bodies as well as free and fair elections; 
strict controls on rights to demonstrate and assemble; lack of truly independent judiciary; lack of 
good governance; non-adherence to rule of law;  restriction on freedom of access of 
information; etc.1150 Yet, the current political system has to be explained in a broader context of 
European external influence which started in the 15th century through the slave trade1151 rather 
than internal dynamics whose impacts were/have not been so significant.  
 
The abolition of slave trade in the 19th century did not leave a vacuum. It immediately saw the 
colonization of Africa by European powers notably the British, German, France, Portuguese, 
Italian and Belgian. The colonization process was preceded by the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 
which partitioned Africa among these European powers. The establishment of the colonial state 
and its instruments that immediately came after the Berlin Conference had far reaching impacts 
on indigenous forms of governance. Chiefly among them was the destruction of indigenous 
                                                          
1145 Harding, C., ‘Leaving the Farm: Africa’s Rapid Urbanisation’, How We Made It in Africa, 12 October 2011, 
http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/leaving-the-farm-africas-rapid-urbanisation/12836/ last visited 13/02/2012. 
1146 African Business, ‘Urbanisation for Better or for Worse’ December 2011, Issue No.381, pp.17-24, at p.18. 
1147 Ibid. 
1148 Ibid. 
1149 Ibid, p.19. 
1150 For detailed discussion of the efficacy or otherwise of the current political system in Africa see generally 
Makulilo, A.B., Tanzania: A De Facto One Party State?, VDM Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, 
Germany, 2008; Gentili, A.M., ‘Party, Party Systems and Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Paper 
Presentation at the Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 24-27 May 2005, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan020460.pdf last visited 4/02/2012. 
1151 Historians generally agree that Africa came into first contacts with Europe in the 15th century through Atlantic 
slave trade also known as ‘Triangular Slave Trade’ because of its behavioural pattern starting from Africa where 
slaves were sourced, proceeding to America where such slaves had to offer intensive labour force in mines and 
plantations owned by Europeans, then to Europe where farm and mineral products from America were finally 
shipped for industrial processing; and from Europe back to Africa where manufactured goods were dumped into 
Africa as market; see e.g. Rodney, note 96, supra; Tanzania Institute of Education., Africa from Stone Age to the 
Nineteenth Century, NPC-KIUTA, Dar es Salaam, 2002, p.39. 
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tribal leadership. Whenever the latter was tolerated to remain intact strategies to integrate it to 
the colonial system were made. There were several reasons. The colonial rule had its target goals 
namely production of raw materials for industries located in Europe, mobilization of labour 
force for the plantations and mines and creation of market to consume manufactured goods 
from Europe hence the common historical expression by African historians: ‘we produce what 
we don’t consume and we consume what we don’t produce’.1152 Concomitantly allowing the 
indigenous tribal rule to exist side-by-side with the colonial rule without any subjugation into the 
latter would have defeated the very objectives of colonialism. It was not therefore by accident 
that Lord Lugard, for example, introduced on behalf of the British colonial administration in 
Africa the so called ‘indirect rule’ i.e. colonial rule through the disguise of tribal rulers while 
slightly the French used the local chiefs and rulers as their agents.1153  
 
On independence (1960s-1970s), the colonial powers introduced in Africa constitutions based on 
the Western style of politics and governance. These constitutions are popularly known as the 
‘Westminster’ or ‘Gaullist’ constitution model after that of the United Kingdom, France or 
Portugal.1154 The independence constitutions which are widely considered as ‘imposed’ upon the 
newly independent African states were tailored around the liberal constitutional principles alien 
to Africa. Such constitutional principles included the doctrines of separation of powers, rule of 
law, parliamentary supremacy, ministerial responsibility and judicial independence. Moreover 
multi-party political system was incorporated in the independence constitutions. Also central to 
these constitutions was the incorporation of the Bill of Rights which guaranteed individuals’ 
basic rights and freedom.  
 
However, the independence constitutions were short-lived. They were soon dismantled and 
replaced by totalitarian governments of military or single party regimes under the guise of 
socialist ideology (neither were these systems of governance indigenous to Africa).1155 The 
                                                          
1152 The expression was originally a summation of the nature of the colonial economy by Dr.Eric Williams the 
author of classic work of Capitalism and Slavery, see Girvan, N., ‘The Post Colonial Economy and Society: Facing 
the Challenge’, Paper prepared for presentation at the Regional Forum of Projects Promotion Ltd., St Vincent and 
the Grenadines, February 11, 2008, pp.1-16, at p.1. 
1153 For details about how the British ‘Indirect Rule’ operated see e.g. Crowder, M., ‘Indirect Rule-French and British 
Style’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 1964, Vol.34, No.3, pp. 197-205. 
1154 See e.g., Andrew, H., ‘The “Westminster Model” Constitution Overseas: Transplantation, Adaptation and 
Development in Commonwealth States’, Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, 2004, Vol.4, No.2, 
pp.143-166; Sinjela, M., ‘Constitutionalism in Africa: Emerging Trends’, The Review, Special Issue, 1998, Vol.23, 
No.60, pp.23-29, at p. 23. 
1155 See e.g., Prempeh, H.K., ‘Africa’s “Constitutionalism Revival”: False start or new dawn?,’ International Journal 
of Constitutional Law, 2007, Vol.5, pp.469-506, at p.474; Wing, A.K., ‘Communitarianism vs. Individualism: 
Constitutionalism in Namibia and South Africa’, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1992-1993, Vol.11, No.2, 
pp.295-380, at p.308. 
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collapse of independence constitutions was partly attributed to the fact that many of the 
assumptions underpinning them were not rooted in the African context, grounded in experience 
and institutionalized patterns of behaviour, nor indeed in an adequate framework of laws.1156  
 
Another argument leveled against the continued existence of independence constitutions is that 
they were not suitable vehicle for creating unified states from different and fragmented nations 
often mixed in the pre-independence era.1157 It has also been argued that a competitive system 
modelled after that of the Western democracies encouraged political competition and rivalry 
while at the same time detracted from economic development programmes set out by the 
independent African countries.1158 The African nationalist elites generally discarded the 
independence constitutions as neocolonial devices designed to ensure ‘the preservation of 
imperial interests in the newly emergent state.1159 Interestingly, the post-independence Africa’s 
military and single party regimes did not either last longer. The oil crisis of 1970s compounded 
by excessive draughts, civil and inter-state wars and above all the end of the Cold War resulting 
into the collapse of U.S.S.R in 1990s as the world superpower (once living side-by-side with the 
U.S.A)1160 saw dramatic turn for developing countries including Africa. Because of economic 
failures attributed by those enumerated factors, African states found themselves on the mercy of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and European donor communities in 
their efforts to reform the devastated economies. By 1980s the latter imposed on Africa 
‘structural adjustment programs’ commonly known as SAPs. As part of conditions to access 
reliefs under SAPs African states were required to liberalize their political systems by allowing 
multi-party political system, democratic elections, exercise of individual rights, good governance, 
rule of law, accountability, etc. In short, SAPs practically required African states to return to 
most of the features of their independence constitutions. To achieve this African states quickly 
adopted either completely new constitutions or just amended the existing ones by incorporating 
the liberal constitutional principles.  It is imperative to note that SAPs widened the space under 
which internal dynamics (poor living standards, legitimacy crisis, etc) would operate to mount 
internal pressure to the African regimes to adopt changes.  
                                                          
1156 Paul, J.C.N., ‘Developing Constitutional Orders in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Unofficial Report’, Third World 
Legal Studies, 1988, Vol.7, No.1, pp.1-34, at p.14. 
1157 Sinjela, note 1154, supra. 
1158 Ibid. 
1159 The Editors of the Spark, Some Essential Features of Nkurumaism, International Publishers, New York, 1965. 
P.39 cited in Prempeh, p.473, note 1155, supra. 
1160 The collapse of Soviet power led to the withdraw of military support to a variety of Soviet client states such as 
Angola. Moreover the end of Cold War reduced the geographical significance of Africa in Western eyes, because 
there was no longer any communist enemy to confront. Thus, western economic support for repressive anti-
communist regimes lessened as well, see Wing, p.309, note 1155, supra. 
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As pointed out, Africa’s adoption of liberal constitutions on independence and in 1980s had 
been pre-conditioned by foreign pressures. As a result and in practical terms such constitutions 
have been derailed by many African leaders. This, to some extent, explains why the executive in 
Africa is still very strong and not fully accountable to the people. It also explains the current 
election problems; lack of respect to the rule of law; interference with the judiciary; weak 
legislatures; weak opposition parties; problems of transparency and respect for human rights 
generally and basic rights and freedom of individuals. Yet, the liberal constitutions have had 
progressive gains in improving the political systems and life in Africa. For example, courts have 
so far produced a corpus of important rulings protecting civil and political liberties and limiting 
governmental powers.1161 At least there are now regular elections after every four to five years in 
many African countries. These elections are reinforced by the rise of new era of presidential term 
limits.1162 There are also ascendance of fearless and strong private media and civil societies.1163 In 
some countries such as South Africa and Mauritius governments are largely made accountable to 
the electorates through legislatures. Moreover, some countries are moving towards the fourth 
generation of constitution making (after the independence constitutions; military/single party 
constitutions 1960s-1980s and liberal constitutions 1980s-1990s) with the view of increasingly 
curbing the executive powers and making the legislatures and judiciary discharge efficiently their 
traditional roles. This is the case with Kenya which has recently adopted a new constitution in 
2010. Other countries such as Tanzania are currently undertaking constitutional review for 
purposes of overhauling the existing constitution enacted in 1977 but which has been amended 
from time to time. 
 
Economically, Africa has evolved through pre-colonial, colonial, post-independent/neo colonial 
and now global economies. In pre-colonial times Africa’s economy was largely subsistence. Small 
scale agriculture and livestock keeping were the permanent feature. Family was the main unit of 
labour force. Pastoralism was practiced in arid and semi-arid areas. The Maasai of the East 
African Valley and grassland plateau, the Fulani of Western Sudan, the Khoi Khoi of the Cape 
Region in South Africa, the Herero of Namibia, the Tswana of Botswana, the Galla and the 
Somali of the semi-desert regions of the Horn of Africa provide typical examples of pastoralist 
societies in Africa.1164 Mining, industry and trade were present but limited. Technology was low 
and the iron technology which was invented in the first millennium A.D was used to make 
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1164 Tanzania Institute of Education, pp.16-17, note 1151, supra. 
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working tools in some societies only.1165 Starting from the 15th century, the African pre-colonial 
economies became incorporated into the world capitalist economy through the mercantile 
capitalism which saw the beginning of the Atlantic Slave Trade, and subsequently colonialism, 
neo-colonialism and now globalization.1166 
 
Despite the above incorporation which might have positively transformed Africa, that has not 
been the case. The external links affected Africa adversely. Africa’s economy is still characterized 
as pre-industrial or simply agrarian with little export trade. The national per capita income is 
relatively very low.1167 Agriculture forms the largest sector of its economy but it faces many 
challenges due to lack of technology, viable industries, draught conditions, capital and researches. 
Together Africa accounts for less than 2% of the global trade.1168 The industrial and mineral 
sectors as well as tourism have yet been fully realized although the continent is rich in these 
natural resources. In the period following independence the state was in total control of 
economy. The private sector was very weak. However with SAPs which came about in 1980s 
strict terms were imposed on African states by the IMF, World Bank and Africa’s lenders and 
creditors of the last resort, as a condition for providing interim relief, to liberalize and deregulate 
their economies and structure their public administrations; privatize the loss-making state 
enterprises, remove price controls and subsidies for the social services, and trim blotted public 
payrolls.1169 The economic liberalization has resulted into significant growth of the private sector 
in present day Africa. It has also changed the pattern of ownership. The latter in turn has led to 
the individual ownership of property. 
 
Technologically, Africa has come far away. Walter Rodney asserts that in the 15th century when 
Africa first came in contact with Europe, the latter’s technological development was not superior 
to that of Africa and the rest of the world generally.1170 Yet, he notes that there were certain 
specific features that were highly advantageous to Europe such as shipping industry and (to a 
lesser extent) guns.1171 According to this historian, Africa had strength in the cloth industry and 
                                                          
1165 Ibid, p.18. 
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irrigation technology (e.g. North Africa particularly Egypt).1172 However, through the Atlantic 
slave trade that saw the decline of Africa’s skilled labour force and colonialism Africa lost its 
technological grip. Under colonialism, Africa remained the exporter of raw materials as well as 
importer of manufactured goods from Europe. This explains why, for example, the African 
cotton cloth industry declined as a result of competition from importing manufactured cotton 
cloth which were of cheap and of high quality.1173 Accordingly, this remarkable reversal is tied to 
technological advance in Europe and to stagnation of technology in Africa owing to the very 
trade with Europe.1174 Yet while Europe has its share in the Africa’s ‘technological arrest,’ after 
independence, African nationalist elites fueled the regression. This is because, immediately after 
independence most African countries purporting to completely detach from European influence 
and in view of stimulating industrialization in the newly independent states banned imports from 
Europe.1175 While it was thought this could have boosted local technological development and 
industries, the same failed to produce such effect. Instead such protectionist policies greatly 
constrained Africa’s ability to participate in international trade.1176 As a result, technologically the 
continent has remained backward compared to the rest of the world, particularly Europe and 
America. However two caveats need to be made.  First, when a society for whatever reason finds 
itself technologically trailing behind others, it catches up not so much by independent inventions 
but by borrowing.1177 Japan is widely cited as an example of a country which effectively borrowed 
technology from Europe and became capitalist.1178 Yet this could not happen in Africa despite 
centuries of contact with Europe because of the nature of the relationship between the two 
continents which operated in disfavor of the former.1179  The second caveat partly linked to the 
first is that technology transfer should be distinguished from transplantation. Whereas in the 
former case, the demand for European technology would have come from inside Africa with the 
willingness of both sides1180 the latter involves the imposition of such technology from Europe to 
Africa. As a result, customization of such technology to suit the local needs has been difficult. 
Undoubtedly, this second caveat has contributed to Africa’s resistance to embracing imported 
technology.  
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However, Africa’s technological breakthrough in the formal sense started with the lifting of 
protectionist policies in 1980s-1990s following SAPs. Through trade liberalization African 
countries began to import technology from developed countries particularly Europe. Today 
Africa has realized the importance of technology as the basis of creating an information 
economy.1181 Recent statistical records by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)1182 
indicate that Africa is the region with the highest mobile phone growth rate. By the end of 2008, 
it had 246 million mobile subscriptions compared to the five million mobile cellular 
subscriptions in 2000; and mobile penetration has risen from just five per cent in 2003 to well 
over 30 per cent by 2009.1183 The number of Internet users has also grown faster than in other 
regions.1184 Yet, despite rapid growth, Africa’s ICT penetration levels in 2009 was still far behind 
the rest of the world and very few African countries reach ICT levels comparable to global 
averages.1185 Less than five per cent of Africans use the Internet, and fixed and mobile 
broadband penetration levels are negligible.1186 It is noteworthy that the pattern of ICT 
infrastructure in Africa has left a ‘digital divide’ between urban and rural areas with high ICT 
concentration in the former.1187  Yet efforts to bridge the gap are being made although with some 
slow progress.1188 
 
Socially, Africans’ ways of life have been greatly affected by political, economic and technological 
liberalism. Prior to external contacts with Europe in the 15th century and generally in pre-colonial 
era, Africans were predominantly living in kinship and other closely associated groups.1189 In 
such socio-political organizations, individuals lived in interdependence. This relationship 
between an individual and another in the African community has been expressed in summary in 
a famous Zulu/Xhosa proverb: umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu abanye (i.e. a person is a person through 
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other persons). The shorthand of this proverb is commonly cited as Ubuntu.1190 The latter’s core 
values include aspects like communalism, interdependence, humanness, sharing, compassion, 
respect and caring.1191 Mbiti, a Kenyan famous philosopher, has underscored the African 
relationship in the following expression: ‘I am because we are, and since we are therefore I 
am’.1192 Yet, although Ubuntu philosophy has its roots in South Africa it has been popularized as 
representing African worldview.1193 Some scholarships have only regarded it as the most recent 
manifestation of the notion of an African humanism, similar to earlier notions such as Pan-
Africanism, Ujamaa (i.e. the special type of socialism in Tanzania) or negritude1194 especially after 
the collapse of the latter. They have therefore dismissed Ubuntu as a post-colonial ‘Utopia’ 
invention and/or a ‘prophetic’ illusion crafted by the African political elites in the age of 
globalization.1195 
 
From the preceding discussions, the dominant discourse by African and non-African scholars 
tend to claim that Africans have only been collectivists.1196 Yet, individualism and individualistic 
life style could/can still be identified in the pre-colonial African societies and the subsequent 
periods. This point is well articulated by Professor Olufemi Taiwo who posits:- 
 
‘Africans and non-Africans alike believe that African societies are essentially 
communalistic and are fundamentally reluctant to pollute these waters with an 
introduction of the bad philosophy of individualism. This is a misplaced 
identification. It ignores the fact that what needs to be accounted for when we 
investigate social forms are what type of individualism can be found in various 
societies, what indigenous nodes of individualist transformations are there to 
be isolated, and how those nodes were affected by colonialism. What is at 
issue is not whether there were forms of individualism in any but the most 
primitive societies but what kind of individualism there is and what role it 
plays in social ordering. In addition a blanket condemnation of individualism 
reinforces a reluctance to identify its presence in African societies, past and 
present. I abjure such a blanket condemnation. While this is not the place to 
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consider the many sides of individualism, I must insist that its introduction 
into African societies by the apostles of modernity and its evolution in 
indigenous societies following upon their own internal dynamics deserve 
serious scholarly attention that does not preclude condemnation of its 
deleterious consequences if there have been such.’1197 
 
The above paragraph clearly suggests that some forms of individualism existed in pre-colonial 
African societies independent from external influences. Taiwo’s views are collaborated by 
Ezedike who argues:- 
 
‘At the same time, let it be said here, that African communitarianism is not 
unqualified collectivism. It would be unbalanced and naive assessment to 
portray the African traditional community as a totalitarian community in 
which an individual is a mere pawn within the rigid and ruthless set-up. What 
we are saying is that the idea of community consciousness should not be 
interpreted to mean that an individual is completely submerged in the 
collectivism and thus has no rights, personal initiatives nor any sense of self-
reliance. This would certainly amount to exaggeration and distortion of facts. 
An individual can hardly be regarded as a slave to community.’1198 
 
Taiwo and Ezedike’s views are reiterated by Kigongo. The latter holds that in African traditional 
society social cohesion was dominant over individuality; unlike individualism, it seems to have 
been distinctly discernible.1199 It is imperative to mention that the co-existence of collectivism 
and individualism in pre-colonial societies is similarly pondered by two renowned African 
philosophers Kwame Gyekye and Leopold Senghor. Gyekye observes, ‘it would be more correct 
to describe that order (i.e. African social order) as amphibious, for it manifests features of both 
communality and individuality….African social thought seeks to avoid the excesses of the two 
exaggerated systems, while allowing for a meaningful, albeit uneasy, interaction between the 
individual and the society’.1200 In tandem with Gyekye, Senghor regards traditional African 
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society to be ‘based both on the community and on the person and in which, because it was 
founded on dialogue and reciprocity, the group had priority over the individual without crashing 
him, but allowing him to blossom as a person.’1201  
 
During the colonial period, the African social relationship experienced stronger external shock of 
waves than those in the slave trade. Western education and Christianity played significant role in 
impacting on the African social cohesion. With colonial education and religion, western values 
based on individualism slowly permeated into African cultures making Things Fall Apart1202 or 
creating The River Between1203 as some African literature writers have portrayed the effect of 
colonialism in their fiction. Apart from education and religion, the colonial government and the 
colonial economy exerted enormous pressures on the African cultural life. Under colonialism 
almost every individual was forced into the colonial monetary system and economy by provision 
of labour force which sometimes displaced families (in case of labour migration), payment of 
taxes, etc. This point is well underscored by Okigbo with respect to the impact of colonialism in 
West Africa where he observed that the family and kinship structures showed signs of breaking 
down as a result of the impact of the growing individualism.1204 
 
In postcolonial period, the external forces continued to erode the African social forms in the 
direction of individualism. First, the leaders and African scholars of the African independence 
and post-independence era analyzed the African value system with socio-economic and political 
implications that are drawn from a different value system, Marxism.1205  The former used African 
value system as justification for their choice of Marxist socialism.1206 The latter was the dominant 
ideology in Africa shortly after independence yet it was alien in the continent although it was 
similar to African value system. Second, and perhaps the most important, following the collapse 
of world’s socialist system, Africans are now engaged in the process of completely abandoning 
their value system and attempting to embrace liberalism.1207 Under liberalism Africans are living 
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in societies in which everything is permitted under the name of individual freedom and 
autonomy.1208 The Kenyan rural sociologist Preston Chitere, offers the following observation 
regarding the current state of the African family in Kenya, a state or condition that exists in 
many other sub-Saharan African nations:- 
 
‘The effects of capitalism are already being felt in our families. Individualism in 
society is increasing. Even families in rural areas like to operate in isolation, 
and those who offer any help are keen to help their immediate families only. 
The (conjugal) family is becoming more independent. The loss of community 
networks and the development of individualism have resulted in (increased 
occurrences of) suicide, loneliness, drug abuse and mental illness. The 
communal system is breaking down. The extended family had certain 
functions to perform, for instance, to reconcile couples at loggerheads with 
each other, but this is no longer the case. It is no one (else’s) business to know 
what’s happening in one’s marriage today.’1209 
 
In support of the above observations but in the Nigeria context, Omobowale observes that since 
the incorporation of the Nigerian economy into the world capitalist system, the indigenous social 
structure has been fundamentally restructured with the youth being immensely immersed in 
Western cultures.1210 Recent empirical studies carried out in different parts of Africa have 
confirmed the above observations. Suffice here to mention four of them in order to make this 
point clearer.  
 
The first of the above studies: Individualism versus Community in Africa? The Case of Botswana1211 was 
carried out in Botswana to answer the following question: How is it possible that two deeply-
rooted values in some African societies-the people’s sense of individualism and their sense of 
community-have persisted through time when they seem to work against each other?1212 This 
study was carried out in the context of collective and private government-sponsored farming 
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projects in rural areas. The study found that it is not that the African value of individualism 
undermines the chances of success for government-sponsored group efforts, or that the African 
value of community hampers the successful operation of government-initiated efforts to 
promote private enterprises.1213 Rather what works against these endeavors in many rural areas is 
that they involve taking risks, when the cultural context in which they are meant to operate, both 
at the individual and societal levels, has been profoundly averse to taking such risks.1214 
 
The second study was carried out in Kenya: Individualism versus Collectivism: A Comparison of Kenyan 
and American Self-Concepts.1215 This study involved two levels of comparison of self-concepts in 
relation to culture. The first level was a comparison between Kenya and America in which case it 
was fond that conceptions of the self among the pastoral nomads in Kenya are more collective 
and less individualized than Western or American self-concepts.1216 This first level confirmed the 
researchers’ hypothesis as it was expected. The second level of comparison involved the various 
groups and communities within Kenya. As compared to Kenyans living in rural areas especially 
the Maasai, the study found that factors of urbanization, development, modernization and 
Western education influenced the self-concepts of Kenyans living in Nairobi (the capital city of 
Kenya) and resulted in a decreased level of collectivism.1217 
 
The third empirical study was carried out in Swaziland under the title: The Indigenous Rights of 
Personality with Particular Reference to the Swazi in the Kingdom of Swaziland.1218 This research study 
found among other things that the rural areas of Swaziland have never remained static.1219 
Instead, considerable pressure has been exerted on traditional Swazi structures by large agri-
business, medical and educational missionaries leading to modernization and transformation of 
traditional rural populations.1220 More specifically, industrialization and urbanization with the 
accompanying labour migration have eroded the ties of kinship with the result that women alone 
have been obliged to rear families, with modern Swazi households lacking the establishing 
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influence of a patriarchal head.1221 Accordingly, the foundation and social cohesion upon which 
the family and kinship ties were based upon had collapsed. 
 
The fourth study illustrating the diminishing value of collectivism in Africa was carried out in 
Malawi.1222 This study is interesting as it specifically investigated the existence of Ubuntu in 
Malawi’s political system. It found that the dictatorial regime of the then President Kamuzu 
Banda associated with massive corruption; violation of individuals’ rights, embezzlement of 
public resources, torture, political killings, mysterious deaths, etc denied the  regime of any 
Ubuntu standards.1223 These findings are relevant to other African countries in which the 
governments are corrupt, lack transparency, are not accountable to the people, they are self-
enriching and do not respect individuals’ rights. 
 
Under globalization, African culture of collectivism has to a large extent given way to Western 
individualism. Maduagwu argues that the present-day extreme individualism of the West, the 
outcome of centuries of laissez-faire capitalism, is being transmitted across the world as the final 
stage of world civilization to which all cultures must strive to attain.1224 It is elucidated that the 
communication dimension of globalization has the potential of eroding national cultures and 
values and replacing them with the cultural values of more technologically and economically 
advanced countries, particularly the United States and members of the European Union.1225  
People living in the urban centers, towns and large cities of Africa are currently experiencing the 
rapid growing of Western individualism.1226 Rural areas of Africa are also slowly being drawn in 
individualism.1227  
 
4.3 African Culture of Privacy 
 
Perhaps it is intriguing to commence discussion in this section with the remarks of the Nigerian 
Professor Nwauche:- 
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‘Is privacy important in Nigeria? The answer to the question is Yes. Because 
there are human beings in Nigeria. And there is a constitutional protection of 
this right. Yet as we have noted above this is one right that has not received 
adequate protection or elaboration both in the definition, philosophical basis 
or the key issues in the concept of privacy.’1228 
 
As a departure, Nwauche’s contention considers the existence of human beings in Nigeria (and 
in every African country) as a pre-condition for existence of the value to privacy. His views are 
based upon dignitary concept of personality and self worth of a person. Nwauche argues that 
dignitary concept seeks to protect the personality of an individual because he is a human 
being.1229 He holds that this is the broader basis of human rights.1230 Accordingly, dignitary 
interests, on the one hand recognize the individual autonomy of person and the need to respect 
such autonomy flowing from the dignity of a person.1231 On the other hand dignitary interests are 
related to the self worth of a person as such the law seeks to protect an individual’s subjective 
feelings.1232 There is yet another reason that Nwauche advances regarding the existence of the 
value of privacy in Nigeria and Africa generally: the availability of constitutional protection of the 
right to privacy. Generally considered, Nwauche’s views partly settle the question whether 
privacy exists or is an important value in Africa.  
 
In contrast to Nwauche, Olinger et al’s survey of Ubuntu (i.e. the African culture based on 
collectivism) reveals that privacy does not exist in African culture because in such culture 
individuals’ interests are inferior to the group.1233 As a result an individual cannot advance claims 
for individual’s right of privacy. This survey finds support of Burchell.1234 However in Swaziland, 
the Swazi indigenous culture seems to recognize privacy, although not in Western individualist 
sense, in the right of honour or dignity.1235 Yet this privacy recognition is flimsy. As a result there 
is no African word corresponding squarely to the English word privacy. 
 
The above background leaves it clear that African culture of privacy is largely a byproduct of 
external influence from the West. The clearest initial point through which privacy started to take 
                                                          
1228 Nwauche, p.66, note 179, supra. 
1229 Ibid, p.65. 
1230 Ibid. 
1231 Ibid. 
1232 Ibid. 
1233 Olinger et al, note 64, supra. 
1234 Burchell, note 77, supra. 
1235 Anspach, pp.217-218, note 1218, supra. 
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shape in Africa was in 1960s-1970s.1236 This was the period when most African states became 
independent from their European colonizers. Through independence constitutions (i.e. the first 
generation of liberal constitutions) ‘privacy’ found its existence in Africa in the Bill of Rights 
incorporated in most of such constitutions. Yet, the Bill of Rights generally and the ‘privacy’ 
right specifically had little impact on the lives of the people during this period. A complex array 
of factors offers explanation to this state of affair. The African ruling elites deliberately ignored 
Bill of Rights by erroneously thinking that its enforcement would be incompatible with 
implementation of development programmes which were at stake; lack of culture of respect of 
individual rights which was most invariably not in harmony with the African  culture of 
collectivism and non-involvement of African people in the independence constitutional making 
process leaving out the impression that such constitutions and whatever values they cherished 
were out of touch of African soils henceforth externally oriented and imposed on Africans. The 
diminishing importance of Bill of Rights at this time became apparent following the adoption of 
military and single party dictatorial regimes shortly after independence. In the atmosphere where 
the Bill of Rights was absent or had very little role to play, the right to privacy became virtually 
absent and accordingly privacy could not be claimed even if one would have wished to do so. 
 
Privacy as a right reappered in 1980s-2000s. This period saw the return of the liberal democratic 
constitutions incorporating Bill of Rights with ‘privacy’ as one of its components. Otherwise this 
period is regarded as the second generation of liberal constitutions in Africa. With such 
constitutions the concepts of liberal Western values as well as privacy significantly permeated in 
African consciousness and culture. More importantly, ‘privacy’ consciousness has been catalyzed 
by specific factors operating in wider environment of socio-economic, political and technological 
set up of Africa from 1980s to 2000s. These set of factors are considered below as determinants 
of privacy concerns.  
 
4.3.1 Determinants of Privacy Concerns in Africa 
 
Privacy concerns which means desire to keep personal information to one-self are essential in 
determining the adoption of privacy policies and legislation. Such concerns are influenced by 
various factors in Africa. These can be broadly classified as positive or negative determinants. 
The former relate to factors which operate to cause individuals to be concerned with their 
privacy and possibly make claim for its protection. It is less important if those factors themselves 
                                                          
1236 South Africa presents an exceptional trend whereby the recognition of ‘privacy’ as an independent right came 
much earlier in 1950s than in the rest of other African countries (see Chapter 6). 
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are positive or negative in their nature but produce one similar result: causing people to be 
concerned and value their privacy. The other class of determinants is the negative determinants 
in the strict sense. The latter constitute factors operating as impediments to the growth of 
privacy attitude. Both sets are considered below.  However before this examination is undertaken 
it is imperative to consider their nature.  
 
Characteristically, privacy determinants in Africa are either spontaneous or non spontaneous in 
operation and in producing their effects. Also, some of them are either localized in a particular 
country or sub-region while others have region-wise influence. Moreover, one or more 
determinants may operate simultaneously or otherwise in shaping and reshaping privacy 
attitudes. Important also to point out is the magnitude of these determinants. Quite often the 
determinants of privacy concerns produce effects at varying degrees: high and low degrees. 
However this does not suggest undermining the significance of the latter.  
 
One caveat must be read in the above classification of determinants of privacy concerns. The 
classification presented here is undeniably not universal. Neither is it exhaustive. Yet, it serves to 
delineate the current major catalysts of privacy concerns in Africa. These may be the bases for 
policy and legislative developments. Also considering these determinants as not exhaustive leaves 
open for future determinants to arise and shape and reshape privacy attitudes in Africa.  
 
4.3.1.1 Positive Determinants 
 
 Development of Databanks 
 
Much of the present day ICTs in Africa is a result of importation of technology mainly from 
Europe, the United States and currently from China. Illustrations of such technologies include 
computer hardware and software, mobile handsets including smart phones, TV sets, DNA 
machines, DVD recorders and players, Internet facilities, body scanners, etc. While these ICTs 
have been essential tools for information communication making Africa part of the famous 
‘global village’ they have at the same time posed a number of risks on individuals’ personal 
information. One of the ways in which personal information is apparently threatened by ICTs is 
the African governments’ tendencies of creating large databanks for various purposes. The latter 
have manifested mainly in the form of mandatory registration of SIM cards in which all service 
providers were and are still required as part of their licensing conditions to register all subscribers 
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using their networks. The countries which have so far implemented mandatory SIM cards 
registration include Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Botswana, Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Algeria, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire( 
Ivory Coast) and Uganda. In most cases, registration of SIM cards in such countries requires 
subscribers to furnish a wide range of their personal information. For natural person, 
information required include names, phone number, gender, date of birth, marital status, 
residential or business address, employment details, identity number or other document which 
proves identity of the subscriber, alternative mobile phone number(if any), subscriber’s 
photograph, etc. However in case of non-natural person usual information required include 
registration number accompanied by certificate of registration or incorporation, business license 
and tax payers identification number(TIN). In either case, unspecified additional information 
relating to the subscribers can be asked by those persons registering subscribers on behalf of the 
service providers.  
 
The development of SIM card databanks has sparked public debates over concern for privacy. 
Part of the reason is the fact that in many countries such as Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana 
and Botswana, to mention but few examples, the mandatory registration of SIM cards proceeded 
on the basis of administrative directives from the national communication authorities in the 
respective countries.1237 There was no in place any legislation or regulation for guiding the entire 
registration process including how subscribers’ privacy would be guaranteed. Such administrative 
directives are generally vague and their scope unclear. Moreover the latter’s legal status and 
enforcement has quite often been challenged.1238 Even when legislation or regulations for SIM 
card registration were in place before or after, most of them have left many potential loopholes 
for infringing subscribers’ personal information.1239 Also, a wide range of personal information 
has been collected without any proper verification risking these databases to contain inaccurate 
information.1240 As an illustration, the National Communications Authority (NCA) in Ghana 
revealed that about 5.2 million consumers registered have invalid data.1241 There is also ample 
                                                          
1237 See e.g., Makulilo, p.48, note 225, supra; Murungi, M., ‘Registration of Mobile Phone Users: Easier said but 
carefully done’, Kenya Law, 26th July 2009, http://kenyalaw.blogspot.com/2009/07/registration-of-mobile-phone-
users.html last visited 19/02/2012; Izuogu, note 180, supra; Anan, K., ‘What is My Beef Against SIM Card 
Registration in Ghana?, Independent Civil Advocacy Network, 25th January 2010, http://www.i-can-
ghana.com/?p=104 last visited 19/02/2012; Sutherland, E., ‘The Mandatory Registration of SIM Cards’, Computer 
and Telecommunications Law Review, 2010, Vol.16, No.3, pp.61-63, at p.61. 
1238 Ibid. 
1239 See e.g., Makulilo, pp.50-54, note 225, supra; Hemeson, C.J., ‘Directive on Consumer Data for SIM card 
Registration in the Telecommunications Sector: An African Perspective’, Social Science Research Network, 2012, 
pp.1-12, at p.5, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982033 last visited 22/02/2012. 
1240 Sutherland, p.63, note 1237, supra. 
1241 Hemeson, p.6, note 1239, supra. 
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evidence for the misuse of personal information in the subscribers’ databases in some 
jurisdictions (see e.g. chapter 7). Mobile spying, interception and everdrop on digital cell phones 
conversations and other abuses relying on individuals’ personal information are commonplace 
despite the mandatory registration of SIM cards. This has casted doubts on the efficacy of such 
laws and also creating fears of ‘big brothers’, ‘little brothers’ and ‘little sisters’.1242   
 
The other manifestations of systems of database in Africa include those on identification systems 
(ID Systems). These constitute the most common ICT privacy issue currently facing Africa.1243 
Such ID systems either manifest as national identification cards (National ID cards) leading to 
creation of databanks of all nationals in a particular country or passports.1244 Both systems use 
biometric technology. Concerns for privacy in this context have arisen from the fact that many 
of the ID systems such as the ones in Rwanda and Mozambique (and now Tanzania) are 
developed and operated by foreign companies.1245 While there is no concrete evidence of any 
misuse of personal data, these concerns have tended to rest upon little control by the African 
governments to prevent such companies from transferring information outside their respective 
jurisdictions or deal with it in an incompatible manner. As a result, it is feared that companies 
may misuse personal information at the peril of individuals. Yet significant concerns come from 
security issues as well as reliability of these databases.1246 Rwanda and Kenya serve as typical 
illustrations of misuse of personal information based on ID systems. During the Rwandan 
genocide of 1994 the national ID cards were used to identify the ‘Tutsi’ victims. Jim Fussel 
explains how important the identification cards were in facilitating the Rwandan genocide of 
which the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda based in Arusha-Tanzania was established 
to try the culprits. Fussel posits:- 
 
‘In 1994 genocide in Rwanda began, an ID card with the designation “Tutsi” 
spelled a death sentence at any roadblock. Along with the prior training of 
militias, stockpiling of weapons, direction of the massacres by hate radio, the 
prior existence of ethnic ID cards was one of the most important factors 
                                                          
1242 See e.g., Makulilo, note 225, p.49 (footnote 11); Hemeson, p.7, note 1239, supra. 
1243 Banisar, D., ‘Linking ICTs, The Right to Privacy, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information’, East 
African Journal of Peace & Human Rights, 2010, Vol.16, No.1,  pp.124-154, at p.126. 
1244 Ibid. 
1245 Ibid. 
1246 Ibid. 
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facilitating the speed and magnitude of the 100 days of mass killing in 
Rwanda.’1247 
 
Although the national ID card system in Rwanda was introduced in 1933 way back in Belgian 
colonial days when ICTs were uncommon, the modern ID systems tend to rely on the same 
pattern yet based upon sophisticated technologies. This has increased many risks of abuses of 
personal information. Closely similar to Rwanda is Kenya. The latter’s post election violence in 
2007 which saw a death toll of more than 1,000 people relied on IDs to identify certain ethnic 
groups the price of which some senior members of the current Kenyan government are to pay 
by facing trial for international crimes in The Hague.1248  
 
Alongside the subscribers’ databases for mobile phones and national ID cards, there are also in 
many African countries centralized voter registration databases (CVRD). Some of the countries 
with CVRD include Tanzania, Ghana, Liberia, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, 
and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The CVRD are in many cases computerized 
databases with biometric information most invariably fingerprints. Privacy concerns with regard 
to CVRD have been raised in three main areas. First, most African countries do not have 
comprehensive data privacy legislation neither do such countries have legislation nor regulations 
which authorize collection of voters’ personal information while guaranteeing protection of 
privacy.1249 Second, where voter registration involves biometrical registration, individuals’ 
concerns for privacy have been raised high. The current registration of voters in Ghana for the 
2012 election is illustrative. In connection with this, some commentators have argued that since 
biometric identifiers are unique to individuals, they are more reliable in verifying identity than 
token and knowledge-based methods, however, the collection of biometric identifiers raises 
privacy concerns about the ultimate use of this information.1250 Third, personal information 
collected for voting purposes are in most cases shared and re-used for other purposes. This is 
especially in countries where there are no national IDs. In Ghana, apart from voters’ ID cards 
being used by card holders for private transactions, the same cards have been widely recognized 
                                                          
1247 Fussel, G., ‘Indangamuntu 1994: Ten years ago in Rwanda this Identity Card cost a woman her life’, Prevent 
Genocide International, http://www.preventgenocide.org/edu/pastgenocides/rwanda/indangamuntu.htm#intro 
last visited 19/02/2012; see also Santon, G.H., ‘Could the Rwandan Genocide have been prevented? Journal of 
Genocide Research, 2004, Vol.6, No.2, pp.211-228, at p. 214. 
1248 See e.g., Banisar, p.127, note 1243; PA., ‘Senior Officials to face ICC Trial over Kenya Violence’, The 
Independent, 23rd January 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/senior-officials-to-face-icc-
trial-over-kenya-violence-6293413.html last visited 19/02/2012. 
1249 Evrensel, A., ‘Introduction’, in Evrensel, A(ed)., Voter Registration in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, Electoral 
Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa(EISA), Johannesburg, 2010, pp.1-54, at p.16. 
1250 Asmah, K., ‘Let’s Commit To Biometric Registration’, Daily Graphic, 20th January 2012, 
http://www.graphic.com.gh/dailygraphic/page.php?news=18417 last visited 19/02/2012. 
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and accepted as official identification by various institutions.1251 This is also the case with many 
other African countries which have not yet adopted national ID card registration system. The 
privacy issue arising here is that at the time of registration and hence collection of personal data, 
the respective individuals are not made aware of disclosure of their personal information to third 
party institutions or individuals for purposes other than voting. Yet, in defending the practice, 
the electoral commissions which are the custodians of individuals’ personal data have always 
argued that since voters voluntarily use voters’ registration cards for other transactions, they have 
by virtue of that given permission for their personal data to be exchanged between those 
institutions and voters’ roll databases.1252 
 
Other databases that are fast developing in Africa include DNA databases, biometric databases 
and body scanners. Various jurisdictions in Africa such as Mauritius and Tanzania have adopted 
legislation on DNA profiling. However in many instances these pieces of legislation contain 
inadequate safeguards to guarantee protection of privacy raising individuals’ concerns over their 
privacy.1253 This is also the case with biometric databases like those used in issuing biometric 
passports. Normally the immigration and/or passport legislation in Africa under which those 
passports are issued require applicants to be taken samples of their fingerprints and sometimes 
their irises. However, quite often such laws fail to provide proper safeguards of biometrical 
materials raising concerns for privacy.1254 Body scanners which have wider privacy implications 
have similarly started to be put in use in African airports and other places. For example, after the 
2009 attempted Christmas Day bombing by a Nigerian terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 
the Nigerian government ordered N448 million worth of body scanners to be installed in 
Nigerian airports.1255 Similarly, last year the Nigerian National Assembly advertised contracts for 
procurement of full-body scanners which would be fixed at the buildings in the precincts of the 
legislature.1256 Also, the procurement was intended to acquire bomb detectors and electronic 
surveillance equipments.1257 It is imperative to point that these technologies have far reaching 
                                                          
1251 Evrensel, pp.16-17, note 1249, supra. 
1252 Ibid. 
1253 For further discussion see chapters 5 and 7 of this thesis respectively. 
1254 See e.g., Williams, R., ‘Doubts over Biometric Passports’, Habari Tanzania, 27th October 2005, 
http://www.habaritanzania.com/new/articles/1945/1/-Doubts-over-biometric-passports last visited 20/02/2012. 
1255 Nwezeh, K and Eze, C., ‘Nigeria: Abdulmutallab-Ministers, Foreigners to Undergo Full-Body Scan’, This Day, 
27th January, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201001270590.html last visited 20/02/2012; see also Banisar, p.128, 
note 1243, supra. 
1256 Hassan, T., ‘Nigeria: National Assembly to Install Full-Body Scanners’, Daily Trust, 13th December 2011, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201112130281.html last visited 20/02/2012. 
1257 Ibid. 
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privacy implications and have raised peoples’ concerns over their privacy not only in Africa but 
also elsewhere in the world (e.g. Europe and America).1258 
 
Similar developments of databases have taken place in the context of population statistical data. 
In the last decade or so, population censuses in Africa have become computerized making it easy 
for access, sharing and distribution when required by governmental departments, private 
organizations or individuals who work in partnership with governments.  Although censuses are 
very important in planning for development and making outreach programmes in different 
countries, they have not remained neutral with regard to privacy of individuals. The potential 
violations of privacy are expressed in the most oft-quoted German census decision of 1983 
which partly annulled the Population Census Act on the ground of a fear of surveillance and 
feelings that such a statistical census was unjust invasion of privacy.1259 These fears are no longer 
illusory in the wake of modern technologies. Neither are they limited to the Germans alone as 
correctly observed by Colin J. Bennett:- 
 
‘The factors that led to the enactment of Federal German Data Protection Act 
in 1977 were broadly the same as those in other countries-proposals for the 
establishment of large integrated databanks as well as unique PINs for 
administrative purposes. Anxieties about such developments should be seen 
against a background of higher rates of participation and a more acute sense of 
citizen efficacy within the German political culture.’1260 
 
The most contested privacy issues with regard to population censuses in Africa are recorded in 
South Africa.1261 Similarly, concerns for privacy emanating from population census have been felt 
in Kenya. The last population census in 2009 raised a number of questions including privacy. 
Undoubtedly, because of the post election violence of 2007 based on ethnic divisions and which 
took away the lives of many Kenyans, ethnical identification during the population census which 
came two years after the violence, was highly resisted. The question ‘What tribe are you?’ was the 
most controversial, in particular, given the recent memory of the 2007-2008 post-election 
                                                          
1258 Banisar, note 1255, supra. 
1259 Note 2, supra; see also Hornung, G and Schnabel, C., ‘Data Protection in Germany I: The Population Census 
Decision and the Right to Informational Self-Determination’, Computer Law and Security Report, 2009, Vol.25, 
No.1, pp.84-88, at pp.84-85. 
1260 Bennett, p.75, note 1, supra. 
1261 For detailed discussion see chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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violence.1262 The controversies surrounding ethnic identity in Kenyan census are well articulated 
in the responses of a Kenyan Peter Aling’o following an interview with Helen Nyambura-
Mwaura, a Reuter’s reporter in Nairobi:- 
 
‘We still have a lot of healing and reconciliation. We’ve begun to chest-thump 
around ethnicity again, not remembering that that was the problem in our 
elections. I don’t think we have learnt our lessons as Kenyans, we are burying 
our heads in the sand.’1263 
 
Yet, despite the local and international criticisms for inclusion of a question on one’s ethnicity, 
the Kenyan government went ahead with its census while retaining the controversial question.1264 
In Ghana too, the 2010 population census saw increasing concerns for privacy. Some people 
dodged the census exercise thinking that when they were captured they would be squeezed to 
pay tax or their personal information could be subsequently used against them.1265  The latter has 
been a growing common trend across African countries. 
 
Somewhat linked to collection of vast amount of personal data in the databases are fraud and 
identity theft. The latter are also on the rise in many countries in Africa due to poor database 
security.1266 At the same time, a lack of ID systems can have serious consequences for other 
rights.1267 This has been the case with Nigeria where the Nigerian Central Bank announced 
recently that those without national identity cards will have a hard time getting bank loans.1268  
 
 Twitter and Facebook Revolutions 
 
There are heated debates whether the recent Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt really deserve 
to be called ‘Twitter Revolutions’ and ‘Facebook Revolutions’. Those who argue in favour of 
                                                          
1262 Chrimes, S.B., ‘Counting as Citizens: Recognition of the Nubians in the 2009 Kenyan Census’, Ethnopolitics, 
2011, Vol.10, No.2, pp.205-218, at p.206. 
1263 Reuters Africa., ‘Ethnic Question in Kenya Census stokes Suspicions’, 25th August 2009, 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE57O0GP20090825 last visited 21/02/2012. 
1264 Chrimes, note 1262, supra; see also Huff Post World(internet newspaper)., ‘Kenya Holds First Census In A 
Decade, Causes Outcry Over Ethnic Identity’, posted on 24th August, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/25/kenya-holds-first-census_n_268076.html?view=screen, 
last visited 21/02/2012; BBC News., ‘Kenya begins contentious Census’, 24th August 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8217637.stm last visited 21/02/2012.  
1265 Business and Gadget., ‘2010 Census for National Development (Ghana)’, at http://www.qiam.org/news/2010-
census-national-development-ghana last visited 21/02/2012. 
1266 Banisar, pp.126-127, note 1243. 
1267 Ibid. 
1268 Ibid. 
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these nomenclatures put consideration on the widespread use of user-generated content through 
the Twitter and Facebook social networks to plan and organize protests against regimes.1269 Yet 
others have argued that calling uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt Twitter or Facebook revolutions 
overlooks ICT access in these countries.1270 According to these commentators, in 2009 there 
were in Tunisia and Egypt only 34.1 and 24.3 Internet users per 100 inhabitants respectively.1271 
They argue that in Egypt only 7% of inhabitants are Facebook users, while 16% use the platform 
in Tunisia.1272 This ICT penetration, at least according to these commentators, seem to suggest 
that the number of those connected to Twitter and Facebook was far disproportionate to the 
masses assembled in Tunis (Tunisia) and Tahrir Square in Cairo (Egypt), respectively. Similarly in 
further refuting claims for referring to the Arab spring in Tunisia and Egypt as ‘Twitter 
Revolutions’ and ‘Facebook Revolutions’, other commentators invented more appealing titles 
such as The Great Twitter/Facebook Revolutions Fallacy.1273  Relying on similar statistics as above, 
these commentators have condemned the Western media and commentators alike for making 
unfounded propaganda appraising Twitter and Facebook as catalysts for revolution in the 
modern era.1274 Yet, these arguments have been forcefully resisted by the pro-Twitter/Facebook 
Revolutions arguing that the democratic change in Islamic countries was/is conditional upon the 
use of communication technologies.1275 These commentators argue that the low connectivity 
rates in these countries could/can not preclude communication technologies from reaching mass 
of enough audience.1276 Through social communication technologies content is being distributed 
between networks of family and friends.1277 While it is not the intention of this thesis to resolve 
these contested claims over what would be the appropriate name of the protests in Tunisia and 
Egypt, it is imperative to note that, the role of ICTs by both the protesters, to plan and organize 
protests as well as the regimes in crackdown is widely acknowledged by both rivals.1278 The ICTs 
evolvement in the Arab spring is also acknowledged in case of the Libyan protests.  
                                                          
1269 See e.g., ‘Twitter and Facebook in the Arab Revolution’ a post by David on Online Media Workshop, 22nd 
February 2011 at http://www.onlinemediaworkshops.com/blog/twitter-and-facebook-arab-revolution last visited 
21/02/2012. 
1270 See e.g., Comninos, A., ‘Twitter Revolutions and Cyber Crackdowns: User-Generated Content and Social 
Networking in the Arab Spring and Beyond’, Association for Progressive Communications (APC), June 2011, pp.1-
18, at p.5, http://www.apc.org/en/system/files/AlexComninos_MobileInternet.pdf last visited 20/02/2012. 
1271 Ibid. 
1272 Ibid. 
1273 The Politikal Blog., ‘The Great Twitter/Facebook Revolutions Fallacy’, 5th February 2011, 
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1274 Ibid. 
1275 Howard, P.N., The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam, 
Oxford University Press, Ney York, 2010, p.31 cited in Allagui, I., ‘The Arab Spring and the Role of ICTs: Editorial 
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In all the above cases, if anything, the Arab spring in the North Africa has demonstrated the 
clearest instances of violations of privacy by African governments through the use of modern 
technologies. First, the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan governments used advanced Internet 
filters to block content during the uprisings.1279 In Tunisia, the government deployed a far more 
advanced technology in crackdown through stealing of user-names and passwords for Facebook, 
Twitter and online e-mail accounts like Gmail and Yahoo!.1280 This was achieved through the 
injection of phishing scripts into the content of these pages before being sent to the end-user.1281 
The identification of users was soon followed by arrests, detentions and harassments of those 
involved in the creation and dissemination of user-generated content.1282 Second, Twitter and 
Facebook were highly used as tools of state surveillance by security and state intelligences to 
identify and locate activists and protestors.1283 Many people participating on Facebook pages 
were actually governments’ agents or supporters of the regimes, spreading propaganda as well as 
spying on other facebook users.1284 Third, the regimes especially those in Egypt and Libya also 
demonstrated their ultimate power over the Internet by virtually shutting down access to it1285 or 
making interruptions frequently.  
 
The Arab-style revolution in North Africa inspired protests across sub-Saharan Africa. Attempts 
of such revolutions were made in 2011 in Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Malawi, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe.1286 Yet, these protests were not successfully due to various reasons which are 
beyond the analysis of this thesis. However it is noteworthy to mention that the ‘Twitter/Facebook 
fallacy’ as some commentators have referred to it in an attempt to underplay the role of the social 
network technology in the Arab spring, was taken seriously by some of those regimes in sub-
Saharan Africa. In Uganda, for example, President Yoweri Museveni after being declared a 
winner of the 2011 presidential election in what is believed to be a rigged election, the opposition 
coalition led by Kizza Besigye protested in Kampala (Uganda). However the protesters failed to 
amass in large numbers, as some commentators have suggested, a failure to totally tally its own 
results through its own SMS system as a result of interruption by the government.1287 As a result, 
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the opposition coalition was unsure if it won the election or not. This had a negative impact in 
mobilization of protesters. 
 
To sum up, the Twitter/Facebook revolutions have raised awareness to majority Africans over 
the privacy implications in interacting with social networks and other electronic communications 
variants. The possibilities to be identified when accessing or exchanging information or opinion, 
for example, and above all the potential possibilities of such communications to be intercepted 
or monitored with more advanced technology have raised more privacy concerns. 
 
 Fears 
 
Public fears over threats to privacy and related values have had significant contribution to the 
emergence and/or existence of data protection laws at least in Europe.1288 One set of such fears 
related to increasing transparency, disorientation and disempowerment of data subjects vis-à-vis 
data controllers.1289 Another set of fears concerned loss of control over technology. A third set 
pertained to human dehumanization of societal processes.1290 Although it is doubtful if such fears 
have had significant impact in the emergence and/or existence of data protection laws in Africa, 
they have raised sufficient fears for privacy encroachments.  Two sources of public fears come 
from government surveillance or reprisals and private sector’s surveillance and unsolicited 
marketing practices. In the former case, fears for surveillance manifest through the extensive 
adoption of interception laws by most African governments including anti-terrorism legislation 
with interception law provisions. Uganda, for example, has recently adopted one of the most 
criticized wiretapping laws in Africa, the Regulation of Interception of Communication Act 
2010. It had taken three years since 2007 for this law to be passed by the Ugandan legislature 
amid strong opposition from the members of parliament. However that opposition did not 
operate in the vacuum. It took into account the entire Ugandan political environment. This point 
is clearly summarized by Mayambala in the following paragraph:-  
 
‘Though the right to privacy in communication did not pose a major challenge 
in Uganda two decades ago, new developments in science and technology 
continue to pose new challenges to human rights, in particular the right to 
human dignity and privacy. In the fight against organized crime and terrorism, 
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modern police and intelligence agencies are using information and surveillance 
technology, including phone tapping, that potentially affects numerous 
innocent citizens and constitutes far-reaching interference with the right to 
privacy. Lt. Gen. David Tinyefuza was possibly the first high profile 
government official to complain about phone tapping after his failed bid to 
resign from the army in 1997. In 2003, the Member of Parliament for Lira 
Municipality, Ms. Cecilia Ogwal, was up in arms with the government and 
President Yoweri Museveni in particular for allegedly tapping her mobile 
phone conversations. This was after the latter told Parliament on September 8, 
2003, that he had listened in on a conversation between Ogwal and a rebel 
commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army.’1291 
 
In supporting the above view, Kaduuli posits:- 
 
‘The Ugandan Government is on the verge operationalizing official telephone 
tapping through the Regulation of Interception of Communication Bill 
2007(already passed as law in 2010) and this has generated intense social, 
political, economic and legislative heat. Most Ugandans are concerned that 
their privacy will be infringed upon in the name of national security. 
Obviously, no individual feels comfortable knowing that there is a possibility 
of their (sic) phone being monitored.’1292  
 
The most contentious area of the Ugandan interception law was and still is the authorization of 
interception. In the original Bill (2007) as it was introduced in the parliament this authority was 
placed in the designated Minister, an idea that was strongly rejected by the members of 
parliament.1293 The latter preferred such mandate to be placed with a judge of the High Court of 
                                                          
1291 Mayambala, p.6, note 38, supra. 
1292 Kaduuli, S.C., ‘To Tap or Not to Tap? This is the Uganda Phone Question’, WIRETAPPING: REGULATORY 
PERSPECTIVES, Ramakistaisah Jilla, ed., Hyderabad, India: Icfai University Press, 2010, pp.209-219, SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=993545 last visited 22/02/2012; see also similar concerns for privacy raised by Bakibinga, 
note 61, supra who observes, ‘Uganda is an emerging democracy and the political background reveals a history of 
turbulence and civil strife for many years, which resulted into the use of illegal means to gather intelligence( 
wiretapping without the sanction of court), which activities if not regulated, today can undermine the functioning of 
a democratic State.’ 
1293 Outside Parliament, academics, practitioners, lawyers, local and international non-governmental organisations 
also raised alarm against the proposed interception law. See e.g.,  Amnesty International., ‘Uganda: Amnesty 
International Concerns on the Regulation of Interception of Communications Bill, 2007’, Amnesty International 
Publications, 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/005/2008/en/10bf8327-7507-11dd-8e5e-
43ea85d15a69/afr590052008en.pdf last visited 22/02/2012. 
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Uganda. Although the final law came out with a victory on the side of the parliamentarians, still 
the scope of the authorization mandate is not clear especially the circumstances and purposes for 
such authorization by a judge.1294  
 
In Zimbabwe the situation is totally horrible. Under the Zimbabwean Interception of 
Communications Act 2007 the designated Minister is vested with authority to issue a warrant of 
interception without any further intervention of a judge.1295 Four categories of persons are 
allowed to lodge application for such warrant: the Chief of Defence Intelligence, the Director-
General of the President’s departments responsible for national security, the Commissioner for 
the Zimbabwe Republic Police and the Commissioner-General of the Zimbabwe Revenue 
Authority.1296 Given Zimbabwe’s poor human rights records, concerns for privacy of 
correspondence especially by the political opposition to President Robert Mugabe are very 
high.1297 Explaining similar situation in Ghana, Branttie posits that because data related to SIM 
registration can be extrapolated to monitor calls and movements of subscribers via GPS data and 
locational signal traces and cell site triangulation, it is very effective tool to accurately track 
users.1298 Accordingly, privacy of movement will be severely compromised by the national 
security operatives whose reputation for zealousness has already been known to cause very 
embarrassing national situations.1299 In North Africa surveillance of citizens and monitoring of 
their electronic communications is commonplace.1300 Yet, it is still early to predict if the Arab 
spring will improve the situation in future. 
 
Surveillance and unsolicited communications for marketing from companies constitute another 
source of fears for privacy. Alongside these companies’ surveillance, individuals also engage in 
                                                          
1294 See e.g., Amnesty International., ‘Uganda: Amnesty International Memorandum on the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications Act 2010’, Amnesty International Publications, 2010, 
 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/016/2010/en/4144d548-bd2a-4fed-b5c6-
993138c7e496/afr590162010en.pdf last visited 22/02/2012. 
1295 Zimbabwean Interception of Communications Act 2007, s.5. 
1296 Ibid. 
1297 See e.g., U.S Department of State., ‘2010 Human Rights Report : Zimbabwe’,p.24, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160485.pdf last visited 22/02/2012; Human Rights Watch., ‘World 
Report 2012: Zimbabwe Events of 2011’, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-zimbabwe-0 
last visited 22/02/2012. 
1298 Branttie, E., ‘IMANI Report: The Failing SIM Card Registration Exercise- Millions of Dollars will be lost to the 
State. Ghana’s Telecom Regulator MUST graduate SIM deactivation Exercise!’, p.2, 
http://www.africanliberty.org/files/IMANI%20Report%20The%20Failing%20SIM%20Card%20Registration%20
Exercise-
%20Millions%20of%20Dollars%20will%20be%20lost%20to%20the%20State.%20Ghana%20Telecom%20Regulato
r%20MUST%20graduate%20SIM%20deactivation%20Exercise.pdf last visited 22/02/2012. 
1299 Ibid. 
1300 See e.g., Human Right Watch., ‘The Internet in Mideast and North Africa: Free Expression and Censorship’, 
Human Rights Watch 1999,  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/midintnt996.PDF last visited 22/02/2012. 
256 
 
some minimum practices of surveillance and sending unsolicited communications. In either case 
the uses of CCTV at homes, offices, hotels and large shopping malls are now common in many 
places in Africa for purposes of preventing crimes. These technologies are supplemented by SMS 
text messages. All of these have generated fears of loss of privacy.1301 
 
 HIV/Aids 
 
Privacy in the context of HIV/Aids is, perhaps, the most notable area of rising privacy concerns 
in Africa. HIV/Aids plagued the African continent in 1980s. Since then it spread significantly. By 
2010, it was estimated that Africa was by far the most continent hit by HIV/Aids. Reports reveal 
that by the end of 2010 an estimate of 22.9 million people were living with HIV in sub-Saharan 
Africa a figure which was equal to 68 per cent of the world population living with HIV by 
then.1302  The epidemic had cost the lives of 1.3 million in the sub-continent by 2009 leaving 1.8 
million as newly infected.1303 Efforts to prevent or provide care and support to people living with 
HIV/Aids have raised a number of privacy law issues. Consent to HIV/Aids testing is the most 
controversial issue surrounding privacy. Many people in Africa are concerned with HIV/Aids 
testing without their consent. Since HIV/Aids has no prevention or cure, many people consider 
their health records in the context of HIV/Aids as most sensitive fearing stigmatisation.1304 The 
second issue stemming from the first is about disclosure of HIV/Aids test results or status to 
third parties without authorisation of people concerned. For example, on 16 February 2012 the 
Star (a Kenyan newspaper) reported in one of its headlines, ‘HIV Positive Girl sues paper over 
Disclosure of Her Status’.1305 The basis of the claim was/is that the girl concerned was not asked 
her consent prior to such disclosure resulting into infringements of privacy and the right to 
dignity.  
                                                          
1301 For detailed discussion see chapters 5,6 and 7 of this thesis. 
1302 UNAIDS., ‘World AIDS Day Report 2011’, p.7,  
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2011/JC2216_WorldAIDS
day_report_2011_en.pdf last visited 23/02/2012. 
1303 UNAIDS., ‘UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic’, p.20, 
http://www.unaids.org/documents/20101123_GlobalReport_Chap2_em.pdf last visited 23/02/2012. 
1304 See e.g., Weiser, S.D et al., ‘Routine HIV Testing in Botswana: A Population-Based Study on Attitudes, Practices, 
and Human Rights Concens’, PLoS Medicine, 2006, Vol.3, No.7, pp.1013-1022, at pp.1018-1019; Mbonu, N.C et al., 
‘Stigma of People with HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Literature Review’, Journal of Tropical Medicine, 2009, 
Article ID 145891, 14 pagesdoi:10.1155/2009/145891; Anglewicz, P and Chintsanya, J., ‘Disclosure of HIV Status 
between Spouses in Rural Malawi’, AIDS Care: Psychological and Sicio-Medical Aspects of AIDS/HIV, 2011, 
Vol.23, No.8, pp.998-1005, at p.1002.; The Wold Bank., Legal Aspects of HIV/AIDS: A Guide for Policy and Law 
Reform, The World Bank, Washington, D.C, U.S.A, 2007,  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHIVAIDS/Resources/375798-
1103037153392/LegalAspectsOfHIVAIDS.pdf last visited 23/02/2012. 
1305 The Star, 16th February 2012, http://www.the-star.co.ke/national/national/62763-hiv-positive-girl-sues-paper-
over-disclosure-of-her-status last visited 23/02/2012. 
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Disclosure has also resulted into serious problems in the healthy and employment sectors. 
Medical practitioners in Africa claim to be in dilemma to disclose or not to disclose HIV/Aids 
status to a victim’s sex partner or relatives as the case may be.1306 Yet, in some cases without any 
consent from a concerned person, they have secretly communicated HIV/Aids test results 
directly to employers while bypassing the employees who were the subject of testing.1307 
Somewhat linked with the disclosure issue, is discrimination of people living with HIV/Aids. 
Once their HIV/Aids status is revealed, many people living with HIV/Aids have found 
themselves discriminated. This discrimination does not just end with the employment sector 
which is commonly cited by commentators1308 but extends to other spheres of life. For example, 
in Kenya, discrimination has also manifested in issues of land ownership.1309  
 
In response to the above concerns, some governments as well as private sector institutions in 
Africa have developed policies as well as special legislation. Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Namibia, 
South Africa serve as examples. However, the major weakness of these laws and policies is that 
they focus on issues of confidentiality alone rather than privacy. Admittedly, while confidentiality 
is an aspect of privacy, confidentiality as such is inadequate to protect health records in the 
context of HIV/Aids. Apart from that, many of the laws are vague in terms of scope and ambit. 
Nevertheless in relative terms, concerns for privacy in the context of HIV/Aids in Africa has 
manifested through development of a lager corpus of case law on privacy.1310 Although such case 
law still falls short of the principles of data privacy it serves to demonstrate how far Africans put 
significant weight on privacy of their health records.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1306 See e.g., Vu, L et al., ‘Disclosure of HIV Status to Sex Partners Among HIV-Infected Men and Women in Cape 
Town, South Africa’, AIDS Behav, 2012, Vol.16, No.1, pp.132-138.  
1307 Makulilo, pp.573-575, note 224, supra. 
1308 See e.g., Dwasi, J.A., The Human Right to Work in the Era of HIV and AIDS, Law Africa, Nairobi/Dar es 
Salaam/Uganda, 2009; Makulilo, note 224, supra. 
1309 Aliber, M and Walker, C., ‘The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Land Rights: Perspectives from Kenya’, World 
Development, 2006, Vol.34, No.4, pp.704-727. 
1310 For a detailed review of case law on HIV/Aids in African jurisdictions see e.g., Ladan, M.T., ‘The Role of Law 
in the HIV/AIDS Policy:-Trend of Case Law in Nigeria and Other Jurisdictions’, Inaugural Lecture delivered at the 
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, 2008, pp.1-64, at pp.19-22; Tadesse, M.A., ‘HIV Testing from an African 
Human Rights System Perspective: An Analysis of the Legal and Policy Framework of Botswana, Ethiopia and 
Uganda’, LL.M Thesis, University of Pretoria, South Africa, 2007; also further discussion on HIV/Aids is given in 
chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
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 Traumas of Past Injustice 
 
The concepts of justice and injustice have been a subject of philosophical debates for centuries 
since the Plato’s Republic.1311 These debates are not covered here because of little bearing to the 
issues addressed. Yet, it is sufficient to point out that an unjust system presupposes existence of 
oppression, exploitation, repression, inhibition or restraints whether at an individual or group 
level or by the state. In Africa the most widely cited traumas of past injustice are those relating to 
the system of apartheid in South Africa and the Rwandan Genocide.1312 However, while these are 
commonly cited examples of past injustice due to the magnitude of their effects, there are other 
past injustices in Africa. For example, the dictatorship of military rulers in Africa qualifies in the 
definition given above. Be as it may, commentators are in agreement that privacy concerns are 
nourished by certain concrete experiences such as the traumas of fascist oppression prior to and 
during World War Two.1313 Banisar argues that one of the reasons for adopting privacy laws in 
many countries including South Africa (which has not yet adopted omnibus data protection 
legislation) is to remedy privacy violations that occurred under previous regimes and prevent 
those abuses from occurring again.1314   
 
 E-Commerce 
 
E-commerce in Africa is still evolving. Its current low level is a result of inadequate e-commerce 
infrastructure. Yet, where it has started to develop consumer trust and confidence; cyber-crimes 
and identity thefts have raised serious concerns. This is largely because e-commerce transactions 
collect vast amount of personal information. The ‘Nigerian Advance Fee Scam’ is the most 
popularly feared across Africa and even beyond. And, has caused a lot of privacy concerns in 
online commercial transactions. Suffice here to quote one example:- 
‘Lagos, Nigeria. 
                                                          
1311 See e.g., Sachs, D., ‘A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic’, The Philosophical Review, 1963, Vol.72, No.2, pp.141-158; 
Rawls, J., ‘Justice as Fairness’, The Philosophical Review, 1958, Vol.62, No.2, pp.164-194; McBride, W.L., ‘The 
Concept of Justice in Max, Engels, and Others’, Ethics, 1975, Vol.85, No.3, pp.204-2018; Rawls, J., A Theory of 
Justice, Revised Edition, Harvard University Press, 1971. 
1312 See e.g., Weldon, G., ‘A Comparative Study of the Construction of Memory and Identity in the Curriculum of 
Post-Conflict Societies: Rwanda and South Africa’, International Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching and 
Research, 2003, Vol.3, No.2, pp.55-72, at p.55; King, R.U., ‘Healing Psychological Trauma in the Midst of Truth 
Commission: The Case of Gacaca in Post-Genocide Rwanda, University of Toronto Press Journals, 2011, Vol.6, 
No.2, pp.134-151. Further discussion on South African Apartheid is given in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
1313 Bygrave, p.108, note 24, supra. 
1314 Banisar, D., ‘Privacy and Data Protection Around the World’, Conference Proceedings of the 21st International 
Conference on Privacy and Personal Data Protection, Hong Kong, 13th September 1999, pp.1-5, at p.2,  
http://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/infocentre/conference.html last visited 23/02/2012. 
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Attention: the President/CEO 
Dear Sir, 
Confidential Business Proposal 
 
Having consulted with my colleagues and based on the information gathered from 
the Nigerian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, I have the privilege to request for 
your assistance to transfer the sum of $47,500,000.00 (forty seven million, five 
hundred thousand United States dollars) into your accounts. The above sum resulted 
from an over-invoiced contract, executed commissioned and paid for about five years 
(5) ago by a foreign contractor. This action was however intentional and since then 
the fund has been in a suspense account at the Central Bank of Nigeria apex bank. 
 
We are now ready to transfer the fund overseas and that is where you come in. It is 
important to inform you that as civil servants, we are forbidden to operate a foreign 
account; that is why we require your assistance. The total sum will be shared as 
follows: 70% for us, 25% for you and 5% for local and international expenses 
incident to the transfer. 
 
The transfer is risk free on both sides. I am an accountant with the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). If you find this proposal acceptable, we shall require 
the following documents:- 
 
(a) your banker’s name, telephone, account and fax numbers. 
(b)your private telephone and fax numbers- for confidentiality and easy 
communication. 
(c) your letter-headed paper stamped and signed. 
 
Alternatively we will furnish you with the text of what to type into your letter-headed 
paper, along with a breakdown explaining, comprehensively what we require of you. 
The business will take us thirty (30) working days to accomplish. 
 
Please reply urgently. 
Best regards’1315 
 
                                                          
1315 Scambusters.org., ‘About the Nigerian Scam(Nigeria Advanced Fee Scam): Internet ScaBuster#11’, 
http://www.scambusters.org/NigerianFee.html last visited 1/03/2012. 
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The above letter seeks to collect personal information for purposes of commission of fraud. It is 
estimated that the Nigerian Crimes Division of the Secret Service receives approximately 100 
telephone calls from victims or potential victims of advanced fee scam and about 300-500 pieces 
of related correspondence per day about it.1316 
 
 World Summit on the Information Society-Tunis 2005 
 
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) was a pair of United Nations-sponsored 
conferences about information, communication and, in broad terms, the information society that 
took place in 2003 in Geneva and in 2005 in Tunis.1317 One of its chief aims was to bridge the so-
called global digital divide separating rich countries from poor countries by spreading access to 
the Internet in the developing world.1318 One of the principles of the WSIS in Geneva of 2003 
states:- 
 
‘58. The use of ICTs and content creation should respect human rights and 
fundamental freedom of others, including personal privacy, conscience, and 
religion in conformity with relevant international instruments.’1319  
 
Reaffirming the Geneva vision from an African perspective during the WSIS in Tunis (on 16 
November 2005), the former President of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki made the following 
statement:- 
 
‘Our country and continent are determined to do everything possible to 
achieve their renewal and development, defeating the twin scourges of poverty 
and underdevelopment. In this regard, we have fully recognised the critical 
importance of modern ICTs as a powerful ally we have to mobilize, as 
reflected both in our national initiatives and the priority programmes of 
NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. We are therefore 
determined to do everything we can to implement the outcomes of this World 
Summit on the Information Society and appeal to all stakeholders similarly to 
                                                          
1316 Ibid. 
1317 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Summit_on_the_Information_Society last visited 1/03/2012. 
1318 Ibid. 
1319 Geneva Declaration of Principles 2003, Principle 58, Document WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E 
12 December 2003, http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html last visited 1/03/2012. 
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commit themselves to take action to translate the shared vision of an inclusive 
development-oriented information society in practical reality.’1320 
 
The significance of the WSIS cannot be over exaggerated. While it did not produce directly its 
effects over the people, it inspired African governments to commit themselves in using ICTs in 
their development efforts. This also meant that the African governments had/have to develop 
policies and regulations on ICTs. To ensure that these commitments are made a reality, WSIS 
has established a monitoring procedure which periodically make follow-up on performance from 
a country to regional organisation level.1321 
 
 International, Regional and National Data Protection Laws  
 
International, regional and national policies and codes for protection of privacy have had impact 
on privacy in Africa. However in relative terms, regional policies and codes have been more 
instrumental in influencing concerns for privacy in Africa and consequently adoption of recent 
comprehensive data privacy legislation more than the others. Yet, both international and regional 
data privacy law vis-à-vis the national legal systems in Africa are subject to the theories of dualism 
and monism.1322 The former treats international law as distinct from domestic legal order, 
meaning that the application of the former in the latter depends on the process of incorporation. 
Hence ratification of a treaty by a state is one thing and its incorporation is yet another. Under 
dualism the national legal order is superior to international law. In contrast, the monist theory 
makes international law part and parcel of the national legal order and accordingly self-executing.   
 
Yet under dualism, where international law has either not been ratified or ratified, but still not 
incorporated, there is increasingly tendency of lawyers and judges using it to interpret domestic 
legislation.1323 In certain cases, international law offers inspiration for development of particular 
                                                          
1320 Capurro, R., ‘Information Ethics for and from Africa’, International Review of Information Ethics, 2007, Vol.7, 
No.9, pp.1-13, at p. 2. 
1321 See e.g., ITU., ‘WSIS Forum 2011: Outcome Document’,  
http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/2011/forum/inc/Documents/WSISForum2011OutcomeDocument.pdf 
1322 For detailed analysis of dualism and monism in relation to Africa, see e.g., Oppong, R.F., ‘Re-Examining 
International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the Reception of International Law into Legal Systems in 
Africa’, Fordham International Law Journal, 2007, Vol.30, No.2, pp.296-345. 
1323 See e.g., Layton, R., ‘When and How Can Domestic Judges and Lawyers use International Law in Dualist 
Systems’, 
http://training.itcilo.org/ils/cd_use_int_law_web/additional/Library/Doctrine/Dualist%20Systems_Layton.pdf 
last visited 28/02/2012; Quansah, E.K., ‘An Examination of the Use of International Law as Interpretative Tool in 
Human Rights Litigation in Ghana and Botswana’, in Killander, M(ed)., International Law and Domestic Human 
rights Litigation in Africa, Pretoria University Law Press(PULP), South Africa, 2010, pp.37-56. Tanoh, A and 
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domestic legislation or decision making process.1324 In Africa, countries with common law legal 
system (i.e. former British colonies), practise dualism. This is with the exception of Namibia and 
Kenya which, though follow the English legal system, have maintained monist practice similar to 
the countries which follow the continental legal system.1325 In this way, the African approach 
towards international law has to be considered whenever assessing the influence of international 
and regional law in their data privacy legislative development. 
 
At international level, three instruments can be identified which relate to protection of the right 
to privacy: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Guidelines with regard to the protection of 
personal data.1326 Since these are UN’s instruments, they apply to African countries by virtue of 
being members to the United Nations. As pointed out in previous sections of this thesis the Bill 
of Rights in many African national constitutions have their foundation in the UDCHR as well as 
ICCPR. The right to protection of privacy is one of the clauses enshrined in such Bill of Rights. 
However their impact in shaping privacy ideas and consciousness as well as adoption of policies 
and regulation has not been much significant. This is partly because such Bill of Rights became 
part of the African legal system through independence constitution which initially received a 
negative attitude and response from African nationalist elites. Even after their re-appearance in 
African constitutions in 1980s and 1990s, African leaders have rendered them impracticable in 
practice. Sometimes the general political environment is made to work negatively to the Bill of 
Rights as is the case with Zimbabwe or the Bill of Rights themselves are formulated with 
numerous clawback clauses rendering them no longer important. Also important to note is that 
in some African countries those international instruments have no direct application. They have 
to be incorporated, especially in dualist states, in order to take effect. This allowance gives these 
countries great leeway to maneuver the application of the Bill of Rights. Yet, in some monist 
states, international law has been disregarded.1327 Nonetheless, the UDHR and ICCR are 
increasingly becoming important as they provide the normative basis for the right to privacy in 
Africa. In contrast to the UDHR and ICCR, the UN Guidelines (the only data protection code 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Adjolohoum, H., ‘International Law and Human rights litigation in Côte d'Ivoire and Benin’, Killander, M(ed)., 
International Law and Domestic Human rights Litigation in Africa, Pretoria University Law Press(PULP), South 
Africa, 2010, pp.109-120. 
1324 Ibid. 
1325 See e.g., Tanoh, A and Adjolohoum, H., ‘International Law and Human rights litigation in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Benin’, Killander, M(ed)., International Law and Domestic Human rights Litigation in Africa, Pretoria University 
Law Press (PULP), South Africa, 2010, pp.109-120; Ndayikengurukiye, M., ‘The International Human Rights Law as 
a source of Law in the Burundian Judicial System’, LL.M Dissertation, University of Makerere, Uganda, 2005. 
1326 See a comprehensive review of these instruments in para 3.2 of this thesis. 
1327 See e.g., Tanoh, and Adjolohoum, pp. 114-115, note 1325, supra; Ndayikengurukiye, pp.21-22, note 1325. 
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under the United Nations’ umbrella) has not generally yielded any significant influence for the 
right to privacy in Africa. As alluded to, these Guidelines are not binding. They are there only to 
provide guidance for such UN members or organizations in member states to use whenever they 
develop data protection policies and regulations. Also important, the fact that they were 
preceded by some national and regional data privacy policies and regulations, especially in 
Europe, which have had influence beyond their area and limits of operation, have rendered the 
former less influential. 
 
The only regional policy and code for privacy and data protection outside of Africa which has 
been influential in matters of privacy in the continent is Directive 95/46/EC. It is imperative to 
mention that the Council of Europe Convention 108 with regard to automatic processing of 
personal data is the only European regional treaty open for accession by non-European states. 
Yet, currently this Convention is not open to African countries for accession.1328 As it has been 
the case elsewhere, Directive 95/46/EC has generated both political and economic pressure over 
African countries to adopt data privacy laws in the European-style. Article 25 of Directive 
95/46/EC clearly says that transfer of personal data to third counties will only be allowed if such  
countries maintain an adequate level of data protection law similar to the Directive. Nevertheless 
some exceptions for transfer of such personal data from Europe to third countries are permitted 
under Article 26 of the Directive.  
 
Unlike the international law under the auspices of the United Nations, Directive 95/46/EC is 
the European Union law. It binds upon its member states only and those under the European 
Economic Area. Since African countries are not members of the EU or EEA, they are not under 
any obligation to comply with the requirements of the Directive. However there are exceptions. 
As pointed out, Article 25 requires any non-EU/EEA member state wishing to receive personal 
information of citizens in such regions must have a system of privacy protection that satisfies the 
‘adequacy’ standard under the European Directive. African countries are subject to this clause. 
Yet, since the above European law came into force in 1998, there is no African country which 
has been declared as providing ‘adequate’ level of protection of personal data. In 2010 some 
African countries which have implemented comprehensive data privacy law applied to the EU 
for accreditation as satisfying this level of protection. In this list there are the following countries: 
Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Tunisia and Morocco. While the reports for the rest of these countries 
have not been made public that of Tunisia is publicly available.  As already pointed out, the first 
                                                          
1328 Explanatory Report, note 701, supra. 
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report with regard to Tunisia data privacy law stated clearly that Tunisia’s regime is not adequate. 
It is also suggested that the other reports for the rest countries may likely not be positive, 
suggesting why they are kept confidential. These reports do not either end the matter. As said, 
Article 26 provides exceptions to the general rule laid down in Article 25, making it not absolute. 
No doubt, these exceptions were made in realization of the difficulty to satisfy the ‘adequacy’ 
standard. Although at the risk of generalization, logic dictates that since no African country has 
been declared to provide ‘adequate’ level of data protection, the current continued flow of 
personal data from Europe to Africa is justified at least under one or more criteria set out in 
article 26 of the Directive. Admittedly, these criteria are limited in their application and 
consequently are likely to affect the volume of personal data from Europe to Africa. 
 
In relation to the volume of personal data in the preceding paragraph, the prevailing view is that 
Africa needs to satisfy the requirements of the European Directive in order to attract investment 
and outsourcing industries. These economic justifications manifest in literature (journal articles, 
commentaries, reference books, newspapers, magazines, reports), legislation, Bills, policies, 
hansards, treaties and conventions as well as in travaux préparatoires. Protection of individual 
personal data of citizens and/or residents in African countries is usually secondary. Some 
examples illustrating the dominant justification for adoption of data privacy legislation need to 
be mentioned. For example, in 2004 Bygrave maintained that the interest in legislating data 
privacy legislation in Africa was due to the impact of Articles 25 and 26 of Directive 95/46/EC 
and the desire by African countries to meet the requirement of the European law set in those 
provisions.1329 Although Bygrave did not clearly indicate the motivation for such desire, in 2010 
he made clearly the point that African countries adopted data privacy law in EU-style in order to 
safeguard their outsourcing industry pointing examples of Tunisia and Morocco.1330 Beyond 
these economic justifications, Bygrave mentions traumas from relatively recent first hand-
experience referring to South Africa’s apartheid experience as justification for development of 
data privacy law.1331 The economic justification put forward by Bygrave is repeated by other 
commentators such as Kusamotu,1332 Ncube,1333 Gayrel,1334 ARTICLE 19,1335 Enyew1336 and Traca 
                                                          
1329 Bygrave, note 51, supra.  
1330 Bygrave, note 56, supra. 
1331 Ibid; see also Bygrave, note 1318, supra. 
1332 Kusamotu, pp.157-158, note 38, supra. 
1333 Ncube, notes 172, 173 and 174, supra. 
1334 Gayrel, p.18, note 38, supra; see also, Gayrel, C., ‘Mauritius: Data Protection in an Evolving Island Economy’, 
Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 2011, No.114, pp.20-22. 
1335ARTICLE 19., ‘Kenya: Draft Data Protection Bill critically limited’, Statement issued on 7 November 2011, 
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2825/en/kenya:-draft-data-protection-bill-critically-limited 
last visited 14/03/2012. 
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and Embry.1337 In this list Enyew, Kusamotu, Traca and Embry and ARTICLE 19 make clearer 
the economic justification theory. In the context of Ethiopia, Enyew argues:- 
 
‘Turning to Ethiopia, the country is not an exception. The country is required 
to satisfy the adequate level for transfer of personal data from Europe. 
Ethiopia has, wants to have extensive trade relations with European countries 
as well as other foreign countries. It has also attempted to privatize many 
sectors so that foreign investors can participate in the economy. The existence 
of appropriate and efficient law is important to regulate and promote 
investment. So long as the Ethiopian law is found to lack of adequate 
protection of privacy, it will encounter limits on the transfers of personal 
information. Limitations on the flow of personal information discourage 
investment and commerce. Beyond trans-border data flow, the enactment of 
privacy law is equally important to put the legal framework in place for e-
commerce within the country. Thus, the enactment of privacy law is very 
essential to facilitate e-commerce (which the country will introduce it in the 
future), international trade and investment.’1338 
 
Somewhat similar to the above paragraph, but slightly different, Kusamotu identifies who will be 
behind the introduction of data privacy legislation in Nigeria. He posits, as for Nigeria, drives to 
introduce EU-compatibility law within Nigeria would come from the business community, and 
not the general public.1339 In the same vein Traca and Embry posit that ‘while the Angolan Data 
Protection Act 2011 may have been enacted by the National Assembly as an instrument through 
which inalienable human rights could be enshrined in this particular context, the Angolan 
legislator took time and care in framing the statute so as to incorporate a healthy respect for the 
needs of business to conduct their operations as swiftly and as smoothly as possible. This Act is 
very much a reflection of contemporary Angola, following on from several other legislative 
reforms at a time when business in Angola is growing at an increasingly fast pace, with no sign of 
slowing down anytime soon.’1340 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1336 Enyew, A.B., ‘Regulatory Legal Regime on the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information in Ethiopia’, 
LL.M Thesis, University of Oslo, Norway, 2009. 
1337 Traca and Embry, p.40, note 38, supra. 
1338 Enyew, pp.47-48, note 1336, supra. 
1339 Kusamotu, p.157, note 38, supra. 
1340 Traca and Embry, note 1337, supra. 
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In criticizing the narrow scope of the Kenyan draft Data Protection Bill 2009 in the context of 
the economic justification theory, the ARTICLE 19 posits:- 
 
‘While the draft will bring greater accountability to the processing of 
information about Kenyan citizens held by government bodies, the restriction 
to public bodies substantially limits the usefulness of the act as a means to 
enhance international trade to Kenya. European ( and many other countries’) 
law limits the transfer of personal information for outsourcing and other 
reasons to only countries with adequate data protection laws, which is why 
many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have adopted laws recently. 
This bill as drafted will not allow European data controllers to transfer 
personal information to Kenya because it does not apply to private sector. 
Thus a major reason for adopting the bill will not be achieved.’ 1341 
 
Noteworthy, the economic justification behind the adoption of data privacy legislation in Africa 
has also manifested in the reports for analysis of the adequacy of protection of personal data in 
some African countries.1342 Similarly, the justification was prominent in the parliamentary 
discussions in Mauritius and is currently featuring in South African legislative process.1343 As 
pointed out, there is currently no general survey to concretize the extent to which African 
countries have economically been affected by the restriction on transfer of personal data from 
Europe. In most cases such claims have been made by sweeping statements. However on 
country level, Morocco seems to have undertaken a study on the impacts of European data 
privacy law. In 2008, a report by the Moroccan Ministry of economy pointed out that the low 
volume of relocation of banking and insurance services to Morocco was partly due to a lack of 
protection of personal data transferred to the Kingdom, and recommended the adoption of 
legislation of this subject, which followed in 2009.1344 
 
Apart from the economic aspect of Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive 95/46/EC considered 
above, there is also its political dimension. The latter rests upon the sovereignty of the state. 
After attainment of political independence in 1960s and 1970s, African countries became 
                                                          
1341 ARTICLE 19, note 1335, supra. 
1342 See e.g., CRID, p.7, note 899, supra. 
1343 Further details are provided in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
1344 Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Dé loc a l i s a t ion de s a c t i v i t é s de s e r v i c e s au Ma roc, Et a 
t de s l i eux e t oppor tuni t é s Juillet 2008, p.15,  
http://www.finances.gov.ma/depf/publications/en_catalogue/etudes/2008/delocalisation.pdf 
last visited 29/02/2012; also cited in Gayrel, note 1334, supra. 
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autonomous sovereign states. Accordingly, a provision requiring third countries, in this case 
African countries, to enact legislation in compliance to European law, is practically interfering 
with their sovereignty. This is despite the fact that finally it is African national legislative bodies 
which are the ones to pass the legislation. Hobby posits that when considered in a broad context, 
it is hard to avoid the feeling that the EU’s implementation of such a wide sweeping regulatory 
exercise in the realm of fundamental rights goes far by effectively creating a worldwide data 
privacy regime utilizing the proverbial back door.1345 Although this argument has not yet featured 
more seriously in the emerging African scholarship, grounds for its emergence already exist. 
Firstly, it is due to the apprehension by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (the EU 
body which gives its opinion to the EU Commission as to the adequacy level of protection of 
legislation in third countries) that the act of engaging in assessment of legal systems of sovereign 
independent states may result into political provocation particularly where such systems fail to 
meet the adequacy standard under the European law.1346 Secondly, is the negative feeling by 
African countries, that a foreign legal order has been imposed upon them just like it was the case 
under the colonial rule. The latter resulted into transplantation of the present day civil and 
common law legal systems in Africa.1347 Accordingly, the level of its acceptability and compliance 
by local population becomes negatively affected.  
 
However, the political dimension of Articles 25 and 26 of Directive 95/46/EC should not be 
exaggerated. This is because calls by scholars within their countries in Africa to their respective 
governments, to enact data privacy legislation, have rarely raised any caution as to the imposition 
of the European law on Africa. This is partly because legal transplantation in Africa is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, the civil and common law legal systems which were imposed during 
colonial rule by force have so far brought benefits in Africa after independence. This, to some 
greater extent, may have undermined concerns for regarding European law as imposed in Africa.  
Also important to take into account, as African countries increasingly become part of regional or 
international bodies, the influence of foreign law is felt quite often. Moreover, in the course of 
judicial interpretation judges and lawyers rely frequently on foreign case law to interpret local 
                                                          
1345 Hobby, pp.157-158, note 1048, supra. 
1346 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, notes 892 and 893, supra. 
1347 See e.g., Ferreira, C., ‘The Europeanization of Law’ in Oliveira, J and Cardinal, P(eds)., One Country, Two 
Systems, Three Legal Orders-Perspective of Evolution: Essays on Macau’s Autonomy after the Resumption of 
Sovereignty by China, Springer-Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009, pp.171-190, at p.184; Mancuso, S., ‘Legal 
Transplants and Economic Development: Civil Law vs. Common Law?’ in Oliveira, J and Cardinal, P(eds)., One 
Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders-Perspective of Evolution: Essays on Macau’s Autonomy after the 
Resumption of Sovereignty by China, Springer-Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009, pp.75-90. 
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legislation, especially where no case law by superior courts in Africa exists. This has in turn 
accelerated the borrowing and permeation of foreign law in African countries.  
 
Before concluding thia part, one fallacy by some African states has to be cleared. Some African 
countries (e.g., Cape Verde, Angola, Francophone Africa, Mauritius, etc) with data privacy 
legislation claim their legislation to be influenced by national laws of particular EU member 
states. Admittedly, while they are some variations in national data privacy law of EU member 
states, it is imperative to note that the effect of national data privacy law by an EU member 
country to Africa is practically the same as the Directive itself. This is because, in the first place, 
each EU member country is required to transpose the European Directive under its national 
legal system. Through this process, EU law becomes part of the legal system of its member 
states. Moreover, and as it has been pointed out, the national data protection authorities in EU 
member states have significant role in determining the adequacy level in third countries, 
particularly on specific transfers. In this regard, any assessment by a data protection authority 
affects other member states in some ways. This is further solidified by the fact that a notification 
for this kind of assessment has to be communicated to all member states in the EU. 
 
Regional/sub-regional data privacy agreements and national legislation within Africa (see 4.4) 
may have some influence too in rising privacy concerns and legislation within their jurisdictions 
and in some other African countries. These legal instruments, after they had received initial push 
from the European law, have also imposed the adequacy standard against transfer of personal 
data to foreign countries including fellow African countries. The latter either fall within or 
outside the regional/sub-regional arrangements with data privacy law or without data privacy 
legislation. This point is well demonstrated by the following provisions of the African regional, 
sub-regional and national laws of African countries with data privacy legislation:- 
 
AU Cyber Convention, Art II-41:- 
 
‘The data processing official shall not transfer personal data to a non-Member 
State of the African Union unless such a State offers sufficient level of 
protection of the private life, freedoms and fundamental rights of persons 
whose data are being or are likely to be processed. 
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Before any personal data is transferred to the said third country, the data 
processing official shall give prior notice of such transfer to the protection 
authority.’1348 
 
ECOWAS, Art 36:- 
 
‘(1) The data controller shall transfer personal data to a non-member 
ECOWAS country only where such a country provides an adequate level of 
protection for privacy, freedoms and the fundamental rights of individuals in 
relation to the processing or possible processing of such data. 
 
2) The data controller shall inform the Data Protection Authority prior to any 
transfer of personal data to such a third country.’1349 
 
SADC, Art 48(1):- 
 
‘Personal data shall only be transferred to recipients, other than member states 
of the SADC, which are not subject to national law adopted pursuant to this 
model-law, if an adequate level of protection is ensured in the country of the 
recipient or within the recipient international organisation and the data are 
transferred solely to allow tasks covered by the competence of the controller 
to be carried out.’1350 
 
Angola, Section 33:- 
 
‘The international data transfer is only possible subject to notification to the 
Data Protection Agency and to countries which ensure an adequate level of 
protection. 
 
A country is considered to ensure an adequate level of protection when it 
guarantees, at least a level of protection equal to that established in this law.  
 
                                                          
1348 AU, Cyber Convention 2011, Art II-41, note 1395, infra. 
1349 ECOWAS, Supplementary Act 2010, Art 36, note 1398, infra. 
1350 SADC, Data Protection Model-Law 2012, Art 48(1), note 1478, infra. 
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The Data Protection Agency shall decide whether a foreign country ensures an 
adequate level of protection through the issuance of an opinion. 
 
The adequacy of data protection in a foreign country shall be assessed by the 
Data Protection Agency on the basis of all circumstances surrounding a data 
transfer, especially given the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of 
the proposed processing operation, the countries of final destination and rules 
of law, whether general or sectoral, in force in that country including the 
professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that 
country.’1351 
 
Benin, Section 9:- 
 
‘The data controller shall not transfer any personal data abroad unless the 
foreign country provides a sufficient level of protection for privacy rights and 
the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of 
personal data.  
 
The level of protection provided by the country shall be assessed in light of 
data protection laws and security measures that are applied in the foreign 
country, such as for the purpose, duration, nature, origin and the intended 
destination of the personal data.’1352 
 
Burkina Faso, Section 24:- 
 
‘The transfer of personal data from the territory of Burkina Faso abroad, 
which is subject to automatic processing as prescribed by Article 19, is 
possible only if it complies with the requirements of this Act. However, in 
exceptional circumstances, a transfer may be authorized by decree with the 
approval of the DPA.’1353 
 
 
                                                          
1351 Angola, Lei nº 22/11 Da Protecçao  de Dados Pessoais 2011, s.33. 
1352 Benin, Loi n° 2009-09 du Mai 2009 Portant Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel 2009, s.9. 
1353 Burkina Faso, Loi n° 010-2004/AN Portant Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel 2004, s.24. 
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Cape Verde, Section 19:- 
 
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act and other relevant legislation on 
protection personal data, the transfer of personal data abroad can only take 
place with respect to the provisions of this law and in particular if such 
country ensures an adequate level of protection. 
 
The adequacy of protection shall be assessed in the light of all circumstances 
surrounding a transfer, in particular the nature of the data, the purpose and 
duration of the proposed processing operation, countries of origin and final 
destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral in force in the country 
concerned, as well as the professional rules and security measures that are 
complied with in that country.’1354 
 
Mauritius, Section 31:- 
 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), no data controller shall, except with the written 
authorization of the Commissioner, transfer personal data to a third country.  
 
(2) The Eighth data protection principle specified in the First Schedule shall 
not apply where- 
 
(c) The transfer is made on such terms as may be approved by the 
Commissioner as ensuring the adequate safeguards for the protection of the 
rights of the data subjects. 
 
(3) For the purpose of subsection (2) (c), the adequacy of the level of 
protection of a country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances 
surrounding the data transfer…’1355 
 
 
 
                                                          
1354 Cape Verde, Lei nº 133/V/2001, de 22 de Janeiro Regime Jurídico Geral de Protecção de Dados Pessoais a 
Pessoas Singulares 2001, s.19. 
1355 Mauritius, Data Protection Act No.13 of 2004, s.31.  
272 
 
Morocco, Section 43:- 
 
‘The data controller shall not transfer any personal data to a foreign country 
unless that country ensures a sufficient level of protection for privacy rights 
and freedoms. 
 
The level of protection provided by the foreign country shall be assessed in 
light of the regulations and security measures applicable in that country, the 
characteristics of the processing such as the purpose, duration, nature, origin 
and intended destination of personal data. 
 
The DPA has established a list of countries that comply with the provisions 
mentioned above.’1356 
 
Senegal, Section 49:- 
 
‘The data controller shall not transfer any personal data abroad unless the 
foreign country ensures a sufficient level of protection for privacy rights, rights 
and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data. 
Before any transfer of personal data to a foreign country, the data controller 
shall inform the DPA.’1357 
 
Tunisia, Sections 51 and 52:- 
 
‘The transfer of personal data to a foreign country is prohibited when it may 
endanger public security or Tunisia’s vital interests. 
 
The transfer of personal data to a foreign country for the purpose of 
processing or for the future purpose of processing is not permitted if the 
country does not provide an adequate level of protection. The adequacy level 
of protection shall be assessed in light of the nature, purpose for which and 
period during which the personal data are intended to be processed; where the 
                                                          
1356 Morocco, Loi n° 09-08 Relative à la Protection des Personnes Physiques à l'égard du Traitement des Données à 
Caractère Personnel 2009, s.43. 
1357 Senegal, Loi n° 2008-12 sur la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel 2008, s.49. 
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data shall be transferred to; and the security measures taken to ensure the 
safety of the personal data. In any case, the transfer of personal data must be 
carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Act.’1358 
 
In Seychelles, sections 8(3) (e), 9(2) (e) 16(1), 45(1), (5) and (6) of the Seychelles’ Data Protection 
Act No. 9 of 2003 imply that data may not freely be transferred from Seychelles to a foreign 
country. This prohibition, although does not clearly use the language of ‘adequate level of 
protection’, appears to be the standard intended to be used for determining if a transfer of 
personal data to a foreign country will receive protection similar to what the Seychelles data 
privacy law provides. 
 
Accordingly, African countries have placed themselves in a similar position as the European 
Union for assessing the adequacy standard of laws in other African jurisdictions. Linked to the 
previous discussion and analyses, this reason has partly silenced concerns for imposition of 
European law in Africa because the same claims against the European Directive would have 
delegitimized the adequacy clauses in African data privacy laws to their fellow African countries. 
 
4.3.1.2 Negative Determinants 
 
 Lack of Awareness of Privacy Risks 
 
Privacy awareness reflects the extent to which an individual is informed about privacy practices 
and policies, about how disclosed information is used, and is cognizant about their impact over 
the individual’s ability to preserve her private space.1359 Lack of privacy awareness is perhaps one 
of the most negative determinants that have impeded the growth of privacy concerns in Africa 
and consequently affecting the adoption of privacy policies and legislation. Understandably this 
lack of individuals’ awareness of privacy risks partly reflects the value individuals attach on 
privacy of their personal information. Sometimes privacy policies and legislation may exist in 
African countries however their ignorance by individuals produce the same result. Froomkin 
summaries the condition in which an individual’s lack of awareness affects the value he or she 
                                                          
1358 Tunisia, Loi n° 2004-63 Portant sur la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel 2004, ss. 51 and 52. 
1359 Xu, H et al., ‘Examining the Formation of Individual’s Privacy Concerns: Toward an Integrative View’, 
International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) Proceedings, 2008, pp.1-16, at 6. 
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attaches on privacy in his famous expression ‘privacy myopia’.1360 The latter concept has to be 
contrasted with the ‘nothing to hide’ argument.1361 This is because in the ‘nothing to hide’ 
argument the data subject appears to be aware of privacy of his or her personal information. Yet 
he or she compromises such value in the course of balancing it with other important values, 
more particularly security issues. However in some cases the ‘nothing to hide’ argument may 
itself be part of the ‘privacy myopia’. This happens when a person who is in the first place 
suffering from the influence of ‘privacy myopia’ is misled to reveal his or personal information 
on the justification of ‘nothing to hide’. In the African context, for example, this can well be 
illustrated by the compulsory registration of SIM card, which quite often proceeded partly on the 
basis of fight against crimes while no evidence merited those claims. In support of this view, 
Branttie posits:- 
 
‘First of all, the NCA and the Ministry of Communication(of Ghana) may not 
have had the hindsight of any empirical evidence supporting how registration 
of SIM cards has curtailed crime in any of the jurisdictions where this exercise 
has been implemented. Instead, there have been concerns about whether the 
exercise was really necessary at all, and its direct effect, or indirect effect for 
that matter, has not been evident as regards to a lowering crime rate, prank 
calling or money laundering.’1362 
 
Extending the concept of ‘privacy myopia’ in the African context while explaining the value 
attached on privacy by individuals in Uganda, Bakibiknga argues that Ugandans largely suffer 
from ‘privacy myopia’.1363 This is also the case with other African countries such as Nigeria as 
already explained by Kusamotu.1364 Yet, lack of awareness of privacy risks should not be regarded 
as a natural phenomenon. There are complex arrays of factors which offer explanation to this 
condition. The latter include the low level of computerisation or penetration of technology in 
Africa which result in the corresponding low level of data processing and awareness about its 
implications for privacy.1365 This penetration level has resulted in ‘digital divide’ between urban 
                                                          
1360 Froomkin, pp.1502-1506, note 6, supra. 
1361 Solove, D.J., “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy’, San Diego Law Review, 
2007, Vol.44, No.4, pp.745-772. 
1362 Branttie, p.1, note 1298, supra. 
1363 Bakibinga, notes 61 and 176, supra.  
1364 Kusamotu, notes 166 and 178, supra. 
1365 Ibid. 
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and rural Africa. Another factor affecting awareness is high level of illiteracy in Africa.1366 With 
this general illiteracy level, individuals’ ability to understanding threats posed upon their privacy 
becomes severely limited. However this does not suggest that literate individuals are well placed 
to understand privacy risks of their personal information. A recent survey conducted across 
Africa, ‘Awareness Survey on Freedom of Information and Data Protection Legislation and Open Government 
Data Initiatives’1367 from 27 to 30 September 2011, provides solid evidence that lack of awareness 
of privacy risks affects a large number of literate individuals working in private sectors, 
governments, academic and researcher institutions. This survey asked the following question in 
the context of data protection legislation: does your country have a data protection law? The 
results were as follows: 36% said yes, 19% said no and 45% said do not know.1368 Yet, when 
mapped against the actual existence of data privacy legislation in each country it was found that 
many of the responses were not correct. Sometimes participants replied yes while such data 
privacy legislation did not exist or replied no while such legislation exists or replied do not know 
while a data privacy legislation exists or does not exist.1369 Although this survey was not meant to 
be rigorously scientific, it gives a snapshot of how much and what people know about data 
privacy in their countries.1370 Admittedly, while being aware of privacy risks does not necessarily 
mean that one must know the existence of legislation yet the vice-versa may be true. This survey 
reflects Bygraves’ views in the following paragraph:- 
 
‘Data protection laws are recent additions in the legal landscape; the first such 
laws were not enacted until the early 1970s. Though a large number of legal 
and quasi-legal instruments on data protection are now to be found, they still 
tend to be an unknown or poorly known quantity for many people, lawyers 
included.’1371 
 
Apart from the above factors affecting awareness, it is difficult to disagree entirely that African 
culture impacts on an individual’s awareness and consciousness for privacy, particularly in rural 
areas where collectivist style of life is still discernible. As pointed out by some commentators, 
                                                          
1366 See e.g., UNESCO, Institute for Statistics. ‘Adult and Youth Literacy’, Facts Sheet, September 2011, 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/FactSheets/Documents/FS16-2011-Literacy-EN.pdf last visited 2/03/2012. 
1367 Taylor, K., ‘Awareness Survey on Freedom of Information and Data Protection Legislation and Open 
Government Data Initiatives’, The Internet Governance Forum, Nairobi, Kenya, 27th -30th September 2011, pp.1-
19, 
http://epsiplatform.eu/sites/default/files/IGF6_W123_PSISurveyreport_21October2011.pdf, 
last visited 2/03/2012. 
1368 Ibid, p.3. 
1369 Ibid, pp.5-15. 
1370 Ibid, p.5. 
1371 Bygrave, p. 2, note 24, supra. 
276 
 
through group association in African cultures an individual’s interests are subordinate to group’s. 
Accordingly, there is sharing of even sensitive personal information with others without knowing 
the likely resulting privacy risks. Yet, while collectivist culture operates as a negative determinant, 
there has been rare discussion let alone mention of culture in the legislative processes and the 
data privacy laws’ trauvaux préparatoires leading to data protection legislation in Africa.1372 This may 
be partly due to two main factors: over dominance of economic justifications for adopting such 
legislation as state-sponsored agenda as well as its attendant propaganda and lack or inadequate 
public consultation during the legislative processes of data privacy laws (see below). 
 
 Resistance to Transparency 
 
Some governments resist taking interest in privacy issues because they do not want to become 
more and more transparent and accountable to their people. This resistance can be demonstrated 
generally by the rejection of the Bill of Rights in the independence constitutions or restricting its 
application; rejection of access of information legislation or restriction of their application; and 
specifically being indifferent in initiating legislative process for data protection legislation which 
in some ways puts governments under certain obligations in processing personal information. 
This in turn limits the ability of governments to conduct unregulated surveillance over its people. 
 
 Lack or inadequate Legislative Consultation  
 
Historically the drafting and enactments of data protection laws around the world, particularly in 
Europe have frequently been lengthy processes fraught with controversy.1373 Yet, in some places 
like Sweden, preparation and enactment of data protection legislation occurred relatively quickly 
and smoothly.1374 However this does not suggest that data privacy legislation in Sweden was 
adopted without public consultation or in just few days. In Africa, with exception of only few 
countries (e.g. South Africa), the enactments of data privacy legislation had not engaged public 
consultation or such consultation had been inadequate. Ordinarily, public consultations in the 
legislative process generate debates about the need or otherwise of data privacy laws, their 
contents, enforcement, etc and in the course of that stimulates interests and awareness in these 
laws to the public. Concomitantly, they facilitate implementation of data privacy laws once 
enacted.  
                                                          
1372 See chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
1373 Bygrave, p.4, note 24, supra. 
1374 Ibid, p.5. 
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 Cost  
 
The cost of adopting and implementing comprehensive data protection legislation is also among 
critical issues to developing countries. Such cost is borne with respect to carrying out training, 
awareness programmes, seminars, carrying out investigations, dispute resolution, etc. As most 
African governments’ annual budgets depend to over 30% of budget support from donors,1375 it 
is practically difficult to finance the adoption and implementation of data privacy legislation (see 
4.4.2.2(b)).  
 
4.3.2 Concepts and Theories of Privacy in Africa 
 
So far there is neither concept nor theory that uniquely deals with privacy in an African cultural 
context. The specific call for conceptualization of privacy in an African context appears only in 
the works of Bakibinga. As pointed out, Bakibinga holds that an individual in Africa can have 
privacy and still be part of the community.1376 Building upon this premise she makes a definitive 
call specifically for her country (Uganda) that privacy has to be defined in a way that is acceptable 
to the Ugandan society given the emphasis on communalism versus individual rights.1377 She also 
contends that privacy should not remain an abstract and one way to start would be to 
commission studies to obtain perceptions of privacy within the Ugandan society.1378 It is really 
difficult to comprehend how a privacy concept can at one and the same time function to serve 
individual and group interests. A similar paradox in the Western privacy discourse can well be 
illustrated by Westin’s definition of privacy which states that privacy is a claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others.1379 Interestingly reference to ‘group’ in the Westin’s 
definition of privacy is not repeated in other Western theories of privacy. Instead, an individual is 
the primary reference point in such theories. 
 
The only theory of privacy that has started to gain prominence in Africa, albeit not in the African 
cultural context as such, is that of a renowned Professor Johann Neethling.  Neethling’s theory 
of privacy states:- 
                                                          
1375 Knoll, M., ‘Budget Support: A Reformed Approach or Old Wine in New Skins?’ UNCTAD Discussion Papers, 
No. 190, October 2008, pp. 1-13, at p.1, 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20085_en.pdf last visited 14/03/2012. 
1376 EPIC, note 60, supra. 
1377 Bakibinga, note 61, supra. 
1378 Ibid. 
1379 Westin, note 410, supra. 
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‘Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by exclusion from 
publicity. This condition includes all those personal facts which the person 
himself at the relevant time determines to be excluded from the knowledge of 
outsiders and in respect of which he evidences a will for privacy.’1380 
 
The above definition implies that privacy is an absence of acquaintance with a person or his 
personal affairs in his state of seclusion.1381 Accordingly, privacy can only be infringed by the 
unauthorized acquaintance by an outsider with a person or his personal affairs, which 
acquaintance can occur in two ways only: first, by intrusion in the private sphere( that is, where 
an outsider himself becomes acquainted with a person o has personal affairs); and, secondly, by 
disclosure or revelation of private facts(that is, where a third party acquaints outsiders with a 
person o his personal affairs which, although known to that party, remains private).1382 As 
privacy is closely associated to other personality interests, Neethling has spent a considerable 
space in his literature, while criticizing his rivals and some South African court’s decisions, to 
distinguish it from such other interests: physical-psychological integrity (including sensory 
feelings); dignity; identity; autonomy; self-realization and patrimonial interests.1383 
 
Although Neethling’s theory of privacy appears to be postulated in 1976,1384 the same is not 
novel. Neethling seems to have relied on a similar theory as propounded by Hyman 
Gross in 1967.1385 The context in which Gross’ conceptualization of privacy sprang was 
the U.S Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v Connecticut.1386 In this way it can be argued 
that Neethling’s theory of privacy follows the same pattern of the Western individualism. 
Also important, such theory can be classified as falling under the control theory of 
privacy concept. Despite that, Neethling’s theory of privacy has received wider 
recognition in literature in South Africa and in other countries within Africa. Roos, 
Anspach and Nwauche serve as commentators in Africa who are fond of Neethling’s 
                                                          
1380 Neethling, J et al., Neethling’s Law of Personality, Butterworth, Durban, 1996, p.36; Neethling, J et al, 
(Neethling’s Law of Personality), p.32, note 186, supra; Neethling, J., ‘The Concept of Privacy in South African 
Law’, The South African Law Journal, 2005, Vol.122, No.1, pp.18-28, at p.19; Neethling, J et al (Law of Delict), 
p.347, note 186, supra. 
1381 Neethling (The Concept of Privacy in South Africa Law), p.21, note 1380, supra. 
1382 Ibid. 
1383 Ibid, pp.22-27; see also, Neethling, et al (Neethling’s Law of Personality), note 186, supra; Neethling, J et al( Law 
of Delict), pp.346-354, note 186, supra; Currie, I., ‘The Concept of Privacy in the South African  Constitution: 
Reprise’, Journal of South African Law, 2008, Vol.2008, No. 3, pp.549-557.  
1384 Neethling, J., ‘Die Reg op Privaatheid’, LL.D Thesis, UNISA, 1976. 
1385 Gross, H., ‘The Concept of Privacy’, New York University Law Review, 1967, Vol.42, No.1, pp.34-54. 
1386 381 U.S. 479 [1965]. 
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theory.1387 Similarly, Neethling’s theory of privacy has received the approval of the South 
African Supreme Court of Appeal in National Media Ltd v Jooste.1388 
 
Putting Neethling aside, other commentators in Africa have avoided debates about the concept 
of privacy. Instead, and for certain purposes, they tend to apply one or more definitions of 
privacy from the Western discourse. This means that the African understanding of privacy is not 
dissimilar to definitions postulated by Western scholars. The similarity alluded to here is partly 
due to the fact that privacy is an imported concept in Africa from the Western culture.  
 
4.4 Policy and Regulatory Frameworks for Privacy and Data Protection 
 
Policy and legal regulation of privacy and personal data protection in Africa can be analyzed in 
three clusters: regional, sub-regional and national levels. At the regional level various instruments 
have been developed under the auspices of the African Union (AU). Under sub-regional level 
there are initiatives by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East African 
Community (EAC), and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Fewer initiatives 
are known to have taken place in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and Arab Maghreb 
Union (UMA). 
 
4.4.1 Regional Frameworks 
 
The policy and regulatory frameworks for privacy and data protection at the regional level are 
those developed under the initiative and auspices of the African Union (AU). Three instruments 
are considered at the exclusion of any other initiatives because they are directly affecting the 
issues addressed in this thesis. For precision, the three instruments are: the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (ACHR or the Banjul Charter); the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990 (ACRWC or the Children’s Charter); and the Draft African 
Union Convention on establishment of a credible legal framework for cyber security in Africa 
2011 (Convention on Cyber Security).  
 
 
 
                                                          
1387 Roos(LL.D Thesis), pp.554-560, note 2, supra; Anspach, p.66, note 1235, supra; Nwauche, p.78, note 179, supra. 
1388 [1996] 3 SA 262(A) 271. 
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4.4.1.1 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 is the main human rights treaty for the 
African Union (AU).1389 The latter (formerly known as the Organization of African Unity until 
2009) is a union of 54 members except Morocco.1390 The objectives of the African Union are to 
promote unity and solidarity among the member states; to foster socio-economic integration of 
the continent; to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interests to the 
continent and its peoples; to achieve peace and security; to eradicate all forms of colonialism 
from Africa and to promote international cooperation having due regard to Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1391 Perhaps it was this latter 
objective which partly necessitated the adoption of the ACHR in 1981.  
 
In terms of privacy, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not provide 
expressly for its protection. This omission has erroneously led many commentators to conclude 
that Africans do not value privacy.1392 Yet, recently some commentators have advanced argument 
that despite such an omission, privacy can still be read in other provisions protection personality 
rights, particularly the right on dignity.1393  
 
4.4.1.2 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990 
 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 19901394 (ACRWC) is the only AU’s 
instrument which expressly guarantees the right to privacy. Article 10 of this Charter states: ‘no 
child shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family home or 
correspondence, or to the attacks upon his honour or reputation, provided that parents or legal 
guardians shall have the right to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of their 
children. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’ 
                                                          
1389 OAU, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), 
27 June 1981, entered into force 21st October 1986. 
1390 Currently the African Union has the following members: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire( Ivory Coast), Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, São Tomé and Príncipe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Madagascar has been suspended since 2009.  
1391 OAU Charter 1963, Article II(1). 
1392 See e.g., Gutwirth, note 46, supra; Bygrave, note 559, supra; Bakibinga, p.9, note 38, supra; Burchell, (footnote 
3), note 77, supra. 
1393 Enyew, p.15, note 1336, supra. 
1394 OAU, note 136, supra. 
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As argued before, the adoption of the ACRWC collapses any argument that the omission of a 
provision for protection of privacy in the ACHPR is sufficient evidence to support the claim that 
Africans do not value privacy. However one point must be clearly made out, the main influence 
on the adoption of the ACRWC is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1989.1395 The right to privacy is one of the provisions of the United Nations Convention. Yet, it 
is still not clear why the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights omits a clause on 
protection of privacy despite the fact that it makes reference in its preamble to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Interestingly, these two instruments contain clear provisions on protection of the right to 
privacy. As already submitted, the provisions on the rights to privacy in the UDHR and ICCPR 
apply directly in some African countries whose treaty practice is monism. Moreover, in dualist 
African states these provisions have permeated into national constitutions as well. 
 
4.4.1.3 African Union Convention on Cyber Security 2011 
 
The African Union Convention on Cyber Security 2011(i.e. Cyber Convention)1396 is still a draft 
convention in legislative process. Significant changes are not expected in the final law because of 
the context in which the Convention arose. This context is considered below.  Partly because of 
this and also the fact that the draft Convention has substantially replicated the ECOWAS sub-
regional data privacy law, it is worth important to make comments on it, more particularly on 
provisions relating to regulation of data privacy.  
 
The development of the draft Cyber Convention traces back into the Addis Ababa Declaration 
by the Heads of State and Government of the African Union on 2 February 2010.1397 In this 
Declaration, it was alluded to that ICTs are powerful catalysts for the development and 
integration process in Africa. It was realized that ICTs need to be regulated in that regard. 
Because of this, the establishment of a legal and regulatory framework that is harmonized and 
                                                          
1395 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989; adopted on 20th November 1989 and entered into 
force on 2nd September 1990. 
1396 AU, Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework for Cyber Security 
in Africa, Version 01/01.2011, 
 http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/events/2011/WDOcs/CA_5/Draft%20Convention%20on%20Cyberlegislation
%20in%20Africa%20Draft0.pdf last visited 4/03/2012. 
1397 AU Addis Ababa Declaration on Information and Communication Technologies in Africa: Challenges and 
Prospects for Development, Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XIV), Adopted by the Fourteenth Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 2nd February 2010. 
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attractive for investments, shared telecommunications and ICT infrastructure as well as the 
convergence of networks, services and administration became necessary. In the context of the 
Addis Ababa Declaration, the draft Cyber Convention became developed. This Convention is 
currently under consideration by the AU organs. 
 
Structurally, the Draft Cyber Convention has two main parts: the introductory matters which 
give the general context in which the Convention is being drafted and the Convention itself. The 
latter is divided into five sections. The first section comprises the preamble with fourteen 
recitals. The rest four sections are titled as ‘parts’. Part I comprising Arts I (1)-I (39) deals with 
Electronic Commerce. Part II starting from Art II (1)-II (50) deals with Protection of Personal 
Data. Undoubtedly this is the longest part in the Convention. Part III covering Arts III (1)-III 
(41) is devoted on matters of Cyber Crimes. Part IV which is the final, covers Arts IV (1)-IV (7) 
on Common and Final Provisions. 
 
Briefly, the context in which the African Union has proposed the Cyber Convention largely rests 
on the development of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the continent 
and the risks and challenges posed by them. In particular, African countries are concerned by the 
globalization of risks, crimes and threats to cyber security.  This concern is reflected in the broad 
objective and goal of the draft of Cyber Convention in paragraph 3 of its introductory section 
which states:- 
 
‘The objective of the Convention on Cyber Security is to contribute to the 
preservation of the institutional, human, financial, technological and 
informational assets and resources put in place by institutions to achieve their 
objectives. The Convention embodies the treatment of cyber crime and cyber 
security in its strict sense, but is not confined solely to these elements. It also 
embraces important elements of electronic commerce and the protection of 
personal data.’ 
 
Also important to note, the proposed Cyber Convention has been prompted by the need to 
achieve harmonisation of cyber laws across Africa. The harmonisation agenda manifests from 
the tendency by some African states to increasingly enact legislation on cyber security and ICTs 
in general. This tendency is also growing at sub-regional level, particularly in ECOWAS where 
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cyber law treaties have been adopted to regulate various issues. The overall result of these 
uncoordinated initiatives is divergences in legal standards and distortion of internal markets.  
 
As pointed out, Part II of the draft Cyber Convention contains data protection regulations. This 
is the only part directly relating to this thesis. A close observation of Part II of the Cyber 
Convention leaves no doubt that the same largely incorporates the ECOWAS’ Data Protection 
Act with few slight modifications.1398 Yet, both the ECOWAS’ Data Protection Act and Part II 
of the Cyber Convention are modelled on the European Directive 95/46/EC on protection of 
individual personal data. Because of this, it can be submitted that Part II of the AU’s Cyber 
Convention contains both the basic principles of data processing as well as the requirement of 
supervisory authorities to implement data protection legislation at national level. The main 
features of Part II of the Cyber Convention are considered below. 
 
Article II (1) of the Cyber Convention defines various concepts used in the text. Most of these 
definitions are the same as those provided in Article 2 of Directive 95/46/EC. However it is 
interesting to note the use of new terminologies with the same meanings as in the Directive. For 
example, ‘data controller’ in the Directive has the corresponding meaning to ‘data processing 
official’ in the Cyber Convention; ‘data subject’ is equivalent to ‘person concerned’ in the Cyber 
Convention. The case is also the same with ‘processor’ in the Directive which corresponds to 
‘sub-contractor’ in the Convention. Interesting also to observe, is the use of the term ‘direct 
prospecting’ which means any solicitation carried out through message dispatch, regardless of 
the message base or nature, especially messages of commercial, political or charitable nature, 
designed to promote, directly or indirectly, goods and services or the image of a person selling 
the goods or providing the services. This definition is absent in the Directive 95/46/EC but the 
same appears narrowly as ‘direct marketing’ in Directive 2002/58/EC (Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications)1399 as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC.1400 
                                                          
1398 ECOWAS, Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal data Protection within ECOWAS adopted in Abuja 
on 16th February 2010. 
1399 Directive 2002/58/EC on the European parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, O.J.L 201, 
pp.0037-0047, dated 31/07/2002. as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European parliament and of the 
Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, O.J.L 337, 
pp.11-36 dated 18/12/2009.  
1400 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending 
Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
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The objectives of the Cyber Convention with regard to protection of personal data are stated in 
Art II (2). This provision provides that each member of the African Union ‘shall put in place a 
legal framework with a view to establishing a mechanism to combat breaches of private life likely 
to arise from the gathering, processing, transmission, storage and use of personal data.’ In broad 
terms Art II(2) proceeds to state that such mechanism must ensure that any processing of 
personal data, respects the freedom and fundamental rights of physical persons while at the same 
time recognising the prerogatives of the state, the rights of local communities and the interest of 
enterprises. It is imperative to note that this objective is slightly different from those in the 
Directive. First, it has been formulated in terms of prevention of breaches of private life while 
that in the Directive relates to protection of the right to privacy. Second, the Cyber Contention 
seems not to put emphasis on free flow of personal information across the African Union as it is 
the case with the Directive in the European Union. Perhaps this is partly because so far there 
have been no serious impediments to this flow of information. Yet when Art II(1) is read in 
conjunction with recitals 7 and 8 of the Convention, the guarantee of the free circulation of 
information stems out clearly as one of the objective of the Convention. Also, the reference to 
protection of privacy appears to qualify the breaches of private life. However recital 7 is 
problematic in its formulation. It restricts the protection of privacy to citizens suggesting that 
non-citizens (i.e. foreigners) cannot be afforded protection. Since this is just a draft, it remains to 
be seen if adopted, how this provision will be implemented as currently some AU member states 
have already adopted data privacy legislation without this restriction while others have had this 
restriction already in their laws. Nigeria, for example, maintains this restriction and has been 
assessed by commentators in combination with other shortcomings as not providing adequate 
level of protection of personal data.1401 Although attraction for investments is not clearly stated 
in the Cyber Convention, the Addis Ababa Declaration clearly points out that investment is one 
of the reasons for adopting such legal and regulatory framework on cyber-security issues. 
 
The scope for the application of the Cyber Convention is stipulated in Art II-3. Accordingly, 
Cyber Convention applies to private and public sectors. In both cases the Convention extends its 
application to processing of personal information of natural person and legal entities. Moreover, 
the Convention targets both automated and non-automated (i.e. manual) processing of personal 
data. The territorial application of the national data privacy is restricted by the Cyber Convention 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, O.J.L 337, pp.11-36 dated 18/12/2009. 
1401 Kusamotu, note 165, supra. 
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to processing of data taking place in the territory of a member state. This to say is the choice of 
law rule in the Cyber Convention. It is based on the territoriality principle akin to Art 4 of the 
Directive 95/46/EC but less complex as the latter. To be precise, the territoriality principle in 
the Cyber Convention is similar to Art 4(1) (a) of the Directive which places emphasis on the law 
of a member state to apply when processing activities have taken place. Yet, it falls short of Art 4 
because it does not cover those situations in 4(1) (b) and (c) where national law applies by virtue 
of public international law and where there is a use of ‘equipment’ in the territory of a member 
state respectively. It is imperative to note that these latter situations apply in relation to third 
countries. Also contrary to the Directive which excludes activities falling outside the scope of the 
Community law (e.g., processing operations concerning public security, defence, state security 
and criminal law), the Cyber Convention subjects these processing operations under its general 
scope. Yet the Convention gives the member states a leverage to make exceptions under specific 
provisions of national legislation. Since the scope of these leverages is not clear, in practice a 
state may exclude entirely the application of the Convention on such types of data processing.   
 
The Cyber Convention intends not to apply in two areas: where processing takes place within the 
exclusive context of personal or domestic activity and where temporary copies produced within 
the context of technical activities for transmission and access to a digital network for the sole 
purpose of offering other beneficiaries of the service the best possible access to the information 
so transmitted. While the first exception in the Cyber Convention is similarly found in Directive 
95/46/EC, it is further qualified: that is, such data processing is not meant to be carried out for 
systematic communication to third parties or for further dissemination. Practically, this 
additional qualification does not serve any value as any processing concealed to be undertaken 
under the cover of personal or domestic activities and subsequently discovered to be inconsistent 
with such purposes and limits will automatically be taken to fall short of this exception. As to the 
second exception, an equivalent provision is lacking in the Directive 95/46/EC. Perhaps this can 
be related to the proviso in Art 4(1)(c) of the Directive, which seems to exclude its application in 
case an ‘equipment’ is used solely for purposes of transit of personal data through the territory of 
the community. Yet, significant differences are still noticeable. In the Cyber Convention, there 
are temporary copies created during transmission of personal data. These can be accessed by 
beneficiaries making potentials for disclosure of individual’s personal data. Accordingly, this 
second exception in the application of Cyber Convention undermines its objective. 
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The Cyber Convention contains seven basic principles of data processing reflecting the ones 
provided in Directive 95/46/EC. However there are significant differences in ambit and scope 
in certain cases. 
 
The first principle is the principle of consent and legitimacy of personal data processing.1402 This 
principle states that processing of personal data shall be deemed to be legitimate where the 
person concerned has given his/her consent. However, there are four exceptions to this general 
requirement: where processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation in which the 
processing official is subject; processing is necessary for executing a mission of public interest or 
deriving from the exercise of public authority vested in the processing official or third party to 
whom the data have been communicated; processing is necessary for executing a contract to 
which the concerned person is party or pre-contractual measures undertaken at his/her request; 
and finally where processing is necessary to safeguard the interest or fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the person concerned. The consent and legitimacy of processing of personal data 
principle under the Cyber Convention somewhat corresponds to Art 7 of Directive 95/46/EC, 
particularly paragraphs (a) to (e). Yet, three significant differences can be noted. The Cyber 
Convention considers ‘consent’ as the single primary criterion for legitimising data processing 
and only regards the four exceptions as subordinate to ‘consent’.  This is not the case under the 
European Directive where ‘consent’ is put at the same level as other legitimising criteria.  Also, 
criterion (f) in the Directive on processing personal data for the purposes of the legitimate 
interest pursued by the controller or the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, 
except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the data subject required under the Directive, is missing in the Cyber Convention. This makes 
the Convention more restrictive than the Directive. Moreover, the Directive is more specific and 
protective in using the expression ‘vital interests of the data subject’ in one of the legitimising 
criteria as opposed to the expression ‘safeguard the interest or fundamental rights and freedoms’ 
used in the Cyber Convention. In the former case, an element of balancing various interests 
emerge and is highly likely to be resolved in the advantage of the data subject than in the Cyber 
Convention. 
 
The second is the licitness and honest of personal data processing principle.1403 This principle 
states that the gathering, registration, processing, storage and transmission of personal data shall 
                                                          
1402 AU, Cyber Convention, Art II-28. 
1403 Ibid, Art II-29. 
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be undertaken licitly, with honesty and non-fraudulent. It is equivalent to the principle of fairness 
and lawfulness of processing under Art 6(1) (a) of the Directive.  
 
The third principle is formulated as the principle of objective, relevance and conservation of 
processed personal data.1404 It requires that data gathering to be undertaken for a set objective 
that is explicit and legitimate. Further processing in a manner incompatible with the original 
objectives is prohibited. This principle also requires that data gathered must be adequate, 
relevant and non-excessive in relation to the ultimate objective for which they have been 
gathered and subsequently processed. With exceptions of processing undertaken for historical, 
statistical or research purposes, data must only be conserved for the duration not exceeding the 
period required to achieve the ultimate objective for which they were gathered. This principle 
corresponds to the principles of purpose specification, adequacy and relevancy in Arts 6(1) (b), 
(c) and (e) of the Directive. 
 
The fourth principle is the accuracy of personal data.1405 Like its corresponding principle in Art 
6(1) (d) of the Directive, it requires that personal data collected must be accurate and kept up to 
date. Every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are incorrect and incomplete 
in relation to the purpose for which they were collected and further processed are deleted or 
corrected. 
 
The fifth principle is the transparency of personal data.1406 This principle requires data processing 
officials to provide information on personal data. Yet, it does not specify which information is to 
be given, to whom and in which manner. However the details of such information are provided 
in Art II-43. The transparency principle in the Convention partly reflects Art 10 of the Directive. 
However the Directive is broader in that under Art 11 another set of information is required 
where personal data is not collected from the data subject directly.   
 
The sixth principle is confidentiality and security of personal data processing.1407 This principle is 
otherwise known as the principle of information security. It places obligation on the part of the 
processing official to process data confidentially and protect it. Much emphasis on this principle 
is placed when processing involves transmission of the data in a network. Further, it requires that 
                                                          
1404 Ibid, Art II-30. 
1405 Ibid, At II-31. 
1406 Ibid, Art II-32. 
1407 Ibid, Art II- 33 and 34. 
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when processing is undertaken on behalf of a processing official, the latter must choose a sub-
contractor with adequate guarantees. Both are required to ensure compliance with security 
measures defined in the Cyber Convention. Yet, such measures are no where defined in Part II 
of the Convention or in any other parts. In contrast, Arts 16 and 17 of the Directive are more 
detailed and clearer than the Cyber Convention. For example, Art 16 provides clearly that the 
data processor or a person working under him, must process personal data only according to 
instructions from the controller, unless he is required to do otherwise by law. Art 17 stipulates a 
list of threats that must be prevented and how. As the Cyber Convention, Art 17 requires that 
whenever a data controller chooses a processor the latter must guarantee sufficient level of 
security. However, contrary to the Convention which is silent on the modality of the relationship 
between the data controller and processor, the Directive requires that the processor to be bound 
by a contract or legal act stipulating that the latter shall only process data on instructions from 
the employer. The obligations defined under the law in the member state shall also be incumbent 
on the processor. Furthermore, for purposes of proof, the contract or legal act is required to be 
kept in writing. Compared, the Directive seems to provide stronger safeguards in terms of 
security than the Convention. 
 
The seventh principle comprises a set of principles governing the processing of certain categories 
of personal data. The first category of such principles is the sensitivity.1408 The latter prohibits 
processing of personal data based on racial, ethnic and regional considerations, parentage 
relationship, political views, religious or philosophical persuasion, trade union membership, sex 
life and genetic information or, more generally, and data on the state of health of the person 
concerned. This principle is somewhat broader than Art 8 (1) of the Directive in terms of the list 
of prohibited processing. However, the Convention provides a list of ten exceptions in which 
the sensitivity principle does not apply. These include where processing involves data manifestly 
published by the person concerned; the person concerned has given his/her written consent, by 
whatever means; processing of personal data is required to safeguard vital interest of the person 
concerned; processing of personal data involves genetic data, in particular required for 
investigation purposes, and exercise or defense of the right to justice; a judicial procedure or 
criminal investigation has been opened; processing of personal data is required in the public 
interest; processing is required in order to execute a contract to which the person is party or pre-
contractual measures undertaken at the request of the person concerned; processing is necessary 
to obtain compliance with a legal order or regulatory obligation to which the processing official 
                                                          
1408 Ibid, Art II-35 and 36. 
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is subject; processing is required to execute a mission of public interest or a mission undertaken 
by  a public authority to the processing official or assigned by a public authority to a processing 
official or to a third party; or processing is undertaken within the framework of the legitimate 
activities of a foundation, association or any other non-profit making body or for political, 
philosophical, religious, self-help or trade union purposes. In this latter provision, the processing 
must only concern members of the said body or persons in regular contact within the framework 
of their activities and not disclosed to a third party without the consent of the person concerned. 
 
The sensitivity principle under the Convention is similar to Art 8 of the Directive with only few 
modifications. For example, while the former makes reference to ‘written consent’ as one of the 
exceptions for processing sensitive personal data, the latter refers to ‘explicit consent’. Also, the 
requirement for processing in the context of ‘mission of public interest’ in the Cyber Convention 
is missing in the Directive. Yet, the Directive leaves room for member states to introduce 
additional exceptions to the principle of sensitivity in their national laws while this is not the case 
in the Convention. This implies that the EU member states may have wider exceptions than AU 
member countries. 
 
The other principle for processing certain categories of personal data includes processing for 
journalistic purposes or research or artistic or literary expression.1409 Processing of personal data 
under these categories is only subject to the code of conduct of the respective professions. With 
the exception of research, this requirement is similar to Art 9 of the Directive.  
 
Furthermore, Art II -38 provides that the provisions of the Cyber Convention shall not impede 
the application of laws relating to the print media or the audio-visual sector and the provisions of 
the penal code which prescribe the conditions for the exercise of the right of response, and 
prevent, restrict, compensate for and, where necessary, repress breaches of private life and the 
reputation of physical persons. This provision is lacking in the Directive. The Cyber Convention 
also contains rules prohibiting direct prospection unless the person concerned has given prior 
consent which are quite broader.1410 While similar rules are not present in the Directive, the same 
are provided in the Electronic Communication Directive as direct marketing. 
 
As regard automated processing, the Cyber Convention provides narrower principles than the 
Directive. Art II-40 of the Convention prohibits automated processing in two circumstances: 
                                                          
1409 Ibid, Art II-37. 
1410 Ibid, Art II- 39. 
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where a legal ruling involving an appraisal of the comportment of a person and where a decision 
produces legal effect on a person. While the Convention seems to contain absolute prohibition 
on automatic processing, the Directive has provided exceptions to the general principle in Art 
15(2). Moreover, the Directive prohibits not only automated processing that produces legal 
effects but also that which significantly affects the data subject.1411 
 
The other principle for processing special categories of personal data is about interconnection of 
personal data files or data matching.1412 The latter is permitted subject to the authorisation of the 
protection authority as per Art II-8 of the Cyber Convention. Moreover, interconnection is 
limited to help attain the legal or statutory objectives that present legitimate interest for data 
treatment officials. Interconnection is required to avoid discrimination or erosion of the rights, 
freedoms and guarantees in respect of the persons concerned. Yet, it is not supposed to be 
loaded with security measures. The underlying principle in any case of interconnection is the 
relevance of the data required to be interconnected. 
 
Apart from the above basic principles of data processing, the Convention contains a set of rights 
of data subject and obligations on the part of the processing official. The set of rights comprises 
the following: the right to information; right to access; right to opposition and right of correction 
or suppression.1413 These rights are similar to those in Arts 10, 11, 12 and 14 of the Directive. Yet 
there are some significant differences in some aspects. For example, under the African Union’s 
Cyber Convention the data subject has the right to request to feature no longer in the file.1414 
While this provision is not available in the Directive, it is akin to the ‘right to be forgotten’ in the 
proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation 2012.1415 Also, the provision on the right of 
access in the Convention is too limited to confirmation of certain information on personal data 
processed and the purpose for such collection as well as their communication to the data subject. 
This is contrary to the corresponding right of access in Directive 95/46/EC which goes far to 
understand knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning the 
data subject in the case of automated decisions. Another important dissimilarity between the 
Convention and the Directive is that the latter puts as a right of access to the notifications of any 
rectification, erasure or blocking made by the data controllers to third parties to whom the data 
have been disclosed.   
                                                          
1411 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 15(1). 
1412
 AU, Cyber Convention, Art II-42. 
1413 Ibid, Art II-43, 44, 45 and 46 respectively. 
1414 Ibid, Art II-43(5). 
1415 EU General Data Protection Regulation, Art 17. 
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As regards obligations, the Cyber Convention places the obligations of confidentiality; security; 
conservation; and sustainability on the part of the processing official.1416 These corresponding 
obligations scatter in the Directive with varying scope and ambit.  
 
Like Directive 95/46/EC, the Cyber Convention contains rules on transborder data movement 
although it adopts ‘sufficient level’ standard as opposed to ‘adequacy level’ standard in the 
Directive. Art II-41 states that the data processing official shall not transfer personal data to a 
non-Member state of the African Union unless such a state offers sufficient level of protection 
of the private life, freedoms and fundamental rights of persons whose data are being or likely to 
be processed. This provision requires further that before any personal data is transferred to a 
third country; the data processing official shall give prior notice of such transfer to the 
protection authority. However, contrary to the Directive, the Cyber Convention does not 
provide criteria for assessing the level of adequacy of data protection nor does it expressly 
indicate who is to undertake such assessment. Despite this omission, the Cyber Convention 
places obligation on the part of national protection authority to authorise cross-border transfer 
of personal data.1417 This may suggest that while at the African Union level there is no anybody 
charged with the duty of assessing the level of adequacy of data protection in the third countries; 
at the national level such mandate is performed by the national protection authority on a case to 
case basis. Yet, there is no requirement of notifying national protection authorities in other 
member states of any finding as to the level of protection of personal data in the third country. 
Also important to note, the Cyber Convention does not lay down any rules of exception that 
may still permit transfer of personal data to third countries where the adequacy level is not met. 
Undoubtedly, the rules of transborder of personal data from the African Union to third 
countries are very limited and are not compatible to the objective of free movement of personal 
data and harmonisation. 
 
Institutionally, the Cyber Convention obliges every member of the African Union to establish an 
authority with responsibility to protect personal data.1418 This authority is required to ensure that 
processing of personal data in their respective countries is conducted in accordance with the 
Cyber Convention.1419 One way to ensure this compliance is to require a declaration before a 
protection authority of any personal data processing activity.1420 As to its nature, the protection 
                                                          
1416 AU, Cyber Convention, Art II-47, 48, 49 and 50 respectively. 
1417 Ibid, Art II-23(11). 
1418 Ibid, Art II-14. 
1419 Ibid. 
1420 Ibid, Art II-6. 
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authority is required to be an independent administrative authority.1421 The independence of this 
authority is discernible in three areas. First, members of the protection authority should not be 
appointed from the governments (i.e. the executive branch).1422 Instead, such members shall 
comprise parliamentarians, deputies, senators, senior judges of the tribunal, Council of State, 
Civil and Criminal Appeal Court, personalities qualified as a result of their knowledge of 
computer science, as well as professional networks or sectors;1423 second, the protection authority 
is required to be afforded budgetary subvention for accomplishment of its missions;1424 and 
finally members of the protection authority are required to enjoy full immunity for the views 
they express in the exercise or on the occasion of the exercise of their functions.1425 Moreover 
members of the protection authority are not required to receive instructions from any authority 
in the exercise of their functions.1426 It is imperative to note that although the corresponding 
provision in the Directive refers to ‘complete independence’ as opposed to just ‘independence’ in 
the Cyber Convention, the two provisions have the same meaning.1427 Other requirements which 
apply to the members of the protection authority include the duty of secrecy.1428 The protection 
authority is similarly required to formulate rules of procedure governing deliberations, processing 
and presentation of cases.1429  
 
In discharging its functions, the protection authority may impose sanctions, both administrative 
and pecuniary, on the defaulting data processing official.1430 In particular, the authority may issue 
a warning to any data processing official that fails to comply with the responsibilities arising from 
this Convention or a formal demand for an end to any particular breaches within a timeframe set 
by the authority.1431 Where the data processing official fails to comply with the formal demand 
addressed to him/her, the protection authority may impose the following sanctions after 
adversarial proceedings: provisional withdraw of licence; definitive withdraw of licence; or 
pecuniary fine.1432 Moreover, in case of emergency, the protection authority may interrupt data 
processing; lock up some of the personal data processed; or prohibit temporarily or definitively 
                                                          
1421 Ibid, Art II-14. 
1422 Ibid, Art II-19. 
1423 Ibid, Art II-16. 
1424 Ibid, Art II-21. 
1425 Ibid, Art II-20. 
1426 Ibid. 
1427 ECJ, notes 944 and 945, supra. 
1428 AU, Cyber Convention, Art II-18. 
1429 Ibid. 
1430 Ibid, Art II-23(8). 
1431 Ibid, Art II-24. 
1432 Ibid, Art II-25. 
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any processing at variance with the provisions of the Convention.1433 The sanctions imposed and 
decisions taken by the protection authority are subject to appeal.1434 However, in contrast to the 
Directive, the Convention does not say where appeals lie. 
 
4.4.2 Sub-Regional Frameworks 
 
4.4.2.1 Economic Community for West African States 
 
ECOWAS is the Economic Community for West African States with fifteen members.1435 It was 
established by the Treaty of Lagos on 28 May 1975 with the objective of promoting cooperation 
and economic integration in the West African region through harmonization of policies and 
laws.1436 The Supplementary Act on the Harmonization of Policies and the Regulatory 
Framework for the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Sector 20071437 is one of 
the greatest achievements towards those objectives. At least when compared to other sub-
regions, ECOWAS is the most vibrant and dynamic organization in Africa.1438 The other sub-
regional groupings are considered in 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.3, and 4.4.2.4. 
 
In terms of data privacy protection, ECOWAS is the first and the only sub-regional grouping in 
Africa to develop a concrete framework of data privacy law: Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 
on Personal Data Protection within ECOWAS.1439 As pointed out, the ECOWAS Supplementary 
Act has been strongly influenced by the EU Directive.1440 In turn the Supplementary Act has 
strongly influenced the African Union Cyber Convention. The latter has in fact replicated the 
former word-to-word with only few exceptions (see 4.4.1.3). Because of this, the analyses with 
regard to the Cyber Convention are wholly relevant for the ECOWAS Supplementary Act. This 
is despite the fact that the Convention may be adopted with significant changes or not. 
                                                          
1433 Ibid, Art II-26. 
1434 Ibid, Art II-27. 
1435 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo, see ECOWAS Website, http://www.ecowas.int/?lang=en last visited 
10/03/2012. 
1436 ECOWAS Treaty 1975 as revised in 1991, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/ecowasfta.pdf last 
visited 10/03/2012, Art 3. 
1437 Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/07 on the Harmonization of Policies and the Regulatory Framework for the 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Sector 2007, adopted on the Thirty-First Session of the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government, Ouagadougou, 19th January 2007. 
1438 See e.g., Banjo, A., ‘The ECOWAS Court and the Politics of Access to Justice in West Africa’, CODESRIA 
Africa Development, 2007, Vol.32, No.1, pp.69-87, at p.70. 
1439 ECOWAS, note 1398, supra. 
1440 Greenleaf (Global Data Privacy Laws: 89 Countries, and Accelerating), p.7, note 38, supra. 
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Concomitantly, the discussion maintained in this part relates only to the main areas of 
differences between the Cyber Convention and the Supplementary Act.  
 
Structurally, the ECOWAS Supplementary Act has a preamble with fourteen recitals and eight 
chapters. The latter comprise 49 articles in total. Chapter I titled ‘General Provisions’ has only 
one article, i.e. Art 1. This provision defines various concepts employed in the text. In total there 
are fifteen concepts defined under this provision similar to Art II-1 of the Cyber Convention. 
However there are two notable differences: the Cyber Convention omits to define ‘Authority of 
Protection’ which is available in the text and naming of some concepts. Data subject, data 
controller and data processor in the Supplementary Act correspond to personal concerned, data 
processing official and subcontractor yet with the same meaning. 
 
Chapter II of the Supplementary Act titled ‘Legal Framework for Personal Data Protection’ is 
similar to Arts II-3, 4 and 5 of the Cyber Convention. The former has three provisions dealing 
with the aims and scope of the Act. It is imperative to note that the scope and aims of the two 
laws are the same except that whereas the Cyber Convention applies in the territory of a member 
state of the African Union the Supplementary Act applies to any processing of personal data 
carried out in a UEMOA1441 or ECOWAS member state. Like the Cyber Convention the 
objectives of the Supplementary Act are protection of privacy and promotion of free movement 
of information. The same are clearly stated in the tenth and eleventh recitals of the preamble 
unlike in the text itself. In contrast to the Cyber Convention, the Supplementary Act takes as its 
objective the harmonization of data protection legislation already in existence prior to the Act.1442  
Moreover the legal vacuum generated by the use of the Internet is considered as a new invention 
of the Supplementary Act though there is little reference to the Internet in the content principles 
of the Act. 
 
The basic principles of data processing in the Supplementary Act are contained in chapter V 
(Arts 23-37). This chapter corresponds to Art II-28 to Art II-42 of the Cyber Convention. The 
two sets of principles in these parts are the same. However there are two notable exceptions: 
                                                          
1441 Union économique et monétaire Ouest Africaine (EUMOA) translating in English as the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union has the following member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. 
1442 Recitals 10 and 11 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act state: ‘NOTING that, notwithstanding the existence of 
the national legislation relating to the protection of privacy of the citizens in their private and professional life and 
relating to the guarantee of the free movement of information, it becomes a matter of urgency to fill the legal 
vacuum generated by the use of internet which is a new instrument of communication; CONCIOUS of the 
necessity to fill this legal vacuum and establish a harmonized legal framework in the process of personal data.’ 
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with regard to transfer of personal data to third countries, the Supplementary Act considers all 
other countries except members of ECOWAS as third countries. The latter includes the rest of 
the African countries as well as non-African countries. Yet, as currently only four ECOWAS 
states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde and Senegal)1443  have adopted data privacy legislation, 
the restriction of transborder data flow to countries without adequate level of protection in such 
laws may still impede movement of personal information within the ECOWAS itself. In contrast 
the Cyber Convention considers non-AU member countries as third countries (including African 
countries which are non-AU members such as Morocco and those suspended membership). 
However since ECOWAS countries are also members of the African Union, they are covered by 
the Cyber Convention. There are little chances for the Cyber Convention and Supplementary 
Act to conflict each other on this aspect simply because the two legal instruments are almost 
identical except for their geographical scope. However in any case of such conflict the former 
will likely prevail over the latter for being a regional law. Yet, the different ways of transposing 
these instruments in national laws leaves possibilities of problems of harmonization similar to 
those currently facing the European Union.  Chapter VI of the Supplementary Act with four 
provisions (Arts 38-41) stipulate the rights of the individual whose personal data are the subject 
of processing. These are identical to Arts II-43, 44, 45 and 46 of the Cyber Convention. At the 
same time the Supplementary Act contains four provisions (Arts 42-45) on obligations of the 
data controller which are the same as Arts II-47, 48, 49 and 50 of the Cyber Convention. 
 
Institutionally, the Supplementary Act and the Cyber Convention contain the same provisions. 
In the former case the governing provisions are Arts 14-22 of chapter IV while in the latter Arts 
II-14 to II-27. There are three differences. The first resides in the requirement of establishment 
of the protection authority. In contrast to the Cyber Convention, the Supplementary Act 
provides in Art 14(1) that every ECOWAS member state shall establish its own data protection 
authority while it provides at the same time that if any state does not have shall be encouraged to 
establish one. The language of ‘encouragement’ is not used in the Cyber Convention or in the 
Directive 95/46 /EC. This implies that there may be difficulties to attain harmonisation in the 
implementation of the Supplementary Act. The second difference rests upon the composition of 
the data protection authority. The Supplementary Act provides the members of the protection 
authority must possess qualification in the field of law, information communication technology 
                                                          
1443 Greenleaf, note 1440, supra. It is important to emphasise that all of these states had adopted their data privacy 
legislation prior to the existence of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act. Since then to date none of the other 
ECOWAS member has adopted a data privacy legislation suggesting that the impact of the Supplementary Act is yet 
to be felt in the sub-region. 
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and other field of knowledge to achieve the objectives of the Act. In contrast, the Cyber 
Convention does not specify these qualifications expressly. It rather provides a list of persons 
who may serve in the protection authority as members. Although in effect those named 
individuals possess similar qualifications as those in the Supplementary Act, the former list other 
persons without specific qualifications (e.g. parliamentarians, deputies and senators). Also, it is 
not clear if following the appointment to serve as members of protection authority persons like 
senior judges listed in the Cyber Convention relinquish their original posts to the new one or 
they serve both. In case they maintain both posts and actually work for them, it is highly likely 
they may be overwhelmed by the responsibilities and fail to work efficiently. Moreover there is 
great likelihood of conflict of interests to arise. The third area of difference appears only as an 
oversight in repetition of the responsibilities of the protection authority. The Supplementary Act 
contains seventeen functions of the protection authority while the Cyber Convention has only 
fifteen. A close examination of the two sets of functions reveals that they are identical, except 
that the Supplementary Act makes repetition of two functions ( Arts 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c); Arts 
19(1)(h) and 19(1)(q)) in its list. Yet in both cases the positive statement of the necessary 
qualifications of protection authority members, and the negative statement of incompatibilities, 
are unusual in international agreements concerning independence of DPAs.1444 
 
Also, the Supplementary Act contains identical provisions on formalities for processing personal 
data as those provided in the Cyber Convention. These appear in chapter III (Arts 5-13). The 
corresponding provisions are contained in Arts II-5 to II-13 of the Cyber Convention. In both 
cases personal data processing is subject to a declaration before a protection authority. However 
this general principle is subject to a number of exceptions. 
 
Finally, contrary to the Cyber Convention and Directive 95/46/EC, the Supplementary Act is an 
integral part of the ECOWAS Treaty.1445 Breaches of the Supplementary Act by member states 
can be enforced before the ECOWAS Court of Justice. It is also imperative to note that neither 
the Supplementary Act nor the Cyber Convention provides the time limit for member states to 
implement them.  This is in contrast to the Directive which put the duration for implementation. 
What it means is that the harmonisation process in ECOWAS is much more complicated. This is 
because, while four ECOWAS members have adopted data privacy legislation the rest have not 
yet done so. 
 
                                                          
1444 Greenleaf, p.9, note 942, supra. 
1445 ECOWAS Supplementary Act 2010, Art 48. 
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4.4.2.2 East African Community 
 
The East African Community comprises of five countries: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda 
and Burundi. The Community was established in 1999 by the Treaty for Establishing of the East 
African Community 1999.1446 The major aim of the EAC is to forester development among the 
member states. To this end, the East African Community established a Customs Union in 2005 
and a Common Market in 2010.1447 There are two instruments in EAC which relate to data 
privacy protection. These are considered below. 
 
(a) Bill of Rights for the East African Community 2009 
 
The Bill of Rights for the East African Community 20091448(i.e. BREAC or East African Bill of 
Rights) is still a draft law. It has not yet been adopted by EAC. The Bill was prepared by the 
Human Rights institutions in the EAC. The major objective of the Bill of Rights is to address the 
omissions in the national constitutions of the member states as well as harmonise the standard of 
protection of human rights across the sub-region. 
 
In contrast to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which omits express reference 
to protection of the right to privacy, the East African Bill of Rights provides in Art 7 as follows:- 
 
‘1. Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have-  
(a) their person, office, or home searched;  
(b) their property searched;  
(c) their possessions seized;  
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed;  
Except as authorized by law.’ 
 
                                                          
1446 The Treaty for Establishment of the East African Community was signed on 30 November 1999 and entered 
into force on 7 July 2000 following its ratification by the original three Partner States – Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania. The Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty on 18 June 2007 and 
became full Members of the Community with effect from 1 July 2007; see EAC Website, 
http://www.eac.int/about-eac.html last visited 12/03/2012. 
1447 Ibid. 
1448 The Draft Bill of Rights for the East African Community 2009, 
http://www.kituochakatiba.org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=410&Itemid=27 
last visited 12/03/2012. 
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The above provision differs significantly in its formulation from the corresponding provision in 
the international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. It also differs from other regional 
instruments including the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 and even the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990. These instruments protect privacy in terms 
of private and family life including right to honour and reputation. In contrast, the East African 
Bill of Rights does so in terms of unauthorised searches of the person, office, home and 
property. The Bill also prevents seizure of possessions and infringement of communications. It is 
submitted that although the provisions of the East African Bill of Rights regarding searches and 
seizure may have implication in the private and family life of an individual, the same are not 
equivalent. Yet, the provision on privacy of communications and that on correspondence in the 
two sets of laws may be similarly interpreted. Since the Bill is not yet adopted, it has to be waited 
to see how far its Art 7 will have impact once the law comes into force as it is proposed. 
 
(b) EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Laws 2008/2011 
 
Like other regional groupings in the world, the East African Community has not been isolated 
by the development of ICTs. The potential benefits and risks of using ICTs are issues which 
have recently gained prominent discussion in the EAC. Accordingly, the realization of a solid 
cyber laws regime in the Community is essential in underpinning the implementation of the 
Common Market Protocol especially on the services, an area of great potential for the region.1449 
Yet, the EAC cyber law reform programme began on 28 November 2006 much earlier than the 
beginning of Common Market Protocol. This was after the East African Community’s Council 
of Ministers identified the creation of an enabling legal and regulatory environment as an 
enabling factor for effective implementation of e-Government strategies at national and regional 
levels.1450  
 
The cyber law reform programme was preceded by the appointment of the Regional Task Force 
on Cyberlaws (the Task Force) established in December 2007.1451 The latter drew from member 
                                                          
1449 Dr. Enos Bukuku, the EAC Deputy Secretary General in charge of Planning and Infrastructure, see UNCTAD, 
Press Clipping: EAC Develops Cyber Laws, 25/10/2011, http://r0.unctad.org/ecommerce/docs/EAC_Media.pdf 
last visited 12/03/2012.  
1450 Ibid; see also Legal Notice No. EAC/8/2007, East African Community Gazette, Vol.AT 1-No.0004, Arusha 
30th December 2007; East African Community, Draft EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Laws, (Phase I) November 
2008, p.3. 
1451 EAC, Draft EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, (Phase I), p.4. 
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states ministries and government departments.1452 To successfully accomplish its task, the Task 
Force organized the reform process in two phases: Phases I and II. The criteria for this division 
based on the priority of issues to be addressed. Accordingly, Phase I comprised the following 
issues: electronic transaction, electronic signature and authentications, data protection and 
privacy, consumer protection and computer crimes. It is this first phase which is crucial and 
relevant in this thesis as it addresses privacy and data protection law issues. The second phase 
comprised the following issues: intellectual property, domain names, taxation and freedom of 
information. 
 
The primary purpose for EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Law Framework (i.e. the Cyber Law 
Framework) is harmonization of policies and regulation in the sub-region. This purpose has been 
repeatedly emphasized in the travaux préparatoires of the Framework. For instance the East 
African Community Task Force on Cyber Laws: Comparative Review and Draft Legal 
Framework puts categorically:- 
 
‘The purpose of developing a Cyber Law Framework (Framework) for the 
EAC Partner States is to promote regional harmonisation in the legal response 
to the challenges raised by the increasing use and reliance on ICTs for 
commercial and administrative activities, specifically in an Internet or 
cyberspace environment.’1453 
 
The above purpose is similarly entrenched in the Background Paper for the Second Meeting of 
the EAC Task Force on Cyber Laws,1454 Report of the 2nd EAC Regional Task Force Meeting on 
Cyber Laws1455 as well as the two EAC Cyber Laws Frameworks.1456 Yet, despite this purpose, 
the approach embarked by EAC to achieve it has left these countries to stay far apart. The EAC 
Cyber Laws are termed as ‘Frameworks’. However in contrast to international and other regional 
codes and regulations on cyber laws, and particularly in the field of privacy and data protection, 
the EAC Cyber Laws Frameworks do not provide any content principles as minimum standards 
for its members to adhere. The travaux préparatoires of the framework clearly points that ‘the 
                                                          
1452 Ibid. 
1453 Walden, I., ‘East African Community Task Force on Cyber Laws: Comparative Review and Draft Legal 
Framework’, Draft v.1.0, 2/5/08 prepared on behalf of UNCTAD and the EAC, May 2008, p.8. 
1454 EAC, Background Paper for the Second  Meeting of the EAC Task Force on Cyberlaws, Golf Course Hotel, 
Kampala, Uganda, 23rd -25th June 2008, EAC/TF/2/2008, (Annex I), p.2. 
1455 EAC, Report of the 2nd EAC Regional Task Force Meeting on Cyberlaws, Golf Course Hotel, Kampala, 
Uganda, 23rd -25th June 2008, EAC/TF/2/2008, p. 6. 
1456 EAC, EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, (Phase I), p.5; EAC, EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, (Phase 
II), p.3. 
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Framework is not itself a model law, thereby focusing the debate within the Task Force on the 
nature of the provisions being recommended to Partner States and avoiding the need for detailed 
scrutiny of specific draft provisions.’1457 The rationale for adopting this approach is twofold: to 
accommodate the progress of the law reform process already underway within certain Partner 
States and also it is pragmatic response to the work that has already been carried out in various 
forums and intergovernmental organizations, which obviates the need to reinvent the wheel in 
each topic area.1458 In this regard, the EAC Cyber Laws Frameworks have taken an approach of 
only making recommendations to member states. Such recommendations are not intended to be 
binding but for member states to take into account when enacting cyber laws in their countries. 
 
As pointed out, EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Law (Phase I) is the relevant Framework in 
the field of data protection. Its preparation was preceded by three important meetings of the 
Task Force. The first meeting took place in Arusha, Tanzania on 28-30 January 2008.  The 
second took place in Kampala, Uganda on 23-25 June 2008 and the third meeting was held in 
Bujumbura, Burundi on 10-11 September 2008. During these meetings, the EAC member states 
reviewed the status of cyber laws in their respective countries. They also deliberated specific 
areas which needed reforms. Professor Ian Walden, Head of the Institute of Computer and 
Communications Law, Queen Mary, University of London, was hired as consultant. Initially the 
final draft legal cyber law framework was scheduled to be considered and adopted by the 
relevant organs of the EAC by November 2008.1459 Member states were to enact cyber laws by 
2010.1460 However, it was until 7 May 2010 when the EAC Cyber Law Framework (Phase I) was 
adopted by the 2nd Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the Community’s Sectoral Council on Transport, 
Communications and Meteorology.1461 The Council urged member states to make use of the 
EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Law Phase I, particularly when initiating related policies and 
laws.1462 It also directed the Secretariat to develop a monitoring system and report on the 
implementation of the recommendations of EAC Legal Framework for cyber laws.1463 
 
In the field of data privacy law the travaux préparatoires recommended two minimum obligations 
should be imposed with regard to a processing activity. First, is to comply with certain ‘principles 
                                                          
1457
 Walden, p.9, note 1453, supra; EAC, EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, (Phase I), p.6. 
1458 Ibid. 
1459 EAC, p.4, note 1455, supra. 
1460 Ibid. 
1461 EAC, The 2nd Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the EAC Sectoral Council on Transport, Communications and 
Meteorology: Report of the Meeting, EAC/SR/2010, Para 2.2(b). 
1462 Ibid, Para 2.2(c). 
1463 Ibid, Para 2.2(e). 
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of good practice’ in respect of their processing activities, including accountability, transparency, 
fair and lawful processing, processing limitation, data accuracy and data security.1464 Second, is to 
supply the individual with a copy of any personal data being held and processed and provide an 
opportunity for incorrect data to be amended.1465 The preparatory works also cautioned about 
cost for implementing comprehensive data privacy laws in EAC. This caution provides:- 
 
‘The cost of regulation will be a critical factor in data protection. The cost 
associated with a comprehensive or omnibus approach, specifically the 
establishment of a dedicated regulatory authority, will generally be excessive 
for most developing countries, especially if borne by the private sector 
through licensing or notification fees. However, in terms of addressing privacy 
concerns vis-à-vis public sector infringements, an authority independent from 
government will generally be necessary in order to provide the necessary trust 
and assurance in its activities. The regulatory authority may not have an 
exclusive data protection remit, which mitigates the costs involved.’1466 
The above minimum obligations regarding data processing as well as the caution about cost for 
implementing comprehensive data privacy law are repeated in the EAC Cyber Law Framework 
(Phase I) itself.1467 Accordingly, the Cyber Framework incorporates Recommendation 19 which 
states:- 
‘The Task Force recognises the critical importance of data protection and 
privacy and recommends that further work needs to carried (sic) on this issue, 
to ensure that (a) the privacy of citizens is not eroded through internet; (b) 
that legislation providing for access to official information is appropriately 
taken into account; (c) the institutional implications of such reforms and (d) to 
take into account fully international best practice in the area (R.19).’1468 
 
While R 19 recommends to the EAC member states to take into account ‘fully’ international best 
practice in the area it avoids mention of any of such best practices. Moreover, the EAC Cyber 
Law Framework (Phase I) has avoided to attach any annex of international code on data privacy 
                                                          
1464 Walden, p.17, note 1453, supra. 
1465 Ibid. 
1466 Ibid, pp.17-18. 
1467 EAC, EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, (Phase I), pp. 17-18. 
1468 Ibid, p.18; see also, Annex I, R. 19 to the EAC, EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, (Phase I). 
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as it has been the case with other areas addressed in the Framework: electronic transaction, 
electronic signature and authentications, consumer protection and computer crimes. This 
omission may have adverse implication in achieving harmonization of data privacy law in the 
sub-region. The reason is simply that each member may opt to follow one ‘international best 
practice’ different from the other. It is submitted that the Framework has not yet produced any 
tangible impact in the data privacy reforms in East Africa. This point is correctly observed by 
Greenleaf:- 
 
‘Less advanced as yet, the East African Community (EAC), a regional group 
of five East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and 
Burundi) has taken various initiatives that encourage the member states to 
adopt data privacy legislation. Such initiatives include the current discussion of 
A Draft Bill of Rights for the East African Community which unlike the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights incorporates the right to privacy. Also, 
although not binding, the EAC has adopted EAC Framework for Cyberlaws 
Phases I and II in 2008 and 2011 respectively, addressing multiple cyber law 
issues including data protection. Yet as of now only Kenya is considering a 
draft bill on data protection.’1469 
 
Worthwhile to mention, the draft data privacy Bill in Kenya was developed much earlier than the 
adoption of the EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Law (Phase I). The initial draft of the Data 
Protection Bill was published by the Kenyan Ministry of Information and Communication in 
June 2009. There is therefore little evidence to link directly the outcome of this draft to the EAC 
cyber law reform programme. Yet currently Kenya has a new version of the draft data privacy 
Bill, the Data Protection Bill 2012. The latter version partly came about as a result of the 
adoption of the new Kenyan Constitution in 2010 (incorporating the right to privacy for the first 
time) as well as strong criticisms particularly from the ARTICLE 19.1470 The main criticisms of 
ARTICLE 19 to the Kenyan draft Data Protection Bill 2009 are as follows. First, the Bill only 
applies to personal information held by public authorities. The private sector remains 
unregulated. Second, although the Bill uses the term ‘personal information’ it fails to limit the 
application of the law in cases where public servants are conducting business. Third, some 
concepts are included in the definitions but are not further mentioned in the text (e.g. public 
servants, whistleblowing and public records). Fourth, the Bill does not provide for additional 
                                                          
1469 Grenleaf, (Global Data Privacy Law: 89 Countries and Accelerating), pp. 7-8, note 38, supra. 
1470 ARTICLE 19, note 1335, supra. 
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funding of the Information Commission which will take charge of both the data privacy and 
freedom of information law. 
 
The cyber law reform programme has a number of implications. First, the programme purports 
to achieve harmonization of data privacy policies and laws in the sub-region without spelling out 
minimum standards for EAC member countries to adhere. Surely this is a significant departure 
from its counterpart ECOWAS sub-region. The latter has imposed binding minimum standards 
of data protection principles and establishment of a data protection authority on its member 
states. This is also the case with the current proposed African Union Cyber Convention. 
Similarly, the East African Community’s approach to data privacy protection is found nowhere 
in the world.  Second, while cost implications for implementing data privacy law are critical, the 
overemphasis on such cost put by the reform programme in relation to the adoption of 
comprehensive data protection laws may have far reaching ramifications for EAC readiness to 
reform. Third, there is virtually little expertise in the field of data privacy in the sub-region. This 
situation compelled the EAC to engage a consultant from the United Kingdom. Yet such 
consultant could not meet the entire demands for expertise in the sub-region. Linked to expertise 
is the issue of funding the reforms in individual member state. This point is clearly illustrated by 
the representative from Burundi in the Task Force, Mr. Gabriel Bihumugani as reported in the 
proceedings of the Task Force:- 
 
‘Commenting on the draft legal frame work, the delegate informed members 
that the Government of Burundi had not yet drafted any bill on cyber laws. It 
was noted that due to constraints of time, finances and expertise, Burundi was 
not in a position to organize a National Consultative Workshop. Therefore the 
Burundi delegation requested for help in terms of a technical expert 
(consultant) and funding for a National Consultative Workshop on cyber laws 
so as to move faster and in harmony with other sister EAC partner states.’1471 
 
Fourth, the cyber law reform in EAC identified little awareness of cyber laws by calling for 
sensitization workshops for parliamentarians.1472 The rationale for that was/is to accelerate the 
process of enacting cyber laws in the sub-region. Similarly, the reform programme identified 
capacity building to judges, law researchers, legal practitioners and other officers involved in the 
                                                          
1471 ECA, pp.4 and 13, note 1454, supra. 
1472 Ibid, p.13. 
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implementation of the proposed cyber laws as necessary.1473 It is submitted that these factors 
have to some extent contributed to the slow legislative reforms in the sub-region. 
 
4.4.2.3 Southern African Development Community 
 
The Sothern African Development Community (SADC) is a sub-regional grouping of fifteen 
countries: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Originally known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC), the organisation was formed in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 1980, 
following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration. The Declaration and Treaty establishing the 
Southern African Development Community1474 (SADC) which has replaced the Co-ordination 
Conference was signed at the Summit of Heads of State or Government on 17 August 1992, in 
Windhoek, Namibia.1475 
 
Initially the members of SADC came together as Frontline States whose objective was political 
liberation of Southern Africa. However SADC’s objectives have since then been significantly 
expanded to include the following: achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, 
enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially 
disadvantaged through regional integration; evolve common political values, systems and 
institutions;  promote and defend peace and security; promote self-sustaining development on 
the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of Member States; achieve 
complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; promote and 
maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the Region; achieve sustainable 
utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; strengthen and 
consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people 
of the Region.1476 In order to achieve these objectives, one of the strategies adopted by SADC is 
to harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of Member States.1477 
 
                                                          
1473 Ibid. 
1474 Declaration and Treaty of SADC as revised in 1992, http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/119 last visited 
16/03/2012.  
1475 SADC, Website, http://www.sadc.int/english/about-sadc/ last visited 16/03/2012. 
1476 Declaration and Treaty of SADC, Art 5(1). 
1477 Ibid, Art 5(2)(a). 
305 
 
As far as privacy and data protection is concerned only three SADC’s member states namely 
Seychelles, Mauritius and Angola have adopted comprehensive data privacy legislation in 2003, 
2004 and 2011 respectively. South Africa is still debating the Bill on data privacy law. The rest of 
the SADC’s countries have yet adopted such laws. However, as a sub-region, SADC is currently 
considering to adopt a model law on data protection in the sub-region.1478 It is imperative to 
highlight the SADC Data Protection Model-Law1479 (i.e. the Model-Law) in order to compare 
and contrast it with other African regional and sub-regional frameworks. Also important, is to 
point out to what extent is it influenced by the European Directive 95/46/EC.  
 
The Model-Law considered here is the draft version of 6 February 2012. This draft Model-Law 
incorporates the basic principles of data processing as well as establishment of data protection 
authorities in member states. As a result, it can be submitted that it is similar to the European 
Directive 95/46/EC. Moreover the Model-Law is similar to the AU Cyber Convention 2011 and 
the ECOWAS Supplementary Act 2010. Yet, there are significant differences in scope and ambit 
for some of the principles covered in these sets of laws. This part considers in a considerable 
degree these differences more than their similarities. 
 
Structurally, the Model-Law has a preamble and fourteen chapters. In contrast to the Directive 
95/46/EC, AU Cyber Convention and ECOWAS Supplementary Act, the preamble of the 
SADC Model-Law does not contain recitals. It rather provides broad elaboration on the nature, 
purpose and function of data privacy policies and laws. The problem which arises here is that 
while normally a preamble somewhat serves as an interpretative aid of the substantive principles 
to a text this may not be the case in the SADC Model-Law.  
 
Chapter 1 of the Model-Law contains various definitions used in the text of the law. Most of the 
concepts are similar to the other instruments. However, the Model-Law introduces new 
definitions such as genetic data, transborder flow and whistleblowing. Genetic data is defined in 
the Model-Law as any information stemming from a DNA analysis.1480 The Directive 95/46/EC 
does not contain this definition. However this omission is cured in the proposed General Data 
                                                          
1478 The last workshop in which the SADC Legal Cyber Security Framework( of which data protection is a 
component) was under discussion was held on 27 February-2 March 2012 in Gaborone, Botswana, 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/events/2012/Agenda.pdf last visited 16/03/2012. 
1479 SADC Data Protection Model-Law 2012,  
 http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/Activities/SA/sa-4.html last visited 16/03/2012. 
1480 SADC Model-Law 2012, Art 1(8). 
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Protection Regulation 2012.1481 Yet, there is significant departure in the formulation. The 
Regulation defines genetic data as all data, of whatever type, concerning the characteristics of an 
individual which are inherited or acquired during early prenatal development. The AU Cyber 
Convention and ECOWAS Supplementary Act do not either contain definition of genetic data. 
The Directive, Cyber Convention and Supplementary Act omit a definition of the concept 
transborder flow. This concept is clearly explained in the contents of the texts. The only 
innovation brought about in the SADC Model-Law is the clarification for treating flow of 
personal information between federated states or between federated state and federated entities 
within the same federal state. In both cases, flow of personal information is not considered as 
transborder flow.1482 The definition of whistleblowing is absent in the other three instruments. 
This is perhaps because whistleblowing are ordinarily governed by specific pieces of legislation 
other than data privacy legislation. Other definitions in the Model-Law such as data controller’s 
representative are specifically referred in the text of the Directive, Cyber Convention and 
Supplementary Act. 
In contrast to the European Directive, Cyber Convention and Supplementary Act, the Model-
Law does not define its objective. Yet the protection of an individual’s right to privacy as well as 
harmonisation of data privacy policies and laws appears to be generally implied in the preamble 
of the Model-Law. 
The Model-Law sets out the scope of its application in chapter 2. Like the Directive, Cyber 
Convention and Supplementing Act, the Model-Law applies to both automatic and non-
automatic processing of personal data.1483 It also applies to both private and public data 
controllers.1484 However, there is no clear provision which leaves possibilities for protection 
against legal persons as it is the case with the Directive or Cyber Convention and Supplementary 
Act.  The latter two instruments leave margins for the national laws to offer protection to legal 
persons. The scope of the application of the Model-Law also relates to the territory. In contrast 
to the Cyber Convention and Supplementary Act which apply to the processing of personal data 
within the members of African Union and ECOWAS respectively, the Model-Law has a broader 
scope similar to Art 4 of the Directive 95/46/EC. Article 3(1) of the Model-Law provides:- 
‘This Model-Law is applicable:- 
                                                          
1481 EU General Data Protection Regulation 2012, Art 4(10). 
1482 SADC Model-Law 2012, Art 1(17). 
1483 Ibid, Art 2(1). 
1484 Ibid, Art 1(3). 
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(a) to processing of personal data carried out in the context of the effective 
and actual activities of any controller permanently established on[given 
country] territory or in a place where [given country] law applies by virtue 
of international public law; 
 
(b) to the processing of personal data by a controller who is not permanently 
established on[given country] territory, if the means used, which can be 
automatic or other means located on [given country] territory, are not the 
same as the means used for processing personal data only for purposes of 
transit of personal data through[given country] territory.’ 
 
The Model-Law provides further that in the circumstances referred to in the previous paragraph, 
the controller shall designate a representative established on [given country] territory, without 
prejudice to the legal proceedings that may be brought against the controller himself.1485 Since 
Art 3 of the Model-Law is similar to Art 4 of Directive 95/46/EC, the analyses made on the 
latter in 3.3.1.6 (e) with regard to applicable law are relevant in the understanding of the ambit of 
the former. However it is worthwhile to note that the European Union proposed Regulation has 
significantly modified Art 4 of the Directive.1486  
 
By way of derogation, the Model-Law does not apply to the processing of personal data by a 
natural person in the course of purely personal or household activities.1487 This is similar to the 
application of the Directive, Cyber Convention and Supplementary Act. Additional limitations 
on the scope of Model-Law are provided in chapter 11 which incorporates only Art 46. Under 
this provision, SADC’s member states are permitted to limit certain obligations put in the 
Model-Law. Such limitations may apply where it is necessary to preserve state security, defense, 
public safety, prevention, investigation, prosecution or execution of criminal sentences. Also the 
                                                          
1485 Ibid, Art 3(2). 
1486 See Art 3 of the General Data Protection Regulation 2012, which states: - ‘1.This Regulation applies to the 
processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the 
Union. 2. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects residing in the Union by a 
controller not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or 
services to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour. 3. This Regulation applies to 
the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where the national law of 
a Member State applies by virtue of public international law.’ 
1487 SADC Model-Law 2012, Art 2(2). 
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limitations apply in matters of literary and artistic expression as well as professional journalism, 
according to the ethical rules of this profession. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the Model-Law contain the basic principles and condition for processing 
personal data. These principles are generally similar to those provided in the Directive, Cyber 
Convention and Supplementary Act. They include the following principles:-fair and lawful 
processing; purpose specification; legitimacy; sensitivity; data quality; security; and accountability. 
Apart from containing some basic principles of data processing, chapter 5 of the Model-Law 
contains the obligations imposed on data controllers. Most of these obligations are formulated 
closely to the provisions of the Directive rather than the Cyber Convention and Supplementary 
Act. These obligations include provision of information prior to processing; confidentiality; 
security; notification of the processing to the data protection authority; and accountability. It is 
important to point out that some of these obligations are broader in the Model-Law than in the 
Cyber Convention and Supplementary Act. For example, the Model-Law imposes an obligation 
on the data controller to provide certain information to the data subject prior to processing. At 
the same time it imposes similar obligation on data controllers when personal data is not directly 
collected from the data subject.1488 The Cyber Convention and ECOWAS Supplementary Act 
omit a provision imposing duty in the latter case. 
Chapter 6 of the Model-Law provides for the rights of the data subject. These are similar to the 
rights provided in the Directive, Cyber Convention and Supplementary Act. They include right 
of access; right of rectification, deletion, temporary limitation of access; right of opposition; and 
representation of the data subject who is under age. 
Like the Directive, Cyber Convention and Supplementary Act, the SADC Model-Law contains 
rules for transboder flows.1489 Yet in contrast to the other instruments, the Model-Law contains 
rules which prohibit transfer of personal data not only to a non-SADC member but also to a 
SADC member state which has not adopted the Model-Law.1490 Arguably the restriction in the 
latter case defeats the harmonisation object. Yet, this requirement may motivate SADC member 
states to adopt data privacy legislation in line with the Model-Law. 
Chapter 7 of the Model-Law provides for the establishment of protection authority in member 
states. It further provides for the composition, functions and powers, sanctions and remedies for 
                                                          
1488 Ibid, Arts 14 and 15 respectively. 
1489 Ibid, Chapter 12. 
1490 Ibid, Arts 47 and 48. 
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breaches of the provisions of the Model-Law. Generally, the rules governing the DPA in the 
Model-Law are similar to those in the Directive, Cyber Convention and Supplementary Act. 
However in contrast to the Cyber Convention and Supplementary Act, the Model-Law leaves to 
the member states to legislate on the incompatibility to the composition of the DPAs.1491 Yet the 
Model-Law clearly puts that members of DPAs are permanent.1492 Because of this, members of 
DPAs may be drawn from the executive branch of the government.1493 Also important to note is 
that DPAs are required to be composed by substitute members who replace permanent 
members when they are absent or when mandate becomes vacant.1494 
4.4.2.4 Other Sub-Regional Frameworks 
 
Besides ECOWAS, EAC and SADC the other sub-regional organizations in Africa notably 
COMESA, ECCAS and UMA have virtually undeveloped initiatives towards adoption of data 
privacy legislation. However some states in these sub-regional groupings have already adopted 
data privacy legislation. This is the case with Tunisia and Morocco which are members of the 
Arab Maghreb Union (with its French acronym UMA).  
 
4.4.3 National Frameworks 
 
As pointed out in 1.2.1, there are three main patterns of protection of data privacy at national 
level in Africa. The highest order of such protection is the national constitution of a respective 
country. Within this category various sub-patterns may be identified. There are countries whose 
constitutions contain express provisions for protection of privacy. This is the dominant pattern. 
Yet, there are various formulations of the right to privacy with different scope and ambit. For 
example, Art 37 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 states, ‘the privacy of 
citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications 
is hereby guaranteed and protected’. This provision only affords privacy protection to citizens. A 
resident or non-citizen cannot claim protection for privacy under the Nigerian Constitution. 
Accordingly, the Nigerian Constitution provides a narrow scope of privacy protection. Kenya 
provides somewhat broader scope of protection. Art 31 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 
provides, ‘every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have (a) their 
person, home or property searched; (b) their possessions seized; (c) information relating to their 
                                                          
1491 Ibid, Art 33(3). 
1492 Ibid, Art 33(1). 
1493 Ibid. 
1494 Ibid, Art 33(1). 
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family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their 
communications infringed.’ This provision starts by the expression ‘every person’ as against ‘the 
privacy of citizens’ in the Nigerian Constitution. In the former a citizen and a non-citizen may be 
afforded privacy protection under the Kenyan Constitution. Also, it can be noted from the 
contents of these two privacy provisions that there are significant departures. Yet, judicial 
interpretation may make these provisions at equal level despite their variations in wordings and 
expressions. Currently this case law is scant (e.g. South Africa) or lacking in some jurisdictions. 
There are other countries whose constitutions are silent on privacy protection. Included in this 
category is Zimbabwe. However, Zimbabwe’s proposed new constitution has an express 
provision on privacy protection. Worthwhile to point out, some constitutions maintain two sets 
of provisions for protection of privacy. The first set relates to similar protection as entrenched in 
the international and regional instruments protecting human rights: the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR, 
ACRWC, etc or sometimes with limited provisions to communications only. The second set is 
habeas data. Cape Verde is illustrative. Article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cape 
Verde 2010 provides that the privacy of correspondence and telecommunications are to be 
guaranteed to all citizens. The same Constitution provides in Art 46(1) for the right of habeas 
data. Moreover, the Constitution of Cape Verde provides another unique constitutional pattern 
with respect to privacy protection which is absent in many African states’ constitutions. Article 
45(1) of the Cape Verdean Constitution provides that all Cape Verdean citizens have the right to 
access data which concern them, to demand that such data be corrected and updated, as well as 
the right to be informed of the purposes to which these data are being put.1495 Art 45(2) forbids 
the use of computerized means to store and process individually identifiable data relating to the 
political, philosophical, or ideological convictions, religious faith, party, or union affiliation and 
private life of citizens.1496 Art 45 includes restrictions to the right of public authorities and other 
institutions to transfer citizens’ personal data to other authorities and institutions to those cases 
provided for by law or judicial order; prohibition from the Cape Verdean government from 
attributing a uniform identification number to its citizens; and a statement indicating that the 
legislator is to implement a legal regime in order to regulate the cross-border transfer of data.1497  
 
 As a basis for protecting privacy, a constitutional right to privacy has three limitations. First, the 
scope of the constitutional right to privacy depends on courts’ interpretation on a case to case 
                                                          
1495 English translation of Art 45 of the Cape Verdean Constitution 2010(original in Portuguese language) adopted 
from Traca, and Embry, p.2, note 38, supra. 
1496 Ibid. 
1497 Ibid. 
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basis. This makes the law uncertain until actual case has been filed in court. Secondly, in most 
cases constitutions only protect against infringements of privacy committed by the state and its 
agencies. The private sector is excluded. Since the private sector is fast growing and expanding in 
Africa constitutional protection does not prevent misuse of personal information by businesses 
and private sector entities. Thirdly, infringements of constitutional right to privacy attract 
different remedies from those obtained under data protection legislation. For example, monetary 
compensation has never been a remedy under breaches of constitutional provisions. 
 
Apart from the constitutional protection, there are also statutory protections. These are either by 
comprehensive data privacy laws, sectoral laws or ad hoc provisions in different statutes. The 
main manifestations of sectoral law protecting privacy are those in the communications sector, 
health and employment. However in most cases these sectoral laws fail to address specific 
principles in that relevant sector. This is the case, for example, of the employment sector and the 
requirements of mandatory or concealed pre-employment HIV/Aids test by employers. In case 
of ad hoc provisions, the laws contain only few sections which may have privacy implication.  
 
There is finally protection of privacy through common law. Yet, this form of protection is clearly 
available in few African countries (e.g. South Africa). Currently South Africa is the only African 
jurisdiction which has relatively large corpus of case law on common law privacy.   
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The preceding analyses safely lead to inescapable conclusions that privacy is an evolving concept 
in Africa. Yet there is currently no specific way or theory which explains privacy in the context 
of African culture. This is partly because the notion of privacy is a Western individualist concept. 
It was only imported to Africa through external contacts with Europe. As a result individuals’ 
attitudes to privacy are slowly being shaped and reshaped by Western influence. While there are 
at present no surveys which have attempted to precisely test the attitudes to privacy, the recent 
awareness survey of data protection legislation in Africa suggests that Africans’ attitudes to 
privacy are largely limited by lack of awareness of what is privacy and implications which follow 
in case of privacy infringement. However the positive and negative determinants of privacy 
concerns continue to accelerate the understanding of the privacy concept and its infringement. 
While these concerns have not so far influenced to a considerable extent the recent adoption of 
data privacy legislation in some African jurisdictions, they are likely to support the application of 
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such laws. The fact that the existence of data privacy policies and legislation in Africa are directly 
influenced by Arts 25 and 26 of the European Directive 95/46/EC on account of restrictions 
the latter impose on transfer of personal data to third countries and the economic justification 
theory, may not render these laws wholly ineffective and irrelevant. Analogously argued, the 
current constitutions in African countries which have generated corpus of case law on protection 
of individuals’ rights other than privacy were adopted with significant influence from outside. 
Nonetheless, individuals are basing their claims to protect their individual rights. However, it has 
to be seen to what extent the newly adopted data privacy policies and legislation are going to be 
effective. There is yet a problem of harmonization. Different data privacy policies and 
regulations are being adopted in Africa. These cut across regional, sub-regional and national 
levels. So far the full impact of these instruments is difficult to assess as they are still evolving or 
put in limited practices. Yet, the disparities in these instruments have/will have far reaching 
consequences on harmonization.  
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5. Data Protection in Mauritius 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Mauritius is the first case study of the present research. In contrast to the other two cases (i.e. 
South Africa and Tanzania); she has comprehensive data privacy protection legislation. This 
chapter analyses the Mauritian data protection system. The analyses commence with the context 
in which the Mauritian data protection sytem developed. By context it means the socio-economic 
and political environment. Subsequently, the analysis of the policies and regulations governing 
data protection is offered. Particular focus is placed upon the Mauritian data privacy legislation. 
Sectoral legislation as well as legislation incorporating ad hoc provisions relevant to data 
protection are left unexamined in detail.  This exclusion owes largely to the fact that, such 
legislation does not contain the basic principles of data processing. Likewise, the analysis of the 
data protection legislation is relevant to the sectoral legislation and statutes with ad hoc provisions 
on data protection. Moreover the latter pieces of legislation provide no central authority to 
implement legislation similar to the one provided under the data protection legislation. Finally, 
this chapter canvasses practices of the data protection authority. Matters included in the list of 
practices are general supervisory role, development of codes of conduct, various decisions of the 
authority, etc.  
 
5.2 Socio-Economic and Political Context 
 
The Republic of Mauritius consists of an island of Mauritius and other three smaller islands of 
Rodrigues, Cargados Carajos and Agalega. Mauritius lies east of Madagascar (an island to the 
south-eastern Africa), in the Indian Ocean. It occupies a total area of 2,040 square kilometres. 
The capital of Mauritius is Port Louis. Mauritian total population as recorded by the 2011 
Housing and Population Census is 1,257,900.1498 Out of this population 42 per cent lives in the 
urban areas with the largest population of 149,000 in Port Louis while the rest still lives in the 
rural areas.1499  
 
                                                          
1498 Mauritius, Housing and Population Census 2011, http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/cso/ei915/esi2011.pdf last 
visited 17/03/2012. 
1499 CIA., ‘Mauritius People 2012’ World FactBook and Other Sources 2012, 
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/mauritius/mauritius_people.html last visited 17/03/2012. 
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Noteworthy, the above population consists of descendants of original immigrants from India, 
Europe, Madagascar, Africa and China. These immigrants have resulted into the following ethnic 
groups in Mauritius: Indo-Mauritian (68%), Creole (27%), Sino-Mauritian (3%) and Franco-
Mauritian (2%).1500 Concomitantly, loyalties usually lie with specific ethnolinguistic groups rather 
than the nation as a whole.1501 Yet, there is unity. However, these diversities are also reflected in 
the languages used in Mauritius. Such languages are English, French, Creole, Bhojpuri and other 
smaller groups of languages. Although there is no clear policy as which language is the national 
language, English is the official language. Its domain includes medium of instruction in schools, 
official language of politics, judiciary, parliament and administration.1502 Yet, it is only spoken by 
less than 1% of the population in Mauritius.1503 Interestingly, Creole is dominantly spoken in 
Mauritius by 80.5% of the population. Next to Creole is Bhojpuri (12.1%), French (3.4%), others 
(3.7%) and unspecified (0.3%).1504 
 
There are four main religions in Mauritius. The dominant religion is Hindu (48%).1505 Hinduism 
has its origin from India. Christianity is the next largest religion in Mauritius. It comprises of 
Roman Catholic (23.6%) and other Christian denominations (8.6%).1506 Muslims constitute 
16.6% while other religions 2.5%.1507 There is yet unspecified religions which constitute 0.3%. 
The last group is of people with no religion (0.4%).1508 None of these religions is a state religion 
making Mauritius a secular state. 
 
Politically, Mauritius is a multi-party system and constitutional parliamentary democracy with the 
president as head of state and prime minister as head of government. The Constitution is the 
supreme law in Mauritius and if any other law is inconsistent with it, that other law, to the extent 
                                                          
1500 Ibid. 
1501 Carrim, A.J., ‘Use and Standardisation of Mauritian Creole in Electronically Mediated Communication’, Journal 
of Computer-Mediated Communication, 2009, Vol.14, No.3, pp.484-508, at p.484. 
1502 CIA, note 1499, supra; see also Mahadeo, S.K., ‘History of English and French in Mauritius: A Study in 
Language and Power’, International Journal of Language, Society and Culture, 2004, Issue No.14, 
http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/journal/articles/Mahadeo/Mahadeo4.html, 
last visited 17/03/2012; Mahadeo, S.K., ‘English Language Teaching in Mauritius: A Need for clarity of vision 
regarding English Language Policy’, International Journal of Language, Society and Culture, 2006, Issue No.18,  
http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/journal/articles/2006/18-2.htm last visited 17/03/2012. 
1503 CIA, note 1499, supra; see also Carrim, note 1501, supra; Carrim, A.R., ‘Language Use and Attitudes in 
Mauritius on the Basis of the 2000 Population Census’, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 
2005, Vol. 26, No.4, pp.317-332, at pp.319-329. 
1504 Ibid. 
1505 CIA, note 1499, supra. 
1506 Ibid. 
1507 Ibid. 
1508 Ibid. 
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of inconsistency, becomes void.1509 According to reports by the Democracy Index (2007, 2008, 
2010 and 2011) Mauritius is the only African country which is characterised as fully democracy 
equating it with most developed countries in Europe.1510 
 
Mauritius attained her political independence from the British on 12 March 1968. However she 
continued to be under her Majesty the Queen of England as head of State until 12 March 1992 
when she became a Republic. Prior to independence Mauritius had witnessed the influence of 
the Arabs, Dutch, Chinese and French. However the French had the most influence and legacy 
in the Island. Although the French activities in Mauritius commenced in 1715, it was until the 
1767 when the French governance started. The French domination in Mauritius ended in 1810 
following their defeat by the British in the Napoleonic War. Subsequently, the British took 
control of Mauritius until 1968.  
 
The British influence in Mauritius accounts for the Mauritian legislative system. The latter is 
modelled after the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy which was common in most 
British colonies during independence. The legislature consists of the President and a National 
Assembly.1511 The latter which is commonly referred to as Parliament consists of 70 elected 
members.1512 The political party or party alliance which wins the majority of seats in Parliament 
forms the government and its leader usually becomes the Prime Minister.1513 The judicial system 
is similarly influenced by the British characterised by the adversarial system of litigation and 
precedent. The Constitution establishes the Supreme Court of Mauritius at the apex of the 
judicial hierarchy and vests it with unlimited jurisdiction in both criminal and civil matters.1514 
However under Art 81 of the Constitution of Mauritius all appeals from the Supreme Court lie 
                                                          
1509 The Constitution of Mauritius 1968, Art 2. 
1510 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2007, 
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf last visited 17/03/2012; 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008, 
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf last visited 17/03/2012; 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2010,  
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf last visited 17/03/2012; 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2011, 
http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_Final_Dec_2011.pdf&mode=wp, 
last visited 17/03/2012. It is imperative to note that the Economist Intelligence Unit uses five criteria for its 
assessment: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and 
political culture. Moreover, countries are placed into four types of regimes: full democracy; flawed democracy; 
hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes. Although democracy as a concept is still problematic to define, these 
reports provide some highlights useful to situate a given country. 
1511 The Constitution of Mauritius 1968, Art 31(1). 
1512 Ibid, Art 31(2). 
1513 Mauritius, National Assembly Website, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/menuitem.37a73b08329da0451251701065c521ca/ 
last visited 18/03/2012. 
1514 The Constitution of Mauritius 1968, Art 76. 
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to the Privy Council in the Great Britain. Below the Supreme Court there are subordinate courts: 
the District Courts, Intermediate and Industrial Courts. These are vested with limited 
jurisdictions in criminal and civil matters. Yet the influence of the French law is also present in 
the Mauritian legal system. This makes Mauritius to have a hybrid legal system with the influence 
of the British and French laws. In general terms, Mauritian private law is based on the French 
Code Civil while public and commercial law are based on the English law.1515 
 
The Mauritian economy has undergone remarkable transformations since independence to the 
extent that it is now characterised by the World Bank as an upper-middle economy.1516 After 
independence, Mauritius continued to rely upon sugar export as a primary source of its economy. 
Sugar plantations were introduced by the French in the Island during their domination. Yet in 
early 1970s Mauritius directed its efforts to diversify its economy which efforts proved failure by 
late 1970s.1517 This failure was attributed by rising of petroleum prices, ending of the sugar boom, 
and the steadily rising of the balance of payments as imports outpaced exports.1518 To address the 
economic crisis Mauritius approached the IMF and World Bank for assistance,1519 a situation 
which was common to many other African countries in1970s-1980s. In exchange for loans and 
credits the Mauritian government agreed to institute certain measures, including cutting down 
food subsidies, devaluing the currency, and limiting government wage increases.1520 Built partly 
on these measures conditioned by SAPs and other subsequent initiatives, Mauritius managed to 
diversify its economies. Today, agriculture, textile manufacturing, tourism and financial services 
account for Mauritius economic sectors. Moreover, since 2000s Mauritius started to invest 
significantly in ICT as the fifth pillar of the country’s economy.1521 Yet, the ICT sector is also 
intended to drive other sectors of the Mauritian economy. In order to ensure that this sector 
                                                          
1515 Brown, L. N., ‘Mauritius: Mixed Laws in a Mini-Jurisdiction’, in Örücü, E (eds), et al., Studies in Legal Systems: 
Mixed and Mixing, Kluwer International, London, 1996, pp.210-214, at 218 cited in Bridge, J.W., ‘Judicial review in 
Mauritius and the Continuing Influence of English Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1997, 
Vol.46, No.4, pp.787-811, at p. 787. 
1516 Metz, H.C(ed)., Mauritius: A Country Study, GPO for the Library of Congress, Washington, 1994, 
http://countrystudies.us/mauritius/ last visited 18/03/2012; see also World Bank List of Economies( July 2010), 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/mos/em-markets/World%20Bank.pdf, 
Last visited 18/03/2012; see also, World Bank List of Economies(18 July 2011), 
http://shop.ifrs.org/files/CLASS.pdf last visited 18/03/2012. 
1517 Metz, note 1516, supra. 
1518 Ibid. 
1519 Ibid. 
1520 Ibid. 
1521 See e.g., Mauritius Research Council., Information & Communications Technology Report, 2001, 
http://www.mrc.org.mu/Documents/Thematic/ICTReport.pdf last visited 18/03/2012; National ICT Strategic 
Plan (NICTSP) 2007-2011, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cpsi/unpan030903.pdf, 
last visited 18/03/2012; 
National ICT Strategic Plan (NICTSP) 2011-2014, http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/telecomit/file/ICTplan.pdf last 
visited 18/03/2012. 
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grows rapidly and produce desired results, Mauritian legislature passed the Information and 
Communication Technologies Act 2001.1522 Similarly, in 2007 Mauritius adopted its first National 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy 2007.1523 ICT use and access in 
Mauritius is becoming common in households.1524 In 2011, the proportion of households having 
mobile phones was 88.2% up from 28.1% in 2001; computers was 37.6% up from 13.3% in 
2001; and internet was 31.7% up from 12.6% in 2002.1525 
 
Internationally, Mauritius is a member of various intergovernmental organisations: the United 
Nations (UN), African Union (AU), SADC and COMESA. This implies that Mauritius is under 
certain international obligations. These include, for example, obligation to implement resolutions 
and agreements flowing from those organisations she is a member.  
 
5.3 Social Attitudes to Privacy 
 
There have been no major and general academic, government or industry studies or surveys on 
privacy in Mauritius. As a result it is difficult to provide a general level of privacy attitude by 
Mauritians. Nonetheless, there exist specific studies which are privacy relevant. While these do 
not provide a general survey, they offer a snapshot of privacy concerns in Mauritius. The first of 
these studies was conducted in the context of the adoption of Internet banking in Mauritius. It 
found that although banks have security arrangements such as network and data access controls, 
user authentication, transaction verification, virus protection, privacy policies and detection of 
possible intrusions which include penetration testing, intrusion detection, etc raised customers’ 
concerns on possible risks from Internet banking.1526 The debates over the legislative process of 
the Mauritian DNA Identification Act 2009 present yet another context of concern for privacy 
in Mauritius.1527 These debates rested on both privacy and ethical issues. First, the adoption of 
the Act resulted in heated debates between the government and the opposition party over 
retention of DNA samples once the case is over.  Second, the debates raged over who should 
carry out analyses of DNA samples. Was this to be done by private, independent or by 
government laboratories? The government argued that DNA samples should be collected and 
                                                          
1522 Act No.44 of 2001. 
1523 Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications National ICT Policy 2007-2011, http://www.ist-
africa.org/home/files/Mauritius_ICTPolicy_2007-11.pdf last visited 18/03/2012. 
1524 Mauritius, note 1498, supra. 
1525 Ibid. 
1526 Khan, N.M and Emmambokus, N., ‘Customer Adoption of Internet Banking in Mauritius’, International Journal 
of Business Research and Management(IJBRM), 2011, Vol.2, No.2, pp.53-58, at p.56. 
1527 See e.g. Maurer, S., ‘Genetic Identity in Mauritius’ Antrocom, 2010, Vol.6, No.1, pp.53-62, at p.55. 
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kept for the future crime cases as it is the case in Denmark or in Great Britain. On the other 
hand, the opposition argued that the collecting and keeping of DNA samples might transform 
the society from an innocent one into a society of convicts. 
 
Another study which has privacy relevance in Mauritius was carried out in the context of e-
governance. The project title is, ‘Are Mauritians ready for e-Government Services?’1528 This study 
found that Mauritians have low trust in terms of privacy, data protection, information security or 
cybercrime.1529 According to the project researcher, the low rate of trust Mauritians have in ICT 
should consequently inspire policymakers to show their firm commitment to investigating e-
justice and cyber-crime issues.1530  
 
Somewhat related to the above is the fear particularly by politicians of interception of private 
communication (i.e. telephone tapping). This fear can well be demonstrated by the Mauritius 
parliamentary debates of 13 April 2004.1531 During these debates, Dr. J.B David (member of 
Mauritius Parliament) asked the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Home Affairs 
whether he would state if telephone tapping was restored to in Mauritius. If that was the case, 
would he give the number of persons whose telephones had been tapped? Furthermore, he 
asked if such persons included politicians who were parliamentarians or non-parliamentarians, 
journalists and representatives of religion. In reply, the Prime Minister said telephone tapping 
was/is prohibited in Mauritius by virtue of section 46(o) of the Information and Communication 
Technologies Act 2001 unless authorised. The Prime Minister’s reply attracted two more 
supplementary questions from Dr. David: had there been any request from any Ministry, or most 
likely from the Police and the Prime Minister’s Office, for telephone tapping? To this question 
the Prime Minister replied, ‘I have replied that when the Police wants to resort to telephone 
tapping in connection with criminal proceedings, whether pending or contemplated in Mauritius, 
they go to a judge sitting in Chambers.’1532 The other question from Dr. David was: would the 
Prime Minister find out from the Commissioner of Police whether maybe without his knowledge 
                                                          
1528 Shalini, R.T., ‘Are Mauritians ready for e-Government Services?,’ Government Information Quarterly, 2009, 
Vol.26, No.3, pp.536-539. 
1529 Ibid, p.537. 
1530 Ibid. 
1531 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 5 of 2004, ‘B/165 Telephone Tapping’, Parliamentary Questions-Oral 
Answers, Tuesday 13th April, 2004, Mauritius National Assembly Website, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/template.MAXIMIZE/menuitem.6ee93699ee0e4d9c6179c38ea0208
a0c/?javax.portlet.tpst=b00fa9180f29b8e9f534909e65c521ca_ws_MX&javax.portlet.prp_b00fa9180f29b8e9f534909
e65c521ca_viewID=orans13apr04&javax.portlet.begCacheTok=token&javax.portlet.endCacheTok=token, 
last visited 22/03/2012. 
1532 Ibid. 
319 
 
telephone tapping was being resorted by the Police? The Prime Minister replied, ‘I am giving the 
guarantee that this is not the case.’1533 
 
A similar source of fears arises in the use of anonymity within the current sale of pre-paid SIM 
cards in Mauritius. These fears transpired in the course of parliamentary debates of 27 April 
2004.1534 During these debates Mr. M. Chumroo asked the Minister of Information Technology 
and Telecommunications whether there existed any control on the use of SMS. If that was the 
case, would he state the measures he had taken or proposed to take to ensure that there was no 
abusive use of such SMS? In his reply, the Minister noted that on average, not less than 40 
million SMS messages were exchanged each month in Mauritius. He also noted that some 
individuals sent messages of an abusive language, indecent, obscene, menacing or otherwise 
objectionable nature. The Minister confirmed existence of reports about threat with rape and 
bodily violence and other forms of harassment arising from use of SMS. However he traced the 
root cause of all such abusive uses of mobile phones to reside in anonymity that people enjoyed 
from the system of sale of prepaid SIM cards. He noted that prepaid SIM cards were sold over 
the counter without any procedure for ascertaining the identity of the buyer. To eradicate the 
problem, the Minister suggested introducing mandatory registration of SIM cards in future. 
 
A less obvious but relevant study was conducted in the context of use of public Internet kiosks 
in Mauritius.1535 The study sought to investigate the determinants affecting individuals’ intention 
and behaviour to use public Internet kiosks.  One of the findings of this study is that subjective 
norm significantly affects individuals’ intention to use ICT. This subjective normativity is 
attributable to the fact that Mauritius culture is largely collective. Partly this explains why the 
recently introduced E-Register System has not raised privacy concerns. The E-Register System is 
a system whereby alerts via automatically generated SMS are sent to responsible parties’ mobile 
phones if their ward is absent or late at school.1536 The system has been introduced in order to 
                                                          
1533 Ibid. 
1534 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 7 of 2004, ‘B/229 Phones(Mobile)-SMS’, Parliamentary Questions-
Oral Answers, Tuesday 27th April, 2004, Mauritius National Assembly Website, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/template.MAXIMIZE/menuitem.6ee93699ee0e4d9c6179c38ea0208
a0c/?javax.portlet.tpst=b00fa9180f29b8e9f534909e65c521ca_ws_MX&javax.portlet.prp_b00fa9180f29b8e9f534909
e65c521ca_viewID=orans27apr04&javax.portlet.begCacheTok=token&javax.portlet.endCacheTok=token, 
last visited 22/03/2012. 
1535 Pee, L.G et al., ‘Bridging the Digital Divide: Use of Public Internet Kiosks in Mauritius’, Journal of Global 
Information Management (JGIM), 2010, Vol.18, No.1, pp.15-38. 
1536 Speech of Honourable Tassarajen Pillay Chedumbrum, Minister of Information and Communication 
Technology, on Launching of E-Register at SSS Forest-Side, Boys Dept on 9th February 2011, 
 http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/telcomit?content_id=8975860892a0e210VgnVCM1000000a04a8c0RCRD 
last visited 20/03/2012. 
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curb unjustified absenteeism of students in Mauritian public and private secondary schools 
which is becoming a major problem. According to the Mauritian Minister of Information and 
Communication Technology, the E-Register System provides also a database of all schools’, 
students’ and parents’ details.1537 Most of these details include personal information. Despite 
massive collection of personal information in computerised databases there have been no public 
concerns over privacy as a result of the introduction of the E-Register System. Yet cultural 
factors, particularly strong family ties have been sometimes regarded as having no or little 
influence in determining Mauritians’ privacy concerns. At least in Mauritius such claims have 
been considered as ‘out-dated concerns’ as risks posed by modern technologies are no longer 
confined to a particular society.1538 Nevertheless, there are still problems in absorbing the culture 
of data protection. This point is well explained by the Data Protection Commissioner for 
Mauritius:- 
 
‘However, the task is indeed an immense one to inculcate the culture of data 
protection into each citizen of this country. Let us not forget that even for 
those countries which have adopted data protection for 30 years, data 
protection was initially viewed as insignificant compared to other pressing 
agendas of the government the more so as it is quite a complex field and it is 
still a challenge for these countries to instil data protection principles in the 
routine of each citizen. Time has shown that such a concept is indeed the 
future guarantee for the individual today and tomorrow.’1539 
 
The conclusion which can be drawn from the above analyses is that ICTs have played significant 
role to catalyse privacy concerns in Mauritius. However the pattern of its influence has yet been 
thoroughly examined. As it can be noted, sometimes there are clear privacy concerns as a result 
of individuals’ interactions with ICTs in different contexts. At the same time such concerns in 
certain cases are lacking as it is the case with the E-Register System. Also significant to note, 
privacy is a relatively recent term in common use in Mauritius. It was firstly introduced vide the 
Bill of Rights in the Mauritian Independence Constitution in 1968.1540 Moreover the attitudes of 
                                                          
1537 Ibid. 
1538 Researcher’s interview with Mrs. Drudeisha Madhub, Mauritian Data Protection Commissioner, on 4/07/ 2011 
in Port Louis, Mauritius. 
1539 Madhub, D., ‘Data Protection from an Employment Perspective’, Paper Presentation to Groupe Mon Loisir 
Ltd, 5th  July 2011, Mauritius Data Protection Office’s Website, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/dataprotection/menuitem.079dc52bbf696f8858c64510a0208a0c/ 
last visited 21/03/2012. 
1540 The Constitution of Mauritius, 1968, Arts 3(c) and 9. 
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privacy by Mauritians are largely affected by lack of culture of data protection rather than the 
Mauritian society’s culture. However the latter may still have impact upon the former and vice 
versa. 
 
5.4 Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
The legal and regulatory framework for privacy and data protection comprises of two major legal 
sources: the Constitution and legislation. The legislative source can be further divided into two 
groups. These are the omnibus data protection legislation and sectoral legislation addressing data 
privacy issues. There are also subsidiary legislation, codes of practice and guidelines developed 
under the general data protection legislation. Apart from sectoral legislation there exist a number 
of pieces of legislation which have ad hoc provisions relevant to data privacy protection. However 
there is no known case law decided by Mauritian courts which directly address data privacy 
complaints. As a result, case law is an insignificant source. Yet since its establishment to date, the 
Mauritian Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) has rendered down 7 decisions arising from 
different complaints filed to her. 
 
As alluded to, the discussions and analyses in this chapter are limited to mainly the general data 
protection legislation. The other sources are minimally analysed. Such analysis is important to 
show how the general data privacy legislation is related to the specific ones. Also significant, the 
analysis will indicate which legislation was repealed and which one was maintained by the general 
data privacy legislation.  
5.4.1 The Constitution of Mauritius 1968 
The Mauritian Constitution explicitly recognises privacy as a basic fundamental human right. Art 
3(c) states:- 
‘It is hereby recognised and declared that in Mauritius there have existed and 
shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, place of 
origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, each and all of the 
following human rights and fundamental freedoms – 
(a)... 
(b)...and; 
322 
 
(c) the right of the individual to protection for the privacy of his home and 
other property and from deprivation of property without compensation’.  
 
Art 3(c) is further expanded and consolidated in Art 9 of the Mauritian Constitution. The latter 
states that ‘except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his own 
person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.’  
 
In contrast to the corresponding provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 to which Mauritius is bound, 
Arts 3 (c) and 9 of the Mauritian Constitution are narrowly formulated. While in the former 
privacy is guaranteed in the contexts of family, home, correspondence, honour and reputation in 
the latter it is only confined to home and other property. Although there is currently no known 
case law by Mauritian courts interpreting Arts 3(c) and 9 of the Constitution, it can be argued 
that the latter have the potential of embracing the other elements in the UDHR and ICCPR. 
This view is strengthened by the fact that in some jurisdictions like the United States where the 
constitution does not expressly guarantee protection of privacy, the U.S Supreme Court has 
concluded that such a right exists.1541 Indeed, the disclosure of personal information, which is 
nowhere stated in the U.S Constitution, can still be secured under certain circumstances.1542  
Hence the whole issue depends on courts’ interpretation. 
 
However the value of Arts 3(c) and 9 of the Mauritian Constitution can be appreciated from the 
fact that they are embedded in the constitution. The latter is the superior source of law in 
Mauritius. This means that any law or its provisions including the data privacy legislation must 
pass the standard set by the constitution for its validity. It can be submitted that despite their 
shortcomings, Arts 3(c) and 9 of the Mauritian Constitution are the legal source for the existence 
of the Data Protection Act 2004 and other legislation relevant to data privacy protection.  
 
Apart from being a legal source for the Data Protection Act 2004, the Constitution of Mauritius 
makes it clear that it applies without discrimination of place of origin. This means that citizens 
and non-citizens of Mauritius can seek constitutional protection once their right to privacy is 
                                                          
1541 See e.g. Hammitt, H., ‘A Constitutional Right of Informational Privacy’, Government Technology, 1998, 
http://www.govtech.com/magazines/gt/A-Constitutional-Right-of-Informational-Privacy.html 
last visited 21/03/2012; see also the Opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in National Aeronatics and 
Space Administration et al, v. Nelson et al, where the Supreme Court avoided the use of the right of informational 
privacy, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf last visited 21/03/2012. 
1542 Ibid. 
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infringed. Concomitantly, any restriction of application of the right to privacy in any legislation 
on the basis of place of origin may be regarded as invalid.   
 
The right to privacy in Arts 3(c) and 9 of the Mauritian Constitution is however not absolute. It 
is subject to certain limitations as designed to ensure the enjoyment of such right by any 
individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interests.1543  These 
set of limitations are specifically stipulated in Art 9(2) which include an expansive list. The 
limitations include those relating to the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality, public health, town and country planning, the development or utilisation of property of 
any kind in order to promote public benefit; for purposes of protecting the rights and freedoms 
of other persons; tax purposes; and enforcement of judgement or order of the court in any civil 
proceedings. Yet the general derogations are provided in Art 18 of the Mauritian Constitution. It 
is submitted that while the exercise of the right to privacy needs to be balanced with other rights, 
it is doubtful if the expansive list of derogations laid down in the constitution may leave privacy 
right as having any practical relevance. 
 
5.4.2 The Data Protection Act 2004 
 
The Data Protection Act 2004(DPA) is the principal data privacy legislation in Mauritius. The 
Act was passed by the Mauritian Parliament on 1 June 2004. It was immediately assented to by 
Sir Enerood Jugnauth, the President of Mauritius on 17 June 2004. However the Data Protection 
Act was proclaimed in three phases. The first proclamation concerned the following sections 1; 
2; 4; 5(b),(c),(e),(g),(h),(i),(j);  and 6. These provisions were brought into force on 27 December 
2004 through Proclamation No. 45 of 2004.1544 It is important to mention that these sections 
relate to the short title of the Act, interpretation, establishment of the office of DPC and vesting 
it with limited functions, confidentiality and oath of the Commissioner and other DPC’s staff 
respectively. Through Proclamation No.45 of 2004 Mauritius became the earliest African country 
to establish the office of Data Protection Commission and make it operational. This means that 
the office of DPC in Mauritius preceded even Cape Verde and Seychelles which adopted data 
protection legislation much earlier. It also preceded Tunisia’s Instance Nationale pour la Protection des 
Données à Caractère Personel (INPDCP or Data Protection Authority). Tunisia’s data protection 
legislation was adopted one month after Mauritius’. As alluded to, this was one of the reasons for 
handpicking Mauritius as the case of the present research. 
                                                          
1543 The Constitution of Mauritius 1968, Arts 3.  
1544 Proclamation No. 45 of 2004 was signed by the Mauritian President on 15th December 2004. 
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The second set of proclamation was made through Proclamation No. 5 of 2009.1545 The latter 
brought the rest of the provisions of the Data Protection Act 2004 in full operation as from 16 
February 2009. However the proclamation left unproclaimed section 17 of the DPA which deals 
with the DPC’s powers of entry and search. Accordingly, the powers of entry and search were 
not exercisable by the DPC at that time. It is imperative to note that the piecemeal proclamation 
of the Data Protection Act 2004 was adopted in order to establish the office of DPC and 
provide opportunity for the Commissioner to develop the necessary guidelines and codes of 
practice under section 5(b) and preparations of regulations by the Prime Minister.1546 Both of 
them were/are necessary to operationalise the principle legislation. As important as it was, the 
piecemeal proclamation had its shortcomings. First, the first proclamation overlooked to bring 
into force sections 56 and 65. Section 56 incorporates detailed provisions on the Commissioner’s 
functions to issue or approve codes of practice or guidelines. In this way section 56 is an 
elaborative provision of section 5(b) of the Data Protection Act which was proclaimed on 27 
December 2004. As for section 65, it empowers the Prime Minister to make regulations to 
operationalise the Act. In the exercise of these powers, the Prime Minister may consult the Data 
Protection Commissioner. Some legal and practical problems which arise here are that the Data 
Protection Commissioner and Prime Minster invoked the application of sections 56 and 65 well 
before they were proclaimed.1547 This supports the argument that the two provisions had to be 
proclaimed with the other provisions in the first proclamation. Yet this could not result into 
serious legal uncertainties because the guidelines and regulations became applicable only after the 
second proclamation of the rest of provisions of the DPA. To be sure, the Data Protection 
Regulations 2009 were made by the Prime Minister under section 65 of DPA on 3 March 2009 
after consultation with the Commissioner.1548 However they were brought into force on 16 
February 2009.1549 The latter was the date the second proclamation was made.  
 
Another legal and practical point is that under sections 5(b) and 56, the DPC has the mandate to 
issue guidelines or codes of practice or approve either of them. Based on these provisions the 
guidelines prepared by the Commissioner in 2007 could have become operational even in the 
                                                          
1545 Proclamation No. 5 of 2009 was signed by the Mauritian President on 4th February 2009. 
1546 In her presentation ‘An Overview of the Mauritian Data Protection Act’ dated 30 November 2007 Mrs. 
Drudeisha Madhub, the Mauritian Data Protection Commissioner mentioned that the instrument of proclamation 
together with the required regulations and relevant guidelines had already been sent to the Senior Chief Executive of 
the Prime Minister’s Office, see Mauritius Data Protection Office’s Website, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/dataprotection/menuitem.079dc52bbf696f8858c64510a0208a0c/ 
last visited 21/03/2012. 
1547 Ibid. 
1548 Data Protection Regulations 2009, Government Notice (G.N) No. 22 of 2009. 
1549 Ibid, R.8. 
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absence of the regulations. But this would practically be impossible. First, the Commissioner’s 
guidelines touched upon most of the provisions of the Data Protection Act 2004 which were yet 
to be proclaimed. Second, such guidelines depended upon the existence of the regulations as the 
other source of enabling provisions. These legal and practical hurdles partly offer explanation 
why it took more than four years for the Data Protection Act to come into full operation since it 
was passed in 2004.  
 
So far the DPA has been amended twice. The first amendment was passed on 15 April 2009 
through section 2 of the Additional Stimulus Package (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009.1550 
This provision, among others, amended section 17 of the Data Protection Act 2004 on 
Commissioner’s powers of entry and search. The same section repealed the contentious section 
21 of the Data Protection Act 2004 on the Prime Minister’s powers to give the Data Protection 
Commissioner direction in the discharge of her duties. The Stimulus Package Act was assented 
on 16 April 2009 and proclaimed on 22 May 2009 through Proclamation No. 11 of 2009. 
Accordingly section 17 of the DPA is currently in force making the third and final phase of 
proclamation of the Act. The second amendment was passed on 22 July 2009 through section 10 
of the Finance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009. This Act was assented on 30 July 2009. 
However, while section 49 of the Finance Miscellaneous Act declared different commencement 
dates for various provisions, it did not do so with respect to section 10 which amends various 
provisions of the Data Protection Act 2004. It is important to note that although the Finance 
Miscellaneous Act was published on the DPC’s Website as a source of data protection legislation 
there is yet a commencement date published by the Commissioner. 
 
The Data Protection Act’s amendments were necessitated by various reasons. The National ICT 
Policy clearly states that it was to meet the need for Mauritius to be potentially recognised by the 
European Union as a third country with an adequate level of protection.1551 The Data Protection 
Commissioner has specifically explained the reasons behind the Act’s amendments through the 
Stimulus Package Act in two aspects: to enhance prospective registration of data processors and 
also to give more independence to the Commissioner in the exercise of her function under the 
DPA.1552 Yet, in her First Annual Report(February 2009-February 2010), the Commissioner 
                                                          
1550 Additional Stimulus Package (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009, Act No. 1 of 2009. 
1551 See, e.g. Mauritius National ICT Policy 2007-2011, pp.1-18, at pp.7-8; Gayrel, p.20, note 1334, supra.  
1552 Madhub, D., ‘Data Protection Implications for Our DNA Bill’, Paper presented by the Commissioner on the 
9th June 2009 at the Awareness Workshop on Legal Aspects of the Use of Human DNA, Mauritius Data Protection 
Office’s Website, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/dataprotection/menuitem.079dc52bbf696f8858c64510a0208a0c/ 
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assigns a different reason: ‘the Commissioner was required to amend and update the Data 
Protection Act to secure better chances of accreditation with the European Union for Mauritius 
to be recognised as an adequate country in data protection to facilitate the transfers of personal 
data from the European Union to Mauritius and thus attract more investment in mainly the 
ITES/BPO( i.e. Information Technology Enabled Service/Business Process Outsourcing) 
sectors of the Mauritian economy.’1553 Admittedly, both reasons advanced by the Commissioner 
are broadly in line with the policy statement in the Mauritian National ICT Policy.1554 This is 
because the need for independent data protection authority as previously stated by the DPC is 
central to the functioning of data privacy legislation under the European Directive 95/46/EC. 
 
5.4.2.1 Need for Data Protection Legislation 
 
There are two major reasons in the discourse of data privacy in Mauritius why the Island adopted 
omnibus data protection legislation.  The first is the protection of individuals’ right of privacy as 
a result of potential risks posed by use of ICTs. The second reason is the attraction of foreign 
investments in Mauritius. This is also commonly known as economic justification theory or 
imperative. It is necessary to investigate the relative strength of each of these reasons in the 
adoption of the Data Protection Act 2004. The rationale for this investigation is twofold: it 
determines the legislative process and competing interests involved and consequently practice 
and enforcement of the legislation.  
 
However in attempting to find out the relative position of the above reasons in adopting the data 
privacy legislation statutory and non-statutory aids to interpretation are used. The former include 
intrinsic (text based) and non-intrinsic (non-text based). The non-statutory aids to interpretation 
are used here as they provide the broader context in which the data privacy legislation developed. 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Data Protection Bill (No. XV of 2004) reads as follows:- 
 
‘The object of this Bill is to provide for the protection of the privacy rights of 
individuals in view of the developments in the techniques used to capture, 
transmit, manipulate, record or store data relating to individuals.’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
last visited 21/03/2012. 
1553 Mauritius Data Protection Office, First Annual Report of the Data Protection Commissioner February 2009-
February 2010, p.4. 
1554 Mauritius National ICT Policy 2007-2011, pp.1-18, at pp.7-8. 
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The above object clause is reproduced as the long title of the Bill itself and finally the Data 
Protection Act 2004, after the former was passed into law. Apart from the object clause and the 
long title of the Data Protection Bill and Act which are silent on economic agenda behind the 
DPA, there is similarly nowhere in the Bill or Act any mention of economic justification as an 
object served by the Data Protection Act 2004. Superficially, it sounds as if the DPA was 
adopted to serve a single object: protection of individuals’ right of privacy. Moreover, the fact 
that the protection of privacy expressly manifests itself in the long title of the DPA suggests that 
it is the dominant reason why the data protection legislation in Mauritius was adopted. Yet the 
Hansard (the printed transcripts of parliamentary debates) of the Parliament of Mauritius of 1 
June 2004 speaks the opposite. While the Hansard repeats privacy protection as the reason for 
adopting the DPA, it frequently and dominantly mentions ITES/BPO as the primary agenda 
served by the Data Protection Act 2004.  In the beginning of his address, while moving the Data 
Protection Bill to be read for the second time, the Prime Minister spent a considerable time and 
space to trace the development of the ICT sector since 2000 as the fifth pillar of the Mauritian 
economy.1555 After lying that foundation, the Prime Minister said, ‘in order to build and maintain 
confidence that Mauritius is a reliable and sure destination for ICT business, we also have to 
ensure that we have the proper legal framework.’1556 Interestingly, until that stage the Prime 
Minister made no mention of protection of privacy as a fundamental right. Although 
subsequently, he clearly recapitulated the object of the Data Protection Bill as nearly as in the 
Explanatory Memorandum, ‘the Bill in front of us is about protection of the fundamental 
privacy rights of individuals, and all data controllers who are established in Mauritius or use 
equipment in Mauritius for processing data will need to comply with this law’,1557 he emphatically 
repeated the economic justification theory as behind the adoption of the data privacy legislation: 
‘it will also constitute a strong incentive for prospective overseas agencies to do business in 
Mauritius in the ICT sector proper, or in businesses where personal data is used routinely’.1558 To 
further demonstrating the priority of business agenda the Prime Minister went on: ‘the European 
Union (EU) countries are strictly regulated by the EU Directives and hesitate to do business with 
countries which do not have the same or similar legal protections for the privacy rights of 
individuals’.1559 
                                                          
1555 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 12 of 01.06.04, Public Bills: Data Protection Bill (No. XV of 2004), 
pp.77-78. 
1556 Ibid, p.78. 
1557 Ibid. 
1558 Ibid. 
1559 Ibid. 
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The business agenda is also amplified by Mr. D. Jeeha, the Minister of Information Technology 
and Telecommunications. In his speech, Mr. Jeeha said, ‘the primary objective of the passing of 
the Data Protection Bill is to protect individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the movement of such data.’1560 However he capitalised that, ‘this Bill comes at the right 
moment with the start of activities by internationally renowned companies in the field of 
business process outsourcing at the Ebene Cybercity.’1561 The Minister made several repetitions 
demonstrating the link between the adoption of the DPA and promoting business interests. For 
example, Mr. Jeeha pointed out, ‘this Bill will additionally provide the necessary comfort to 
investors in the IT Enabled Services and Business Process Outsourcing sectors.’1562 He pointed 
also, ‘the Data Protection legislation will help to create appropriate confidence among investors 
and foreign companies to the effect that the data they send to Mauritius for back-office 
operations is indeed safe and that appropriate statutory mechanisms in place should a breach of 
data take place.’1563 
 
Beyond parliamentary debates, the reasons for adoption of the DPA in Mauritius appear in the 
National ICT Policy 2007-2011. The latter sets out ICT sector as the fifth pillar of the economy 
of Mauritius. One of the objectives of the Policy in supporting its broad vision is to develop the 
export markets for ICT services and BPO/ITES. This entails, among other policy priorities, to 
strengthen the legal and regulatory framework. In this context, the National ICT Policy clearly 
sets an agenda for amending the Data Protection Act 2004 to support the Policy’s vision and 
objectives.1564 The protection of individuals’ privacy is insufficiently covered in the ICT Policy 
relatively to the business interests. 
 
Another source where the reasons behind the adoption of the DPA can be traced is the various 
presentations of the Data Protection Commissioner. The accounts given in such presentations 
are not consistent.  Sometimes privacy appears as the sole reason for adoption of the DPA. Yet 
in certain cases this is business outsourcing industry. And, in some occasions both reasons are 
given to support the existence of the DPA. However these reasons are similarly inconsistent in 
their weight. For instance, in her presentation1565 of 30 November 2007 the Commissioner 
                                                          
1560 Ibid, p.96. 
1561 Ibid. 
1562 Ibid. 
1563 Ibid. 
1564 Mauritius National ICT Policy 2007-2011, p.7. 
1565 Madhub, note 1546, supra. 
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restated the object of the DPA by adopting the long title of the Act. She took investment as the 
second priority of the law. Yet in her presentation of 5 October 2011 the Commissioner seems 
to put more emphasis on investment than privacy. In that presentation the slide presentation 
asked, ‘why have a DPO in Mauritius?’ Her reply was as follows:- 
 
‘The need was felt when investment in the ITES/BPO sector was being 
prejudiced due to lack of an appropriate legal data protection framework in 
Mauritius. However, since data protection is essentially a human right issue as 
it concerns the protection of the personal data of living individual, the scope 
of data protection is not restricted to purely economical considerations or 
gains but also encompasses the broader perspective of the right to privacy or 
the right to be left alone of every citizen of this country.’1566 
 
However, during interview with the researcher of this thesis on 4 July 2011 in her office (Port 
Louis, Mauritius), the Commissioner made clear to the question: ‘why did Mauritius adopt data 
protection legislation’ that protection of privacy of an individual was a priority consideration. She 
noted that privacy in Mauritius is protected in the constitution. However, the constitutional 
protection is very broad to protect infringement of privacy resulting from ICTs. This became the 
reason for adopting the data protection legislation which though limited it creates a specific legal 
framework for processing personal data. The Commissioner clearly pointed that economic or 
business process outsourcing was secondary and incidental to the privacy of the individuals in 
Mauritius. 
 
The statement of Mr. Raju Jaddoo, the Managing Director of the Mauritius Board of Investment 
and board member of the COMESA Regional Investment Agency is clearer on the business 
agenda behind the adoption of DPA. He posits:- 
 
‘Since 2004, the island’s IT-enabled and BPO service sectors have witnessed 
an average growth rate of 30-35%, generating wide-scale social and economic 
benefits for the country. This growth has been accompanied with the 
consolidation of business processes and the whole sector is demonstrating a 
                                                          
1566 Madhub, D., ‘The Data Protection Office in Mauritius-The Challenges Ahead’, Paper presented by the 
Commissioner on 5 October 2011 to the ICT-BPO Community, see Mauritius Data Protection Office’s Website, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/dataprotection/menuitem.079dc52bbf696f8858c64510a0208a0c/ 
last visited 23/03/2012. 
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strong growth potential....The legal framework governing ICT has been 
developed in accordance with international norms and best practices. A 
Copyright Act, a Cybercrime and Computer Misuse Act and Electronic 
Transaction Act are currently in force. These, along with the recent 
promulgation of the Data Protection Act, illustrate the government’s 
commitment to enhancing the credibility of the Mauritian outsourcing 
industry.’1567 
 
The above analyses clearly demonstrate that despite the object clause of the Data Protection Bill 
and the long title of the Data Protection Act 2004, both protection of individuals’ privacy and 
securing foreign investment were the reasons for the adoption of the DPA. However in relative 
terms, the latter played a significant role as against the former in the adoption of DPA. Yet in 
interpretation of the DPA the two objectives must be balanced. This is because over protection 
of privacy may impede free flow of information resulting into distortion of business process 
outsourcing which is the fifth pillar of economy in Mauritius. At the same time, over protecting 
business may result into violation of individuals’ privacy. Therefore only a fair balance between 
the two objects may effectively result into smooth implementation of the DPA. 
 
5.4.2.2 Legislative Process 
 
The Data Protection Bill 2004 was introduced in the Mauritian Parliament on 25 May 2004 and 
passed into law on 1 June 2004. The first reading of the Bill was on 25 May 2004 while the 
second and third readings were on 1 June 2004. According to Rules 52 and 53 of the Mauritius 
Standing Orders and Rules of the National Assembly 1995 (i.e. Parliamentary Rules), only the 
short title of a Bill is read and no debate is allowed in the first and third readings. However under 
Rule 56, that is, during the second reading-the long title of the Bill is read. Moreover debates 
covering the principles and general merits of the Bill are permitted. During the second reading 
amendments, omission or addition of all or some words can be made but not in any other stage. 
Accordingly, the Data Protection Bill 2004 was debated in hours and passed as law on the same 
date, i.e. 1 June 2004. 
 
                                                          
1567 Jaddoo, R., ‘Mauritius Board of Investment: Mauritius-The Island of Opportunity’, 
http://www.the-chiefexecutive.com/projects/island-of-mauritius/ last visited 23/03/2012. 
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However before the Bill was introduced in the National Assembly, it was not or at least it was 
subjected to limited consultation process. The latter did not involve at all members of the public. 
The Parliamentary Hansard reveals this shortcoming through Dr. A. Boolell:- 
 
‘Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, we, of course, welcome the Bill, but we intend to 
sound a note of caution. And with the breakthrough in ICT and easy 
accessibility to computer usage and Internet, we can say that the legislation is 
timely. But, however, let us call a spade a spade. Enforcement, Mr. Deputy 
Speaker, Sir, may be difficult because the Internet is the property of everyone 
and no one. I am sure you will agree, Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, that this is a 
complex Bill. This legislation, in our opinion, should have been circulated to 
invite participation from all relevant stake players. Unfortunately, the Bill has 
not been widely disseminated, but we agree that the Data Protection Bill, in 
almost every country, is almost a copycat of each other and available on the 
net....It would have been better if the Bill could have been widely circulated, if 
it could have had vital input from all the stake players and if a copy of the Bill 
could have been sent to the National Economic and Social Council so that 
input could be obtained. Elsewhere, Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, there has been a 
While Paper, the matter has been widely discussed because we are talking of a 
balancing Act and we have to make sure that there is no infringement upon 
privacy and that human rights issues are strictly adhered to.’1568 
 
Somewhat similar to the above observation, Mr. M. Dowarkasing submitted, ‘I would like to say 
this Bill is a very complex one and we should proceed in phases to make the law known to all 
stakeholders, especially the data controllers and the public. Since this Bill is sensitive as it deals 
with the personal privacy, great care has to be taken to strike the right balance between 
technological advance and privacy.’1569  
 
Further evidence in support of the view that the Data Protection Bill 2004 was not put into 
public consultation is given by Dr.N.Ramgoolam, the leader of the opposition in the Mauritius 
Parliament. Dr. Ramgoolam observed, ‘I know that hon. Dr. Boolell and hon.Dowarkasing have 
said it. It is an important and complex Bill which deals with the privacy rights, from what I have 
                                                          
1568 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 12 of 01.06.04, Public Bills: Data Protection Bill (No. XV of 2004), 
pp.85-86, 90. 
1569 Ibid, p.103. 
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heard the Bill has not been debated enough outside in the public and people are not aware of 
what are the dangers, perhaps they could have been given more time.’1570 Interestingly, in his 
reply to the call for public consultation, the Prime Minister said, ‘we can always at any point in 
time, improve and plug loopholes.’1571 Based on this opinion he assured the members of 
Parliament that the Bill, once voted, the Act would be referred to the National Economic and 
Social Council, to the Human Rights Commission, and to anybody, who would have time to 
look at the Act that had already been voted and propose amendments and improvements to the 
piece of legislation.1572 
 
It is imperative to point that the legislative process of the Data Protection Act 2004 did not as 
well involve the Mauritius Law Reform Commission. There were obvious reasons for this. First, 
although the Law Reform Commission was established since 19921573 by 2004 when the Data 
Protection Bill 2004 was being considered it had no any staff except its Chairperson.1574 
Moreover it had no library.1575 Second, the limited projects it could handle did not include the 
DPA.1576 Since the Law Reform Commission was the body to carry out public consultations, its 
non- involvement increased constraints to the legislative process. 
 
The overall implications for the legislative process leading to the adoption of the DPA leave a lot 
to be desired. It has partly made difficult to win compliance from both the data controllers and 
subjects. This is because majority of persons, the subjects of the operation of the DPA, are 
ignorant of the existence and/or application of the provisions of the Data Protection Act. In the 
First Annual Report, the Commissioner points out lack of awareness of the DPA as one of the 
most challenging areas of enforcement.1577 Despite that fact the Commissioner maintains that 
ignorance of the obligations under the DPA is not a legitimate excuse, especially given the fact 
that data protection obligations are more often simply just a question of adopting good civilian 
manners.1578 Arguably, ‘adopting good civilian manners’ particularly in the complex context of 
data privacy needs one to appreciate the privacy risks, policies and regulatory frameworks in 
                                                          
1570 Ibid, p.104. 
1571 Ibid, p.109. 
1572 Ibid. 
1573 Mauritius Law Reform Commission Act 1992, (Act No.33 of 1992), proclaimed on 1st December 1992 through 
Proclamation No. 2 of 1993. 
1574
 Mauritius Law Reform Commission Annual Report June 2004, pp.1-9, at p. 4. 
1575 Ibid. 
1576 Ibid, pp.5-7. 
1577 Mauritius Data Protection Office, First Annual Report of the Data Protection Commissioner February 2009-
February 2010, p.42. 
1578 Ibid, p.6. 
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place. That is why for example, unlike other ordinary statutes and especially penal laws which 
states ‘ignorance of law’ is no defence, data privacy legislation incorporates provisions requiring 
the Commissioner to educate the public. To be sure section 5(g) of the Data Protection Act 2004 
states that the function of the Commissioner shall be to take such measures as may be necessary 
so as to bring to the knowledge of the general public the provisions of this Act. 
 
It can also be argued that the above legislative process partly explains why Mauritius adopted the 
DPA. The Act was adopted as a matter of urgency suggesting that it aimed to instil confidence to 
foreign investors. As alluded to, the Act had to be voted in the first place and then be subjected 
to some sort of consultation afterwards. Moreover, the amendments which have so far been 
made to the DPA were/are intended to meet compliance to the ‘adequacy’ standard in Directive 
95/46/EC (see 5.4.3). More amendments are expected as Mauritius is currently seeking from the 
European Union accreditation of its DPA (see 5.4.3). 
 
 5.4.2.3  Scope and Application 
 
Section 3 of the Data Protection Act provides that the Act shall bind the State. Literally this 
means that the DPA applies to public bodies only. The definition of ‘data controller’ in section 2 
does not either suggest if the DPA applies to private bodies. This is somewhat contrary to the 
corresponding definition of ‘data controller’ in the European Directive which defines a ‘data 
controller’ in terms of public or private status. Nonetheless, when reading section 54 it becomes 
certain that the DPA applies to private bodies and individuals as well. This provision excludes 
the application of the Act when data processing takes place purely in the context of family, 
household affairs or for recreational purposes. This exemption suggests that in any other cases 
where individuals process personal data, the Act binds them. Also significant to note the Hansard 
indicates that the DPA has a wide application in that it binds not only the State, but also a data 
controller.1579 While it may sound as if a ‘data controller’ is an individual or private entity, the 
notion of ‘controller’ includes the State and its agencies. The Data Protection Commissioner has 
similarly made this point clear in most of her presentations that the DPA applies to both public 
and private bodies and individuals.1580 
                                                          
1579 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 12 of 01.06.04, Public Bills: Data Protection Bill (No. XV of 2004), 
p.84. 
1580 See e.g., Madhub, D., ‘An overview of the Data Protection Act and its implications as regards registration and 
data subject access requests for the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology’, Paper presented by 
the Commissioner on the 10th June 2009 at the Ministry of the Information and Communication Technology, see 
Mauritius Data Protection Office’s Website, 
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Moreover the DPA applies to both automatic and manual processing of personal data.1581 Yet 
such processing of personal data is limited to individual natural/physical persons only called the 
‘data subject’.1582 Legal/juristic persons are outside the purview of the Act. 
 
Territorially, the DPA has a broad scope. It applies to a data controller who is established in 
Mauritius.1583 In addition such a controller must process personal data in the context of that 
establishment.1584 However in case a controller is not established in Mauritius but uses equipment 
in Mauritius for processing data such a controller is subject to the application of the DPA.1585 In 
that case he or she has an obligation to nominate a representative who resides in Mauritius to 
carry out his or her data processing activities through an office in Mauritius.1586 But if such 
controller uses such equipment for the purpose of transit through Mauritius, the Act does not 
apply upon him/her.1587 
 
As relating to non-application, the DPA contains an extensive exemption regime in Part VII (ss 
45-54). The exemption is either partially or wholly. The list of matters exempted are national 
security(s 45); crime and taxation(s 46); health and social work(s 47); regulatory activities(s 48); 
journalism, literature and art(s 49); research, history and statistics(s 50); information available to 
the public under an enactment(s 51); disclosure required by law or in connection with legal 
proceedings(s 52); legal professional privilege(s 53); and domestic purposes(s 54). Partial 
exemption usually takes the form of relieving the controller from obligation of notification and 
application of certain data protection principles. With the exclusion of ‘health and social work’ 
Gayrel does not seem to worry about the Mauritian data exemption regime in the DPA.1588 She 
contends that the rest of the exemptions can be justified and do not raise many issues.1589 
However she is concerned with two things. First, although these exemptions are only allowed ‘to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/dataprotection/menuitem.079dc52bbf696f8858c64510a0208a0c/ 
last visited 24/03/2012. In this presentation the Commissioner said, ‘if you, as an individual or an organisation, 
collect, store or process any data about living people on any type of computer or in a structured filing system, then 
you are a data controller’. See also, Madhub, note 1565, supra, where the Commissioner clearly points out, ‘a data 
controller is any private or public entity controlling the processing of personal information.’ 
1581 ‘Processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on the data wholly or partly by 
automatic means, or otherwise than by automatic means, Data Protection Act 2004, s.2. 
1582 ‘Data subject’ means a living individual who is the subject of personal data, Data Protection Act 2004, s.2. 
1583 Data Protection Act 2004, s.3 (3), (a). 
1584 Ibid. 
1585 Ibid, s.3(3),(b). 
1586 Ibid, s.3 (4). 
1587 Ibid, s.3(3),(b). 
1588 Gayrel, p.21, note 1334, supra. 
1589 Ibid. 
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the extent that such an application would be likely to prejudice’ they are questionable, particularly 
because of the wide range of regulatory activities.1590 Arguably, this is one of the things Gayrel 
should have worried about in the first place. Second, ‘crimes and taxation’ matters ( s 46), 
notably the processing of personal data ‘for the prevention and detection of crime’ and 
‘apprehension or prosecution of offenders’ are exempted from various principles of the Act, but 
surprisingly are not exempted from the obligation of information imposed on controllers 
according to section 22 of the Act.1591 She holds that that may be an unintended loophole of the 
Act; otherwise the Mauritian police would have to inform suspected people about fraudulent 
activities under investigation.1592 In Gayrel’s opinion, this omission nevertheless raises the issue 
as to whether exemptions to data protection principles for police activities have been duly 
assessed.1593 Gayrel’s doubts have to be explained in the entire legislative process of the DPA 
(see 5.4.2.2). 
 
Taking the entirety of the Mauritian context as already considered, the exemption regime leaves a 
lot to be desired. This is clearly captured in the Hansard. During the Mauritian parliamentary 
debates of the Data Protection Bill 2004, the exemption regime was one of the issues which 
attracted heated debates. For parliamentarians it was argued that the exemption regime contained 
a too long list virtually leaving nothing to be protected or regulated.1594 They also argued that it 
would be difficult to justify certain exemptions.1595 Two illustrations cited by the parliamentarians 
need mention. In exempting controllers with respect to physical and mental health from granting 
data subject’s access; the argument is that health data are generally of confidential nature and 
cannot be disclosed without the consent of the individual concerned, i.e. the patient.1596 Hence a 
patient cannot be blocked access to his or her own medical information. Moreover, a data 
controller can not disclose such information to third parties without the patient’s consent. The 
only acceptable exemptions, according to parliamentarians, can be limited to circumstances 
where either there is a statutory requirement to disclose, court order or public interest 
justification, such as significant risks to others.1597 The second illustration concerns data retention 
by the police. The submission by the leader of the opposition during debates is appealing. It 
deserves a direct quote:-  
                                                          
1590 Ibid. 
1591 Ibid. 
1592 Ibid. 
1593 Ibid. 
1594 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 12 of 01.06.04, Public Bills: Data Protection Bill (No. XV of 2004), 
p.101. 
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‘Then there are usual blanket covers given to national security, but the Prime 
Minister knows that we need to have strong safeguards as there is a great deal 
of information which is secret and which has nothing to do with security 
matters. I hope the Prime Minister knows what I am saying because there is a 
lot of information coming to you which is meant to be secret and which has 
nothing to do with the security of State. This is something we need to make 
sure that we have safeguards because the Police can put a lot of data on the 
central computer, they can put the records, for example, all criminal 
convictions, etc., but how long are they going to stay there?’1598 
 
The government’s counter arguments to the members of parliament are that the exemptions are 
not provided against keeping of data in any database as these concerned only with notification 
and few principles only.1599 Moreover, the Prime Minister categorically said, ‘I cannot agree with 
hon. Dowarkasing that the list of exemptions is so long that there is nothing left to protect. No, 
that is not the case; the list of exemptions is restrictive and there would be plenty of scope left 
for protection of personal data.’1600 It can be submitted that once a set of activities are excluded 
from the application of the DPA, information about individuals can be processed without any 
compliance to the Act. Moreover, based on the parliamentary debates surrounding the DPA’s 
exemption regime, it is difficult to see how the exemptions, with whatever good justification, 
cannot be abused. This view is further strengthened by lack of proper safeguards surrounding 
the exemption regime. Section 45 of DPA on national security serves as an illustration. Under 
this provision, the Prime Minister can certify a particular case as one falling under section 45 
hence exempted from the application of DPA. The powers given to the Prime Minister are 
important to the security of the state but are susceptible to abuse as no safeguards are provided. 
This point will further be discussed in part 5.4.2.5. 
 
5.4.2.4 Data Protection Principles 
 
The basic principles of data processing in the Data Protection Act 2004 are provided in the First 
Schedule titled ‘Data Protection Principles’. This schedule contains eight principles closely 
patterned to the European Directive 95/46/EC. However some authorities have maintained that 
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1600 Ibid, p.110. 
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the DPA draws its inspiration from both the European Directive and the OECD Guidelines as 
opposed to national laws of EU member states or other countries beyond Europe.1601 Be as it 
may, in contrast to these two instruments, the eight principles in the DPA are framed without 
sufficient details. During parliamentary debates on the Data Protection Bill 2004, this issue was 
raised. However, the government made plainly that in the Mauritian legislation only the eight 
principles have been mentioned and it has been left to the Commissioner, at his discretion, to 
come up with codes of practice.1602 This approach may pose two difficulties. First, as the field of 
data privacy is new in Mauritius, development of such codes of practice creates great challenges 
to formulate. The Commissioner may end up lifting codes of practice elsewhere in Europe and 
approve them. Second, the concept of ‘discretion’ may absolutely leave the Commissioner free 
from any obligation to consult anybody, be it stake players or experts. This may be dangerous 
particularly during the implementation stage of the Act. Yet in the exercise of such powers, the 
Commissioner has developed various codes of practice and guidelines. The latter provide some 
insights in the understanding and interpretation of the eight principles. Two of these codes 
directly apply here: ‘A Practical Guide for Data Controllers & Data Processors -Volume 1’ 
1603(i.e. Practical Guide) and ‘Data Protection-Your Rights -Volume 3’1604 (i.e. Your Rights). Both 
of them are considered in the course of discussing the data protection principles enshrined in the 
First Schedule of the DPA. 
 
The ‘First principle’ states that personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully. The criterion 
of ‘fairness’ is extensively covered in Rule 1 of the Practical Guide. Under this Rule ‘fairness’ is 
understood in terms of collection hence ‘fair collection’ and processing hence ‘fair processing’. 
As for ‘fair collection’ this is meant to make the data subject fully aware of the fact that his or her 
data is being collected. This entails provision of identity of the controller or processor; specifying 
the purpose of the collection; identifying persons to whom data will be disclosed; specifying 
whether supply of information is voluntary or obligatory; informing about the consequences for 
the individual if the required information is not provided; specifying whether or not consent of 
the individual is required for any processing of the information; and informing the right of access 
of the individual and the possibility of correction or destruction of personal data to be provided 
                                                          
1601 See e.g. Gayrel, p.20, note 1334, supra. 
1602 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 12 of 01.06.04, Public Bills: Data Protection Bill (No. XV of 2004),  
Ibid, p.91. 
1603 Mauritius Data Protection Office, ‘A Practical Guide for Data Controllers & Data Processors-Volume 1’, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/dpo/files/Guidvol1v3.pdf last visited 25/03/2012. 
1604 Mauritius Data Protection Office, ‘Data Protection-Your Rights -Volume 3’, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/dpo/files/Guidvol3v3.pdf last visited 25/03/2012. 
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by him or her. Most of these details are provided as part of controller’s obligations in section 22 
of the DPA. 
 
However, the above details are not required to be provided in two scenarios. First, is in case of 
secondary or future uses of the personal data under section 22(3)(a) of the DPA if there is 
repetition of the same information without any material differences. Yet this exemption applies 
only in limited period of 12 months since the previous collection. In any other case other than 
those exempted, the controller must give the above information afresh. Second, is where under 
section 22(3)(b) of the DPA, the data subject cannot reasonably expect to be identified from the 
personal data collected. 
 
Section 22(2) of the DPA requires the controller to give certain information to the data subject at 
the time of collection of data identifying him or her, stating the purpose of collection, etc. Rule 1 
of the Practical Guide requires that where it is practically impossible to give such information 
prior to collection, the controller must provide it as soon as possible after collection. 
 
On the other hand, ‘fair processing’ is understood in Rule 1 of the Practical Guide as fulfilment 
of the conditions stipulated in sections 24 and 25 of the DPA. Section 24(1) states, ‘no personal 
data shall be processed, unless the data controller has obtained the express consent of the data 
subject.’ However the rest of the subsections in section 24 provide exceptions where in the 
absence of consent, personal data can be processed. These are situations where processing is 
necessary for performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party; in order to take 
steps required by the data subject prior to entering into a contract; in order to comply with any 
legal obligation to which the data controller is subject; to protect the vital interest of the data 
subject; for administration of justice; or in the public interest. 
 
Section 25 provides the conditions when processing sensitive personal data. These are construed 
in the Practical Guide to be over and above the conditions provided in section 24 of the DPA. 
Section 25(1) states that no sensitive personal data shall be processed unless the data subject has 
(a) given his express consent to the processing of the personal data; or (b) made the data public. 
Section 25(2) clearly states that the conditions in section 25(1) shall not apply in stipulated 
situations: where processing is necessary for purposes of exercising or performing any right or 
obligation which is conferred or imposed by law on the data controller in connection with his 
employment; in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person where 
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consent cannot be given by or on behalf of the data subject, or the data controller cannot 
reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject; in order to protect the vital 
interests of another person, in case where consent by or on behalf of the data subject has been 
unreasonably withheld; for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party; in 
order to take steps required by the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or for 
compliance with a legal obligation to which the data controller is subject. Other conditions apply 
where processing is carried out by any entity or any association which exists for political, 
philosophical, religious or trade union purposes in the course of its legitimate activities and the 
processing is carried out in accordance with the Act; relates only to individuals who are members 
of the charitable entity or association; and does not include disclosure of the personal data to a 
third party without the consent of the data subject. Also processing of sensitive personal data is 
permitted in respect of the information contained in the personal data made public as a result of 
steps deliberately taken by the data subject; or is required by law. 
 
It is imperative to note that sections 24 and 25 of the DPA refer to express consent. According 
to the Practical Guide, the notion of express consent means voluntary agreement to some act, 
practice or purpose. In this way, consent entails knowledge of the matter agreed to, and 
voluntary agreement. By ‘express’ it means consent which is given explicitly, either orally or in 
writing. However, no age limit is associated with consent. 
 
From the above, it can be submitted that the classification of ‘fairness’ into ‘fair collection’ and 
‘fair processing’ is oversimplification of the concept of ‘processing’. The latter notion is broader. 
Under section 2 of the DPA ‘processing’ entails collection and various manipulations of personal 
data. The overall implication of this classification is to make the implementation of the DPA 
difficult. Moreover ‘consent’ is singled out as the primary condition for making processing fair. 
The other conditions are regarded as exceptions. As a result, this may affect the fair balance 
between the interests of the data subject and those of the controllers. In the European Directive, 
‘consent’ and the other conditions are treated as equal in Art 7. 
 
The other point to mention is that, the Practical Guide does not explain what is meant by 
‘lawfully’. Yet, there is no challenge in understanding it partly because in its wider sense ‘lawfully’ 
may mean processing that is in compliance with the provisions of the DPA. This may include 
elements of authorisation (e.g. consent) as legal justification for processing personal data. 
Similarly, the interpretation of ‘lawfully’ can be infused in the criterion of fairness.  
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The ‘Second principle’ states that personal data shall be obtained only for any specified and 
lawful purpose, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that 
purpose. This principle is partly reflected in sections 22(1), 26(a),(b) and 29 of the DPA. Rule 2 
of the Practical Guide which interprets the second principle prohibits collection of information 
about people routinely and indiscriminately, without having a sound, clear and legitimate purpose 
for so doing. Data controllers can only process personal information against the purpose for 
which they registered in the entry of public register. Furthermore, Rule 4 of the Practical Guide 
lays down the test for ‘compatibility’.  This is whether ‘you use and disclose the data in a way 
which those who supplied the information would expect it to be used and disclosed’. The 
Practical Guide gives some illustrations of the test. For example, transmission of personal 
information to the controller’s agents who carry data operation on behalf of such controller and 
not retaining it for their own purpose, do not constitute ‘disclosures’ of data for the purposes of 
the Act.  
 
The ‘Third principle’ is that personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 
to the purpose for which they are processed. This principle is also reflected in section 26(c) of 
the DPA. Rule 7 of the Practical Guide elaborates the third principle to mean that the data 
controller should only collect and keep enough information that enables him or her to achieve 
the purpose for which information is collected and no more. The controller is prohibited to 
collect and keep information ‘just in case’ a use can be found for the data in the future. 
Moreover, controllers are prohibited from asking intrusive or personal questions, if the 
information obtained in this way has no bearing on the specified purpose for which he or she 
holds personal data. 
 
The ‘Fourth principle’ states that personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to 
date. This principle appears also as an obligation in section 23 of the DPA. A close look indicates 
that it relates to the previous three principles. Rule 6 of the Practical Guide provides that a data 
controller after being informed as to the inaccurateness of personal data by a data subject must 
rectify, block, erase or destroy the data as appropriate. This obligation extends to the third party. 
If the data controller fails to rectify, block, erase or destroy inaccurate personal data, a data 
subject may apply to the Commissioner to have such data rectified, blocked, erased or destroyed. 
Rule 6 provides further that this requirement (i.e. keeping data accurate and up-to-date) has an 
additional importance in that it may result into liability of a data controller to an individual for 
damages if the former fails to observe the duty of care provision in the Act applying to the 
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handling of personal data. It is interesting to note that only Rule 6 of the Practical Guide and 
‘Your Rights’1605 make reference to the remedy of damages. This is not repeated in the DPA, and 
in fact it was an issue of concern during parliamentary debates.1606 Yet it was indicated that such 
a remedy may still be available under other pieces of legislation following the due process of 
law.1607 
 
The ‘Fifth principle’ states that personal data processed for any purpose shall not be kept longer 
than is necessary for the purpose or those purposes. This principle is otherwise known as 
retention of personal data. It is reflected in sections 26 (d) and 28 of the DPA. Rule 8 of the 
Practical Guide provides that this requirement places a responsibility on data controllers to be 
clear about the length of time for which the data will be kept and the reason why the information 
is being retained. If there is no good reason for retaining personal information, then that 
information should be routinely deleted. Moreover, if the data controller would like to retain 
information about customers to help provide better service to them in future, he or she must 
obtain the customers’ consent in advance. 
 
The ‘Sixth principle’ is that personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of the 
data subjects under this Act. This principle has to be read in conjunction with Part VI of the 
DPA which deals with the rights of data subjects. The right of access to personal data under 
section 41 is the most important to the exercise of other rights of rectification, blockage, erasure 
or destruction in section 44 of the PDA. Rule 10 of the Practical Guide repeats essentially the 
requirements and exceptions provided in Part VI of the DPA. Moreover it places an obligation 
on the data controller to explain to the data subject the logic used in any automated decision 
making process where the decision significantly affects the individual and the decision is solely 
based on the automated process. Surprisingly, the DPA itself does not contain any clause on 
automated decision making similar to Directive 95/46/EC. It is doubtful if the Data Protection 
Commissioner can legally supply a new requirement not completely envisaged under the DPA. 
 
Moreover, the exercise of the right of access is under condition to pay fee by the data subject to 
the controller. This fee is currently fixed at Rs 75(approximately US Dollar 2.5). With an 8% of 
population living below the poverty line in Mauritius,1608 the fee requirement may present 
                                                          
1605 Mauritius Data Protection Office, ‘Data Protection-Your Rights -Volume 3’, p.17. 
1606 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 12 of 01.06.04, Public Bills: Data Protection Bill (No.XV of 2004),  
pp.105 and 111. 
1607 Ibid, p.111. 
1608 CIA WorldFactbook, ‘Mauritius Population below poverty line( as of 9th January 2012), 
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unnecessary financial burden on the data subject henceforth a technical denial to access. This 
may also be the case to the rest of the population where a data subject makes many requests to 
different data controllers holding his or personal data. It may similarly cause financial burden 
where the same data subject makes multiple requests of information about him or her to the 
same data controller. 
 
Apart from fee requirement, there are obstacles to the exercise of the right of access. Section 
43(5),(a),(i) of the DPA exempts a data controller from providing access right to a data subject 
‘where he is being requested to disclose information given or to be given in confidence for the 
purposes of the education, training or employment, or prospective education, training or 
employment, of the data subject’. This leads to exclusion from the right of access regime in a 
range of processing operations carried out by schools, universities and employers.1609 The 
rationale behind such exemption is not discussed in the preparatory works. This raises serious 
questions about its appropriateness.1610 The other access denying provision is section 47 of the 
DPA relating to health and social work (see 5.4.2.3). 
 
Also pertinent to mention is that the right of access and other data subject’s rights are covered 
by the other code of practice ‘Your Rights’. Hence the ‘Sixth principle’ has to be read together 
with this code of practice. Since some of the important issues already addressed above repeat 
themselves in ‘Your Rights’, detailed discussed is skipped here.  
 
The ‘Seventh principle’ states that appropriate security and organisational measures shall be 
taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or 
destruction of, or damage to, personal data. This principle is broadly covered in section 27 of the 
DPA as part of obligations of a data controller. However sufficient details of security measures 
are provided in Rule 5 of the Practical Guide. These include regular review of the security 
measures; weighing up the costs of security measures against the other factors; assessing the state 
of technological development; training of staff; using of contractual obligations to put processors 
under compliance to application of appropriate security measures; providing appropriate access 
control; and physical security. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mp.html last visited 26/03/2012. 
1609 Gayrel, note 1601, supra. 
1610 Ibid. 
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The ‘Eighth principle’ states that personal data shall not be transferred to another country, unless 
that country ensures an adequate level of protection of the rights of data subjects in relation to 
the processing of personal data. This principle has to be read with section 31 of the DPA. The 
latter section deals with international transfer of personal data similar to Arts 25 and 26 of 
Directive 95/46/EC. It is worth noting that the ‘Eighth principle’ is also dealt under Rule 9 of 
the Practical Guide.  
 
The regime of international transfer creates conditions for Mauritian data controllers to transfer 
personal data to other countries. The primary requirement under section 31(1) of the DPA is 
that ‘subject to subsection 2, no data controller shall, except with the written authorisation of the 
Commissioner, transfer personal data to another country.’ The exceptions to section 31(1) are 
provided in section 31(2). The latter are similar to what the European Directive 95/46/EC 
provides in Art 26. Section 31(2) states that ‘the Eighth data protection principle specified in the 
First Schedule shall not apply where (a) the data subject has given his consent to the transfer; (b) 
the transfer is necessary (i) for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the 
data controller, or for the taking steps at the request of the data subject with a view to his 
entering into a contract with the data controller; (ii) for the conclusion of a contract between the 
data controller and a person, other than the data subject, which is entered at the request of the 
data subject, or is in the interest of the data subject, or for the performance of such a contract; 
(iii) in the public interest, to safeguard public security or national security; (c) the transfer is made 
on such terms as may be approved by the Commissioner as ensuring the adequate safeguards for 
the protection of the rights of the data subject.’ 
 
Section 31(3) states that, ‘for the purpose of subsection 2(c), the adequacy of the level of 
protection of a country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding the 
data transfer, having regard in particular (a) the nature of the data; (b) the purpose and duration 
of the proposed processing; (c) the country of origin and country of final destination; (d) the 
rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the country in question, and (e) any relevant 
codes of conduct or other rules and security measures which are complied with in that country’. 
 
Rule 9 of the Practical Guide interprets the ‘Eighth principle’ together with section 31 as setting 
out two criteria for transfer of personal data to a foreign country: that the foreign country in 
question ensures an adequate level of data protection and also the transfer is authorised in 
writing by the Commissioner. The two conditions must exist simultaneously. This interpretation 
344 
 
appears to be correct particularly when one reads the first sentence of section 31(2) of the DPA. 
This opening sentence states categorically that the ‘Eighth principle’ shall not apply in all cases 
falling under that subsection. Concomitantly, it leaves the ‘Eighth principle’ to be applicable only 
in the context of section 31(1) of the DPA henceforth limiting the two stated conditions for 
transfer of personal data in that subsection. However, these conditions do not completely apply 
in the context of section 31(2) of the DPA. This is because transfer of personal data to a foreign 
country can still take place without adequate level of protection being afforded by such a country 
and without the written authorisation of the Data Protection Commissioner. This formulation is 
similar to Article 26 of the European Directive 95/46/EC. Yet, this view is contrary to the 
opinion of Gayrel who holds that ‘a transfer is also possible in specific cases (exemptions), which 
however do not exempt the data controller from obtaining the approval of the Data Protection 
Commissioner.’1611 As a result of this requirement, she argues, ‘the Mauritian regime therefore 
appears to be quite restrictive with respect to transborder data flows. It requires the controller to 
obtain the approval of the Data Protection Commissioner in all cases, whether the transfer is 
intended towards a country ensuring an adequate level of protection or not. This appears to be 
burdensome both for controllers and the Commissioner.’1612 Gayrel’s position is largely 
influenced by a similar view taken by the Data Protection Commissioner in the Practical Guide 
particularly Rule 9 as well as her presentation of 5 October 2011. In such presentation the 
Commissioner raised the following question: what are the conditions to be fulfilled for transfers 
of personal data from Mauritius? She replied:- 
 
‘All transfers are subject to the written authorisation of the Commissioner. An 
application form is available on the homepage of the website to facilitate the 
request for authorisation. Transfers to countries not ensuring an adequate level 
of protection standards are further subject to conditions that may(sic) imposed 
by the Commissioner for protection of personal data involved.’1613 
 
Gayrel and Commissioner’s views over the Mauritian international transfer regime are erroneous 
for three reasons. First, both of them have omitted to interpret the phrase ‘subject to’ appearing 
in the beginning of section 31(1) of the DPA. Such a phrase has the effect of making section 
31(2) of the DPA prevail over section 31(1), at least in those specific circumstances. Accordingly, 
the requirements of written authorisation by the Commissioner as well as the adequacy level of 
                                                          
1611 Gayrel, note 1588, supra. 
1612 Ibid. 
1613 Madhub, note 1566, supra. 
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protection in the ‘Eight principle’ of data protection are excluded in the application of section 
31(2) of the DPA. Second, the Mauritian Parliamentary debates (Hansard) surrounding section 31 
of the DPA are quite clear that there are circumstances where transfer of personal data outside 
Mauritius do not require authorisation of the Commissioner. To be sure part of these debates 
reads:- 
 
‘Similar safeguards have also been provided under clause 31 of the Bill to 
prohibit the transfer of personal data to a third country without the written 
authorisation of the Commissioner. Thus, in accordance with the Eighth Data 
Protection Principle, the Commissioner will have to ensure that the transfer of 
personal data to a third (sic) country may only take place if the third (sic) 
country in question ensures an adequate level of protection, both in terms of 
disclosure of personal data to a third party and protection afforded to the data 
subject.’1614 
 
It can be ascertained from the above paragraph that it was the intention of the Parliament that 
the transfer of personal data regime to a foreign country should not impede flow of information. 
That is why those exceptions were envisaged by the DPA. Third, the misinterpretation of section 
31(2) of the DPA by both Gayrel and the Commissioner has been partly attributed by two other 
factors. The Commissioner has completely omitted to refer to section 31(2), (c) of the DPA in 
her Practical Guide. She just considered section 31(2), (a) and (b) as exceptions to section 31(1). 
This is also the case with Gayrel. However for Gayrel it appears that the word ‘approved’ used in 
section 31(2),(c) is similar to ‘written authorisation’ in section 31(1) of the DPA. This might not 
be correct because section 31(3) provides that ‘adequate safeguards’ referred in section 31(2),(c) 
of the DPA must be assessed at a country level to see whether such country provides an 
adequate level of protection of personal data. The criteria for assessment are then provided. Such 
criteria are almost the same as those provided in Art 25(2) of the European Directive 95/46/EC. 
Thus, the word ‘approved’ in section 31(2), (c) must be associated with the authority assessing 
the level of data protection in a country. However once such assessment has been conducted and 
a country approved as providing an adequate level of protection, transfer can always proceed 
without any further ‘written authorisation’ in section 31(1) of the DPA. This interpretation is in 
accord with the ‘safeguards’ referred in the above quoted paragraph from the Hansard. Yet, it 
                                                          
1614 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 12 of 01.06.04, Public Bills: Data Protection Bill (No. XV of 2004), 
p.81. 
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must be admitted that the formulation of section 31 of the DPA is somewhat confusing. It 
was/is not proper to treat section 31(2), (c) as a rule of exception rather as a general rule as it is 
the case with the European Directive. The confusion is further exacerbated by the exclusion of 
the ‘Eighth principle’ at the beginning of section 31(2) of the DPA while at the same time 
referring to it in section 31(2)(c) and 31(3) which are meant to be exceptions for transferring 
personal data to a country without an adequate level of protection.  
 
Apart from the eight data protection principles, the DPA contains special rules for processing of 
personal data. These include sensitivity (already considered above); direct marketing; and data 
matching. 
 
Section 30 of the DPA governs processing of personal data in the context of direct marketing. 
Generally, this provision does not prohibit direct marketing neither does Rule 12 of the Practical 
Guide on direct marketing. Section 30(1) of the DPA only states, ‘a person may, at any time, by 
notice in writing, request a data controller (a) to stop; or (b) not to begin, the processing of 
personal data in respect of which he is a data subject, for purposes of direct marketing.’ Once the 
data controller receives such notice he is obliged under section 30(2) to act within a period of 28 
days by either erasing the data if such data were kept only for purposes of direct marketing; and 
where the data were kept for direct marketing and other purposes, stop processing the data for 
direct marketing. Further, the data controller is required to notify the data subject in writing of 
any action taken.1615 Where the data controller fails to comply with a notice issued by the data 
subject, the latter may appeal to the Tribunal.1616 In event the data controller fails to comply with 
an order of the Tribunal he or she shall commit an offence.1617 
 
According to the Commissioner, the application of the data protection law in the sector of direct 
marketing varies depending on the medium through which the marketing is delivered.1618 Thus, 
there are marketing by post, phones, fax and e-mail. Postal marketing is the traditional and oldest 
form of marketing for mail received through a person’s letter box.1619 To be considered direct 
marketing, a mail must be addressed to a named person and must be promoting a product or 
                                                          
1615 Mauritius Data Protection Act 2004, s. 30(4). 
1616 Ibid, s. 30(5). 
1617 Ibid, s.30(6). 
1618 Mauritius Data Protection Office, ‘A Practical Guide for Data Controllers & Data Processors-Volume 1’-Rule 
12. 
1619 Ibid. 
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service.1620 In the Commissioner’s view an unaddressed mail put into a letter box or mail 
addressed to the ‘occupant’, ‘the resident’ or ‘the householder’ does not necessarily involve the 
use of personal data and consequently data protection legislation may not apply.1621 While the 
DPA is silent about consent for purposes of direct marketing, Rule 12 of the Practical Guide 
provides two main forms of consent at least with regard to postal marketing. These are ‘opt in’ 
or ‘opt out’. The former is a box which invites a person to indicate if he or she would like to 
receive such material. Unless he or she demonstrates ‘active consent’ by ticking the box, his or 
her personal data cannot be used for direct marketing purpose. On the other hand, an ‘opt out’ 
box invites a person to indicate (usually by ticking) if he or she objects to receive direct 
marketing material. According to the Commissioner, failure by the person to tick the box, may 
be taken as an indication of his or her ‘passive consent’ to receive the direct marketing material. 
The Commissioner indicates in the Practical Guide that she is prepared to accept that the 
individual has given his or her ‘passive consent’ by not ticking the ‘opt out’ box, provided the 
personal data in question are not of a sensitive nature. Moreover, the Practical Guide is clear that 
consent may also be verbal or if a person participates in a special promotion, which clearly 
involves the use of personal data for certain clearly defined direct marketing purposes, 
participation may be taken as implicit consent by individual. Also significant, Rule 12 of the 
Practical Guide provides that a person intending to use personal data for direct marketing 
purposes should offer a cost free opt-out facility. This requirement applies across all other forms 
of communications. Other important rules of postal direct marketing include the following:-a 
controller is prohibited from using personal information obtained in the past for a different 
purposes for direct marketing; a person cannot sell a list of personal data for direct marketing 
unless he or she obtains the consent of all the individuals affected; consent from children should 
be obtained through their parents or guardians; and ordinarily a controller is not allowed to 
direct market at people referred by his or her existing customers.  
 
As to residential subscribers’ phone calls and faxes; these are prohibited unless the controller 
obtains prior consent from the individuals concerned. This applies also to business subscribers’ 
phones and faxes. However, in case of directing marketing by using e-mail, the controller must 
obtain an individual’s consent or he/she obtained those information in the course of a sale to 
him or her for a service or product; the controller disclosed his or her identity, the purpose of 
collecting personal data; the persons or categories of persons to whom such personal data may 
be disclosed and any other information which is necessary so that processing may be fair; also 
                                                          
1620 Ibid. 
1621 Ibid. 
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the direct marketing the controller is sending is in respect of his or her similar products and 
services only; the controller had given a simple cost-free means of refusing the use of an 
individual’s contact details for direct marketing and such individual did not object and he or she 
was given similar options subsequently still he or she could not refuse. 
 
Section 32 of the DPA generally prohibits data matching. However there are exceptions where 
data matching is permissible: where the data subject has given his consent; the Commissioner has 
consented to the procedure being carried out and such procedure is carried out in accordance 
with conditions imposed by the Commissioner; or data matching is required or permitted under 
any other enactment. Rule 13 of the Practical Guide clearly provides that any data matching that 
is likely to adversely affect the data subject must be carried out only after the data subject and 
Commissioner have consented. 
 
5.4.2.5 Data Protection Commission 
 
The Data Protection Commission is the main institution of enforcement of the Data Protection 
Act 2004. It is established under section 4(1). Structurally the Commission falls under the Prime 
Minister’s Office. It is composed of the Commissioner as its head and other public officers.1622 
To qualify as the Commissioner one must be a barrister with at least five years standing at the 
Bar.1623 While the Act is silent as who appoints the Commissioner, the Website of the 
Commission provides that the Data Protection Commissioner is appointed by the Public Service 
Commission.1624 Moreover, the Data Protection Act does not state the length of tenure of the 
Commissioner and if he or she can be reappointed. As regards the other public officers in the 
Data Protection Commission, the Act does not specify their numbers. Neither does it list their 
respective positions nor qualifications, leave alone their remunerations. However such officers 
are under direct administrative control of the Commissioner.1625 In her first Annual Report 2009-
2010, the Commissioner made a call that ‘it is further of utmost importance that this office be 
provided within the least possible delay with adequately qualified staff to carry out the activities 
listed in section 5 of the Data Protection Act.’1626 She also requested the Prime Minister’s Office 
                                                          
1622 Mauritius Data Protection Act 2004, ss. 4(2) and 4(4). 
1623 Ibid, s.4(3). 
1624 Mauritius Data Protection Commission’s Website, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/dataprotection/menuitem.00d90163887e1852a6a4bc10a0208a0c/, 
last visited 27/03/2012. 
1625 Mauritius Data Protection Act 2004, s.5 (5). 
1626 Mauritius Data Protection Office, First Annual Report of the Data Protection Commissioner February 2009-
February 2010, p.2. 
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to consider appointing on a contract of one year under the capacity building programme foreign 
consultants with expertise in data protection so that they can train the staff once recruited and 
also assist the Commission in the performance of its duties.1627 These requests by the 
Commissioner leave a lot to be desired on the qualifications of members of the Commission.  
 
Before assuming duties, the Commissioner and every officer of the Commission is required 
under section 6 of the DPA to take oath. The oath puts the Commissioner and other officers in 
the Commission under duty of confidentiality. They are therefore not required to divulge any 
information obtained in the exercise of a power or in the performance of a duty under the Act. 
However section 6 permits divulge of information in accordance with the provisions of the 
DPA, any other enactment, upon a court order, or as authorised by the order of a Judge. As it 
will be shown subsequently, this provision has ramification in reporting decisions of complaints 
by the Commissioner. 
The question whether or not the Mauritian Data Protection Commission is independent is 
difficult to assess. Yet in theory the general view is that the Commission is independent. This 
general view comes following the amendment of the Data Protection Act 2004 on 15 April 2009 
through the Stimulus Package Act 2009. The latter legislation repealed section 21 of the DPA. 
To be sure, section 21 provided:- 
‘21(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Prime Minister may give in writing such 
directions of a general character to the Commissioner, not inconsistent with 
this Act, which he considers to be necessary in the public interest, and the 
Commissioner shall comply with those directions.  
 
(2) The Prime Minister shall not (a) give any direction in relation to any 
specific matter which is the subject of any investigation by the office; and (b) 
question the Commissioner or an authorised officer, or otherwise enquire into, 
a matter which is under investigation by the office.’ 
 
Subscribing to the above view, Gayrel argues that the repeal of section 21 of the Data Protection 
Act 2004 shows the will of the Mauritian legislature to provide an unambiguous independence to 
the Commissioner.1628  However repeal of section 21 of the DPA may not necessarily translate 
                                                          
1627 Ibid, p.14. 
1628 Gayrel, note 1588, supra. 
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independence of the Commission into practice although it is admitted this is a sound starting 
point. As analogously argued by Professor Michelo Hansungule:- 
 
‘As indicated, Angola, Botswana, Malawi and most other Southern African 
constitutions recognize and guarantee the notion of judicial independence. 
Surprisingly, Mauritius, one of the most widely acclaimed democracies in 
Africa throughout the period of one party dictatorships, does not have an 
explicit pro-judicial independence clause in its Constitution. There are typical 
provisions one finds in a constitution describing the structure of government 
including judicial structures in the Constitution of Mauritius but the document 
is shy to pronounce itself on the specific issue of judicial independence. What 
this means is that while a country may not make special mention of judicial 
independence in its constitution, it may achieve it in practice. In other words, 
it is not enough to proclaim the independence of the judiciary for the judiciary 
to be independent. Much more will need to be done to actually achieve the 
standard in practice and a statutory proclamation to that effect though a 
desired natural first priority especially for countries emerging from the throes 
of dictatorships, nevertheless, does not achieve it by itself.’1629 
 
In the context of judiciary other safeguards exist (e.g. security of tenure for judges) in which case 
the absence of explicit proclamation of independence of judiciary may not affect it in practice. 
However such safeguards are lacking with the Commission. For example, the Data Protection 
Act does not contain the compatibility regime which addresses the conflicts of interests between 
members of the Commission and the executive. Similarly the DPA does not state expressly that 
the Commissioner is independent such that the Commissioner may offer any opinion even if it is 
unfavourable to the public sector. This is contrary to Art 28(1) of the European Directive 
95/46/EC which explicitly makes reference to ‘complete independence’. Yet this omission is 
partly mitigated by section 60 of the Act which limitedly provides for immunity of the 
Commissioner and authorised officers against civil and criminal liability. Moreover, there is no 
provision in the DPA stating the source of funds for the activities of the Commission.  
 
Worthwhile to mention is that section 21 of the DPA raised fierce debates during Parliamentary 
discussions of the Data Protection Bill 2004. On the one hand, the government, through the 
                                                          
1629 Hansungule, M., ‘Independence of the Judiciary and Human Rights Protection in Southern Africa’, pp.1-9, p.6, 
http://www.pdfcari.com/Judiciary-and-Human-Rights.html last visited 29/03/2012. 
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Prime Minister, maintained that it was necessary for him to have powers to give directions to the 
Commissioner on account of national security.1630 On the other hand, parliamentarians objected 
such a provision on account of potential abuse.1631 The parliamentarians cited three illustrations 
of possible abuses of such powers. The first involved an occasion where sensitive personal 
information was released when the Prime Minister attended a socio-cultural organisation.1632 The 
other relates to section 45 of the Bill (the same as the DPA) which gives the Prime Minister 
power to exempt from application of the Act any of its provision based on national security.1633 
The third instance likely to operate in undermining the independence of the Data Protection 
Commissioner is assessed from the entire past experience of the public service in Mauritius as 
aptly posited by Dr. Ramgoolam, ‘we have seen in the past that some people do not feel that 
independence. They don’t have independence to act independently and I think this is the danger 
we face.’1634 With this last illustration, it can be submitted that sometimes informal directives 
from the executive may partly be the reason for fear to act independently. However and as 
submitted above, it is difficult to trace such kinds of directives as they are given secretly. 
 
Section 5 of the Data Protection Act vests the Commissioner with a wide range of functions 
typical of any data protection authority. These include ensuring that subjects of the Data 
Protection Act comply with its provisions and any regulations made under it; to issue or approve 
codes of practice or guidelines for the purposes of the Act. This function is further consolidated 
in section 56 of the Act; to create and maintain a register of all data controllers and data 
processors; to exercise control on all data processing activities, either of its own motion or at the 
request of a data subject, and verify whether the processing of data is in accordance of the DPA 
or regulations made under it; to promote self-regulation among data controllers and data 
processors; to investigate any complaint or information which give rise to a suspicion that an 
offence, under the Act may have been, is being or is about to be committed; to take such 
measures as may be necessary so as to bring to the knowledge of the general public the 
provisions of the DPA; to undertake research and monitor developments in data processing and 
ensure that there are no significant risks of any adverse effects of those developments on the 
privacy of the individuals; to examine proposals for data matching or linkage and ensure that 
they do not cause any adverse effects to individuals privacy; to co-operate with supervisory 
                                                          
1630 Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 12 of 01.06.04, Public Bills: Data Protection Bill (No. XV of 2004), 
pp.80 and 112. 
1631 Ibid, pp.86, 87 and 108.  
1632 Ibid, p.87. 
1633 Ibid. 
1634 Ibid, p.108. 
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authorities of other countries, to the extent necessary for the performance of his duties under the 
Act particularly by exchanging relevant information in accordance with any other enactment; and 
to do anything incidental or conducive to the attainment of the objects and better performance 
of his duties and functions under the DPA. The Commissioner is also required under section 55 
of the DPA to prepare and submit to the National Assembly annual report of the Commission’s 
activities not later than three months of every calendar year. Matters to be reflected in the report 
include a statement about the operation of approved and issued codes of practice; other matters; 
and any recommendations that the Commissioner thinks fit in relation to the implementation of 
the Act, and in particular the data protection principles.  
 
In exercise of the above functions, the Commissioner is vested with various powers. Generally, 
the Commissioner has powers to do anything for the purpose of carrying out his functions as 
long as it appears to him to be requisite, advantageous or convenient for discharging such 
functions.1635 Apart from these general powers, the Commissioner has specific powers to certain 
acts under the DPA. It may appear that the specific powers were intended to operate in specific 
contexts. Yet beyond those contexts, it is difficult to see how the powers of the Commissioner 
may be invalid given that under section 7 of the DPA he has the general powers to do anything 
as long as they are tandem to the implementation of the Act. To be sure, specific powers vested 
in the Commissioner relate to the following:-powers to obtain information (section 8). However 
the exercise of such powers is subject to certain provisions of pieces of legislation listed there. 
The Commissioner may delegate his powers to any officer in his office or any police officer on 
his or her behalf.1636 Such powers are limited to those relating to investigation and enforcement 
powers but nothing more. In relation to dispute settlement, where a complaint has been made to 
him, the Commissioner is empowered to investigate the complaint unless he is of the opinion 
that such complaint is frivolous or vexatious.1637 And, as soon as practicable, he is required to 
notify the complainant in writing of his decision in relation to the complaint.1638 Moreover, the 
notice by the Commissioner to the complainant must explain to him that if he is aggrieved by the 
Commissioner’s decision, he has the right of appeal to the ICT Appeal Tribunal.1639  
 
To give effect to functions vested in him, the Commissioner has power to serve an enforcement 
notice under section 12 of the Data Protection Act 2004. This notice can only be issued where 
                                                          
1635 Mauritius Data Protection Act 2004, s.7. 
1636 Ibid, s.9. 
1637 Ibid, s.11 (a). 
1638 Ibid, s.11 (b). 
1639 Ibid. 
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the Commissioner is of the opinion that a data controller or processor has contravened, is 
contravening or is about to contravene the provisions of the DPA. The role of the enforcement 
notice is to direct the data controller or processor to take specific steps within such specified 
time in the notice. Failure to comply with the enforcement notice without reasonable excuse is 
an offence which upon conviction attracts a fine not exceeding 50,000 rupees( approximately US 
Dollar 1,660) and to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. Once complied with the 
enforcement notice, the data controller or processor is required to notify the data subject 
concerned. It is imperative to note that the enforcement notice does not bar the Commissioner 
from investigating the same matter he has called the data controller or processor to comply. 
Where the data controller or processor is aggrieved by the enforcement by the Commissioner he 
may appeal to the ICT Appeal Tribunal. The Commissioner has also powers to seek 
expeditiously for preservative order from a Judge in Chambers where he has reasonable ground 
to believe that such data is vulnerable to loss or modification.1640  
 
Other categories of powers vested in the Commissioner include power to carry out prior security 
checks(section 14); power to carry out periodic audits of the systems of data controllers or 
processors to ensure compliance to the data protection principles( section 15); and powers to 
request assistance for purposes of gathering information or proper conduct of investigation 
(section 16). Also, to better enable the Commissioner to discharge his duties, the Data Protection 
Act vests in him under section 17 powers of entry and search any premise. However, before the 
Commissioner exercises such powers, usually through an authorised officer, he must apply and 
obtain a warrant from a Magistrate. Moreover before entry and search, the authorised officer 
must show the owner or occupier a warrant issued by the Magistrate which is only valid for the 
period specified and other conditions stipulated there. It is an offence for the owner or occupier 
of a premise to obstruct the authorised officer to enter and search if the warrant is shown to him 
or her.1641 Finally, the Commissioner has powers to refer the matter to the police following a 
revelation of commission of offence from his investigation.1642  
 
The above outlined functions and powers of the Commissioner are similar to those provided in 
Arts 27 and 28 of the European Directive. However, it is important to assess how they have 
been implemented in practice. One caveat must be pointed out in relation to this assessment. 
Most of the provisions with regard to functions and powers of the Commissioner are 
                                                          
1640 Ibid, s.13. 
1641 Ibid, s.19. 
1642 Ibid, s.21. 
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interrelated and overlap in their implementation. As a result, in order to keep focus, key areas of 
exercise of these functions and powers are discussed.  These include public awareness of the 
provisions of the Data Protection Act 2004, issuance or approval of codes of practice or 
guidelines, determination of complaints and preparing annual reports. 
 
 Public Awareness 
 
As pointed out in 5.4.2.2, there was no or little public consultation of the Data Protection Act 
2004 during its legislative process. To partly mitigate the implications of such an omission, the 
Act incorporates a provision on carrying public awareness of DPA and its regulations as part of 
the functions of the Commissioner. However, it should be clear that the provision on public 
awareness was not specifically inserted to address the omission to consult the public prior to the 
adoption of the DPA. Instead, it was incorporated to facilitate compliance to the law by data 
controllers and subjects just as it is the case elsewhere. 
 
In discharging her duty to bring into the knowledge of the public the provisions of the Data 
Protection Act and its regulations under section 5(g), the Commissioner had issued a leaflet on 
data protection to individuals and organisations. The leaflet is about their obligations and rights. 
The leaflet is also available on the Commission’s homepage of its website. Perhaps the most 
important efforts by the Commissioner in sensitising the public about the Data Protection Act 
are demonstrated by handful of presentations delivered to various sectors: banks, business 
processing outsourcing sectors and employers including universities.1643 All the presentations of 
the Data Protection Commissioner are posted on PowerPoint on the ‘presentation’ section of 
the website of the office.1644 Currently there are twenty five(25) presentations (up to 26 May 
2012).1645 Apart from these presentations, the Commissioner has further developed a ‘teens corner’ 
                                                          
1643 Mauritius Data Protection Office, First Annual Report of the Data Protection Commissioner February 2009-
February 2010, p.6. 
1644 Ibid, p.34. 
1645 ‘Overview of the Mauritian Data Protection Act’ presented on the occasion of the Cyber Security Conference 
by the Commissioner 30 November 2007; ‘The challenges imposed by biometric technology on data protection and 
privacy’ presented on 1st of December 2008 on the occasion of the Computer Security Day 2008;  ‘A simplified 
understanding of the intricacies of the Data Protection Act and how the implementation of this legislation will affect 
your daily life’ presented on 27th of February 2009 for workshop on Privacy and Data Protection organised in 
collaboration with the National Computer Board;  ‘Overview of the legal requirements imposed by the Data 
Protection Act on data controllers and the corresponding rights of data subjects’ presented on 10 March 2009 at the 
University of Technology to the students; ‘An overview of the Data Protection Act and its implications as regards 
registration transfers of personal data and data subject access requests’ for the banking sector presented by the 
Commissioner on the 5th June 2009 at the Mauritius Bankers’ Association;  ‘The Data Protection Implications for 
our DNA Bill’ presented by the Commissioner on the 9th June 2009 at the Awareness Workshop on Legal Aspects 
of the Use of Human DNA;  ‘An overview of the Data Protection Act and its implications as regards registration 
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which is found on the website of the Commission.1646 The reason for developing this corner is to 
sensitise young people on the pros and cons of the social networking sites.1647 
 
From the above observations, it can be submitted that the sensitisation of the Data Protection 
Act and its regulations is still severely limited. At present, the Commissioner’s efforts to make 
the Data Protection Act and its regulations known to the public are confined largely to data 
controllers and processors. This is revealed in the Data Protection Commissioner’s Second 
Annual Report where it states, ‘the Data Protection Office has deployed considerable efforts to 
educate data controllers on their obligations under the Data Protection Act.’1648 Similarly, one 
can still notice the limited level of sensitisation from the number of presentations so far made by 
the Commissioner. The 25 presentations made by the Commissioner are far smaller in number 
compared to the number of registered data controllers and processors by December 2010 which 
was 8200.1649 This number might have gone higher in 2011. However, one can argue that other 
data controllers and processors can access the 25 presentations from the homepage of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and data subject access requests for the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology’ presented by the 
Commissioner on the 10th June 2009 at the Ministry of the Information and Communication Technology;  ‘Data 
Protection Requirements for the ITES/BPO/KPO/LPO sector’ presented by the Commissioner on  03 September 
2009 at MEF-MCCI Building, Ebene in collaboration with OTAM;  ‘Data Protection Implications for the Public 
Sector’ presented by the Commissioner on  16 September 2009 at the Ministerial Security Committee in 
collaboration with the National Security Advisor's Office; ‘Les Propositions apportées par la commissaire au projet 
de loi mauricien visant à protéger les enfants à l' ère numérique’ presented by the Commissioner on  2 November 
2009 at the Francophone Conference held in Madrid;  ‘Ensuring compliance with data protection principles from a 
practical perspective’ presented by the Commissioner on  30 November 2009 on the occasion of the Computer 
Security Day 2009;  ‘A Legal Purview of the Data Protection Act and the Mission of the Data Protection Office’ 
presented by the Commissioner on  26 January 2010 to Mauritius Employers Federation members;  ‘The Data 
Protection Act  - An introduction to its implications and objectives’ presented by the Commissioner on  13 
August 2010 to the staff of the Local Government Service Commission;  ‘The Data Protection Obligations of a 
Public Institution’  presented by the Commissioner on  5 October 2010 to the Ministry of Social Security at the 
Training Unit of the Ministry;  ‘The Obligations of a Public Data Controller and Processor under the Data 
Protection Act’  presented by the Commissioner on  16 November 2010 to the Ministry of Health;  ‘Analysis of the 
Obligations of a Data Controller and a Data Processor’  presented by the Commissioner on  11 November 2010 
to Data Protection Compliance Officers organised by Geroudis Management Services Ltd;  ‘How to Ensure 
Effective Compliance with the Data Protection Act’  presented by the Commissioner on  18 January 2011 to Lamco 
Insurance Ltd; ‘Making Sense of it:- What is Data Protection?’  presented by the Commissioner to the Truth and 
Justice Commission on  09 March 2011;  ‘How to incorporate data protection rules to safeguard shareholders' 
personal data of the sugar investment trust’  presented by the Commissioner on  25 March 2011;  ‘Data protection 
from an employment perspective’ presented by the Commissioner on  05 July 2011 to Groupe Mon Loisir Ltd;  
‘Video on Data Protection’ presented by the Commissioner on  12 August 2011 to International Card Processing 
Ltd and others; ‘La problématique juridictionnelle et les enjeux du transfert de données personnelles dans les 
opérations d'externalisation’ presented by the Commissioner on  21 September 2011 to AFAPDP in Dakar;  ‘The 
Data Protection Office in Mauritius - The Challenges Ahead’ presented by the Commissioner on 5 October 2011 to 
ICT-BPO Forum; ‘Overview of the Fundamental Aspects of the Right of Access’ presented by the Commissioner 
on 20 April 2012 to Mutual Aid Association Staff; and  ‘Data Protection Fundamentals for the Banking 
Sector’ presented by the Commissioner on 26 April 2012 to Barclays Bank. 
1646  Mauritius Data Protection Office, First Annual Report of the Data Protection Commissioner February 2009-
February 2010, p.34. 
1647 Ibid. 
1648 Mauritius Data Protection Office, Second Annual Report of the Data Protection Commissioner January 2010-
December 2010, p.6. 
1649 Ibid, p.9 (number of registered data controllers and processors). 
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Commission’s website. Given the fact that data protection is a new field of law, the direct 
interaction of the Commissioner and data controllers and processors is necessary for clarifying 
the understanding of various concepts, obligations and rights defined in the Act and its 
regulations. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the leaflet distributed by the Commissioner 
is difficult to assess. In the first place, it is difficult to ascertain how many data controllers, 
processors and individuals received such a leaflet. Moreover, it is difficult to assess if those who 
received the leaflet were able to understand it without difficulties. 
 
Another point needing comment is the availability of various documents on data protection on 
the Commission’s website. Admittedly any person in Mauritius and outside may at any time 
access such documents to familiarise with the operation of the Data Protection Act and its 
regulations. However, it has been shown in 5.2 that only 31.7% of Mauritians had access to the 
Internet by 2011. This number is relatively small as a result the limitation posed by Internet 
penetration has adverse impact in the use of such medium to reach a large number of public. 
Moreover, out of this number it is less clear how many teens have access to the Internet in 
Mauritius.  
 
Despite the above efforts to educate the public and certainly due to lack of effective mechanisms 
for that purpose, the Commissioner has identified ‘continued lack of awareness amongst data 
controllers and data processors of their data protection obligations’1650 and ‘ continued lack of 
awareness on the part of the members of the general public( who, as a result, give away their 
personal information too easily, do not ask why personal information is needed or fail to ‘tick the 
box’ to say they do not want to be contacted)1651 as among the nine threats to data protection in 
Mauritius.  
 
 Codes of Practice and Guidelines 
 
The Commissioner issued various codes of practice and guidelines under the provisions of 
sections 5(b) and 56 of the DPA. Some of them have already been referred in various parts of 
this thesis. Yet, it is important to list these codes and guidelines so that a general assessment can 
easily be made. They include: A Practical Guide for Data Controllers & Data Processors-Volume 
1; Registration Classification & Guidance Notes for Application of Data Controllers & Data 
                                                          
1650 Mauritius Data Protection Office, First Annual Report of the Data Protection Commissioner February 2009-
February 2010, p.42. 
1651 Ibid. 
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Processors-Volume 2; Data Protection-Your Rights-Volume 3; Guidelines for Handling Privacy 
Breaches-Volume 4; Guidelines to regulate the Processing of Personal Data by Video 
Surveillance Systems-Volume 5; Guidelines on Privacy Impact Assessments-Volume 6; Practical 
Notes on Data Sharing Good Practices for the Public and Private Sector-Volume 9; and Code of 
Practice issued by the Data Protection Commissioner for CCTV Systems operated by the 
Mauritius Police Force. 
 
The above codes of good practice and guidelines either supply details to the main provisions of 
the DPA or offer simplified version of the provisions of the Act to ease their understanding. 
Sometimes both aims manifest in the texts of these codes and guidelines at the same time. As 
alluded to, in some of the codes of good practice and guidelines, the Commissioner has supplied 
conditions for processing which somewhat appear in excess of the provisions of the DPA or 
which are sometimes in conflict with the principle Act. For example, the general condition of 
data processing in the DPA is data subject’s consent under section 24(1). However the Act does 
not define what is an ‘express consent’. It only defines ‘consent’ in section 2 as any freely given 
specific and informed indication of the wishes of the data subject by which he signifies his 
agreement to personal data relating to him being processed. As pointed out, in ‘A Practical 
Guide for Data Controllers & Data Processors-Volume 1’ the Commissioner has taken the view 
that ‘express consent’ is consent given explicitly, either orally or in writing.  According to the 
Oxford Advanced Leaner’s Dictionary1652 the word ‘explicitly’ in relation to a statement or piece 
of writing denotes something which is clear and easy to understand. Yet, despite the clear 
requirement of ‘express consent’ in section 24(1) of DPA, the Commissioner has significantly 
lowered ‘express consent’ to ‘passive consent’ in the direct marketing context and is prepared to 
accept it in compliance to the law.1653 The latter means that the data subject does not ‘tick a box’ 
in order to ‘opt out’. Another instance where ‘A Practical Guide for Data Controllers & Data 
Processor-Volume 1’ provides a condition which is not stipulated in the DPA relates to the 
obligation imposed upon data controllers and processors to explain to data subjects the logic 
used in any automated decision making process where an individual is significantly affected.  
 
The inconsistencies between the codes of practice and guidelines on the one hand and the DPA 
have not yet been considered by any court in Mauritius. However, it is doubtful if the former 
                                                          
1652 Hornby, A.S., Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 7th Edition, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2005, p.536. 
1653 See Mauritius Data Protection Office, A Practical Guide for Data Controllers & Data Processors-Volume 1, 
Data Protection Rule 12. 
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may pass the repugnancy clause in the Interpretation and General Clauses Act 1974.1654 The 
repugnancy clause is provided in section 23(c) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act. It 
states that where an enactment confers power on any person to make a subsidiary enactment for 
a general purpose and also for a special purpose, the special purpose shall not derogate from the 
generality of the power conferred by the general provision. Since there is no any court decision 
annulling provisions of the codes of the practice or guidelines, the Commissioner’s opinion as 
contained in these legal texts comprises the correct statement of the law in Mauritius. 
 
There is yet another problem with the codes of practice and guidelines. It is about the legality of 
their application. Section 56(3) (b) of the Data Protection Act 2004 states that any code of 
practice shall, where the code is approved under subsection(1), come into operation on a day 
specified by the Commissioner. In section 56(1) the Commissioner may ‘issue or approve codes 
of practice’ or ‘issue guidelines’. Yet in section 5(b) it is provided that the Commissioner shall 
‘issue or approve codes of practice or guidelines’ for the purposes of the DPA. While section 
5(b) leaves it open for the Commissioner to ‘approve’ both the codes of practice and guidelines, 
section 56(1) restricts the term ‘approve’ to codes of practice as against ‘issue’ which is used for 
both codes of practice and guidelines. Interestingly, DPA does not distinguish a ‘code of 
practice’ from ‘guideline’. However in practice the two appear closely related. For example the 
Guidelines to regulate the Processing of Personal Data by Video Surveillance Systems-Volume 5 
is similar to the Code of Practice issued by the Data Protection Commissioner for CCTV 
Systems operated by the Mauritius Police Force. Yet, the former is a guideline while the latter is a 
code of practice. So far the Commissioner has only specified the date of commencement of the 
Code of Practice issued by the Data Protection Commissioner for CCTV Systems operated by 
the Mauritius Police Force and left the guidelines unspecified. Since both the codes of practice 
and guidelines are either issued or approved by the Commissioner under the same legal provision 
and also affect the data controllers, processors and data subjects, their commencement date is 
necessary to be given. 
 
 Complaints  
 
As pointed out, section 11 of the DPA gives the Commissioner power to receive and determine 
complaints. The Commissioner has decided seven complaints since 2009 to 24 May 2012. Such 
decisions have been posted on the section of the Commission’s website called ‘Decisions on 
                                                          
1654 Mauritius Interpretation and General Clauses Act 1974(Act No.33 of 1974). 
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Complaints’. Postings appear to be made immediately after the decision. However, it is difficult 
to establish exactly the date as the website does not contain this information. Currently, the exact 
number of pending complaints is unknown since the Commissioner does not post such records 
on the website. However, during interview with the researcher of this thesis on 4 July 2011(Port 
Louis, Mauritius), she confirmed that there were thirteen pending complaints. This number may 
have arisen. However, four complaints were determined after the day of interview with the 
Commissioner. 
 
To initiate a complaint, a complainant has to fill a prescribed off print or electronic form. The 
former can be downloaded from the Commission’s homepage in the ‘To report your complaint’ 
section while the latter is available on ‘Online submission of complaint’. In relative terms, the off 
print form requires the complainant to fill only little information: name of complainant; name of 
a person against the complaint; contacts of the complainant(address, e-mail address and phone 
number); address of the person against the complaint; nature of relation; date of submission; and 
brief facts about the complaint. On the other hand, the online form requires pre-registration to 
obtain a username and password. As a result, more information is needed: gender, age group, 
country, occupation, education, interest, and citizenship. However after logging in, the same 
form as off print appears for the complainant to fill. 
 
In practice, a party lodging complaint is called ‘complainant’ while a party responding it is called 
‘respondent’. If there are more than one complainants or respondents, these are differentiated by 
numbers (e.g. complainant 1, 2, or respondent 1, 2). In the reported decided complaints, the 
identities of the complainant and respondent are always anonymised. The Commissioner has 
done so on the basis of a duty of confidentiality imposed upon her and every officer in the 
Commission under section 6 of the DPA. Thus, the section of ‘Decisions on Complaints’ bears 
the following notice:-   
 
‘Please note that all complaints lodged to the Data Protection Office under 
section 11 of the Data Protection Act are also subject to a duty of 
confidentiality imposed upon all officers of the Data Protection Office.  The 
Commissioner has thus decided to publish decisions on this public website 
without revealing the personal data of the complainants and respondents to 
the public but only the decision based on the facts of the case.’ 
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However, some non-direct parties to a complaint are fully named by their identities. This is the 
case with the third and fifth decisions considered below. Yet, in the seventh decision, the 
Commissioner avoided to mention the non-direct parties involved in the complaint. 
 
The decisions are cited by reference numbers followed by ‘In the matter of’ then names of the 
parties. The first and second decisions are referenced as PMO/DPO/DEC while in the third to 
seventh DPO/DEC. In each case a serial number of a decision is added at the end. In these 
references PMO stand for Prime Minister’s Office, DPO Data Protection Office and DEC 
decision. It is not clear why the Commissioner dropped PMO in the subsequent reporting of her 
decisions. One may argue, though with some risks of certainties, that the Commissioner wanted 
to demonstrate a sense of independence of her office in determining the complaints. 
 
The other basic feature of the Commissioner’s decisions is that they are relatively short usually 
ranging between two to three A4 pages. Yet, they are sufficient to convey information about the 
nature of a complaint, legal issues involved, essential steps taken by the Commissioner in 
investigation, summary of evidence, her findings and verdicts. However, in certain cases (e.g 
decision seven) these decisions are longer. 
 
As pointed out, so far the Commissioner has decided seven complaints. It is imperative to survey 
these decisions in order to uncover: how the basic data protection principles have been applied 
in practice; how the Commissioner has engaged other provisions of the DPA, codes of practice 
and guidelines; how relevant are such decisions in the development of data protection system in 
Mauritius; at whose interests the decisions are made; etc. These decisions are considered in their 
order of reference numbers. 
 
The first decision is Complainant v Respondents 1, 2, and 3.1655 The complaint in this decision was 
lodged on 21 July 2010 at the Data Protection Office under section 11 of the DPA. It was about 
unauthorised use of the complainant’s curriculum vitae (CV) by respondents 1, 2 and 3 which 
was originally communicated electronically to the respondent 1. The complainant alleged that he 
had a contract with respondent 1 for the implementation of a Food Security Management 
System (HACCP-MS 133) project at respondent 2 who was a beneficiary of respondent 3. 
According to the complainant, he cancelled his contract with respondent 1 for non-fulfilment of 
the terms of the contract. Following such cancellation, the complainant officially wrote to the 
                                                          
1655 Ref.No:-PMO/DPO/DEC/1. 
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respondent 1 asking him not to use or process his CV. He further alleged that respondent 1 had 
acted in bad faith and breach of contract by using his curriculum vitae to obtain financial benefit 
for his client, namely respondent 2 from a public institution, namely respondent 3. The 
complainant also added that respondent 2 acted in bad faith by using his CV to obtain financial 
benefit from a public institution i.e. respondent 3. He also alleged that respondent 2 acted as an 
accomplice with its consultant i.e. respondent 1 to defraud the complainant. Lastly, he 
complained that respondent 3 had failed to recognise his right by not stopping to use his CV 
when asked to do so. 
 
In her decision, the Commissioner found that there was no evidence to support the complaint of 
unauthorised or unlawful use of personal data in the complainant’s CV by respondents 1, 2 and 3 
in carrying out project HACCP-MS 133. The reason given by the Commissioner was that the 
complainant was not any more hired as consultant for the project after the cancellation of the 
contract with respondent 1. Moreover respondent 1 had informed respondent 3 that the 
complainant was not hired for the project. Also, the Commissioner’s site visit at respondent 1’s 
company premise, made with its consent, revealed no evidence of any personal data in the hard 
drive nor external media storage of the computer of respondent 1. The latter had deleted all 
personal data of the complainant suggesting that he had no intention to use it in future. 
However, the Commissioner requested respondent 3 in writing to return the complainant’s CV 
through her office which he did guaranteeing that it was never used for the benefit of the 
project. Following the return of his CV, the complainant made a statement recorded by the 
Commissioner that since all respondents had endeavoured not to use it, he was satisfied with the 
outcome of the enquiry. 
 
Based on the above, the Commissioner set aside the complaint under sections 26(a) & (b) and 28 
of the Data Protection Act as the offence had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 
Moreover, the CV was not used or disclosed in any manner incompatible with the purpose for 
which data was collected and processed and was further kept only for the lawful purpose. When 
the purpose for keeping the data had lapsed, respondents deleted and/or removed all data 
pertaining to complainant within their possession. The Commissioner’s decision was delivered 
on 23 March 2011. 
 
The Commissioner’s above decision is based on the second principle of data protection in the 
First Schedule of the Data Protection Act i.e. purpose specification. The latter principle 
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manifests as duty on use of personal data in section 26(a) & (b). Also important to note, the 
Commissioner’s decision is based on the duty to destroy the personal data in section 28 of the 
DPA once its purpose has lapsed. Both of these requirements were fulfilled by the respondents. 
Yet, a close examination of the above decision leaves a lot to be desired. For example, it was 
until the complainant had brought the matter into the attention of the Commissioner and the 
latter had officially written the respondent 3, he was only able to return the complainant’s CV. 
However evidence on record reveals that respondent 1 had already notified respondent 3 that 
the complainant was no longer hired as consultant of the project. Despite such notification 
respondent 3 continued to retain the complainant’s CV. It can be submitted that respondent 3 
did not comply with section 28 of the DPA. Moreover, it can be argued that the Commissioner 
omitted to consider the fifth principle of data protection principles in the First Schedule of the 
DPA on data retention. This principle manifests as an obligation on the party of data controller 
and processors in section 26(d). As alluded to, the Commissioner has taken the view in Rule 8 of 
‘A Practical Guide for Data Controllers & Data Processors-Volume 1’ that the data controller 
must be clear about the length of time for which data is kept and the reason why the information 
is being retained. Had the Commissioner considered all these, she would have probably found 
respondent 3 in breach of his obligations under the DPA. 
 
The second complaint considered by the Commissioner was Complainant v Respondent.1656 This 
complaint was about the use of CCTV camera in residential areas. The complainant lodged it on 
8 November 2010 by way of a letter to His Excellency, the President of Mauritius and to the 
Commissioner of Police. On 25 January 2011 the Commissioner of Police channelled the letter 
to the Data Protection Commissioner. The complainant alleged that his neighbour, who is the 
respondent, had placed CCTV cameras in his yard, the visual angle of which was directed 
towards him. As a result, it had caused and was continuing to cause heavy prejudice to him by 
violating his privacy. The complainant further alleged that because of the acts of the respondent 
he was not able to open his kitchen room and his family was suffering from intense heat during 
summertime.  
 
Upon consent by the respondent, the Commissioner investigated the complaint. The site visit 
was carried out in the presence of both parties. The investigation revealed that the images which 
were recorded in the respondent’s camera did not capture anything outside the respondent’s site. 
Moreover the respondent justified the continued use of CCTV cameras for privacy and security 
                                                          
1656 Ref.No:-PMO/DPO/DEC/2. 
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reasons. Following this investigation, the complainant gave a written declaration that the cameras 
placed by respondent were not infringing his privacy rights since they were not directed towards 
his premises and was satisfied with the enquiry carried by the Commissioner. 
 
The Commissioner decided that there was no any incriminating evidence against the respondent. 
Nonetheless, she required the respondent to place within two months of the date of receipt of 
the decision, a small but visible and legible sign near his entrance gate or any other appropriate 
area within his premises to inform all visitors that CCTV cameras were in operation for security 
purposes. The rationale for this was to prevent any potential infringement of privacy rights of 
individuals and violations of sections 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,28 and 29 of the DPA. The 
respondent was further required to notify the Commissioner the compliance to her direction 
failure of which would result into commission of an offence under section 12 of the DPA. The 
Commissioner set aside the complaint under section 11 of the DPA as the commission of an 
offence under the DPA had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This decision was 
delivered on 25 April 2011. 
 
The above decision shows that the Commissioner did not specifically refer to the ‘Guidelines to 
regulate the Processing of Personal Data by Video Surveillance Systems-Volume 5’ although she 
applied some of the rules laid down there. Moreover, in contrast to the first decision, she set it 
aside under section 11 of the DPA. 
 
The third decision is Complainant v Respondents 1 and 2.1657 The complaint involved here was about 
unauthorised marketing by short service message (SMS). It was lodged on 17 December 2010 
and was decided on 26 June 2011. In this matter it was alleged that the complainant received an 
SMS on his private mobile phone number reading as follows: ‘INVEST IN LAND. Buy land on 
the heights of Les Marianes. Show day 19 December from 14h30 onwards. Phone (respondent 
1) for more info :(...)’ without his consent. The complainant’s number was private and registered 
on his name at Orange Mauritius Telecom. He requested an enquiry by the Commissioner as to 
how the leakage of his private mobile number had taken place.  
 
For investigation of the above complaint, the Commissioner delegated her powers to an 
investigative officer outside the Commission as the complainant was an officer of the 
Commission. The complainant voluntarily showed the SMS concerned with the advert to the 
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enquiring officer. The enquiry revealed that respondent 1 had outsourced the marketing activities 
of the company to respondent 2, a data processor. Respondent 1 further stated by way of 
declaration that he had been made aware of the relevant sections of the Data Protection Act 
namely sections 22, 24 and 30 and that he was satisfied with the enquiry conducted by the 
Commission. 
 
Respondent 2 informed the Commissioner by way of a written statement that he had constituted 
a database of his customers which consisted of their demographic details and phone numbers. 
He also stated that the marketing activities of the company were carried out with prior consent 
of his customers through duly signed forms. Moreover, each month a customer was sent a 
message to deregister should he or she wish to do so. In event there was no reply, customers 
remained in the database. During the site visit, carried out with respondent 2’s consent, the latter 
showed the enquiring officer the mobile number used to contact the customers monthly, 
consent forms, and those who declined their consent. Respondent 2 also stated that the incident 
comprising the complaint cropped up due to an inadvertent error wherein a number had been 
wrongly or erroneously inputted in the database or a subscriber failed to deregister from the 
service when given the opportunity. He further gave assurance that minute care would be 
exercised to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future and was satisfied with the 
manner the enquiry was conducted. 
 
During investigation, the enquiring officer informed respondent 1, that in accordance with 
section 24 of the Data Protection Act, he must ensure that respondent 2 was only sending SMSs 
to those consented to receive the required advert. The enquiring officer required respondent 2 to 
stop sending SMSs though there was initially a written consent to accept SMSs about marketing 
when the customer did not wish to receive SMSs anymore. Respondent 1 was required to notify 
all its agents and concerned stakeholders to ensure that express consent of individuals for 
marketing had been obtained before any advert was sent through a third party or data processor 
to them.  Moreover, the complainant gave a written declaration that he was satisfied with the 
outcome of the enquiry and the prompt action taken by the Commissioner. Since corrective 
measures had already been implemented by the respondents he had not received any more 
advert SMSs from them. 
 
The Commissioner found that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the SMS complained 
was sent through a genuine error to complainant on his mobile and was not meant to cause any 
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prejudice to him. Nevertheless, she required both respondents to carry out direct marketing 
activities in compliance with the requirements of the DPA, particularly Part IV.  She also 
required the respondent 1 to provide a more user friendly and efficient marketing system where 
the option to deregister or opt-out was incorporated in the SMS (containing advert) itself before 
sending. The Commissioner required respondent 1 to envisage opt-in consent to confirm 
express consent of the customers electronically together with the signing of the appropriate 
consent forms as already catered for by him. Respondent 1 was similarly required to comply with 
the principle of purpose specification and security. Respondent 2 was required under section 27 
of the DPA to enter into a contract with the data processor, i.e. respondent 1, which stipulates 
that the latter would only act on instructions received from the data controller, i.e. respondent 2 
and was bound by the obligations devolving on the data controller. The complaint was thus set 
aside to the above legal conditions being fulfilled. 
 
As it can be noted, the Commissioner’s above findings do not refer or in any case take into 
account the provisions of ‘A Practical Guide for Data Controllers & Data Processor-Volume 1’ 
regarding direct marketing. As a result, her decision is fundamentally inconsistent with her own 
guidelines. Particularly significant to note, the Commissioner has complicated the data subject’s 
requirement of consent in the context of direct marketing. Whereas in the Practical Guide she 
was prepared to accept ‘passive consent’ i.e. failure by the data subject to ‘tick a box’ marked 
‘opt-out’ in compliance with the provisions of the DPA, in the present decision she insisted on 
express consent standard. Moreover, the Commissioner’s view, that the express consent already 
obtained by the respondent 1 in duly written forms was to be supplemented by an electronically 
‘opt-in’  consent to confirm the previously obtained consent, was rising the standard too high. It 
can be argued that the two-stage consent approach may not be in compliance with section 24(1) 
of the DPA which imposes duty on data controllers and processors to obtain ‘express consent’ 
before processing personal data. This provision or section 30 of the DPA does not impose an 
extra duty to ‘confirm consent’ by obtaining another ‘express consent’ in respect of the same 
personal data and for the same purpose. 
 
It is imperative to note that in the present case the Commissioner found sufficient evidence that  
respondent 1 used the complainant’s private mobile phone number without his consent. Yet she 
was prepared to accept ‘genuine error’ as defence to mitigate the effect of the unlawful use of 
one’s private mobile phone number. Nevertheless, it is difficult to comprehend where and how 
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respondent 1 picked the private mobile phone number of the complainant, perhaps due to the 
amount of details reported.  
 
This complaint also demonstrates possibilities of conflicts of interest surrounding the functions 
and powers of the Commissioner. As allude to, the complainant in the present complaint was an 
officer working in the Data Protection Office. To partly resolve the conflict of interest, the 
Commissioner delegated her powers to investigate to another person. While this is commendable 
approach, it has to be noted that the same Commissioner proceeded to decide the complaint. It 
is not clear how she dealt with the issues of conflict of interest at the decision stage. It is 
submitted that merely working together with the Commissioner may not necessarily prevent the 
latter from deciding a complaint involving a co-employee. 
 
The fourth complaint, Complainant v Respondent,1658 is similar to the second in that they are both 
related to unauthorised use of CCTV cameras. The former was lodged on 13 April 2011 under 
section 11 of the DPA and its decision was passed on 5 August 2011. In this complaint, the 
complainant alleged that the respondent placed his CCTV cameras in such a position as to affect 
his private life through the monitoring of his movements from and to his dwelling house. He 
provided the schema of the alleged positioning of the camera systems where he resided. 
 
On a site visit to the respondent’s premise which was conducted with her own consent it was 
revealed that, the respondent installed the CCTV cameras to deter vandalism from students, 
trespassing of her pupils to neighbouring houses and littering on the school compound. She also 
gave concrete experiences leading to installation of the CCTV cameras. Despite the justification, 
the investigation revealed that two cameras slightly focused beyond the boundary walls because 
they were long range surveillance. As a result, passerby and vehicles could be viewed outside the 
college premise. The respondent confirmed to the enquiring officers that she had no malicious 
intention to invade the privacy rights of the complainant and/or neighbours. She installed the 
cameras systems for security purposes only. Moreover, she stated that immediate measures for 
compliance would be taken for reorienting all cameras to focus the premises of the college only. 
The respondent had already placed sign boards after the first site visit. However, the respondent 
failed to successfully take corrective measures. Following this failure, the Commissioner served 
the respondent with an enforcement notice which she complied with. 
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Based on the above, the Commissioner decided that the respondent had implemented corrective 
measures to safeguard privacy rights namely posting of proper signage to inform all the college’s 
premises of the presence of CCTV cameras. That was in compliance with sections 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28 and 29 and Part VI of the Data Protection Act. Moreover, the enforcement notice 
served to the respondent had been observed by her. 
 
Like the second decision, the Commissioner properly applied some rules in the ‘Guidelines to 
regulate the Processing of Personal Data by Video Surveillance Systems-Volume 5’ without 
express reference to it.  However in this particular complaint the Commissioner found sufficient 
evidence to incriminate the respondent yet she avoided to reach such a conclusion. Although not 
specifically stated, this may be partly due to the Commissioner’s acceptance of the respondent’s 
defence of ‘no malicious intention to invade the privacy rights of the complainant and/or 
neighbours.’ Instead, she said that the respondent had implemented corrective measures and 
complied with the enforcement notice. It is also important to note that this is the only complaint 
in which the Commissioner had used the enforcement notice to make the respondent compliant 
to the provisions of DPA.  
 
The fifth decision, Complainant v Respondent,1659 is about unauthorised marketing by phone. The 
complaint was lodged on 17 December 2010 under section of 11 of the DPA and decision was 
passed on 17 August 2011. The complainant alleged that he received a call from someone 
claiming to be calling on behalf of the respondent from telephone number (...). The person 
calling said to the complainant that he got complainant’s number from Orange (a Telecom 
company in Mauritius). He also claimed that the complainant was very lucky to have won a 50% 
off discount on the training courses the respondent was offering. The complainant stated in his 
complaint that he had never played any game to receive that discount nor had he granted written 
authorisation to Orange to disclose his private phone number to any third party. Due to that, the 
complainant requested the Commissioner to investigate how the leakage of his private mobile 
number had taken place. 
 
The Mauritius Telecom informed the Commissioner that the complainant’s number (...) was not 
within the public domain and was registered as a prepaid SIM in their system. Also, it was not 
the policy of MT/Cellplus to disclose details of subscribers to third parties. MT was also neither 
in any business relationship or partnership with the respondent. 
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In the course of investigation, the enquiring officer contacted the respondent and informed him 
the implications of marketing by phone with emphasis on Part IV of the Data Protection Act. 
The enquiry had also revealed that the respondent was not aware of the provisions of the Data 
Protection Act.  
 
By way of written declaration, the respondent confirmed that he was not in partnership with 
Orange/Emtel for marketing activities but did marketing to all customers of Emtel and Cellplus. 
The respondent stated that the mobile numbers of customers were chosen at random to contact 
them and the company does not phone customers anonymously. Upon calling, they introduced 
themselves first and then asked for permission before talking to the customer. If the person 
agreed, they then proceeded with their marketing; else they stopped the marketing procedure 
immediately. The respondent also stated that those customers who did not consent to take the 
call were recorded in a database and were not contacted further. Similarly, the respondent kept a 
database of phone/mobile numbers for those who expressly consented and were interested to 
take any course from the respondent. He showed the records in the database. 
 
The enquiring officer informed the respondent a number of practical steps to comply with the 
provisions of the DPA in the marketing of his business: to establish a written contract for those 
customers who wanted to be contacted further with the option of ‘opt-out’ incorporated in the 
marketing agreement. Such agreements must be duly signed by the subscriber who accepted to 
receive any advert concerning ICT Training course from respondent. The respondent was also  
informed to contact only clients who had provided their written consent and stop immediately 
under the provision of section 30 of the DPA marketing for those customers who no longer 
accepted the marketing though they had initially signed consent forms to receive adverts. The 
enquiring officer also informed the respondent to adhere to section 22 of the DPA which is 
about purpose specification. The respondent was also informed to use other means of marketing 
as public broadcast media such as television, radio and/or written press. The enquiring officer 
insisted that marketing by phone could only be done with express consent. 
 
The complainant gave a written declaration that he was satisfied by the investigation carried out 
by the Commissioner which remedied the matter. He also informed the enquiring officers that 
he had not received any call from the respondent after the complaint was lodged in the office of 
the Commissioner. Similarly, the respondent declared in writing that he was satisfied with the 
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enquiry carried out by the Commissioner and would ensure compliance to the provisions of the 
Act. 
 
The Commissioner decided that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the call was made 
to the complainant on his mobile by the respondent. She required the respondent to carry out 
his marketing activities in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Data Protection Act 
particularly Part IV. Similarly the Commissioner required the respondent to provide a more user 
friendly and efficient marketing system whereby the option to deregister or opt-out is given 
whilst securing written consent of the customers for marketing. The consent collected should 
not be used for any other purpose incompatible with the original purpose. He was also required 
to ensure appropriate security and organisational measures are taken to protect the personal data 
of customers. 
 
It can be noted from the above; the Commissioner required only ‘express consent’ as opposed to 
both ‘express consent’ and confirmation of the previous consent by ‘opt-in’ option in the third 
decision. The latter is practically new and/or additional ‘express consent’. Therefore while the 
two complaints are slightly similar, the level of consent required has not been consistent. 
Moreover, contrary to the Practical Guide where it is provided by the Commissioner that express 
consent may be oral or written, in the present decision she insisted that written consent must 
always be given. Also important to note, although the Commissioner found the respondent 
incriminated by evidence, she did not say so expressly. Instead, she proceeded to direct 
corrective measures. Lack of awareness or rather ignorance of the law pleaded by the respondent 
might have influenced the Commissioner not to strictly deal with the respondent. However such 
defence raised by the respondent had not been expressly considered. The other point which is 
difficult to comprehend is the respondent’s approach of choosing randomly customers of 
Orange and Emtel. Although both, the respondent and MT/Cellplus denied to have any 
relationship, one is made to believe that such relationship might have existed otherwise the 
respondent could have nowhere to pick customers’ mobile phone numbers in the first place.  
  
The sixth decision is Complainant v Respondent.1660 It was about unauthorised use of private e-mails. 
The complainant was lodged on 18 February 2011 by way of letter and decided on 26 August 
2011. The letter was from anonymous data subjects. Their claim was that the respondent had 
emailed symbolic pictures of a religious nature to several persons. He used email addresses of 
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complainants without their authorisation. The complainants alleged that the respondent used 
their email addresses allocated to them by the organisations they were working for as such he 
divulged their private addresses and infringed their right of privacy.  
 
The Commissioner investigated the complaint submitted to her under the powers vested in 
section 5(f) of the DPA. Under this provision the Commissioner may initiate investigation on 
the basis of suspicion received by her that an offence under the Act may be committed. In the 
present complaint the complainants were anonymous. Hence the complaint letter sent to her was 
sufficient to trigger intervention of the Commissioner even if the complainants remained 
anonymous. 
 
By way of a written declaration, the respondent confirmed to have sent the email in question 
from his employee mailbox to various recipients. However, he stated that he did so without 
malicious intention to harm anybody since he did it according to his religious beliefs and as a 
well-wisher. He further stated that, in his opinion, some people or one of the email receivers 
were attempting to put his professional career at stake by making an anonymous complaint. The 
respondent also stated that he would cooperate fully with the Commission in its investigation. In 
another statement, the respondent stated that he had been made aware of the relevant provisions 
of the Data Protection Act with regard to the complaint made against him. He was satisfied with 
the way the enquiry was conducted.  
 
The Commissioner decided that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was 
not aware of implications of sending email addresses of third parties to unauthorised recipients 
and there was no mala fides involved in his action. The enquiring officers informed him such 
implications. The Commissioner reminded the respondent that under section 24 of the Data 
Protection Act of his duty to obtain the express consent of a data subject before using the latter’s 
personal data. She also informed the respondent that failure to abide by the provisions of the Act 
would result in prosecution by the Commission. 
 
This decision is the first in which the Commissioner expressly accepted lack of awareness of the 
provisions of the Data Protection Act (i.e. ignorance of law) as a defence for unlawful processing 
of personal data. She similarly accepted lack of malicious intention to harm anybody as a 
defence.  
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The seventh complaint is Complaint v Respondents 1 and 2.1661 The complaint in his decision 
concerned about the use of personal data in the context of debit/credit card. It was lodged on 7 
June 2011 and decided on 14 May 2012. Initially, this complaint was lodged on 3 March 2011 by 
letter to the General Manager of respondent 1 and the CEO of respondent 2. The copy of the 
complaint was sent to the Prime Minister’s Office (Defence and Home Affairs Department). It 
was subsequently channelled to the Commissioner. The complainant alleged that respondents 1 
and 2 stored his debit/credit card details during purchase transaction at Point of Sale (POS). 
During investigation-the complainant showed the investigators his debit card he used to pay at 
the POS as well as a copy of respondents’ 1 and 2 receipts where the debit/credit card number 
was recorded. The complainant alledged that his details could be used for illicit payment by 
hackers. Moreover, the Commissioner requested necessary advice from two unnamed sources. 
The Commissioner decided that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that respondents 1 and 
2 displayed the required efforts to remedy the potential dangers to personal information of 
customers being used for illegal transactions by adopting appropriate security and organisational 
measures. However, the Commissioner required the respondents to show compliance with 
international and local standards by ensuring that personal information as identified above are 
not kept illegally. 
 
An overview of the above decisions reveals the following common trends. First, in all complaints 
the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. However, it is less clear who primarily bears 
the burden of proof. In some cases, the burden lays upon complainants yet in certain other cases 
upon the respondents. Also less obvious is the criterion for the shift of this burden. Second, 
somewhat related to the first, the Commissioner has not strictly enforced the provisions of the 
DPA and its regulations. In most cases where she found controllers contravened the law, the 
Commissioner avoided to find so expressly. Instead, she proceeded to give corrective measures. 
This is partly because many data controllers and processors in Mauritius are not aware of their 
obligations, suggesting why the Commissioner has accepted ignorance of law and/or lack of 
awareness of the provisions of the DPA as a defence. As a result, the Commissioner has utilised 
the proceedings arising out of the complaints lodged in her office to bring the provisions of the 
DPA and its regulations in the knowledge of the data controllers and processors. To accomplish 
that mission, the enquiring officers spend substantial part of the investigation to explain to the 
data controllers and processors their obligations under the Act. Similarly, the Commissioner 
makes reference to various provisions of the Data Protection Act in her decisions even if they 
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are not directly applicable to a particular dispute. Third, there are no formal definitions of 
complaint outcomes. For example, in the first three decisions the Commissioner used the 
expression ‘set aside’ while in the seventh case no express outcome is declared. Yet, in setting 
aside the first decision, she did so under sections 26(a) & (b) and 28 of the DPA while in the 
second and third decisions she set aside the complaints under section 11. Surely, the 
Commissioner erred to set aside the first decision under the substantive provisions rather than 
section 11 of the DPA. Yet ‘set aside’ is not clear as sometimes it appears to mean the complaint 
is not founded hence dismissed as it was the case with the second complaint. However, ‘set 
aside’ appears also to mean the complaint has been resolved as in the third complaint. On the 
other hand, the Commissioner has not used the term ‘set aside’ in the fourth, fifth, sixth and 
seventh decisions. Hence, it is difficult to ascertain readily the outcomes of such complaints. It is 
submitted that, consistency in reporting outcomes of complaints is necessary. The latter is also 
required to be made around formalised definitions which explain the meaning of complaint 
outcomes, e.g. resolved, settled, dismissed, withdrawn, etc. Fourth, the current way of 
anonymising parties to the complainant is somewhat confusing. As alluded to, parties are called 
as ‘complainant(s)’ and ‘respondent(s)’.For example the parties in the second, fourth, fifth and 
sixth appear to be the same. This may cause difficulties to properly distinguish these decisions. 
An alternative way of achieving anonymity, while maintaining degree for distinguishing decisions 
is to refer to the names of parties with their initial capital letters of their first names (e.g. Z v P).  
Also important in citation of decisions is to add years of decisions. This may help to obtain the 
statistics of the complaints in a particular year. Fifth, in all seven decisions, the Commissioner 
has not explained to the parties their right of appeal to the ICT Appeal Tribunal as is required 
under section 11(b) of the DPA. It is not certain whether the Commissioner has been using a 
different method to notify the parties of this right. During interview with the researcher of this 
thesis on 4 July 2011, in Port Luis, Mauritius, the Commissioner confirmed that none of the first 
three decided decisions by then was appealed to the ICT Appeal Tribunal partly because parties 
were satisfied by the Commissioner’s decision. However, one point has to be made clear. None 
of the above seven decisions ended with a consent settlement of parties. Hence the signed 
declarations by parties in the Commissioner’s decisions that they were satisfied with the way the 
complaint and/or investigation were handled do not qualify as settlement to bar appeals. It is 
imperative to note that the Commission’s website is not linked to the website of the ICT Appeal 
Tribunal. This partly makes difficult to ascertain if there is any appeal in the Tribunal arising 
from the Commissioner’s decision. Also significant to note is that there is no known case law in 
which a data subject has instituted in the ordinary courts for compensatory claims. Finally, it can 
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be submitted that most of the problems enumerated above are largely caused by absence of 
regulations on proceedings of the Commission in determining complaints. In connection with 
this, the Commissioner once observed that section 11 of the DPA simply provides for 
investigation of the complaint, notification to the complainant in writing of her decision and 
information about the appeal to the ICT Appeal Tribunal.1662 ‘There is no provision in the Data 
Protection Act on the manner in which a hearing may take place and the evidences(sic) to be 
submitted before the Commissioner...’1663    
 
 Annual Reports 
 
Section 55 of the Data Protection Act requires the Commissioner to lay an annual report to the 
National Assembly. The Commissioner has to table the report three months latest after the end 
of the calendar year. Section 55(3) provides that the first calendar year covered the period from 
the commencement of the DPA to the end of the year of such commencement. Since the rest of 
the DPA came into force on 16 February 2009, the latter was the commencement of the first 
year of the report while 31 December 2009 was the last date. Accordingly, the Commissioner 
had up to 31 March 2010 to lay her first annual report to the National Assembly. In compliance 
to the time limit, the Commissioner has so far laid her first annual report (February 2009-
Decemnber 2009), second annual reports (January 2010-December 2010) and third annual report 
(January 2011-December 2011). 
 
The contents of the Commissioner’s reports are largely determined by herself. However section 
55(2) states that the annual report shall include a statement about the operation of approved and 
issued codes of practice and any recommendation relating to the compliance with the Act, and in 
particular the data protection principles. All of the Commissioner’s three reports contain the 
minimum contents required by the law. Other issues included in the reports are registration of 
data controllers and processors; sensitisation; complaints; investigations; and threats to data 
protection generally. Some shortcomings of these reports are: they lack special formats as a result 
it is difficult to follow the progress of particular issues. For instance, the first report states the 
vision and mission of the Data Protection Office while the second states only the vision yet with 
slight difference from the first. Also, the reports do not cover decisions of the Commissioner 
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regarding complaints submitted in her officer. Apart from being posted on the Commission’s 
website it is not certain if these reports are disseminated to data controllers and processors. 
   
5.4.3 EU-Accreditation Process 
 
This part comprises of an extended discussion of part 5.4.2.2 dealing with legislative process. It 
has been dealt separately for three reasons. First, is to give clear focus of discussion of the issues 
falling under accreditation stage. Second, there is no clear evidence of the direct involvement of 
the European Union in the legislative process already covered in 5.4.2.2. As discussed elsewhere 
in this thesis, this second reason stems out of the fact that it is the third country which initiates 
the accreditation process and not EU itself. Third, during accreditation stage, the European 
Union is largely involved to streamline the third country’s data legislation already in place. 
However two caveats must not be forgotten. Most invariably the legislative process in a third 
country (e.g. part 5.4.2.2) is initially influenced and driven by the objective of adopting the data 
privacy law in line with the requirements of Arts 25 and 26 of Directive 95/46/EC. Moreover, 
quite often such a legislative process involves copycat of the basic principles and provisions of 
the Directive 95/46/EC and institutions of enforcement. Sometimes a third country takes a 
statute on data privacy from an EU member state which had already transposed the Directive. 
Therefore while the accreditation process is a component of legislative process it deserves its 
own treatment. 
 
As pointed out, the Mauritius Data Protection Act 2004 was adopted largely to secure the 
business agenda. Not surprisingly compliance with the European Directive 95/46/EC was/is 
necessary to ensure uninterrupted flow of personal data from Europe to Mauritius. In the first 
annual report to the National Assembly, the Data Protection Commissioner reported:- 
 
‘The prime objective of the Commissioner in 2009 has been to pave the way 
to the international recognition of the office through accreditation of 
Mauritius with the European Union. A project becoming reality since the 
European Union has officially been requested to consider extending to 
Mauritius the status of an adequate third country in data protection and the 
issue is presently being considered at the level of the EU.’1664 
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The Commissioner also reported to the National Assembly that in response to the above official 
request for accreditation, a consultant (representing University of Namur) appointed by the 
European Union went to Mauritius in March 2010 to study the Data Protection Act and the level 
of compliance of the Mauritius data privacy legislation with European standards.1665 The report 
of the consultant would then be forwarded to the European Union who would make proposals 
with regard to any amendments to be brought to the Data Protection Act to satisfy the 
safeguards provided under the European Direction on data protection.1666 
 
In 2010 the European Union issued its report on the adequacy level of data protection afforded 
by Mauritius.1667 This report did not clear Mauritius as providing adequate level of protection of 
personal data as the Commissioner states:- 
 
‘The office has since its inception been working on the adequacy procedure 
and in 2010 a first report of the EU demonstrating the required improvements 
to be made to the legislation was finalised. The office has drafted the required 
changes and is waiting the visit of a second EU consultant next week for the 
draft amendment bill to be finalised and presented to the National Assembly 
as soon as possible. Once the amendments made, the EU would have to 
consider the adequacy of Mauritius.’1668 
 
As noted, Gayrel was one of the European Union consultants who evaluated the data protection 
law in Mauritius. Her article titled ‘Mauritius: Data protection in an evolving island economy’ has 
substantially highlighted the deficiencies of the Mauritius data protection system based on the 
adequacy report.1669 Because of this, no detailed discussion of the report is offered here.  
 
On 24 November 2011, the ‘Workshop for the Mauritius data protection accreditation with the 
European Union’ was held in Port Louis, Mauritius. It was facilitated by the second consultant 
for the European Union, Mrs. Tira Greene. The workshop was also attended by the Ambassador 
of the European Union in Mauritius, Hon. Alessandro Mariani. Other participants included the 
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1667 CRID, University of Namur (Belgium)., ‘Analysis of the adequacy of protection of personal data provided in 
Mauritius: draft final report, 2010. 
1668 Madhub, note 1566, supra. 
1669 Gayrel, note 1334, supra. 
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Minister of Information and Communication Technology, Mr. Pillay Chedumbrum, Attorney 
General, Hon. Yatin Verma and Mrs. Madhub, Data Protection Commissioner.  
 
Mr. Mariani said the workshop was held in the context of the technical assistance being provided 
by the European Union to the Prime Minister’s Office and to the Data Protection Office.1670 He 
further pointed out that the objective of the consultancy was to pave the way for the compliance 
of the data protection legislation in Mauritius with European Union’s standard.1671 Emphasising 
the economic agenda for the compliance, Mr. Mariani posited that it was of utmost importance 
that the data protection legislation and principles in Mauritius was made compliant with the 
European Union Directive.1672 That would secure better chances that Mauritius was recognised 
by the European Union as a country where data protection is adequate, thus opening up 
opportunities for Foreign Direct Investments in important sectors such as offshore and business 
processing outsourcing.1673  
 
On the other hand, the consultant, Tira Greene, pointed out a number of areas which required 
amendments. These included certain definitions of the Data Protection Act to be amended to 
correspond to those in the Directive, particularly definitions of personal data, processing, 
individual; provision on processing of sensitive personal data, transfer of personal data and 
exemptions to be amended to correspond to those in the Directive; removal of the requirement 
for renewal of registration; section 51 of the DPA on ‘information available to the public’ was 
not compliant to the Directive hence it was required to be repealed; the right to object to be 
inserted and some e-government provisions.1674 
 
It is submitted that although the Data Protection Act in Mauritius was adopted in order to offer 
individuals protection of their privacy and to facilitate transfer of personal information in the 
context of business, the latter appears to be the broad agenda for accreditation. Since the transfer 
of personal information envisaged in the accreditation relates to individual residents or citizens 
of EU countries, it is the effect of Mauritius Data Protection regime over the latter that counts 
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1674 Greene, T., ‘Data Protection Accreditation for Mauritius’ Port Louis, Mauritius, 24 November 2011,  
http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/dpo/files/pres_eu1.pdf last visited 4/04/2012. 
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towards adequacy hence accreditation rather than the effect produced by the same regime on its 
own citizens.1675  
 
5.4.4 Other Legislation 
 
The most important of other pieces of legislation regulating protection of personal data is the 
Information and Communication Technologies Act 2001.1676 Previously this Act incorporated 
the regime of data protection law in section 33 and the Fourth Schedule. The latter detailed the 
data protection principles somewhat similar to the First Schedule of the Data Protection Act 
2004. However the entire regime of data protection in the ICT Act 2001 was repealed by section 
64(2) of the Data Protection Act 2004. Currently the ICT Act regulates matters of interception 
of communication under section 32(3) based on limited provisions of confidentiality.  
 
The next statute is the National Computer Board Act 1988.1677 Like the ICT Act, the entire 
regime of data protection in the NCB Act 1988 has been repealed by section 64(3) of the Data 
Protection Act 2004. This is also the case with Criminal Code Cap 195. Previously, the Criminal 
Code contained a regime of data protection in section 300A. The later has been repealed by 
section 64(1) of the Data Protection Act 2004. 
 
Other pieces of legislation with remote regimes of data protection are the Computer Misuse and 
Cybercrime Act 20031678 and Electronic Transactions Act 2000.1679 The former statute applies in 
the context of criminal activities perpetrated through computer systems while the latter applies in 
the electronic transactions and communications. Issues under this legislation include e-
commerce, liability of service providers, electronic and digital signatures, etc. Both the Computer 
Misuse and Cybercrime Act 2003 and Electronic Transactions Act 2000 have never been 
affected by the Data Protection Act 2004. The reason is that they are not directly related with 
regulation of personal data. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1675 For similar view, see e.g. Greenleaf and Bygrave, note 905, supra. 
1676 Act No. 44 of 2001. 
1677 Act No.43 of 1988. 
1678 Act No. 22 of 2003. 
1679 Act No.23 of 2000. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that privacy is still an evolving concept in Mauritius. The development 
of the ICT sector has largely attributed to the rising concerns for individuals’ privacy. However, 
lack of awareness rather than collectivism affects the culture of data protection for majority of 
Mauritians. Moreover the endeavours by the Mauritius government to develop and promote the 
ICT sector to become the fifth pillar of the country’s economy serve as the broad agenda for the 
adoption of the data protection regime. The key players in the ICT sector are foreign companies 
largely originating from Europe. As a result the European Union is keen to ensure that transfer 
of personal data in Mauritius must receive an adequate level of protection. At the same time 
Mauritius is putting efforts to streamline its data protection regime to comply with the European 
standards through the accreditation procedure. For Mauritius, compliance to EU standards is 
lucrative business as the latter will be able to engage in foreign direct investment in Mauritius, 
particularly in offshore and business processing outsourcing, without interruption. 
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6. Data Protection in South Africa 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
South Africa has no comprehensive data protection legislation. However she has currently a data 
privacy protection Bill pending before the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional 
Development of the South African Parliament. This Bill is a product of the longest debates, 
public consultations and reports in the history of the country and Africa. The present chapter 
sketches the legislative development of the South African data privacy Bill alongside the socio-
economic and political history of the country. In the course of these analyses, contested interests 
operating for and against the adoption of the data protection legislation are identified. Besides 
the Bill, this chapter offers an outline of the present systems of data privacy protection in South 
Africa. The strength and weakness of this system is provided as one of the justifications for 
adopting the omnibus data privacy law in the Republic. 
 
6.2 Socio-Economic and Political Context 
 
In contrast to many African countries, South Africa has a complex socio-economic and political 
history. Its thorough presentation deserves a separate treatment for want of space and time. This 
part provides only a summary of selected areas which are relevant to the theme of this thesis.  
The rest of the history is left out. 
 
The Republic of South Africa (South Africa) is located in southern Africa, at the southern tip of 
the African continent. It extends 1,821 kilometres north east to south west of Africa and 1,066 
kilometres south east to north west. South Africa’s total area is 1, 219, 912 square kilometres. To 
the north, it is neighboured by Botswana and Zimbabwe; to the north east by Mozambique and 
Swaziland; on the east by the Indian Ocean; on the south by the Indian and Atlantic Oceans; on 
the west by the Atlantic Ocean; and on the north west by Namibia. In total South Africa is 
administratively divided into nine provinces: Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, 
Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Limpopo, North West and Western Cape.1680 The Capital City of 
South Africa is Pretoria. South Africa has also control of two small islands of Prince Edward and 
Marion which lie some 1,920 kilometres south east of Cape Town. 
 
                                                          
1680 The Constitution of South Africa 1996, Art 103(1). 
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Demographically, South Africa’s total population is estimated at 50.59 million.1681 The main racial 
groups out of this population are Africans (79.5%), Coloured i.e. mixed-race descendants of early 
white settlers and indigenous people (9%), Indian/Asian (2.5%) and White (9%).1682 According 
to the World Bank statistics, by 2010 more people in South Africa lived in the urban areas than 
in rural: in the former it was 60.7% and the latter 39.3%.1683 There are 11 official languages in 
South Africa: Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Zulu, 
and Xhosa.1684 Each of them has an equal status as the other.1685 Yet in practice English enjoys a 
relatively dominant position. Other languages such as German, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, 
Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu, Urdu, Arabic, Hebrew, and Sanskrit are protected and promoted by 
the South African Constitution 1996.1686 
 
South Africa is a secular state. However there are four dominant religions practiced by South 
Africans. These include Christianity 68 %( mostly Whites and Coloured, about 60% of blacks 
and about 40% of Indians); Islam 2%; Hindu 1.5 %( 60% of Indians); indigenous beliefs and 
animist 28.5%.1687 
 
Politically, South Africa is a multi-party constitutional democracy with the president as both head 
of state and government.1688 At the provincial and local government level, the executive function 
is vested in the premier and municipal council respectively.1689 The Constitution is the supreme 
law in the country.1690 Any other law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid.1691 Democratically, 
South Africa is characterised as flawed democracy similar to Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia, 
Lesotho, Benin, Mali, Ghana, and Zambia.1692 
 
                                                          
1681 Statistics of South Africa, Mid-Year Population Estimates, 2011, 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022011.pdf last visited 6/04/2012. It is important to point out 
that the latest population census in South Africa was carried out in 2011, however the report has not yet been 
released. 
1682 Ibid. 
1683 World Bank Indicators, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/population-density-people-per-sq-km-
wb-data.html last visited 6/04/2012. 
1684 The Constitution of South Africa 1996, Art 6(1). 
1685 Ibid, Art 6(4). 
1686 Ibid, Art 6(5). 
1687 South African Web, http://www.saweb.co.za/provs.html last visited 6/04/2012. 
1688 The Constitution of South Africa 1996, Arts 1 and 83. 
1689 Ibid, Arts 125(1) and 151(1). 
1690 Ibid, Art 2. 
1691 Ibid. 
1692 The Economist Intelligence Unit, note 1510, supra. Note that Mali, Zambia and Ghana have been changing 
their status in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011 reports. 
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South Africa became independent from the British colonial rule on 31 May 1910. However it 
remained under the white minority rule until 27 April 1994 when she attained majority rule. This 
date is the South Africa’s Freedom Day and officially the Independence Day. Prior to the South 
Africa’s Freedom Day, the country had experienced the Dutch and English colonial rule just as it 
was the case with many African countries. However, this was compounded by the worst form of 
racism and apartheid regime which was officially launched in 1948, the date when the National 
Party (NP) came in power, and ended in 1994.1693  
 
Apartheid was a system of racial segregation enforced through legislation by the National Party 
governments of South Africa between 1948 and 1994.1694 During this period, the rights of the 
majority non-white inhabitants of South Africa were curtailed and white supremacy and 
Afrikaner minority rule was maintained.1695 Welsh posits that one of apartheid’s chief aims was 
the elimination of competition between black and white, invariably to the benefit of whites.1696 In 
significant respects the linchpin of the apartheid system was the Population Registration Act 
1950, which in principle sought to classify every South African according to ‘race’.1697 As cruel in 
its consequences, though for many people, the Group Areas Act 1950 was another fundamental 
pillar of apartheid.1698 It subsumed all previous pieces of legislation, notably the ad hoc attempts of 
previous governments to curb the so-called Indian ‘penetration’, by providing for the 
comprehensive residential and business segregation of the different colour groups in every city, 
town and village.1699 Other pieces of legislation that consolidated apartheid system included the 
Bantu Building Workers Act 1951 which permitted Africans to perform skilled building work in 
the African townships, at lower wage rates than their white counterparts, but prohibited them 
from doing so outside African areas.1700 A far-reaching in its scope, was the introduction of ‘job 
reservation’ in terms of an amendment to the Industrial Coalition Act 1956.1701 This Act 
empowered the Minister of Labour to reserve particular categories of work for a specific racial 
category.1702 The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act 1959 was yet another important 
                                                          
1693 See e.g., Welsh, D., The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg/Cape Town, 2009, 
particularly Chapter 3; Cottrell, R.C., South Africa: A State of Apartheid, Chelsea House Publishers, Philadelphia-
U.S.A, 2005. 
1694 Wikipedia., ‘Apartheid in South Africa’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apartheid_in_South_Africa last visited 
6/04/2012. 
1695 Ibid. 
1696 Welsh, p.56, note 1692, supra. 
1697 Ibid, p.54. 
1698 Ibid, p.55. 
1699 Ibid. 
1700 Ibid, p.57. 
1701 Ibid. 
1702 Ibid. 
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piece of legislation. Through this Act, the so-called ‘Bantustans’ which means separate and 
supposedly autonomous black African states were established.1703 Africans were required under 
this law to live in the Bantustans but nowhere else. There was also the Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriage Act 1949 which prohibited by deeming null and void marriages between white people 
and people of other races.1704 A series of other pieces of legislation were also enacted in the fields 
of education, health and medical care, voting, access to public services, recreation, etc. 
 
A point has to be made that, although apartheid officially commenced in 1948, its foundation 
was laid down since the early Dutch settlement in South Africa. Historians narrate that it was in 
1652 when the Dutch through the Dutch East India Company, led by Jan van Riebeeck decided 
to establish permanent settlement at Table Bay.1705  The primary reason for establishment of this 
settlement was to provide Dutch ships and other Europeans on their way to East Indies with 
foodstuffs and refreshments.1706 The Dutch settlement and gradual expansion into the interior of 
South Africa resulted in clashes with the original inhabitants-the Khoisans.1707 In 1795 when the 
Dutch influence was fading, the British took over the control over South Africa to prevent it 
from falling in the hands of the French.1708 It is imperative to mention that some of the historical 
events which resulted in and/or accentuated the apartheid regime in South Africa were the Great 
Boer Trek (1830s-1840s),1709 Mfecane Wars( 1820s-1830s),1710 the First (1880-1881) and Second 
(1899-1902) Anglo-Boer Wars,1711 and the Union of South Africa of 1910.1712  
 
                                                          
1703 Cottrell, p.92, note 1693, supra. 
1704 Ibid, p.102. 
1705 Ibid, p. 14. 
1706 Ibid. 
1707 Ibid. 
1708 Wikipedia., ‘History of South Africa’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_South_Africa, 
last visited 7/04/2012. 
1709 The Great Trek (Afrikaans: Die Groot Trek) was an eastward and north-eastward migration away from British 
control in the Cape Colony during the 1830s and 1840s by Boers (Dutch/Afrikaans for ‘farmers’). The migrants 
were descended from settlers from western mainland Europe, most notably from the Netherlands, northwest 
Germany and French Huguenots. The Great Trek itself led to the founding of numerous Boer republics, the Natalia 
Republic, the Orange Free State Republic and the Transvaal being the most notable, see Wikipedia., ‘Great Trek’, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Trek last visited 7/04/2012. 
1710 These wars were a result of the expansion of the European colonial settlement and trade in South Africa. They 
were other reasons such as scarcity of lands, etc. For detailed analyses of Mfecane Wars see e.g., Richner, J.E., ‘The 
Historiographical Development of the Concept “mfecane” and the Writing of Early Southern African History, from 
1820s to 1920s’, M.A Thesis, Rhodes University, 2005. 
1711 These wars were fought between the British and the two Boer independent republics of Orange Free State and 
Transvaal Republic. The wars were part of the British effort to create the Union of South Africa for easy of control 
and administration. 
1712 The Union of South Africa came about on 31 May 1910 after unification of Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange 
Free State into the rest of South Africa under the British colonial control. The Union came to an end on 31 May 
1961, when the country became Republic, see Wikipedia., ‘Union of South Africa’, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_of_South_Africa last visited 7/04/2012. 
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The apartheid system left non-whites, particularly Africans with only one option of resisting it 
through militant and armed struggles. Some leading events which sparked and magnified the 
growth of African resistance were the Sharpeville Massacre of 21 March 1961, Soweto Uprising 
1976-1977, restrictions of non-white movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) 
which operated through its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), detentions and 
killings of leaders of African movement.1713 Also significant to note is the fact that the opposition 
to apartheid arose outside South Africa notably from: United Nations, United States of America, 
Russia, United Kingdom, other European countries as well as African countries. Pressure on 
South Africa to abandon apartheid system from outside took largely the form of political and 
economic sanctions.  
 
South Africa has a bicameral legislative system with the National Assembly as a lower house and 
National Council of Provinces as the upper house.1714  The National Assembly is composed of 
not fewer than 350 and not more than 400 elected representatives.1715 On the other hand the 
National Council of Provinces is composed of a single delegation from each province consisting 
of ten delegates.1716 At provincial and local government levels, legislative functions are performed 
by the provincial legislatures and municipal council respectively.1717  
 
The judicial authority in South Africa is vested in courts.1718 The Constitutional Court is at the 
top in the hierarchy. It has jurisdiction to determine questions with regard to constitutions.1719  
Just below the Constitutional Court there is the Supreme Court of Appeal. The latter has 
jurisdiction to determine all appeals except in constitutional matters.1720 The High Court is the 
third in judicial hierarchy. It has jurisdiction to determine any constitutional matter except those 
reserved for the Constitutional Court.1721 Moreover, the High Court is vested with powers to 
decide any matter as assigned by an Act of parliament.1722 Below the High Court, there are 
Magistrates’ Courts and other courts with limited jurisdiction.1723 These courts do not determine 
constitutional matters.1724 It is important to note that the South African judiciary operates on a 
                                                          
1713 See e.g., Welsh, Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8, note 1693, supra. 
1714 The Constitution of South Africa 1996, Art 42. 
1715 Ibid, Art 46. 
1716 Ibid, Art 60. 
1717 Ibid, Arts 104 and 151(2). 
1718 Ibid, art 165(1). 
1719 Ibid, Art 167. 
1720 Ibid, Art 168. 
1721 Ibid, Art 169. 
1722 Ibid. 
1723 Ibid, Art 170. 
1724 Ibid. 
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hybrid of legal system. Due to the external influence as alluded to, South African legal system is 
largely made of Roman, Dutch and English law.1725 As a result it is characterised by civil and 
common law traditions. Indigenous system of law also forms part of South Africa’s legal 
system.1726   
 
South Africa’s economy has transformed significantly since the attainment of majority rule. Prior 
to that and more particularly during the apartheid era, the country’s economy suffered stagnation 
and international isolation. Trade and financial sanctions and withdraw of significant of foreign 
investment in order to pressurerise South Africa to end apartheid regime had far reaching impact 
on the country’s economy.1727 There was yet another blow upon South Africa’s economy. This 
was generated by the world economic conditions of the late 1970s and the early 1980s. As it was 
the case elsewhere in Africa, South Africa’s economy slowed due to a number of reasons: the 
declining gold revenues, rising prices for oil imports and increased international competition in 
other traditional export commodities.1728 By 1985 South Africa was hit by a major foreign debt 
crisis.1729 
 
In its bid to reconstruct the country in the post apartheid era, the African National Congress 
(ANC), the ruling party led by Nelson Mandela(the first President after majority rule), embarked 
upon Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP included privatisation of 
parastatals, launching of worldwide appeals for new trade and investment packages, re-entering 
world financial markets, establishing new trade partners and expanding formerly clandestine 
trade ties that had long existed with many countries.1730 As a result of these reconstruction efforts 
and despite the turbulence of economic crises in recent times, South Africa has successfully 
raised its economy. The country is now characterised by the World Bank as an upper-middle 
income economy.1731 It is important to mention that South Africa’s economy is reasonably 
                                                          
1725 See e.g., Hahlo, H.R and Kahn, E., The South African Legal System and Its Background, Juta, Cape Town, 
1968; Mireku, O., ‘Three Most Important Features of South African Legal System that Others Should Understand’, 
pp.215-217; IALS Conference, Learning from Each Other: Enriching the Law School Curriculum in an Interrelated 
World, http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/enriching/mireku.pdf last visited 7/04/2012. 
1726 See e.g., Church, J., ‘The Place of Indigenous Law in a Mixed Legal System and a Society in Transformation: A 
South African Experience’, ANZLH E-Journal, 2005, pp.94-106. 
1727 Levy, P.I., ‘Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do’, Discussion Paper, No. 796, Yale University, 1999, 
pp.1-13, at p. 2, http://aida.wss.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp796.pdf last visited 7/04/2012. 
1728 South Africa-Economy, 
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/south-africa/ECONOMY.html last visited 7/04/2012. 
1729 Ibid. 
1730 Byrnes, R.M(ed)., South Africa: A Country Study, GPO for the Library of Congress, Washington, 1996, 
http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/61.htm last visited 7/04/2012. 
1731 World Bank List of Economies( July 2010), http://www.fas.usda.gov/mos/em-markets/World%20Bank.pdf, 
last visited 7/04/2012; see also, World Bank List of Economies(18 July 2011), 
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diversified with key economic sectors including mining, agriculture and fishery, vehicle 
manufacturing and assembly, food-processing, clothing and textiles, telecommunication, energy, 
financial and business services, real estate, tourism, transportation, wholesale and retail trade.1732 
The hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup has acted as a catalyst for expanding the country’s 
infrastructure base, skills development, employment creation and economic growth.1733 
 
In the field of international trade, trade relations with Europe, particularly with the European 
Union (EU), are pivotal to South Africa’s economic development.1734 It is imperative to note that 
the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU forms a substantial 
element of South Africa’s reconstruction and development.1735 Overall, the EU accounts for over 
40% of South Africa’s imports and exports, as well as 70% of foreign direct investment.1736 
Similarly South Africa is the largest EU’s trading partner in Africa.1737 To be sure, some EU 
member states such as the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
are among South Africa’s top-10 export destinations.1738 Germany, UK and France are among 
the top-10 countries from which South Africa’s imports originate.1739 
 
ICT is also an important sector in the South Africa’s economy. The market for mobile phone is 
dominated by operators such as Vodacom, MTN, 8ta and CellC. By 2012 the total number of 
mobile phone subscribed is expected to reach 127%.1740 In December 2011 there were 6,800,000 
internet users in South Africa (representing 13.9% of the population).1741 While it is difficult to 
provide concrete estimates of revenues collected from the ICT sector for lack of information, it 
is imperative to note that ICT is integrated in other sectors of the South Africa’s economy. This 
integration facilitates the growth and development of such other sectors of the economy.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://shop.ifrs.org/files/CLASS.pdf last visited 7/04/2012. 
1732 Wikipedia., ‘Economy of South Africa’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa last visited 
7/04/2012. 
1733 Pocket Guide to South Africa 2010/11 Economy, pp. 48-58, at p.48, 
http://www.gcis.gov.za/resource_centre/sa_info/pocketguide/2010/008_economy.pdf last visited 8/04/2012. 
1734 Ibid, p.54. 
1735 Ibid. 
1736 Cooperation Between the European Union and South Africa: Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p.12, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/print_csp07_za_en.pdf last visited 8/04/2012. 
1737 Ibid. 
1738 Pocket Guide to South Africa 2010/11 Economy, note 1734, supra. 
1739 Ibid. 
1740 South Africa-Telecoms, Mobile, Broadband and Forecasts, http://www.budde.com.au/Research/South-Africa-
Telecoms-Mobile-Broadband-and-Forecasts.html last visited 8/04/2012. 
1741 Internet Worlds Stats., ‘Internet Usage Statistics for Africa’, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm last visited 8/04/2012. 
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Socially, the South African society is both individualistic and collectivist.1742 Professor Geert 
Hofstede indicates that South Africa has high index score of 65 for individualism measured in 
values range from 0 to 100.1743 One reason this score is much higher than that of most African 
nations is the high level of European influence in the country.1744 In contrast, black individuals 
from the Xhosa, Zulu and Sotho tribes tend to have much lower individualism indexes.1745 As 
alluded to, the latter has been frequently explained by commentators as due to Ubuntu. The value 
of Ubuntu has manifested in politics through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 
post apartheid era as a healing of the past injustice.1746 Ubuntu has also manifested in business and 
other aspects of life. However its application in business has raised serious debates.1747 More 
importantly Ubuntu has been somewhat inserted in the South African Constitution of 1996 and 
above all, it has already become part of constitutional jurisprudence of South African courts.1748 
There is now a handful of case law which has been decided in the spirit of Ubuntu.1749  
 
The last point deserving mention is about HIV/Aids pandemic. South Africa is the most African 
country affected by HIV/Aids. By 2011 it was estimated that the overall HIV prevalence rate 
was approximately 10.6%.1750 The total number of people lived with HIV was 5.38 million.1751 An 
estimated 16.6% of the adult population aged 15-49 years was HIV positive.1752 The number of 
new infections for 2011 among the population aged 15 years and older was estimated at 316, 
900.1753 An estimated 63,600 new HIV infections was among children aged 0-14 years.1754 The 
South African government has been adopting various measures to curb the increasing number of 
                                                          
1742 See e.g., Louw, J., ‘Culture and Self in South Africa: Individualism-Collectivism Predictions’, The Journal of 
Social Psychology, 2000, Vol.140, No.2, pp.210-217; Vogt, L and Laher, S., ‘The Five Factor Model of Personality 
and Individualism/Collectivism in South Africa: An Exploratory Study’, Psychology in Society, 2009, No.37, pp.39-
54. 
1743 Hofstede Cultural Dimensions Summary, 
http://www.clearlycultural.com/geert-hofstede-cultural-dimensions/individualism/ last visited 8/04/2012. 
1744 International Business Wiki, 
http://internationalbusiness.wikia.com/wiki/South_Africa_Collectivism_vs._Individualism last visited 8/04/2012. 
1745 Ibid. 
1746 See e.g., Gade, C.B.N., ‘Ubuntu and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process’, M.A Thesis, Aarhus 
University, Denmark, 2010. 
1747 See e.g., MacDonald, D.A., ‘Ubuntu bashing: the marketisation of “African values” in South Africa’, Review in 
South African Political Economy, 2010, Vol.37, No.124, pp.139-152. 
1748 See e.g., Keevy, I., ‘Ubuntu versus the Core Values of the South African Constitution’, Journal for Juridical 
Science, 2009, Vol. 34, No.2, pp.19-58; Makgoro, J.Y., ‘Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa’, Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 1998, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.1-11; Wing, pp.349-375, 
note 1155, supra. 
1749 Ibid. 
1750 Statistics of South Africa, Mid-Year Population Estimates, 2011. 
1751 Ibid. 
1752 Ibid. 
1753 Ibid. 
1754 Ibid. 
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new infections, providing health care for the victims of HIV/Aids pandemic, etc.1755 However 
such measures have been considered by commentators as not sufficient.1756 
Internationally, South Africa is a member of the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and 
SADC. Accordingly, international obligations from these organisations are applicable on South 
Africa. 
 
6.3 Social Attitudes to Privacy 
 
There are no general surveys as to privacy attitudes in South Africa. However public concern for 
privacy and data protection is positive and relatively high in South Africa. There is a large degree 
of consensus among experts in the field that one reason that has nourished privacy concerns in 
South Africa rests upon the legacy of apartheid regime.1757 This position is partly justified by the 
founding provisions of the South African Constitution 1996. To be sure, Art (1) (a) sets out 
human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms 
as one of the basic tenets of the Constitution. Moreover, Art (1) (b) categorically sets another 
pillar of the South African Constitution in the following words: ‘no-racialism and no-sexism’. 
Examples of the scholarships that have given a clear linkage between claim for privacy and 
apartheid in South Africa are Wasserman and Boloka.1758 These authors assert that while on the 
one hand there are laws indicating a general climate of openness and access to information in 
South Africa after 1994(i.e. after apartheid era), the issue of the media’s invasion of politicians’ 
privacy is raised in the Constitution itself.1759 Hence the balance between privacy and freedom of 
information has been complicated by the past experiences of apartheid.1760  
 
Besides the political arena, public concerns for individual privacy in South Africa have frequently 
been raised in the context of the operation of South African intelligence services. The apartheid 
state intelligence services of the early 1990s characteristically invaded the privacy of individuals; 
conducted various forms of surveillance without judicial authorisation; were unaccountable to 
                                                          
1755 See e.g., Grundlingh, L., ‘Government Responses to HIV/AIDS in South Africa as Reported in the Media, 
1983-1994’, South African Historical Journal, 2001, Vol.45, No.1, pp.124-154; New York Times., ‘South Africa 
Redoubles Efforts Against AIDS’, published 25th  April 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/health/policy/26safrica.html?pagewanted=all last visited 8/04/2012. 
1756 See e.g., Jordan, S., ‘South Africa: How the government’s response to HIV fails to address masculinity’, 
http://www.kit.nl/net/KIT_Publicaties_output/ShowFile2.aspx?e=1040 last visited 8/04/2012. 
1757 See e.g., Banisar, note 1314, supra; Bygrave, p.343, note 25, supra. 
1758 Wasserman, H and Boloka, M., ‘Privacy, the Press and the Public Interest in Post-Apartheid South Africa’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 2004, Vol.57, No.1, pp.185-195. 
1759 Ibid, p.189. 
1760 Ibid, pp.190-193. 
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parliament; and were involved in political violence, suppression and the manipulation of the 
domestic political environment.1761 On this account, the historical antagonism and mistrust 
between the intelligence community and the population continues to have an impact on public 
perceptions of intelligence in South Africa in post apartheid era.1762 Concerns for privacy as a 
result of fears of intelligence services can be demonstrated partly by the blog debates and 
comments on the thread ‘I am a RICA criminal’1763 posted on 2 July 2009 by Arthur Goldstuck in 
the context of mandatory requirement for registration of SIM cards in South Africa. This 
became effective from 1 July 2009. Following an amendment of the Regulation of Interception 
of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (RICA) 2002,1764 
South Africa requires service providers to register SIM cards of their subscribers. This legal 
requirement sparked a lot of discussion including ‘I am a RICA criminal’. The latter received a 
total number of 50 comments, many of them raising privacy concerns. It is imperative to quote 
some of these comments to illustrate how pertinent is the privacy issue in South Africa:- 
‘Richard  
This article, although at times somewhat inaccurate, does a magnificent job of 
illuminating the fine print of the Bill that was initially passed six years ago and has 
subsequently (and rather suspiciously) been kept in the dark. It really worries me that 
there seems to be such an apathetic and unengaged response from the general public 
when this Act, on face value, is blatantly threatening every mobile phone user’s 
privacy of conversation and location. Sadly the “reasonableness-” criterion leaves a 
great deal up to the (easily corrupted) discretion of law enforcement (or am I being 
too cynical?) Should this fundamental right take a backseat because of the 
misdirection towards convenience? Jul 22nd, 2009. 
 
Joe Blogs  
The thing that gets to me is the fact that like most of the current legislation passed 
does not go out for public opinion or debate. this is just a clear example of how our 
government prefers to adopt the constitution when its suits them and to ignore it 
when they want to. Last that i looked, each and every South African had a right to 
privacy as stated as one of the key heading in the constitution. So really I don’t care 
whether this was implemented by the Department of Justice or even the president, all 
                                                          
1761 Hutton, L., ‘Looking Beneath the Cloak: An Analysis of Intelligence Governance in South Africa’, Institute for 
Security Studies (ISS), 2007, Paper No. 154, pp.1-24, at p.3. 
1762 Ibid. 
1763 Goldstuck, A., ‘I am a RICA criminal’, The Big Change, 2009, http://thebigchange.com/i-am-a-rica-criminal/ 
last visited 9/04/2012. 
1764 Act No. 70 of 2002. 
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of us as South Africans have a right to privacy and by implementing a law whereby 
any South African can be listened into at any given time and wit any prior notice is 
just not on. If I wanted to live in a country where the rights of people are not 
respected, then I would have moved to Zimbabwe. Mr. Zuma it may a good idea for 
both you and your cabinet to spend sometime there, maybe then you will learn what 
not to do as a president. Currently my concern is that we are heading in the direction 
of a Uncle Bob dictatorship. Aug 7th, 2009. 
 
Aaron Scheiner  
Great article! I’m trying to find ways of being able to give up my cellphone… one of 
them is using a UHF carrier to a VOIP line. I really do hope people make a stand 
against this.Oct 6th, 2009. 
 
Ernie  
This whole RICA thing is a direct invasion of our right to privacy and is against the 
constitution. Oh but I suppose that doesn’t matter to this government as the 
constitution means nothing to them. I will not register my sim card period and if they 
cut my line I will take the matter to the constitutional court. I am tired of being 
abused by this government. While criminals walk free on our streets shooting 
innocent people for their cars, they waste money on crap like this is instead of 
focusing on the real issues we face in this country. It is about time we as South 
Africans stand together against this sort of abuse. Oct 8th, 2009. 
 
Harold  
the constitution states that every person has the right to privacy, that includes not to 
have their right to privacy of communication infringed. What I wonder is how was 
this law passed because when a is in conflict with the constitution it is automatically 
invalid. Nov 7th, 2009. 
 
Craig  
Heres an idea. Lets everyone just stop using cell phones and by implication stop 
paying the service providers. Then you will see how quickly the service providers get 
this nonsense sorted out with government. Hit them where it hurts, in the pocket. 
Nov 12th, 2009. 
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Bob  
Apart from victimising law abiding citizens once again, I think our clueless MPs will 
have successfully made a measurable contribution to our annual murder score. Think 
on it, owners of registered phones are potential targets for serious crime. If a criminal 
needs a cell number for a few days, then a simple mugging will only suffice for about 
24 hours before the cel is reported stolen and the sim is locked. But on the other 
hand, if the victim is in no condition to report the loss of his/her rica registered 
phone…? Dec 28th, 2009. 
 
Yasser  
I am waiting for cellc to cancel my contract and then…..cause i am not going to 
register. For anything. hats this now…the white man was right when he told me, “any 
country that is govern by a black man is a mess” that is what’s happening to this 
country. Rica what’s next….vica? 
Mar 5th, 2010. 
 
Andries  
This feels like another step has been taken in, as posted earlier, “keep civilians safe 
behind lock and key”. I fear infringement of societies rights in order to prohibit 
criminal intent will only spark further criminal action by individuals/groups already 
living outside law-abiding society... Aug 23rd, 2010. 
 
Crap  
Well, what does one expect other useless law from the kaffirs. All they can do is come 
up with stupid ideas, showing the rest of the world how useless black government 
really is. They line the pockets every day, the country is going for a ball of shit. Rica 
my phone, never. it is so easy to get round it, and they are too stupid to realise it. 
Screw the kaffis.Oct 1st, 2010. 
 
Stefan  
Great article, thanks for the legal detail. I would love to see some opposition to this 
law mustered. I don’t trust any government, let alone the ANC with it’s glorious track 
record of corruption, with monitoring my phone calls – whatever the justification. 
Get lost RICA. I’ll never register my sim card just to be under their thumbs. It seems 
obvious to me that this whole “deadline” and mass of scare tactics is to gauge how 
many people actually are subservient and how far the ANC can push civil rights and 
constitution down the toilet. I say don’t register, you know they’ll postpone the 
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deadline anyway! No way the cell phone companies will cut the service of more than 
100 000 people in one week! Their shares will plummet on that news and I will be 
there for the short. No doubt some hot-shot lawyer will build his career of fighting 
off this evil. Who’s up to it? Oct 5th, 2010. 
 
Marius  
I agree, this law is there to control the public and not to catch criminals, this law 
might even increase cell phone theft since the value of a stolen or lost SIM card will 
make it a much better business than before. Thieves with thrive on stolen or abandon 
sim cards while the original owners will be held accountable. Jun 15th, 2011.’ 
 
The above concerns with regard to interception of private communication by intelligence 
services have not remained unreal. They have manifested in the recent high profile scandal 
charging the South African intelligence services of phone hacking without authorised orders of a 
judge.1765 This has raised public fears over the spying laws.1766   
 
Interception of private communication has not only been confined to the public sphere. Private 
firms as well as individuals have also been condemned of making unlawful interference of private 
communication. A handful of case law determined by the South African courts illustrate how 
public fears about their loss of privacy from private firms and individuals. Some of such cases 
include: Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd;1767  Bernstein v Bester NO;1768 Protea Technology 
Limited and Another v Wainer and Others;1769 S v Kidson;1770 and Waste Products Utilisation (Pty) Ltd v 
Wilkes and Another.1771  
 
HIV/Aids has also raised a lot of concerns for privacy in South Africa. The manifestations of 
these concerns have resulted in a large corpus of case law by South African courts. The first of 
these cases concerned unauthorised disclosure of the patient’s HIV status by the doctor in the 
famous ‘McGeary case’ officially cited as Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger.1772 In this case the court 
decided in favour of the patient. However, it is important to stress that HIV/Aids issues are 
                                                          
1765 CAJ News Agency., ‘SA Intelligence Faces Phone Hacking Scandal’, 
http://cajnewsagency.com/index.php/technology/software/127-sa-intelligence-faces-phone-hacking-scandal, 
last visited 10/04/2012. 
1766 Ibid. 
1767 1993 (2) SA 451(A). 
1768 1996(2) SA (A); (2) SA 751 (CC). 
1769 [1997] 3 All SA 594. 
1770 1999(1) SACR 338(W). 
1771 2003(2) SA 515(W). 
1772 1993(4) SA 342. 
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often racially determined in South Africa due to the apartheid experience.1773 The McGeary case 
took place in 1993, and it involved a white, middle class man.1774 However, it took 15 years later 
for the South African court to defend the right of the HIV/Aids status confidentiality of a 
black.1775 This case famously known as the De Lille case (NM and Others v Smith and Others) 
involved three women who were HIV positive.1776 Their status was detected in a clinical trial in 
which they participated. Subsequently, their full names with their related HIV status were 
published in the biography of Patricia De Lille which was authored by Charlene Smith and 
published by the New Africa Books. The publication was made without the three women’s 
consent. Other cases on HIV/Aids in South Africa include: Joy Mining Machinery v NUMSA and 
Others;1777 I & J Ltd v Trawler & Line Fishing Union and Others;1778 and PFG Building Glass (Pty) Ltd v 
Chemical Engineering Pulp Paper Wood and Allied Workers Union and Others.1779 
 
Commentators like Ndebele et al, have argued that HIV/Aids have reduced the relevance of the 
principle of individual medical confidentiality among the Bantu (i.e. Black) people of Southern 
Africa.1780 These authors assert that due to Ubuntu which undermines the notion of individual 
autonomy, individual medical confidentiality does not work well with Ubuntu, which emphasises 
family, community, and sharing and solving of life problems together.1781 Accordingly, there is 
frequent sharing and disclosures of HIV status of individuals to their family and community 
members. The view by Ndebele et al, is somewhat overstated. For example, the De Lille case 
illustrates the opposite, where disclosure of HIV status of blacks was strongly battled in court. 
Moreover such view does not fare well in the analyses of Olinger et at.1782 Although the latter 
have found that there is little or no Ubuntu influence in the adoption of the data privacy 
legislation in South Africa suggesting similar position as Ndebele et al, they have not made any 
suggestion that once the data privacy law is adopted in South Africa it will apply to non-black 
population. As alluded to, the totality of the experience of apartheid has catalysed those who 
suffered under the regime, particularly the blacks, to be more privacy conscious and claim for 
their basic freedom and individual rights. Yet, caution has to be exercised not to generalise 
                                                          
1773 Gorska, Z.M., ‘Privacy, Surveillance and HIV/Aids in the Workplace: A South African Case Study’, M.A Thesis, 
University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2008, p.36.  
1774 Ibid. 
1775 Ibid. 
1776 2007(5) SA 250. 
1777 (2002) 4 BLL 372 (LC). 
1778 (2003) 24 ILJ 565(LC). 
1779 (2003) 24 ILJ 974(LC). 
1780 Ndebele, P et al., ‘HIV/Aids reduces the relevance of the principle of individual medical confidentiality among 
the Bantu people of Southern Africa’, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2008, Vol.29, No. 5, pp.331-340, p.331. 
1781 Ibid, p.337. 
1782 Olinger et al, note 64, supra. 
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situations. For example, when asked ‘to what extent did the Department take into account 
cultural sensitivities when drafting the Bill’ during the briefing meeting of the Justice and 
Constitutional Development and South African Law Reform Commission on the one hand and 
the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development on the other, Ms. Ananda 
Louw, Principal State Law Advisor for South African Law Reform Commission replied ‘that 
each person had a conception of what privacy was. Some people would argue that one had no 
privacy. If a person signed up for Facebook, then one had no privacy. What the department 
found in all the different cultures was that if one had a lovely face, one did not mind having a 
picture of one’s face taken, but if one had ugly legs then one would not want a person to take a 
picture of those legs. Something was private if the person concerned regarded it as being private. 
The law was there to protect those who indicated that they want their privacy protected.’1783 Ms. 
Louw’s reply clearly shows that values to privacy in South Africa significantly varies from one 
individual to another based on a vast array of factors such as the benefit such individual expect 
in return of his or her release of personal information. 
 
There are similarly concerns for privacy arising from unsolicited marketing practices. During an 
interview with Sedibane Thabo in Pretoria, he had the following to say, ‘since today we have to 
register our SIM cards, I propose or suggest that our personal information should be protected 
in order to prevent abuse. Marketing companies should not be allowed to access our personal 
information e.g. selling their products via cell phones.’1784 This response supports the view by 
Ms. Louw that the Department faced many problems with the Direct Marketing Council during 
consultations because it largely deals with Spam mails.1785 Perhaps one of the most appealing 
headlines that had raised the eyebrow of South Africans’ concerns for privacy in the field of 
marketing practices was the announcement by the South African Post that it would sell the 
personal information of all registered citizens contained in its National Address Database 
(NAD).1786 The NAD contained personal information about individuals’ names, national identity 
numbers, home addresses, postal addresses as well as telephone numbers.1787 
 
                                                          
1783Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG)., ‘Protection of Personal Information Bill [B9-2009] briefing’, 6th 
October 2009, 
 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091006-protection-personal-information-bill-b9-2009-briefing, 
last visited 11/04/2012. 
1784 Interview held on 29th June 2011, Pretoria, South Africa between the researcher of this thesis and Sedibane 
Thabo. 
1785 PMG, note 1783, supra. 
1786 Pretoria News, 15th June 2005 cited in Olinger et al, p. 32, note 64, supra. 
1787 Ibid. 
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However, it is interesting to note that CCTV cameras have generated limited privacy concerns in 
South Africa although the extensive use of CCTV technique is leading South Africa into a 
surveillance society.1788 Currently in South Africa, CCTV is used in almost commercial venues 
such as hotels, casinos, banks, retail stores, airports, financial institutions, mines, garages, 
hospitals and shopping centres.1789 Yet, despite this extensive use of CCTV cameras there have 
been no strong opposition of their use by the public as it has been the case in Europe.1790 Very 
probably, this is because of the crime rate, which is enormous in South Africa compared to that 
of Germany (and Europe generally); because of the perceived immediate threat it presents; and 
because of the population in general is more prepared to submit to the relatively far-ranging 
curtailments of the protection of their private sphere.1791 This view is tandem to the response the 
researcher of this thesis received from Professor Roos that while South Africans are concerned 
about invasion of their privacy when information is required from them, they are at the same 
time ready to give out their personal information if they feel they will get a benefit in return.1792 
 
6.4 Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
At present, privacy in South Africa is protected through the Constitution 1996, common law and 
legislative frameworks. The first two sources of law are of general nature and in which case more 
prevalent while the third source is more context specific. As alluded to, these sources are not 
considered as adequate to protect personal information in a similar manner as data protection 
legislation. Partly because of this deficiency, South Africa has decided to adopt a comprehensive 
data protection law which is still being considered by the Portfolio Committee on Justice and 
Constitutional Development of the South African Parliament. This part provides a lengthy 
discussion and analysis of this Bill. The other sources are only analysed to show how strong and 
weak they are in specific contexts. It is also important to mention that the constitutional and 
common law source of privacy protection in South Africa have been extensively dealt by 
renowned South African scholars such as Professor Anneliese Roos, Professor Johann Neethling 
                                                          
1788 The term ‘surveillance’ is in this context assigned a wider meaning to include both the activities of the public and 
private sector with regard to processing of an individual’s personal data. 
1789 Van Rensburg. J., ‘CCTV Security and Safety Security/Safety Equipment – Africa’, International Market Insight. 
2001, Strategis: Industry Canada, cited in Norris, C et al., ‘Editorial: The Growth of CCTV: A Global Perspective on 
the International Diffusion of Video Surveillance in Public Accessible Space’ Surveillance and Society, 2004, 2(2/3), 
pp.110-135, at p.115.     
1790 Hörner, S., ‘Datenschutz und Kriminalitätsprävention in Südafrika Ein Vergleich mit Deutschland am Beispiel 
der Einführung der Videoüberwachung öffentlicher Plätze‘, KAS-AI 11/04, S.62-88, at p. 63, 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_5813-544-1-30.pdf?041213120312 last visited 11/04/2012. 
1791 Ibid, p.66. 
1792
 Interview held between the researcher of this thesis and Professor Anneliese Roos on 28th June 2011, Pretoria, 
South Africa. 
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et al and Professor Max Loubser et al. Since most of these works present the correct account of 
the law, this thesis limits lengthy discussion on the same issue.  
 
6.4. 1 The Constitution of South Africa 1996 
 
The Constitution of South Africa 19961793 was promulgated on 18 December 1996 and officially 
commenced to apply as from 4 February 1997. One of the significant changes brought by the 
South African Constitution 1996 was the repeal of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1993.1794 The latter was an interim Constitution towards the majority rule in South Africa 
which marked the end of apartheid era. The Interim Constitution was assented on 25 January 
1994 and commenced to apply on 27 April 1994. Because of this, it is sometimes loosely referred 
as Constitution of South Africa 1994.  
 
Privacy is constitutionally protected in South Africa. It has been protected as a fundamental right 
in South African Constitutions since 1994.1795 Section 13 of the Interim Constitution provided, 
‘every person shall have the right to his or her personal privacy, which shall include the right not 
to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private 
possessions or the violation of private communications.’ This provision has been reproduced 
with insignificant modifications in the South African Constitution 1996. It appears in section 14 
as follows:- 
 
‘Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have- 
(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possession seized; 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.’ 
 
The above section is apparently narrow in scope of protection in the sense that it guarantees a 
general right to privacy, with specific protection against searches and seizures and of the privacy 
of communications.1796 However it has been argued that the list of privacy instances provided in 
section 14 of the South African Constitution 1996 is not exhaustive: the protection given by this 
right extends to any other method of obtaining information or making unauthorised 
                                                          
1793 Act No. 108 of 1996. 
1794 Act No. 200 of 1993; see the Seventh Schedule.  
1795 Roos, p.352, note 201, supra. 
1796 Ibid, p.353. 
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disclosures.1797 Accordingly, while the instances of privacy enumerated in section 14 of the 
Constitution 1996 relate to the ‘informational’ aspects of the right to privacy, courts have 
extended the right to privacy to ‘substantive’ privacy rights.1798 The latter are rights which enable 
persons to make decisions about their family, home and sexual life.1799 
 
At the same time, the right to privacy in the South African Constitution is broad in two respects. 
First, the fact that section 14 opens with the expression ‘everyone’ suggests that the protection 
afforded in this section extends to non-South African citizens. This is similar to the European 
Directive 95/46/EC which is not restrictive of protecting privacy of EU citizens only. The other 
aspect regarding the broad scope of constitutional privacy under the South African law is that it 
applies to both natural/physical as well as juristic persons. Section 8(2) of the Constitution states 
that ‘a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, 
it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by 
their right.’ This means that data controllers who are most invariably corporations are subject of 
the provision of section 14 of the Constitution as to the enjoyment of the privacy right. 
However, this right is only limited. Section 8(4) of the Constitution provides the limitation of 
privacy right afforded to juristic persons as follows, ‘a juristic person is entitled to the rights in 
the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic 
person.’ In the case of Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty); In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa held:- 
 
‘Juristic persons are not the bearers of human dignity. Their privacy rights, 
therefore, can never be as intense as those of human beings. However, this 
does not mean that juristic persons are not protected by the right to privacy. 
Exclusion of juristic persons would lead to the possibility of grave violations 
of privacy in our society, with serious implications for the conduct of 
affairs....’1800 
 
                                                          
1797 McQuoid-Mason, D.J., ‘Privacy’ in Chaskalson, M et al,(eds)., Constitutional Law of South Africa, Juta, Kenwyn, 
1996, 18-11, cited in Roos, p.353, note 201, supra. 
1798 Roos, p.353, note 201, supra. 
1799 Ibid; see also Neethling et al., (Neethling’s Law of Personality), p.220, note 186, supra; De Reuck v Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2004(1) SA 406(CC); Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 
(CC). 
1800 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) 557. For detailed discussion of the right to privacy for juristic persons in South Africa see, 
e.g., Roos(LL.D Thesis), pp.639-643, note 2, supra; Neethling et al, (Neethling’s Law of Personality), pp.68-73, note 
186, supra. 
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It is imperative to note that the constitutional right to privacy is not absolute. In order to balance 
it with the exercise of other rights and interests, it is limited by section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
Under this section, the rights in the Bill of Rights including the right to privacy, may be limited 
only in terms of the general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors. The latter include the nature of the right; the importance 
of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation between the 
limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. Beyond the limits 
provided in section 36(1) or any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution 1996.1801 This means that the 
question of infringement of the constitutional right to privacy must be investigated by a two-
stage approach. First, whether an individual’s right to privacy has been interfered and second, 
whether such interference is justified under the limitation in section 36(1) or any other provision 
of the Constitution. 
 
As pointed out, section 39 of the South African constitution provides guidance on how courts, 
tribunals or forums should interpret the provisions of the Bill of Rights. In their interpretation, 
courts, tribunals or forums must promote the values basic to an open and democratic 
community based on human dignity, equality and freedom. They must also take into account 
international law and may consider foreign law.1802 The latter include both decisions of foreign 
national courts or foreign national legislation.1803 Also, when interpreting any legislation, and 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the Bill of Rights does not deny the 
existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill. What it means is 
that the Bill of Rights sets the standard upon which the existence of other rights from other 
sources of laws is measured up. 
 
It can be submitted that although it is generally argued that the protection of privacy afforded by 
the Constitution is not the same as the data protection legislation,1804 the recognition of privacy 
as a fundamental right in the South African Constitution 1996 serves two significant purposes. It 
                                                          
1801 The Constitution of South Africa 1996, s. 36(2). 
1802 The Constitution of South Africa 1996, s. 233. 
1803 Church, et al., p.194, note 159, supra. 
1804 Gorska, p.31, note 1773, supra. 
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prevents the legislature and the executive of the state from passing any law or taking any action 
which infringes or unreasonably limits the right to privacy.1805 Also, the entrenchment of privacy 
in the Constitution gives it a higher status in that all law, state actions, court decisions and even 
the conduct of natural and juristic person may be tested against.1806  
 
6.4.2 The Common Law 
 
The common law provides the earliest source of privacy protection in South Africa. There is a 
considerable degree of consensus among South African commentators that the current 
protection of privacy in the South African Constitution 1996 is merely the codification of the 
common law protection of privacy although some differences can still be made.1807 At common 
law, privacy is recognised as a personality interest and protected by the law of delict.1808 Similar to 
the English law, the functions of delict ‘are those purposes or ends which people seek to further 
or achieve through tort law’.1809 Compensation for harm is the primary, but not the sole function 
of the law of delict.1810 Yet, unlike the English law which is focused on specific torts, the South 
African law on delictual liability is based on general principles.1811 Due to this, the latter is more 
flexible than the former in the sense that it is able to accommodate changing circumstances and 
new situations without necessarily creating new delicts which is a slow legislative process.1812 The 
South African law of delict, unlike the English law of torts, has therefore been able to recognise 
and protect individual interests such as privacy and the goodwill of a corporation which have 
only come to the force in modern times.1813 
 
The classical case for the recognition of an independent right to privacy in South African law is 
O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd.1814 The brief facts in O’Keeffe were that, a woman had 
agreed to be photographed and her likeness to be used as part of a news article. In contrast, her 
photograph was used in an advertisement for rifles, pistols and ammunition. In finding for the 
claimant, the court took a broad view that dignitas (i.e. dignity) does not represent a single interest 
                                                          
1805 Neethling et al, (Neethling’s Law of Personality), p.17, note 186, supra. 
1806 Ibid, p.75. 
1807 See e.g., Roos, p.355, note 201, supra; Neethling et al, (Neethling’s Law of Personality), p.220, note 186, supra. 
1808 Ibid(Roos); see also Roos,(LL.D Thesis), chapter 7, note 2, supra; Neethling et al, (Neethling’s Law of 
Personality), chapter 8, note 186, supra; Neethling et al., (Law of Delict), note 186, supra; Loubser, M et al., The Law 
of Delict in South Africa, Oxford University Press Southern Africa, Cape Town, 2010. 
1809 Loubser et al., p.8, note 1808, supra.  
1810 Ibid. 
1811 Neethling et al., (Law of Delict), p.4, note 186, supra 
1812 Van der Walt, J.C and Midgley, J.R., Principles of Delict, Butterworths, South Africa, 2005, p.31 cited in 
Neethling et al., (Law of Delict), p.5, note 186, supra. 
1813 Neethling et al., (Law of Delict), note 1812, supra. 
1814 1954 (3) SA 244(C). 
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of personality (namely dignity which is infringed by insult), but as the whole legally protected 
personality-or all ‘those rights relating to...dignity-except corpus (i.e. bodily integrity) and fama (i.e. 
reputation).1815 Accordingly the court correctly found privacy as one of such rights falling under 
dignitas.1816 In Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger,1817 the Appellate Division held that ‘the actio iniuriarum 
(i.e. a legal action for violation of a personal interest) protects a person’s dignitas and dignitas 
embraces privacy. 
 
As alluded to, in South Africa privacy is also protected under the common law of delict. A delict is 
the act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way causes harm to another.1818 While privacy 
is generally said to be infringed when someone learns of true private facts about another person 
against his or her determination and will,1819 in order to succeed in a claim for privacy 
infringement a claimant has to prove the five elements in the definition of a delict: act or conduct, 
wrongfulness, fault, causation and harm.1820 
 
By act or conduct it means a voluntary human act or omission.1821 This means that only an act of 
a human being in contrast to that of an animal is accepted as ‘conduct’.1822 Where a human being 
uses an animal as an instrument in the commission of a delict, a human act is still present.1823 
Moreover it is acceptable that a juristic person may act through its organs (humans) and may 
thus be held delictually liable for such actions.1824 Once an act or omission is established, the 
claimant has to prove that it was wrongful. By wrongful it simply means that an act or conduct 
has its consequence the factual infringement of his or her personal interest, in this case 
privacy.1825 Fault is the legal blameworthiness or the reprehensible state of mind or conduct of 
someone who acted wrongfully.1826 Its main forms are intention and negligence.1827 However for 
purposes of the actio iniuriarum intention is generally required and negligence is insufficient to 
sustain liability.1828 Apart from proving that an act or conduct was wrongful and the defendant 
was at fault, it has to be further proved that the damage or harm resulted from the conduct of 
                                                          
1815 Neethling et al., (Neethling’s Law of Personality), p.217, note 186, supra. 
1816 Ibid. 
1817 1993(4) SA 842(A), p.849. 
1818 Neethling et al., note 1811, supra. 
1819 Ibid, p.347.  
1820 Ibid, note 1811. 
1821 Ibid, chapter 2. 
1822 Ibid, p.25. 
1823 Ibid. 
1824 Ibid. 
1825 Ibid, p.34 (and generally chapter 3). 
1826 Ibid, p.123 (and generally chapter 4). 
1827 Ibid. 
1828 Ibid, p.124. 
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the defendant.1829 In other words, a causal nexus between conduct and damage is required for a 
delict.1830 Finally, the claimant has to prove harm.1831 As pointed out, the primary function of the 
law of delict is compensatory. Hence to establish a delictual liability the claimant has to prove that 
he or she had suffered some loss or damage from another person’s wrongful act or conduct.1832 
 
However, there are set of grounds of justification which may negative the wrongfulness element 
of an act or conduct. These operate as general defences. They include such grounds as consent, 
necessity, provocation, statutory authority, official capacity, obedience to orders, disciplinary 
powers and impossibility.1833 Yet, not all these grounds of justification are applicable in the 
context of privacy infringement and consequently relevant for data protection.1834 Consent is 
especially relevant when infringement of privacy is involved.1835 This is so because the individual 
determines what he or she considers to be private and ‘absent a will to keep a fact private, absent 
an interest (or right) that can be protected.1836 Other defences relevant to privacy infringement 
include necessity, statutory authority, official capacity and public interest.1837 There is also the 
defence of impossibility.1838 The rest of the general defences of common law of delict are not 
applicable in claims for privacy infringement. 
 
As is the case with the constitutional protection, the common law protection of privacy through 
delict is broad. It applies to everyone irrespective of its citizenship.1839 However it generally falls 
short of the general principles of data protection.1840 
 
6.4.3 The Data Protection Bill 2009 
 
The Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009 (simply abbreviated PPIA after the name of 
the Act to be enacted or Data Protection Bill) constitutes South Africa’s latest efforts to adopt 
comprehensive data privacy legislation.1841 The Bill was introduced for the first reading in the 
Parliament of South Africa on 25 August 2009. Subsequently on 6 October 2009, it was sent to 
                                                          
1829 Ibid, chapter 5. 
1830 Ibid, p.175. 
1831 Ibid, chapter 6. 
1832 Ibid, p.211. 
1833 Loubser et al., chapter 9, note 1808. 
1834 Roos,(LL.D Thesis), p.590, note 2, supra 
1835 Ibid, 591. 
1836 Ibid. 
1837 Ibid, pp.595-599. 
1838 Ibid, p.599. 
1839 Ibid, p.547. 
1840 See e.g., Roos, note 201, supra. 
1841 Bill No. 9 of 2009. 
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the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development for deliberations and 
considerations before it is adopted as law by the Parliament. Until 29 March 2012 there were six 
working drafts of the Data Protection Bill. The seventh and the final version is currently being 
prepared by the Technical Sub-Committee for the Portfolio Committee on Justice and 
Constitutional Development. The subsequent analyses will therefore rely much on the Sixth 
Working Draft of the Bill.1842 This is because, the final version of the Bill as deliberated by the 
Portfolio Committee will be the one to be debated by the Parliament in its second reading. 
However some comparison with the original Bill will be made where necessary to show to what 
extent the original Bill has transformed. 
 
Essentially, the Data Protection Bill proposes a law on regulation of processing of personal data 
similar to EU Directive 95/46/EC. The Bill contains the basic principles of data processing as 
well as a centralised authority for its implementation. It proposes to amend certain existing 
legislation which currently applies in specific data processing contexts. The latter are considered 
in 6.4.5. 
 
6.4.3.1 Need for Data Protection Legislation 
 
There are three main sources of accounts as to why South Africa decided to propose a Bill on 
data protection. The first of these sources is the memorandum on the objects of the Bill itself. 
The second source is travaux préparatoires. The latter source manifests in the records of the South 
African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) and deliberations of the Portfolio Committee on 
Justice and Constitutional Development. The third source comprises of scholarly works of South 
African commentators. While sometimes the reasons offered in these strands are similar, they are 
at times different not only in their scope but also in their contents. Due to this, it is appropriate 
to deal with them together while pointing out the main areas of their divergences. 
 
The Memorandum on the Objects of the Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009 states 
two purposes for the Bill. First, it provides that the Bill aims to give effect to the right to privacy, 
by introducing measures to ensure that the personal information of an individual (data subject) is 
safeguarded when it is processed by responsible parties.1843 Second, the Bill aims to balance the 
right to privacy against other rights, particularly the right of access to information, and to 
                                                          
1842 Dated 27th January 2012. 
1843 The Memorandum on the Objects of the Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009(appended to the Bill), 
paragraph 1. 
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generally protect important interests, including the free flow of information within and across 
the borders of South Africa.1844 
 
The above twin objectives are reflected in the long title of the Data Protection Bill.1845  They are 
further consolidated in the preamble to the Bill. The latter makes clear that the Bill is first and 
foremost premised on section 14 of the South African Constitution 1996 on protection of the 
right to privacy. This implies that the Data Protection Bill is an implementation of the privacy 
provision of the constitution. Second, the preamble categorically states that the Bill is adopted 
bearing in mind the need for economic and social progress within the framework of the 
information society which usually requires the removal of unnecessary impediments against the 
free flow of information including personal data. Third, the Bill is adopted in order to regulate 
the processing of personal information in harmony with international standards. 
 
Perhaps to give more prominence, section 2 of the Data Protection Bill incorporates the spirit of 
the preamble of the Bill. This section is titled ‘Purpose of the Act’.1846 Moreover to ensure that 
the purposes stated in section 2 of the Bill are promoted and given considerable weight in the 
implementation of the Act once passed by Parliament, section 3(3) of the Data Protection Bill 
requires interpretation of the Act must always give effect to the purpose of the Act set out in 
section 2, and at the same time it does not prevent any public or private body from exercising or 
performing its powers, duties and functions as long as they are related to the purpose of the Act 
or any other legislation which regulates processing of personal information. 
 
In the light of the above it can be submitted that, generally the agenda behind the proposition of 
the Data Protection Bill is twofold. First, it seeks to protect privacy. Second, the Bill seeks to 
secure economic gains for South Africa. Yet at this stage it is difficult to assess the relative 
                                                          
1844 Ibid. 
1845 Bill to promote the protection of personal information processed by public and private bodies; to introduce 
certain conditions so as to establish minimum requirements for processing of personal information; to provide for 
the establishments of an Information Regulator; to provide for the issuing of codes of conduct; to provide for the 
rights of persons regarding unsolicited electronic communications and automated decision making; to regulate the 
flow of personal information across the borders of the Republic; and to provide for matters connected therewith. 
1846 The purpose of this Act is to- (a)give effect to the constitutional right to privacy, by safeguarding personal 
information when processed by a responsible party, subject to justifiable limitations that are aimed at-(i) balancing 
the right to privacy against other rights, particularly the right of access to information; and (ii) protecting important 
interests, including the free flow of information within the Republic and across international borders; (b) regulate 
the manner in which personal information may be processed, by establishing conditions, in harmony with 
international standards, that prescribe the minimum threshold requirements for the lawful processing of personal 
information; (c) provide persons with rights and remedies to protect their personal information from processing that 
is not in accordance with this Act; and (d) establish voluntary and compulsory measures, including an Information  
Regulator, to ensure respect for and to promote, enforce and fulfil the rights protected by this Act.  
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strength of these agendas as to their influence in the proposed data privacy legislation. It is 
imperative to assess other sources of reasons behind the Data Protection Bill. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive strand explaining the reasons why South Africa has proposed 
comprehensive data privacy legislation is comprised in the background paper for deliberations of 
the Portfolio Committee.1847 This paper lists four main reasons why South Africa needs to adopt 
data privacy legislation. The first is the response to Parliamentary request.1848 This request came 
as a result of the limitations for incorporating data privacy law in the then Open Democracy Bill. 
Accordingly the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Joint Committee on the Open Democracy Bill  requested 
the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development to introduce privacy and data protection 
legislation in Parliament, after thorough research of the matter, as soon as reasonably possible.1849  
The Committee pointed out that the Open Democracy Bill (as it then was, the Bill was later 
renamed and became the Promotion of Access to Information Act) dealt with access to personal 
information in the public and private sector to the extent that it included provisions regarding 
mandatory protection of the privacy of third parties.1850 Similarly the Committee argued that the 
Bill did not, however, regulate other aspects of the right to privacy, such as the correction of and 
control over personal information and so forth.1851 The Committee furthermore reported that 
foreign jurisdictions with access to information legislation have also enacted separate privacy and 
data protection legislation.1852 Since the work of the Committee was subject to a constitutional 
deadline, the sections in the Bill dealing with privacy and protected disclosures were removed for 
consideration at a later stage.1853   
 
The second reason advanced in the background paper proposing for the data privacy legislation 
is the constitutional imperative.1854 This is the same reason as the one stated in the Memorandum 
of Objects of the Bill. The same is repeated in the long title of the Bill, preamble and section 2 of 
the proposed Bill. It is clear that in South Africa privacy is protected in terms of common law 
and section 14 of the Constitution. However the South African Constitution is the supreme law. 
Any law which is in conflict with the Constitution becomes invalid. In this way the common law 
is itself required to be in agreement with the provisions of the Constitution. Yet, constitutional 
                                                          
1847 Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development., ‘Background Information: Protection of 
Personal Information Bill [B9-2009], Deliberations 4th November 2009; http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091104-
protection-personal-information-bill-b9-2009-deliberations last visited 15/04/2012. 
1848 Ibid, paragraph 2.1. 
1849 Ibid. 
1850 Ibid. 
1851 Ibid. 
1852 Ibid. 
1853 Ibid. 
1854 Ibid, paragraph 2.2. 
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protection of privacy is too broad. It does not embody data protection principles which regulate 
processing of personal data. Thus, the need to enact general data privacy legislation is to give 
effect to the constitutional protection of the right to privacy by creating specific privacy rules for 
data processing. 
 
The third reason for adopting data protection legislation is to fulfil international obligations and 
expectations of trading partners.1855 The Bill, as far as South Africa’s international obligations are 
concerned, aims to create a statutory framework in terms of which the Republic will be able to 
comply with the expectations of its major trading partners relating to the processing of personal 
information.1856 Therefore the Bill is in compliance with the following two crucial instruments: 
Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (CoE Convention); and the 1981 Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data.1857 
 
Moreover, the Bill seeks to meet EU adequacy requirements in terms of the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC.1858 The Directive provides that personal data should only be allowed to 
flow outside the boundaries of the European Union to countries that can guarantee an ‘adequate 
level of protection’ of the data.1859 From a business perspective, an adequate privacy protection 
rating will result in the free flow of information, both nationally and internationally, which will 
stimulate the economy and provide employment opportunities, for instance in the call-centre 
industry.1860 It also has major implications for credit granting and financial institutions, for hotel 
and airline reservations systems, for the direct marketing sector, for life and property insurance, 
for the pharmaceutical industry and for any online company that markets its products and 
services worldwide.1861 Proper protection of privacy will also ensure consumer confidence and 
trust in electronic on-line business activities.1862 
Similarly, the ‘adequacy’ and economic imperative reasons appear prominently in scholarly works 
of various commentators. Plückhahn, for example, posits:- 
 
                                                          
1855 Ibid, paragraph 2.3. 
1856 Ibid. 
1857 Ibid. 
1858 Ibid. 
1859 Ibid. 
1860 Ibid. 
1861 Ibid. 
1862 Ibid. 
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‘The need for a legislative data protection framework in South Africa is largely 
a trade and development issue. After the European Union introduced the Data 
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC), it was deemed necessary by the 
South African government to place the issue of data protection on the agenda. 
This is due to the fact that the E.U Data Protection Directive sets out a 
standard that requires that all personal information of E.U citizens must be 
protected. This is a standard that all countries, that process data belonging to 
the E.U member states and its citizens, must adhere to.’1863 
 
In respect to South Africa, one major issue that was taken into consideration was that any sort of 
legislation adopted to protect privacy in compliance to the European Directive should at the 
same time promote the country’s economy.1864 This view is supported by Ms. Louw who briefed 
the Portfolio Committee that the protection of information was not a domestic policy but a 
worldwide concern.1865 She also briefed that the Bill was a hybrid piece of legislation 
incorporating the human right perspective while providing for economic expediencies.1866 
However, when she was asked what influenced African countries which have adopted the data 
privacy legislation, she pointed out, Europe.1867 It was because of this that Ms. Louw contended 
that the data privacy legislation has primarily to be interpreted with reference to the international 
instruments from which it originated.1868  
 
Similarly, in her 2004’s article, Caroline Ncube argued as Plückhahn.1869 At the same time, Roos 
has in different occasions considered economic imperative and compliance to the European 
Directive 95/46/EC as the agenda behind data privacy in South Africa. She argues that 
considering the international trend and expectations, information privacy or data legislation will 
ensure South Africa’s future participation in the information market, if it is regarded as providing 
‘adequate’ data protection by international standards.1870 Roos has reiterated this view in a wider 
scope where she argues:- 
 
                                                          
1863 Plückhahn, P., ‘(E-Commerce) Data Protection in the European Union and South Africa: A Comparative Study’, 
Msc Thesis, Aarhus University (Denmark), 2010, p.62. 
1864 Ibid, p.64. 
1865 PMG, note 1783, supra. 
1866 Ibid. 
1867 Ibid. 
1868 Ibid. 
1869 Ncube, note 172, supra. 
1870 Roos, A., ‘Data Protection Provisions in the Open Democracy Bill, 1997’, Journal of Contemporary Roman-
Dutch Law/Tydskrif Vir Hedendaagse Romein- Hollandse Reg (THRHR), 1998, Vol.61, No.3, pp.497-506, at 
p.499. 
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‘The Directive...has an impact on South African businesses. The EU countries, 
who are subject to the Directive, are major partners of South Africa. Any 
impediment in the flow of information from Europe to South Africa will 
impact negatively on South Africa’s participation in the global economy. As 
such, South Africa has to ensure that the protection afforded to personal 
information in South Africa is of an acceptable standard for the international 
community.’1871 
 
The above scholarly views appear in the South African Law Reform Commission preparatory 
works on the Data Protection Bill. There is a considerable degree of consensus that economic 
imperative particularly trade is one of the agenda behind the adoption of data privacy legislation 
in South Africa. This may be expressly and impliedly discovered where the SALRC makes review 
of Articles 25 and 26 of the European Directive 95/46/EC with respect to the requirements of 
the ‘adequacy’ standards. The SALRC points that ‘with the exception of the USA, the 
requirements set out in the EU Directive have resulted in growing pressure outside Europe for 
the passage of strong information protection laws. Those countries that refuse to adopt 
meaningful privacy laws may find themselves unable to conduct certain types of information 
flows with Europe, particularly if they involve sensitive information.’1872 Undoubtedly, South 
Africa is not an exception to this requirement as demonstrated by the SALRC, ‘it is important to 
consider that the transfer of information to South Africa from Europe is governed from the 
European side by the Directive or country legislation that is implemented in terms of the 
Directive’.1873 The issue is obviously of concern to business in South Africa.1874 It is imperative to 
note that respondents to Issue Paper 24 were general in favour of the principle that care should 
be taken to ensure that South Africa satisfies the ‘adequate standard’ in terms of Art 25 of the 
European Directive 95/46/EC.1875 Yet, there were differing views on the approach to meet the 
standard. Those who favoured a comprehensive data privacy statute particularly the Internet 
Service Providers Association argued as follows:- 
 
‘South Africa’s international trade aspirations would be adversely affected by 
the adoption of a privacy model that is considered inadequate by international 
and EU standard. This impact would not be felt on a bilateral basis, but on the 
                                                          
1871 Roos, pp.406-407, note 2, supra. 
1872 South African Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper 109, paragraph 7.16, note 249, supra. 
1873 Ibid, paragraph 7.17. 
1874 Ibid. 
1875Ibid, paragraph 7.18.  
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multilateral level. It would result in lost opportunities for database 
warehousing, and possible crossborder trade in financial and 
telecommunications services.  Moreover, as the SADC region moves towards 
a trade bloc in 2008, South Africa’s policies should be a guiding best practice 
for the region and capable of adaptation by our regional trading partner.’1876 
 
The Banking Council, Gerhard Loedolff, Nedbank, and Eskom Legal Department were some of 
the respondents who argued, ‘it will definitely affect South African international trade negatively 
if we do not meet the requirements of article 25 of the EU Directive.’1877 Nedbank has gone far 
to explain the extra costs she incurs due to lack of comprehensive data privacy legislation in 
South Africa. The bank has been forced with the absence of legislation to set up processing 
centres in Europe, in order to meet the European information protection legislative 
requirements.1878 The bank faces similar difficulties that it is precluded from transferring personal 
information relating to its customers from its branches in London, Hong Kong, New York and 
other jurisdictions to its head office in South Africa, for the reason that South Africa has not yet 
adopted adequate information protection legislation.1879 
 
Respondents who argued against the general data privacy law in the European style such as Sagie 
Nadasen Legal Adviser and Sanlam Life Law Service have argued that in case of satisfying the 
adequacy provision; South Africa can adopt self regulations and rely on courts’ intervention.1880 
These respondents have similarly argued that ‘both contractual provisions concluded between 
South Africa and foreign companies (which provisions will ensure that core principles and 
procedures are adequately addressed) and the existing Constitutional protection of fundamental 
freedoms and rights are more than sufficient to meet information protection concerns of the 
regulatory authorities in Europe. South African companies must of course ensure that any audit 
will confirm that they have requisite systems of and processes in place to meet the EU 
requirement of “adequate level of protection”.’1881 The strongest criticism against adoption of 
comprehensive privacy legislation aired by respondents can be summarised in the following 
paragraph:- 
 
                                                          
1876 Ibid, paragraph 1.19. 
1877 Ibid. 
1878Ibid.  
1879 Ibid. 
1880 Ibid, paragraph 7.20. 
1881 Ibid. 
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‘The majority of African States, if not all, have no information privacy 
legislation in place and subjectively it is foreseen that with the problems of the 
continent being what they are, the introduction of such legislation will not be 
seen for some considerable time. South Africa is presently increasing its 
presence on the continent and many South African organisations have offices 
throughout Africa. In effect this will mean that South Africa would isolate 
itself from the rest of the continent in its attempt to blindly follow directives 
designed for economies far removed from Africa and South Africa.’1882 
 
The fourth reason behind the adoption of the data protection legislation in South Africa is to 
address the mischief in the existing system of privacy protection.1883 It is argued that the widely 
use of modern technologies has led to a considerable information explosion and has increased 
opportunities for private data collection.1884  Some of the information collected may unduly harm 
the subject of the collection by undermining his or her dignity, integrity and independence as it 
may be inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant, accessed and distributed unlawfully, used for purposes 
that are incompatible with and or contrary to the purpose for which it was collected or 
unlawfully destroyed.1885 The challenges of modern technologies could not be addressed in by the 
common law of delict as well as section 14 of the Constitution 1996. 
 
The preceding discussion reveals that protection of privacy and promotion of trade and business 
are the main agenda behind the proposition of data privacy legislation in South Africa. Although 
the Memorandum of Objects of the Bill, the long title, preamble and section 2 of the Bill make 
reference to economic progress as one of the agenda behind the data privacy law in South Africa, 
in relative terms, protection of privacy appears to be more a prominent agenda than securing 
trade and business. This can be noticed in the travaux préparatoires generally particularly those of 
the South African Law Reform Commission. Likewise, although commentators have pointed out 
the economic imperative as one of the reasons behind data privacy legislation in South Africa, 
most of their discussions are based upon privacy protection as such. Perhaps this is because of 
the country’s long history of apartheid and the injustice that was brought about through the use 
of personal information. It is also significant to note that privacy has long been protected in 
South Africa through the common law of delict. As alluded to, O’Keeffe set the baseline for 
                                                          
1882 Ibid. 
1883 Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development, paragraph 2.4, note 1847, supra. 
1884 Ibid. 
1885 Ibid. 
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protection of privacy as an independent personality interest as far back as 1954. Subsequent to 
O’Keeffe, several cases based on infringement of the right to privacy have been considered and 
decided by the South African courts. Moreover, the incorporation of a specific provision for 
protection of privacy in the South African Interim Constitution 1994 and subsequently in the 
permanent South African Constitution 1996 strengthened privacy protection in the country. This 
is because, privacy has become a fundamental right. It can therefore be noted that even prior to 
the adoption of the European Directive 95/46/EC and its coming into force in 1998, South 
Africa had a fairly stronger system of privacy protection. Although the latter has not been 
adequate to protect processing of personal data in the present era of information technologies it 
has laid the foundation of adoption of the data privacy legislation. However despite that the 
influence of the European Directive 95/46/EC remains imminent as shown in the subsequent 
analyses.1886  
 
6.4.3.2 Legislative Process 
 
Data protection has been on South African legislative agenda since mid-1990s.1887 Initially the 
provisions for regulating personal information appeared within the Open Democracy Bill 1996 
which later became known as Promotion of Access to Information Act 2002(PAIA). Yet, these 
provisions did not fit well within the context of the Open Democracy Bill which was intended to 
promote governmental transparency through the access of information. Moreover the Bill was 
part of the efforts of the post-apartheid government to cure the secrecy with which the apartheid 
regime operated in South Africa rather than to regulate data processing. Partly due to this, it was 
viewed that the provisions regulating data protection be removed out of the Open Democracy 
Bill and reserved for a separate legislation. The Minister of Justice was requested by the Ad Hoc 
Joint Committee on the Open Democracy Bill to consider the introduction of such legislation in 
Parliament.1888 This request was later referred by the Minister to the South African Law Reform 
Commission marking the beginning of the Commission’s subsequent investigation into privacy 
and data protection legislation.1889 
 
                                                          
1886 See also e.g., Allan, K and Currie, I., ‘Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating Proposals 
for an Information Protection Regulator for South Africa’, South Africa Journal on Human Rights, 2007, Vol. 23, 
No.3, pp. 563-579, at pp.563-572. 
1887 See e.g., Currie, p.2, note 248, supra; Allan and Currie, p.565, note 1869, supra.  
1888 Report of the Ad Hoc Joint Committee on the Open Democracy Bill [B67-98], 24th January 2000, 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=280#22 last visited 17/04/2012. 
1889 South African Law Reform Commission, Issue Paper 24, paragraph 1.1.4, note 250, supra. 
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At the request of the South African Law Reform Commission, the Minister appointed a Project 
Committee to assist the Commission in its task.1890 The chairperson of the Committee was 
Honourable Mr. Justice Craig Howie. Prof. Johann Neethling was appointed as the project leader 
while other members included Prof. Iain Currie, Ms. Caroline da Silva, Ms. Christiane Duval, 
Prof. Brenda Grant, Ms. Adri Gobler, Mr. Mark Heyink, Ms. Saras Jogwanth and Ms.Allison 
Tilley.1891 The Committee met for the first time on 22 July 2002.1892 
 
The SALRC made extensive public consultations in its investigation.1893 First, the Commission 
published the Issue Paper 24 in September 2009 with a set deadline on 1 December 2003.1894 
This was subsequently followed by the publication of the Discussion Paper 109 in October 2005 
with a deadline on 28 February 2006 which was extended to 30 September 2006 at the public 
request.1895 In addition, the Commission carried out regional workshops countrywide to discuss 
and explain to the public various options proposed for protection of their personal 
information.1896 Based on the responses received from public on account of the Issue and 
Discussion Papers, the Commission prepared a comprehensive report with a proposed Bill on 
data privacy law.1897 This report was submitted to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and was made public on 26 August 2009. 
 
As pointed out, the Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009 was introduced to the 
Parliament for its first reading on 25 August 2009. Subsequently, it was sent to the Portfolio 
Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development for deliberation and consideration. The 
                                                          
1890 Ibid, paragraph 1.1.5. 
1891 Ibid. 
1892 Ibid. 
1893 However there were still some complaints particularly from Business Unit South Africa (BUSA) made to the 
Portfolio Committee on 13th October 2009 during public hearing that the consultation period by the SALRC was 
not sufficient, BUSA., ‘Submission Protection of Personal Information’, October 20009, see PMG., ‘Protection of 
Personal Information Bill [B9-2009]: public hearings’, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091013-protection-personal-information-bill-b9-2009-public-hearings, 
last visited 18/04/2012. 
1894 Ibid, note 250, supra. An issue paper is the first step in the consultation process. The purpose of an issue paper 
is to announce an investigation, to elucidate the aim and extent of the investigation, to point to possible options 
available for solving existing problems and to initiate and stimulate debate on identified issues by way of including 
specific questions on relevant issues, see South African Law Reform Commission Website,  
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/ipapers.htm lat visited 18/04/2012. 
1895 South African Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper 109, note 249, supra. Discussion papers, previously 
referred to as working papers, are documents in which the Commission’s preliminary research results are contained. 
In most cases discussion papers also contain draft legislation which gives effect to the Commission’s tentative 
recommendations and proposals. The main purpose of these documents is to test public opinion on solutions 
identified by the Commission, see South African Law Reform Commission Website, 
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/dpapers.htm last visited 18/04/2012. 
1896 South African Law Reform Commission, Project 124, Report, note 253, supra.  
1897 Ibid. 
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Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and SALRC briefed the Committee on 
the Bill on 6 and 7 October 2009.1898 One of the issues that was raised by members of the 
Portfolio Committee was that the SALRC’s Report focused on the first world countries such as 
the USA, Britain; Canada and Australia as best practice. They wanted to know from the 
Department and SALRC why there was no developing country mentioned in the report with 
regard to privacy laws. The response by Ms. Louw for the Department was that one should not 
look at the countries in particular, although one could look at the example of what was 
happening in other countries. She pointed out that the South African Data Protection Bill was 
based on international instruments and that is what they had complied with to get the adequacy 
rating. The examples used were made because the countries mentioned had legislation already. 
South Africa did not necessarily copy their implementation. It was following the international 
instruments. She noted that the countries in Africa had only implemented their laws recently. 
Senegal was the first to implement in 2006. The other three (Morocco, Benin and Burkina Faso) 
had only adopted their privacy legislation in 2009. They were also following the European Union 
instruments. As pointed out in 1.2.1 and elsewhere in this thesis, one can note that most of the 
responses of Ms. Louw regarding the state of privacy legislation in Africa are misleading.   
 
On 13 October 2009, the Portfolio Committee held public hearings.1899 The Committee received 
35 submissions from individuals and organisations.  Subsequently, the Portfolio Committee met 
on eight separate occasions (21, 27 and 28 October 2009; 4 November 2009; 24 February 2010; 
2 March 2010; and 8 and 9 April 2010) to deliberate on the Bill.1900 Since then the Portfolio 
Committee left the Technical Sub-Committee (TSC) to deal with the Bill and report to it for 
further deliberations by the full Committee. The TSC had met on eleven separate occasions (21 
May 2010; 4 June 2010; 13 August 2010; 15, 16 and 24 February 2011; 1 March 2011; 19 
September 2011; 10 October 2011; 7 November 2011 and 29 March 2012).1901 It is imperative to 
note that the 29 March 2012 was the last meeting of the TSC.1902 In this last meeting, it was 
decided that the seventh working draft of the Bill be submitted to the full Portfolio Committee 
for deliberations before it is sent back to the Parliament for debate. 
                                                          
1898 PMG, note 1783, supra; see also, PMG., ‘Protection of Personal Information Bill [B9-2009] briefing’, 7th  
October 2009; http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091007-protection-personal-information-bill-b9-2009-briefing, 
last visited 19/04/2012.  
1899 PMG., note 1893, supra. 
1900 See PMG, All Committee Reports (Justice and Constitutional Development) from October 2009 to March 2012; 
PMG Website. 
1901 Ibid. 
1902 PMG., ‘Protection of Personal Information Bill [B9-2009] sixth working draft: technical sub-committee 
deliberations’ http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120329-deliberations-protection-personal-information-bill, 
last visited 20/04/2012. 
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6.4.3.3 Urgency for PPIA 
 
With the exception of Van der Merwe, South African commentators are unanimous that the 
creation of data protection measures through legislation is a matter of great urgency.1903 Yet for 
more than decade such urgency has not turned a reality. As alluded to, data protection legislation 
has been on legislative agenda in South Africa since mid-1990s. However, the last event that 
accentuated the urgency for the adoption of the data protection legislation, at least from the 
commentators’ point of view, was the 2010 FIFA World Cup which took place in South Africa. 
It was widely viewed by commentators that the World Cup would have put some sort of 
pressure on South Africa to pass its pending data privacy Bill 2009 into law. Heyink notes, ‘the 
Protection of Personal Information Bill was urgent in 2002, and now it’s even more urgent in 
2009, because of the 2010 World Cup.’1904 This was due to the fact that under Article 25 of the 
European Directive 95/46/EC South Africa would not qualify as providing adequate level of 
protection of personal data. Considering that the World Cup was to result into transfer of 
massive amount of personal information of European citizens to South Africa during that 
period, Europe would insist on data privacy legislation. To be sure Ms. Alison Tilley, Executive 
Director of the Open Democracy Advice Centre, posits:- 
 
‘Eight years later, this legislation is now (sic) finally ready, but this is where the 
World Cup comes in. European airlines cannot transfer their Advance 
Passenger Information to SA, unless we have data protection legislation 
equivalent to that of Europe, which we don’t. We require API from these 
airlines. They can’t give it to us without legislative safeguards. You would 
think the answer to this would be treating the legislation as a top priority. 
Unfortunately, the legislation is not yet even on its way to the cabinet-the 
likelihood of it going through Parliament this season is zero.’1905 
 
To partly mitigate the mischief and assure Europeans that their personal information during the 
2010 FIFA World Cup would not be misused, the South African government amended the 
Customs and Excise Act 19641906 by introducing a new section 7A through the Revenue Laws 
                                                          
1903 Neethling et al., (Neethling’s Law of Personality), p.271, note 186, supra. 
1904 IT Web Security., ‘2010 pressure mounts on privacy Bill’, 26 November 2009, 
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28415:2010-pressure-mounts-on-
privacy-bill&catid=69:business&Itemid=58 last visited 20/04/2012. 
1905 Tilley, A., ‘Airline Security sets offside trap for World Cup’, BusinessDay, 22 September 2008, 
http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=53915 last visited 20/04/2012. 
1906 Act No.91 of 1961. 
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Amendment Act 2008.1907 This provision became effective on 8 January 2009.1908 Section 7A 
regulates personal information in the context of Advance Passenger Information (API). While 
this provision may fall under Article 26 of the EU Directive 95/46/EC providing exceptions to 
the general ‘adequacy’ standard under Article 25, it is doubtful if it really meets any of such 
conditions. This is because, similar legislation in the United States of America has been subjected 
into stringent scrutiny by EU organs without successful results.1909  Some commentators in South 
Africa such as Tilley have also cast doubt as to the adequacy of section 7A of the Customs and 
Excise Act 1964.1910 At the same time it has been suggested by Roos that beyond Advance 
Passenger Information, South Africa has to use contractual clauses for adequate protection 
measures for every international commercial transaction that involves the transfer of personal 
data from overseas to South Africa, such as the selling of tickets for the World Cup games in the 
names of specific persons.1911 Similar views are maintained by Ncube positing that South Africa 
has not been declared as having adequate level of protection of personal data nor has a 
determination been made regarding the adequacy of contractual clauses. Data may be flowing to 
South Africa in terms of Article 26(1) of the European Directive 95/46/EC.1912 
 
There are several explanations behind the delay for adoption of data privacy law in South Africa 
despite the urgent call to do so by commentators. It has been argued that despite proposals for 
the adoption of an Act for the protection of personal information being on the table for more 
than three years, it seems as if the political will to enact such law is absent.1913 Moreover the ad 
hoc strategy of adopting section 7A in the Customs and Excise Act 1964 also runs itself the risk 
of derailing the real data protection legislation, which South Africa needs if it has to have the call 
centres managing all that European data.1914 This is because the need of the law somewhat 
diminishes if there are other options to rely to achieve similar results. Other reasons that may 
have contributed to the long delay of data protection legislation are heavy costs of implantation 
on part of government and private sector once the law is enacted. During the deliberations of 
the Technical Sub-Committee it transpired that the budget of the data processing authority 
under the Bill which is projected at R 17 million rand (approximately USD 2,179,487) is 
                                                          
1907 Act No. 61 of 2008. 
1908 South African Government Gazette No. 31782 of 8th  January 2009. 
1909 European Council, note 1078, supra. 
1910 Tilley, note 1904, supra. 
1911 Roos (Personal Data Protection in New Zealand), p.98, note 38, supra. 
1912 Ncube, p.19, note 38, supra. 
1913 Roos (Personal Data Protection in New Zealand), p.65, note 38, supra. 
1914 Tilley, note 1905, supra. 
414 
 
inadequate to implement the legislation once enacted.1915 This has also been the case for the 
private companies who mostly submitted that the new law should not overburden them with 
costs of implementation. To be sure, while the Association for Savings and Investment South 
Africa supported the purpose and objectives of the Bill, it called for a more moderate pace for 
implementation in order to balance the risks and costs associated with the new regime.1916 The 
company submitted that the imposition of the new privacy regime established by the Bill would 
be a major undertaking and would have a substantial economic impact on companies. This view 
was shared by many companies including the Business Unity South Africa who submitted that it 
was important that once enacted into law, the implementation of the Bill was carefully managed 
so as to minimise the costs to businesses.1917 Partly because of this, there have been lobbying by 
businesses to get certain kinds of data processing exempted from the application of the data 
protection legislation.1918 As pointed out, some private companies, particularly those engaging in 
the business of direct marketing have been in strong opposition of the Bill as it threatens their 
business.1919 
 
It can be submitted that a lengthy consultation process for adopting data protection legislation in 
South Africa reflects the country’s historical past in the apartheid regime. This has been the case 
with other pieces of legislation such as those regulating freedom of information and interception 
of communications. By their nature of secrecy or interfering with individual’s rights, adoption of 
such laws have been contentious. With respect to the Data Protection Bill, various interests have 
similarly been operating for and against the adoption of the data privacy legislation. As there is 
no specific deadline for the adoption of the data privacy Bill, it is not clear when South Africa 
will pass its data privacy legislation.  
 
6.4.3.4 Scope and Application 
 
The scope of the Bill is broad. It applies to both automatic and non-automatic processing of 
personal information by a ‘responsible party’.1920 The term ‘responsible party’ is similarly broadly 
defined. It means a public or private body or any other person which, alone or in conjunction 
with others, determines the purpose of and means for processing personal information.1921 This 
                                                          
1915 PMG, note 1893, supra. 
1916 Ibid. 
1917 Ibid. 
1918 Ibid. 
1919 Ibid, note 1785, supra. 
1920 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 3(1),(a). 
1921 Ibid, s.1. 
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means that the Bill proposes a law that is applicable to both the public and private sector and 
above all the individuals. It is interesting to note that in its wider scope the Bill extends its ambit 
to juristic and non-juristic persons in the private sector. This is because the term ‘private body’ is 
interpreted as a natural person who carries on any trade, business or profession; a partnership or 
juristic person.1922   
 
However the Bill has its limitations which may make it falls short of the European Directive 
95/46/EC. ‘Operator’ is defined in the Bill as a person who processes personal information for a 
responsible party in terms of a contract or mandate, without coming under the direct authority 
of that party.1923 This definition is equivalent to ‘processor’ in Article 2(e) of the Directive. Yet 
the Bill lacks an equivalent definition of the term ‘third party’ in Article 2(f) of the Directive who 
is not a data subject, data controller or processor but someone who processes data under the 
direct authority of the controller or processor.  
 
The scope of the Bill is also limited by the definition of ‘processing’. It is imperative to note that 
in the original Bill ‘processing’ is assigned a broad definition similar to the one in Article 2(b) of 
the European Directive. This has led Roos to observe that ‘this definition is so wide that one can 
argue that “processing” could be any action performed on personal information.’1924 However in 
the sixth working draft of the Bill, the Technical Sub-Committee of the Portfolio Committee has 
proposed a narrow definition of ‘processing’ as an option to the original definition. The latter 
states:- 
‘Processing’ means any operation or activity or any set of operations, whether 
or not by automatic means, concerning personal information, including (a) the 
collection, receipt, recording (b) dissemination by means of transmission, 
distribution or making available in any form; or (c) merging, linking, as well as 
blocking, degrading, erasure or destruction of information; but excludes the 
collection, storage or updating of blocked information.’1925 
 
                                                          
1922 Ibid. 
1923 Ibid. 
1924 Roos, p.368, note 201,supra. 
1925 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 1, Option 14. ‘Blocking’ means to withhold from circulation, 
use or publication any personal information that forms part of a filing system, but not to delete or destroy such 
information or (Option 3) ‘Blocked’ as referred to information means information which placed contained in a data 
bank which-(a) remains unused and inaccessible for as long as it is unused and inaccessible, provided that safeguards 
are in place to verify whether it is used or accessed, or (b) is kept in a place or in manner which prevent the use of 
such information as prescribed, see Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 1. 
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The above definition omits ‘organisation, collection, storage, updating or modification, retrieval, 
alteration, consultation or use’ from the definition of ‘processing’ in the original definition of the 
Bill.1926 Moreover, the proposed new definition excludes certain operations ‘collection, storage or 
updating of blocked information’ from the ambit of ‘processing’. It can be submitted that the 
sets of definitions of the term ‘processing’ are materially different. One cannot equate them by 
simply picking the expressions ‘any operation or activity or any set of operations’ and ‘including’ 
just before the enumerations of such operations or activities or set of operations in the two 
definitions. While these expressions suggest broad ambit of the two definitions, it is arguable that 
the specific exclusion in the proposed new definition leaves no doubt that the new definition 
intends to limit the scope of the definition of the term ‘processing’. If the Bill is finally passed 
into law with an inclusion of the proposed new definition of ‘processing’ it is clear that the South 
African data privacy regime will fall short of the EU law in this context. 
 
Similarly, the narrow definition of ‘processing’ limits the term ‘personal information’. The latter 
appears in the original Bill as broad.1927 However in the proposed option, the Sub-Committee has 
proposed both a broad and narrow definition. In the broad sense, the proposed definition just as 
it is the original definition, maintains a list of an exhausted list of what amounts to ‘personal 
information’ with an addition of one paragraph.1928 Moreover, it extends the meaning of personal 
information to both natural and juristic persons as data subject.1929 Yet, in line with the definition 
                                                          
1926 The original definition provides that ‘processing’ means any operation or activity or any set of operations, 
whether or not by automatic means, concerning personal information, including-(a) the collection, receipt, 
recording, organisation, collation, storage, updating or modification, retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; (b) 
dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making available in any other form; or (c) merging, linking, 
as well as blocking, degradation, erasure or destruction of information, see Protection of Personal Information Bill 
2009, s. 1. 
1927 ‘Personal information ‘means information relating to an identifiable, living, natural person, and where it is 
applicable, an identifiable, existing juristic person, including, but not limited to-(a) information relating to the race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or 
mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of a person; (b) 
information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment history of the person; (c) any 
identifying number, symbol, e-mail address, physical address, telephone number or other particular assignment to 
the person; (d) the blood type or any other biometric information of the person; (e) the personal opinions, views or 
preferences of the person; (f) correspondence sent by the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or 
confidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence; (g) the 
views or opinions of another individual about the person; and (h) the name of the person if it appears with other 
personal information relating to the person or if the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about the 
person, see Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 1. 
1928 A proposed paragraph adds ‘(i) consumer or purchasing preferences or patterns: Provided that such information 
is-(i) used or meant to be used in trade or commerce; (ii) not in the public domain in the same or in a different 
format; or (iii) held by a public body’, as part of ‘personal information’, see Protection of Personal Information Bill 
2009, s. 1, Option 12. 
1929 ‘Person’ means a natural person or a juristic person; and a ‘data subject’ means the person to whom personal 
information relates; see Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 1. 
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of ‘processing’ it excludes ‘blocked information’ from the list of ‘personal information’.1930 Thus 
it is submitted that the South African data privacy law may not meet the equivalent standard of 
personal information provided in Article 2(a) of the European Directive. 
 
Furthermore, the application of the Data Protection Bill rests on the ‘territoriality principle’. This 
means that the Bill when becomes law it will apply on the processing of personal data of a 
responsible party taking place in South Africa. To be sure section 3(1), (b) of the Bill states:- 
 
‘3(1) This Act applies to the processing of personal information (b) where the 
responsible party is (i) domiciled in the Republic and the information is 
processed in Republic; or (ii) not domiciled in the Republic, but makes use of 
automated or non-automated means that are situated in the Republic, unless 
those means are used only to transfer personal information through the 
Republic.’ 
 
The Bill defines the expression ‘automated means’ in the above section as any equipment capable 
of operating automatically in response to instructions given in processing information.1931 It is 
imperative to note that while section 3(1)(b) is similar to Article 4 of the European Directive, it 
omits a requirement that a data controller must designate a representative in the Republic. This 
may bring difficulties for data subjects to exercise their rights. Moreover it is likely to result in 
difficulties of enforcement by the data protection authority.  
 
Besides the scope of application of the Bill explained above, it is noteworthy that the proposed 
law contains an extensive data exemption regime. The provisions of the Bill do not apply when 
processing personal information in the course of a purely personal or household activity.1932 It is 
arguable that any person who keeps a directory of telephone numbers and addresses of friends 
and acquaintances for personal use processes data for a purely personal or household activity.1933 
Clearly this type of activity ought not to be regulated by legislation, since the risk posed to the 
privacy activity of third parties is minimal.1934 The Technical Sub-Committee of the Portfolio 
Committee has proposed an option provision which excludes the provisions of the Bill from the 
                                                          
1930 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 1, Option 12. 
1931 Ibid, s.3 (4). 
1932 Ibid, s.6(1)(a). 
1933 Roos, p.371, note 201, supra. 
1934 Ibid. 
418 
 
processing ‘in the course of non-commercial, non-governmental or household activity’.1935 This 
proposed new provision is broader than the EU law, and in particular it may not be compatible 
with Article 3(2) of the Directive. This is because ‘non-commercial and non-governmental’ 
entails a broad range of processing activities which may render the Bill defeats the very purpose 
of its enactment. Also excluded from the application of the Bill is processing of personal data 
that has been de-identified to the extent that it can be re-identified again.1936 ‘De-identify’ or ‘de-
identified’ in relation to personal information of a data subject, means to delete any information 
that-(a) identifies the data subject; (b) can be used or manipulated by a reasonably foreseeable 
method to identify the data subject; or (c) can be linked by a reasonably foreseeable method to 
other information that identifies the data subject.1937 On the other hand, the Bill defines the 
terms ‘re-identify’ or ‘re-identified’ in relation to personal information of a data subject, as 
resurrect any information that has been de-identified, that- identifies the data subject; (b) can be 
used or manipulated by a reasonably foreseeable method to identify the data subject; or (c) can 
be linked by a reasonably foreseeable method to other information that identifies the data 
subject.1938 To say the least, this provision is not available in the EU law. Also its implementation 
will require a maximum level of transparency.  
 
The provisions of the Bill are also excluded from application in respect to processing operations 
concerning national security, defence, public safety and activities of public bodies in the areas of 
criminal law, prosecution and execution of sentences.1939 However this provision puts one caveat: 
that exclusion is permissible only where respective legislation regulating public bodies in those 
areas provides ‘adequate safeguards’ for the protection of such personal information. Section 
6(1)(c) of the Bill is equivalent to Article 3(2) of the European Directive. Yet one may argue that 
it provides somewhat higher standard than Article 3(2) of the Directive because while it purports 
to exclude public bodies from the application of the privacy legislation it does so only to the 
extent that there are adequate safeguards for processing personal information. However it is 
interesting to note that the Technical Sub-Committee has proposed a new option of deleting 
completely section 6(1)(c) from the Bill.  
                                                          
1935 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 6(1)(a), Option 1. 
1936 Ibid, s.6 (1)(b). 
1937 Ibid, s.1. 
1938 Ibid. 
1939 The specific section provides, the provisions of this Act are excluded when processing of personal information, 
Section 6(1)(c) by or on behalf of a public body and(i) which involves national security, including activities that are 
aimed at assisting in the identification of terrorist and related activities, defence or public safety; or (ii) the purpose 
of which is the prevention , detection, including activities that are aimed at assisting in the identification of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities and the combating of money laundering activities, investigation or proof of offences, 
the prosecution of offenders or the execution of sentences or security measures, to the extent that adequate 
safeguards have been established in legislation for the protection of such personal information. 
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The other areas where the provisions of the Act will not apply include processing by any person 
for the purpose of bonafide literary or artistic expression and journalistic purposes ;1940 by the 
Cabinet and its committees and the Executive Council of a province;1941 processing relating to 
the judicial functions of a court referred to in section 166 of the Constitution;1942 or to the extent 
that a responsible party has been exempted from the application of such conditions for the 
lawful processing of personal information as determined by the Information Regulator, the 
supervisory authority, in terms of section 37 of the Bill.1943  
 
It is submitted that some of the exemptions listed in the preceding paragraph particularly those 
relating to artistic or literary expressions and journalistic purposes are equivalent to Article 9 of 
the European Directive 95/46/EC. However, the rest of the exemptions have far reaching 
consequences to individual personal information. For example, the exemptions of the Cabinet 
and its committees and the Executive Council of the province leave most of the processing of 
personal information in the public sphere unregulated. Perhaps the worst of these exemptions 
relate to the powers of the supervisory authority, the Information Regulator, to exempt from the 
application of the Act of processing by responsible parties.1944 It is submitted that, much as most 
of the criteria in section 37 of the Bill upon which the Information Regulator may exempt 
responsible parties from compliance to the law even though the processing activities would be in 
breach of an information protection principle are open ended, the requirement to publish a 
notice in the Gazette for the grant of the exemption is not a sufficient safeguard to check abuse 
by the Regulator. Instead the notice may only serve as a notification to the public of the fact of 
the exemption rather than a mechanism to check possible abuse by the Regulator. Moreover, the 
language of ‘may’ used in the beginning of section 37 clearly suggests that the publication of 
notice is not obligatory. The Regulator may not publish it and still be in compliance to the law. 
                                                          
1940 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, ss. 6(1)(d) and 7. 
1941 Ibid, 6(1)(e), with an option to delete the whole paragraph(e). 
1942 Ibid, 6(1)(f). 
1943 Ibid, 6(1)(g). 
1944 Section 37 of the Bill states (1)The Regulator may, by notice in the Gazette, grant an exemption to a responsible 
party to process personal information, even if that processing is in breach of  a condition for the processing of such 
information if the Regulator is satisfied that, in the circumstances of the case-(a) the public interest in the processing 
outweighs, to a substantial degree, any interference with the privacy of the data subject that could result from such 
processing; or (b)the processing involves a clear benefit to the data subject or a third party that outweighs, to a 
substantial degree, any interference with the privacy of the data subject or third party that could result from such 
processing. (2)The public interest referred to in subsection (1) includes-(a)the interests of  national security; (b)the 
prevention, detection and prosecution of offences; (c)important economic and financial interests of  a public body; 
(d) fostering compliance with legal provisions established in the interests referred to under paragraphs (b) and (c); or 
(e) historical, statistical or research activity. (3) The Regulator may impose reasonable conditions in respect of any 
exemption granted under subsection (1). 
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Similarly, the provision of section 37(3) which provides ‘the Regulator may impose reasonable 
conditions in respect of such exemptions’ may not guarantee safeguards. It is entirely upon the 
Regulator to determine which conditions are reasonable in a particular case. Moreover, it is not 
mandatory to impose any of the so called ‘reasonable conditions’. It can be submitted that the 
whole of chapter 4 of the Bill comprising sections 36 and 37 on exemption from conditions for 
processing of personal information by the Regulator may not likely satisfy the standards set by 
the European Directive. Together with other discussed shortcomings, it may negatively impact 
on the overall assessment of the ‘adequacy’ standards by the EU organs. 
 
The application of the Bill when becomes law is also limited in relation to other legislation which 
regulates processing personal information. In the first place, the Bill provides that the Act will 
generally prevail over any other legislation which is materially inconsistent with an object, or a 
specific provision, of this Act.1945  Yet, when such other legislation provides for conditions for 
the lawful processing of personal information that are more extensive than those set out in 
chapter 3, the extensive conditions prevail.1946 One of likely situations that is envisaged by this 
second scenario is sector specific laws regulating personal processing. 
   
6.4.3.5 Data Protection Principles 
 
The Data Protection Bill is based on the eight data protection principles. These principles are 
referred to as conditions for lawful processing of personal information.  They are similar to, but 
not exactly the same as, the principles found in the OECD Guidelines and the European Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC.1947 The Data Protection Bill lists the data protect protection 
principles in section 5(1)(a)-(h) as accountability, processing limitation, purpose specification, 
further processing limitation, information quality, openness, security safeguards, and data subject 
participation respectively. Each of these basic principles is elaborated in details in chapter three 
of the Bill (sections 8-25). Compared to the original Data Protection Bill, one may find that the 
sixth working draft of the Bill has introduced some changes on these principles, although not so 
significant. First, the original Bill numbered the basic principles serially from principles 1 to 8. 
This is no longer the case in the sixth working draft. The working draft has abandoned such 
manner of numbering. It is important to note that the abandonment of numbering the basic 
principles of data protection came right away in the first working draft of the Bill. Part and parcel 
                                                          
1945 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 3(2)(a). 
1946 Ibid, s.3(2)(b). 
1947 Roos, note 1933, supra. 
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of this shift in the structure of the Bill is a controversial debate among the members of the 
Technical Sub-Committee in their deliberations of 2 March 2010 and 8 April 2010 whether the 
Bill was principle or rule based. This debate has never successfully ended. Because of this, the 
Committee decided to abandon specific reference ‘principle’ and the corresponding numbering. 
Similarly, the Committee did not opt to make reference of the principles as ‘rules’ because the 
same was confusing. Instead, it introduced section 5(1)(a)-(h) presumably to ease reference of the 
basic principles to the general public. Second, the sixth working draft of the Bill has re-arranged 
the basic principles of data processing. Third, the scope and ambit of these principles have either 
been broadened or narrowed in some cases. Since the sixth working draft of the Bill is a work in 
progress, this part does not offer definitive detailed discussion. 
 
The first principle of data processing is accountability.1948 It imposes obligation on a responsible 
party to comply with conditions of processing set out in chapter 3 of the Bill and all measures 
that give effect to them. Since the responsible party is usually ‘the natural person, juristic person, 
administrative body or other entity which, which alone or in conjunction with others, determine 
the purpose of and means for processing personal information’, it is clearly the senior person or 
body in an organisation who will ultimately be held responsible for a breach of the principles by 
the persons processing the information.1949 Accountability is an express principle in the EU 
proposed General Data Protection Regulation. However, it manifests in different principles in 
the Directive. 
 
The Bill contains processing limitation as the second basic principle of data processing.1950 The 
latter provides that personal information must be processed lawfully and in a reasonable manner 
that does not infringe the privacy of the data subject unnecessarily. It is important to note that 
the expression ‘unnecessarily’ was introduced by the Technical Sub-Committee during its 
deliberations of 4 June 2010 to highlight the notion that some degree of prima facie infringement 
is permissible. Also important to note is that the principle of processing limitation is a composite 
of four other sub-requirements. First and foremost is the requirement of lawful processing. This 
simply means there must be in existence some sort of legal basis for processing personal data. It 
also entails some balancing of the rights of the data subjects against data processing. The second 
sub-requirement is minimality.1951 It aims to limit the amount of personal information collected 
                                                          
1948 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 8. 
1949 Roos, p.380, note 201, supra. 
1950 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 9. 
1951 Ibid, s.10. The Technical Sub-Committee has proposed an option provision which states ‘Unless authorised 
under the law or objectively necessary for the completion of the transaction concerned, no-one shall be required to 
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only to what is necessary to achieve the purpose(s) for which the information is processed.1952 
This is regardless of the lawfulness of the processing itself. Hence the minimality sub-principle 
requires that only adequate, relevant and in excessive personal information should be processed. 
The third requirement appears as consent, justification and objection.1953 These are collectively 
referred in Article 7 of the EU Directive as conditions for processing. To be sure section 11 
states:- 
‘11. (1) Personal information may only be processed if-  
(a) the data subject or a competent person where the data subject is a child 
consents to the processing; (b) processing is necessary to carry out actions for 
the conclusion or performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; 
(c) processing complies with an obligation imposed by law on the responsible 
party; (d) processing protects a legitimate interest of the data subject; (e) 
processing is necessary for the proper performance of a public law duty by a 
public body; or (f) processing is necessary for pursuing the legitimate interests 
of the responsible party or of a third party to whom the information is 
supplied.’ 
Section 11 provides further that the data subject may object on reasonable grounds his or her 
personal data to be subjected into processing by the responsible party.1954 Once the data subject 
has objected the processing, the responsible party may not proceed with the processing of his or 
her personal information. 
 
The fourth sub-requirement of the processing limitation is called ‘collection directly from data 
subject’.1955 The latter provides that except with some specified situations, the responsible party 
must collect personal information directly from the data subject.1956 This requirement is not laid 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provide or disclose personal information as a condition for the completion of a transaction or the receipt of a 
benefit’, see Option 31. 
1952 Roos, p.372, note 201, supra. 
1953
 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 11. 
1954 Section 11(2) A data subject may object, at any time, on reasonable grounds relating to his, her or its particular 
situation, in the prescribed manner, to the processing of personal information in terms of subsection (1)(d) to (f),  
unless legislation provides for such processing. (3) If a data subject has objected to the processing of personal 
information in terms of subsection (2), the responsible party may no longer process the personal information. 
1955 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 12. 
1956 Section 12 of the Data Protection Bill states, 12. (1) Personal information must be collected directly from the 
data subject, except as otherwise provided for in subsection (2). (2) It is not necessary to comply with subsection (1) 
if- (a) the information is contained in or derived from a public record or has deliberately been made public by the 
data subject; (b) the data subject or a competent person where the data subject is a child has consented to the 
collection of the information from another source; (c) collection of the information from another source would not 
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down in the 1995 Data Protection Directive and at the first glance may seem unnecessarily 
strict.1957 Yet, it may be implied in Articles 10 and 11 of the EU Directive which require the data 
controller to supply certain information when personal data are collected from the data subject 
directly or indirectly respectively. 
 
The third principle of data protection is the purpose specification.1958 According to this principle, 
personal information must be collected for a specific, explicitly and lawful purpose related to a 
function or activity of the responsible party.1959 The responsible party must always ensure that 
the data subject is aware of the purpose of the collection of the personal information unless 
provided in section 18(2) of the Act.1960 The purpose specification principle also requires that 
records of personal information must not be retained any longer than is necessary for achieving 
the purpose for which information was collected or subsequently processed.1961 However, there 
are exceptions to this general principle where retention of the record is required or authorised by 
law; the responsible party reasonably requires the record for lawful purposes related to its 
functions or activities; retention of the record is required by a contract between the parties 
thereto; or the data subject or a competent person where the data subject is a child has 
consented to the retention of the record.1962 It is imperative to note that the Technical Sub-
Committee has proposed three options with respect to data retention which may significantly 
detract from the conditions of data processing in chapter 3 of the Bill.1963 
 
The fourth principle of data processing is further processing limitation.1964 Usually, the further 
processing of information is dealt with as part of the purpose limitation principle.1965 However, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
prejudice a legitimate interest of the data subject; (d) collection of the information from another source is necessary- 
(i) to avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public body, including the prevention, detection, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of offences; (ii) to comply with an obligation imposed by law or to 
enforce legislation concerning the collection of revenue as defined in section 1 of the South African Revenue 
Service Act, 1997 (Act No. 34 of 1997); (iii) for the conduct of proceedings in any court or tribunal that have 
commenced or are reasonably contemplated; (iv) in the interests of national security; or (v) to maintain the legitimate 
interests of the responsible party or of a third party to whom the information is supplied; (e) compliance would 
prejudice a lawful purpose of the collection; or (f) compliance is not reasonably practicable in the circumstances of 
the particular case.  (g) the information- (i) is or is placed in a data bank operating in terms of a code of conduct; or 
(ii) is transferred from a data bank operating in terms of a code of conduct to another data bank or entity operating 
in terms of a code of conduct. 
1957 Roos, p.373, note 201, supra. 
1958 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 13. 
1959 Ibid, s.13(1). 
1960 Ibid, s.13(2). 
1961 Ibid, s.14(1). 
1962 Ibid, s.14 (1)(a)-(d). 
1963 Ibid, Options 38,39 and 40. 
1964 Ibid, s.15. 
1965 Roos, p.376, note 201, supra. 
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has been made to stand as an independent principle in order to emphasise its importance.1966 The 
further processing principle prohibits processing of personal information in a way that is 
incompatible with the purpose of its original collection.1967 The assessment of compatibility must 
take into account: the relationship between the purpose of the intended further processing and 
the purpose for which the information has been collected; the nature of the information 
concerned; the consequences of the intended further processing for the data subject;  the manner 
in which the information has been collected; and any contractual rights and obligations between 
the parties.1968 The Bill provides specific exceptions where processing must not be regarded as 
incompatible to the original purpose(s).1969   
 
Information quality constitutes the fifth data protection principle under the Bill.1970 It states that 
the responsible party must take reasonably practicable steps to ensure that the personal 
information is complete, accurate, not misleading and updated where necessary.1971 There are no 
exceptions to this principle. This partly suggests that every responsible party has no option other 
than compliance. However, there are some challenges in implementation of this principle. For 
example, the responsible party may for purposes of safeguarding his or her interest deliberately 
omit to take ‘reasonably practicable steps’ envisaged under this principle. Roos illustrates this 
situation clearly. She observes that if the responsible party records the fact that the data subject 
refused to pay for a product or service, but does not record that the data subject refused to pay 
because he or she was dissatisfied with the service or product, the information is incomplete and 
therefore misleading.1972 The impression created by information should not be misleading and 
should give a complete picture of the data subject’s situation.1973  
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 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 15(1). 
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1969 Section 15 of the Data Protection Bill states, (3)The further processing of personal information is not 
incompatible with the purpose of collection if-(a)the data subject or a competent person where the data subject is a 
child has consented to the further processing of the information;(b)the information is available in or derived from a 
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concerning the collection of revenue as defined in section 1 of the South African Revenue Service Act, 1997 (Act 
No. 34 of 1997);(iii)for the conduct of proceedings in any court or tribunal that have commenced or are reasonably 
contemplated; or(iv)in the interests of national security;(d)the further processing of the information is necessary to 
prevent or mitigate a serious and imminent threat to-(i)public health or public safety; or(ii)the life or health of the 
data subject or another individual;(e)the information is used for historical, statistical or research purposes and the 
responsible party ensures that the further processing is carried out solely for such purposes and will not be 
published in an identified form; or (f)the further processing of the information is in accordance with an authority 
granted under section. 
1970 Protection of Personal Information Bill 2009, s. 16. 
1971 Ibid, s.16 (1). 
1972 Roos, p.377, note 201, supra. 
1973 Ibid. 
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The expression ‘reasonably practicable steps’ used in the formulation of the information quality 
principle clearly suggests that total accuracy is not absolutely guaranteed.1974 Likewise the 
necessity of updating information is determined by the purpose for which the information is 
held.1975 For example, updating is unnecessary if information is part of a historical record, but is 
necessary if it is used for a purpose such as credit rating.1976 
 
The sixth data protection principle is openness.1977 This principle requires the responsible party 
to notify both the Regulator and the data subject of the planed data processing.1978 With regard 
to notification to the Regulator, the detailed provisions of chapter 6 of the Bill should be 
adhered to. This type of notification has to be noted in the register kept by the Regulator.1979 
However, in case of the data subject, the responsible party is required to supply a set of 
information before processing takes place or as soon as reasonably practicable after it has been 
collected.1980 Such information include the information being collected; the name and address of 
the responsible party; the purpose for which the information is being collected; whether or not 
the supply of the information by that data subject is voluntary or mandatory; the consequences 
of failure to provide the information; any particular law authorising or requiring the collection of 
the information; and any further information such as the-recipient or category of recipients of 
the information; nature or category of the information; existence of the right of access to and the 
right to rectify the information collected; and the existence of the right to object to the 
processing of personal information.1981 However, the requirement of notification is not absolute. 
It has a wide range of exceptions.1982 
 
The seventh principle is security safeguards.1983 By this principle, a responsible party must ensure 
the integrity and confidentiality of personal information in its possession or under its control by 
taking appropriate, reasonable, technical and organisational measures to prevent loss of, damage 
to or unauthorised destruction of personal information an unlawful access to or processing of 
personal information.1984 The Bill lists specific measures that have to be taken by the responsible 
party to give effect to the requirement security safeguards: to identify all reasonably foreseeable 
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internal and external risks to personal information in its possession or under its control; establish 
and maintain appropriate safeguards against the risks identified; regularly verify that the 
safeguards are effectively implemented; and ensure that the safeguards are continually updated in 
response to new risks or deficiencies in previously implemented safeguards.1985 Moreover, the 
security principle requires that the responsible party must have due regard to generally accepted 
information security practices and procedures which may apply to it generally or be required in 
terms of specific industry or professional rules and regulations.1986  
 
It is imperative to note that the security safeguards principle does not bind the responsible party 
only. It extends to an operator and anyone who processes personal information on behalf of a 
responsible party or operator.1987 In this kind of situation, processing of personal information is 
only permitted with the knowledge or authorisation of the responsible party.1988 Moreover, such 
information must be treated as confidential and must not be disclosed unless required by law or 
in the course of the proper performance of their duties.1989 To ensure that those measures are 
adhered to by the operator or any other person, the processing of personal information by the 
operator or such other person must be governed by written contract.1990 It can be submitted that 
the Data Protection Bill somewhat corresponds to the safeguards in the EU Directive when it 
comes to security safeguards in the context of processing by ‘operators’ and ‘anyone processing 
personal information on behalf of a responsible party or an operator’. This is because; Article 
17(3) of the Directive provides categorically that processing by way of a ‘processor’ must be 
governed by a contract or legal act binding the processor to the controller. Moreover, for 
purposes of keeping proof, Article 17(4) of the Directive obliges that the paries of the contract 
or the legal act relating to data protection and the requirements relating to security measures 
must be in writing or in another equivalent form. Yet, the Directive is somewhat broader in two 
senses. First, the expression ‘legal act’ leaves other possibilities other than the use of ‘contract’ to 
bind the processor with the terms of security measures. Second, the expression ‘in another 
equivalent form’ leaves other possibilities of keeping proof other than the use of ‘writing’. In the 
present age of extensive use of ICTs where electronic contracts are legally recognised and are 
enforceable, the EU law makes perfect a sense as compared to what the Data Protection Bill 
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provides. The Bill also has provisions which the responsible party has to comply whenever there 
are breaches of security safeguards.1991 
 
The eighth data protection principle is the data subject participation.1992 Usually the data subject 
participation principle entails a bundle of rights that may be exercised by the data subject in 
relation to his or her personal information. These include a right of access to his or her personal 
information, a right of correction of inaccurate information and a right to object the processing 
of personal information in certain situations, for example in direct marketing.1993 However, in its 
earlier working drafts of the Bill, only two rights were provided: the right of access and the right 
to request correction.1994 The sixth working draft of the Bill has expanded the horizon of the data 
subject participation principle. The draft has incorporated a new section 4 titled ‘rights of the 
data subjects’.1995 The rights included in section 4 of the Bill are: right to object processing; right 
to be notified processing; request of confirmation of processing; correction, destruction and 
deletion; right to refuse to participate in direct marketing; right to refuse to be subjected to a 
decision based solely on the basis of the automated processing; right to submit complaint to the 
Regulator; and right to institute civil proceedings regarding interference of his or her personal 
information. It can be submitted that section 4 of the Bill is generally a pointer of specific rights 
scattered in the Bill to ease their attention to the public. However, in order to exercise these 
rights the data subject must over and above rely specifically to the provisions pointed out under 
                                                          
1991 Ibid, s.22. 
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1995 Section 4 of the data Protection Bill provides: 4. A data subject has the right to have his, her or its personal 
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provided for in section 102. 
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section 4. It is also important to note that the data subjects’ rights are not absolute. There are 
some limitations on them.1996 These must be adhered to by the data subjects.  
 
The regime of international transfer of data is also provided in the Data Protection Bill.1997 This 
regime provides that a responsible party in the Republic may not transfer personal information 
about a data subject to a third party who is in a foreign country.1998 However, personal data may 
be transferred where the recipient of the information is subject to a law, binding code of conduct 
or binding agreement.1999 These instruments must effectively uphold principles for reasonable 
processing of the information that are substantially similar to the conditions for the lawful 
processing of personal information; and include provisions, that are substantially similar to this 
section, relating to the further transfer of personal information from the recipient to third parties 
who are in a foreign country.2000 The other exception is where the data subject consents to the 
transfer; the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and 
the responsible party, or for the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken in response 
to the data subject’s request; the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a 
contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the responsible party and a third 
party; or the transfer is for the benefit of the data subject, and it is not reasonably practicable to 
obtain the consent of the data subject to that transfer; and if it were reasonably practicable to 
obtain such consent, the data subject would be likely to give it.2001 It is submitted that the South 
African proposed international regime of data transfer may not meet the standard of the EU law. 
This is because, the default rule under the EU Directive is provided in Article 25 that data may 
be transferred to the third country which provides ‘adequate’ level of protection of personal data. 
By way of exception, Article 26 of the Directive provides that data may still be transferred to a 
third country which does not provide ‘adequate level’ of protection of personal data. 
Surprisingly, the South African Bill does not in the first place restrict transfer of personal data to 
a foreign country just as it is the case with Article 25. Instead, the Bill picks Article 26 of the 
Directive and makes it the default rule. While section 77 of the Data Protection Bill can be said 
to provide minimum fulfilment of the requirement of the European law, it is doubtful if it may 
be accepted by Europe. This doubt is exacerbated by the fact that similar approach elsewhere, 
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particularly the APEC data privacy framework has been considered by Europe as a weak 
standard.   
 
Apart from the eight data protection principles, the Data Protection Bill incorporates principles 
for processing special categories of personal information. There are four main categories of this 
class of personal information and their corresponding principles. The first of them is processing 
of sensitive personal information. Section 26 provides, ‘a responsible party may not process 
personal information concerning-(a) the religious or philosophical beliefs, race or ethnic origin, 
trade union membership, political persuasion, health, DNA or sexual life  of a data subject; or (b) 
the criminal behaviour of a data subject to the extent that such information relate to-(i) the 
commission or alleged commission by a data subject of any offence; or (ii) any proceedings in 
respect of any offence committed or allegedly committed by a data subject, the disposal of such 
proceedings or any sentence that has been imposed by a court in such proceedings. It is 
important to note that the restriction imposed in processing personal data in section 26 of the 
Bill is subject to both the general and specific exemptions. The general exemptions exclude the 
application of section 26 where processing is carried out with the consent of a data subject; 
processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of a right or obligation in law; 
processing is necessary to comply with an obligation of international public law; processing is for 
historical, statistical or research purposes; the data subject has deliberately made his or her 
individual personal information public; or upon exemption by the Regulator.2002 The specific 
exemptions apply to various aspects of sensitive information listed in section 26 of the Bill. 
These include religious or philosophical beliefs;2003 race or ethnic origin;2004 trade union 
membership;2005 political persuasion;2006 health;2007 criminal behaviour;2008 and sexual life.2009 While 
it is too early to evaluate the provisions of sensitive processing of personal information, it is 
doubtful if the dual approach of exemptions in the Data Protection Bill may satisfy the standards 
of the European Directive which incorporates only the general exemptions but not the specific 
ones as the Bill. 
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The second category of special processing relates to the processing of personal information of 
children. The Bill prohibits a responsible party from processing personal information concerning 
a child.2010 A ‘child’ is defined as a natural person under the age of 18 years who is not legally 
competent, without the assistance of a competent person, to take any action or decision in 
respect of any matter concerning him- or herself.2011 However the Technical Sub-Committee has 
proposed an optional definition which defines a ‘child’ as a natural person under the age of 13 
years.2012 The processing of personal information of a child is still permissible if the processing is 
carried out with the prior consent of a competent person; if the processing is necessary for the 
establishment, exercise or defence of a right or obligation in law; if the processing is necessary to 
comply with an obligation of the public international law; if the processing is for historical, 
statistical or research purposes; or exempted by the Regulator.2013 It is interesting to note that the 
EU Directive does not contain special provisions governing the processing of a child’s personal 
information. To this extent, the Bill proposes a stronger protection to a vulnerable category of 
persons. 
 
The third category of processing of personal information in specific contexts is direct marketing. 
Generally the Data Protection Bill prohibits processing of personal information of a data subject 
for direct marketing.2014 The means prohibited are of any form of electronic communication, 
including automatic calling machine, facsimile machine, SMSs or e-mail.2015 However, processing 
of personal information for direct marketing is permitted in certain circumstances. The Bill 
provides two main exceptions. First, is where the data subject has given his, her or its consent to 
the processing.2016 The responsible party may approach the data subject only once in order to 
obtain consent of the data subject in processing.2017 The second situation permitting direct 
marketing is where the responsible party has obtained the contact details of the data subject in 
the context of the sale of a product or service; for the purpose of direct marketing of the 
responsible party’s own similar products or service; and if the data subject has been given a 
reasonable opportunity to object the processing of information, free of charge and in a manner 
free of unnecessary formality.2018 The Bill provides further that in any communication for the 
purpose of direct marketing, details of the identity of the sender or the person on whose behalf 
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the communication has been sent; and an address or other contact details to which the recipient 
may send a request that such communication cease.2019 There are also special provisions for data 
processing with respect to directories.2020 It can be noted that with the exception of directories, 
the provisions of the Bill on direct marketing are restrictive to electronic communications only. 
This may leave other forms of direct marketing such as those through post, etc to remain outside 
the ambit of the law.  
 
The fourth category of special processing is automated decision making.2021 The Bill incorporates 
an equivalent provision to Article 15 of the EU Directive on automated decision making. Section 
76(1) of the Bill states that a data subject has the right not to be subject to a decision which 
results in legal consequences for him, her or it, or which affects him, her or it to a substantial 
degree, which is based solely on the basis of the automated processing of personal information 
intended to provide a profile of such person including his or her performance at work, or his, 
her or its credit worthiness, reliability and conduct. However automated decision making may be 
allowed in exceptional circumstances.2022 
 
6.4.3.6 Data Protection Commission 
 
For purposes of implementing the data privacy legislation once enacted, the Data Protection Bill 
provides for the establishment of a data protection authority by the name of Information 
Regulator (or Regulator).2023 The Regulator is a juristic person. 2024 It is independent and is subject 
only to the Constitution and to the law.2025 In which case, it is required to act impartially and 
performs its functions and exercises its powers without fear, favour or prejudice.2026 However, 
the Regulator is accountable to the National Assembly.2027 Geographically, the jurisdiction of the 
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Regulator extends throughout the Republic of South Africa.2028 In terms of exercise of functions 
and powers, the Regulator has jurisdiction over two statutes: the Data Protection Bill once it 
becomes law and the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000 (PAIA).2029 
 
The Regulator is composed of chairperson and four ordinary members.2030 One of the members 
must be appointed on account of being a practising advocate or attorney or a professor of law at 
a university.2031 The rest of the members may be appointed on account of any other expertise and 
experience relating to the objects of the Regulator.2032 Members of the Regulator are appointed 
by the President upon recommendation of the National Assembly.2033 The chairperson of the 
Regulator is appointed in a full-time capacity.2034 Similarly two of the ordinary members of the 
Regulator must be appointed on a full-time capacity,2035 while the other two members may be 
appointed in a full-time or part-time capacity.2036 With the exception of members appointed in 
part-time capacity, the rest of members of the Regulator are not permitted to perform any other 
remunerative work.2037 Yet, members appointed in full-time capacity may still perform any other 
remunerative work with the permission of Minister.2038 The term of office of the members of the 
Regulator is not more than five years with an eligibility of re-appointment.2039 During this tenure 
a member of the Regulator may  be removed from office only on the ground of misconduct, 
incapacity or incompetence; a finding to that effect by a committee of the National Assembly; 
and by the adoption by the National Assembly of a resolution calling for that person’s removal 
from office.2040 Such a resolution must be supported by a majority vote of the members of the 
National Assembly.2041 Moreover, any person including members of the Regulator who acts on 
behalf or under the direction of the Regulator is not civilly or criminally liable for anything done 
in good faith with respect to the exercise of functions or powers under the Data Protection Act 
or PAIA.2042 Members of the Regulator are always required to disclose conflict of interests in 
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their duties.2043 They are also under duty of confidentiality not to disclose any information 
accrued in their duties.2044 Moreover the remunerations, allowances, benefits and privileges of 
members of the Regulator are statutorily provided.2045  
 
In order to ensure smooth discharge of its duties and powers, the Regulator receives its funds 
from the sums of money that Parliament appropriates annually, for the use of the Regulator.2046 
The other source is prescribed fees collected by the Regulator. 
 
The Bill provides extensive list of powers, duties and functions of the Regulator.2047 These are 
typical of most data protection authorities. They include, for example, to educate the public; to 
monitor and enforce compliance; make consultations with public on matters affecting them; to 
handle complaints; to conduct research and  report to the Parliament; to issue codes of conduct, 
to register responsible parties, etc.2048 
 
As pointed out, one of the functions and powers of the Regulator is to receive complaints and 
decide them.2049 An aggrieved complainant has a right to appeal to the High Court against the 
decision of the Regulator.2050 Also a responsible party who is aggrieved by an enforcement notice 
by the Regulator may appeal to the High Court.2051 Moreover, the Data Protection Bill provides 
for civil remedies.2052 A data subject or at the request of the data subject, the Regulator may 
institute a civil action for damages in a court having jurisdiction against a responsible party.2053 A 
complaint for breach of personal information may also be settled by the parties.2054 The Bill also 
creates offences most of them ‘procedural’ in the sense that they relate to the failure to comply 
with certain provisions of the Bill.2055 These offences attract fines and/or imprisonment.2056 It is 
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interesting to note that the Technical Sub-Committee has proposed what is called ‘administrative 
fines’.2057 
A preliminary evaluation of the Regulator reveals that it is strongly protected in discharging its 
duties, functions and powers. It qualifies at least on theory to be an independent supervisory 
authority. However, since the implementation of the Act depends on other instruments such as 
regulations and codes of conduct, it is premature at present to provide a thorough assessment of 
the Regulator. Much will depend on the practice as theory is one thing yet its enforcement is 
another. Also significant to note, is the fact that the Bill is still a work in progress with alternative 
options proposed by the Technical Sub-Committee. 
 
6.4.4 EU-Accreditation Process 
 
The South African government has not openly declared its intention to apply for ‘adequacy’ to 
the EU.2058 However there are clear indications that South Africa will seek adequacy rating from 
the European Union. This is because, one of the reason advanced in the travaux préparatoires for 
the adoption of the data privacy law in South Africa is to comply with the international standards 
particularly the European Directive.2059 The strong intention to apply for the ‘adequacy’ rating 
from the European Union is similarly demonstrated by the fact that the legislative process of the 
South African Bill has been predominated by Directive 95/46/EC as its primary reference point. 
In the last meeting of the Technical Sub-Committee held on 29 March 2012, it was strongly 
brought to the attention of the Committee that the EU Directive which provided the reference 
point for the South African Bill was undergoing major reforms.2060 Based on the European legal 
developments, it was suggested by Ms Ananda Louw, the Principal State Law Advisor, of the 
South African Law Reform Commission that the South African data privacy legislation would be 
enacted sometime in 2014 or 2015, the same time the EU new regime of data privacy may be 
coming into force.2061 It is submitted that, since the EU Directive is undergoing reform it may 
delay the South African legislative process if it waits and see the direction of the new law.  
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6.4.5 Other Legislation 
 
Currently there are three important pieces of legislation in South Africa which, to certain extent, 
regulate personal information: the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000(PAIA),2062 the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 2002(ECTA)2063 and the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act 
2002(RICA).2064 As alluded to, the scope of application of these pieces of legislation is limited. 
PAIA, for example, is essentially a freedom of information Act. It was enacted to give effect to 
section 32 of the Constitution 1996. Although it applies on both public and private bodies, it 
narrowly touches upon processing of personal information. That is, when access of information 
is sought but not in any other context. This legislation will be administered by the Regulator if 
the Data Protection Bill is enacted into law without changes in this aspect. ECTA as its name 
suggests essentially deals with electronic transaction. Its scope on protection of personal data is 
marginal. RICA regulates interception of communications. The Act’s application in the context 
of processing of personal data is limited in interception. Beyond this, RICA has nothing to 
regulate. 
 
It is important to note that section 112 of the Data Protection Bill and the Schedule makes 
substantial amendments to PAIA. Part and parcel of these amendments is the harmonisation of 
its administration by the Information Regulator. ECTA has few amendments resulted by the Bill. 
Most of them relate to basic concepts. RICA has not been amended. As pointed out, these 
pieces of legislation exist side-by-side with the Data Protection Act when the Bill becomes law. 
However their application is subject to the provisions of section 3(2)(a) and  3(2)(b) of the Data 
Protection Bill.2065  
 
 6.5 Conclusion 
 
Concerns for privacy are relatively high in South Africa. One of the catalysts that influences such 
concerns is the past injustice of the apartheid regime. Although apartheid regime formally ended 
in 1994, the traumas created by it are still in fresh memories of those who suffered under the 
system. Perhaps because of this background, privacy has long been protected in South Africa 
                                                          
2062 Act No.2 of 2000. 
2063 Act No.25 of 2002. 
2064 Act No. 70 of 2002. 
2065 The application of other statutes in relation to the Data Protection Bill has been considered in 6.4.3.4, supra. 
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through the common law of delict. It is imperative to note that O’Keeffe, decided in 1954, was the 
first landmark case on privacy in South Africa. Since that moment privacy claims have become 
common in South African courts. The impetus to privacy protection came about in 1994 after 
the constitutional recognition of the right to privacy in the South African Interim Constitution. 
The same was incorporated in section 14 of the 1996 Constitution which is still applicable to 
date. Yet the rise of modern technology has rendered the South African common law of delict 
and the constitutional protection of privacy incapable of sufficient protection. Hence the need 
for comprehensive data privacy legislation came about. However, this has been compounded by 
strong pressure from the European Union through Articles 25 and 26 of Directive 95/46/EC 
for non-EU countries to enact data privacy legislation that would be considered ‘adequate’ by 
EU. To say the least, compliance to the EU Directive has been the dominant agenda behind the 
adoption of data privacy legislation solely to secure investments from Europe and participate in 
international trade. It has also been shown that collectivist culture in its manifestation of Ubuntu 
has no or has insignificant role to influence the privacy concerns and the adoption of privacy 
legislation. Also to note, the lengthy legislative process of the data privacy legislation in South 
Africa is explained in the context of contesting interests.   
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7. Data Protection in Tanzania 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Tanzania has neither data privacy legislation nor a Bill on such law. In 2005-2006 the country 
made an attempt to introduce data privacy legislation through the Bill for the Freedom of 
Information Act 2006. However, the Draft Bill of this Act did not actually reach the Parliament. 
Its discussion was ended by the government when it reached its fourth version, that is, Draft 
No.4. Yet, besides this attempt, Tanzania protects privacy through its Constitution, statutory 
means and to some marginal extent the common law. This chapter analyses the Tanzania’s 
system of data privacy protection. The latter is situated upon the country’s socio-economic and 
political context. Competing interests around the development of data privacy law are pinpointed 
and considered as well. 
 
7.2 Socio-Economic and Political Context 
 
Tanzania is a United Republic of the defunct sovereign state called Tanganyika (now mainland 
Tanzania) and Zanzibar. The two entities united on 26 April 1964. The Union resulted into two 
governments, the government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Revolutionary 
Government of Zanzibar. The government of the United Republic of Tanzania has dual 
mandates. It caters for union matters between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. The United 
Republic also caters for non-union matters for mainland Tanzania. On the other hand, the 26 
April 1964 Union did not extinguish the Zanzibar’s sovereignty. It retained a limited sovereignty. 
Through this, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar caters for non-union matters for 
Zanzibaris. It is important to note that sometimes reference to Tanzania is restrictive of 
mainland Tanzania but sometimes inclusive of Zanzibar under the Union. In this part, both 
references are used and are only differentiated by their specific contexts.   
 
Tanganyika gained its independence on 9 December 1961 from the British. However, after the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-85, it was under the German colonial rule. The German domination 
ended with their defeat in the First World War (1914-1918). Subsequently, Tanganyika was put 
under the British as a Trusteeship territory within the mandate of the League of Nations and 
later the United Nations after the end of the Second World War (1939-1945). However, prior to 
the German and British rule, Tanganyika had external trade contacts with the Middle and Far 
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East. These had resulted into Arab and Islamic cultures on local communities living along the 
coastal areas of the Indian Ocean.  
 
In 1962 Tanzania became a Republic.2066 This ended Her majesty the Queen of England’s post as 
the head of the government of Tanganyika.2067 From this moment to date the president has 
become both the head of state and government. Following the union between Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar, Tanzania adopted the Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965. This was replaced by the 
permanent constitution of Tanzania in 1977, the Constitution of the United Republic of 
Tanzania 1977(URT Constitution). Since then, the URT Constitution has been amended from 
time to time to accommodate political, social and economic changes taking place locally and 
globally. Currently, Tanzania is reviewing its URT Constitution by overhauling it with a new one. 
The constitutional reform process started last year with the adoption by the Parliament of the 
United Republic of Tanzania of the Constitutional Review Act 2011.2068 It is projected that by 
2014 Tanzania will have a new Constitution. 
 
On the other hand, Zanzibar was under the Arab domination for centuries. However, during 
colonisation of Africa, it was put under the British rule. She got her independence from the 
British on 10 December 1963. This was considered as Arab independence. As a result on 12 
January 1964, the Zanzibar Revolution broke out with the overthrow of the Arab government. 
Since that moment, the government of Zanzibar is called the Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar (RGZ) in order to preserve this historical event. 
 
Compared to Zanzibar, mainland Tanzania has a larger size and population. Located in East 
Africa, the mainland has a size of about 947,300 square kilometres of which 61,500 square 
kilometres is inland waters. It is neighboured to the north by Uganda and Kenya; to the east by 
the Indian Ocean; to the South by Malawi and Mozambique; to the west by Rwanda, Burundi 
and Zambia. The population in Tanzania is estimated at 43,601,796(including Zanzibar whose 
population is approximated at 1.2 million) with a large population of about 80% living in rural 
areas.2069 However, in large cities like Dar es Salaam, there is rapid urbanisation rate. It is 
estimated that by 2020 Dar es Salaam will be one of the Africa’s megacities in terms of 
                                                          
2066 The Constitution of Tanganyika 1962, Art 1. 
2067 The Constitution of Tanganyika 1961, Art 11. 
2068 Act No.8Eng of 2011 or Act No.8Sw of 2011. 
2069 CIA World Factbook 2012, http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/tanzania/tanzania_people.html, last visited 
25/04/2012. 
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population.2070 On the other hand, Zanzibar comprises of the two main Islands of Pemba and 
Unguja off the east coast of Africa in the Indian Ocean, about 40 kilometres from the port of 
Dar es Salaam. Its total area is approximately 2,460 square kilometres. 
 
The dominant ethnic group in Tanzania is African. In mainland Tanzania there is about 99% of 
African (of which 95% are Bantu consisting of about 130 tribes) and 1 % the rest of ethnic 
groups (Asians, European and Arab).2071 In Zanzibar, there are Shirazi (60%), although black, 
they distinguish themselves from African; African (35%), Arab, Indians, and Zanzibaris of mixed 
race (5%).2072  
 
Tanzania is a secular state.2073 Yet, the major religions in Tanzania are Christianity and Islam. 
There are also other smaller religions existing side-by-side with Christianity and Islam. Although 
there are no official statistics as to the distribution of the major religions, it is estimated that they 
are almost the same in number. Yet, in Zanzibar Islam is dominant. Despite ethnic, religious and 
language diversities, Tanzanians exhibit high level of national identity and low level of ethnic 
consciousness.2074 In most cases Tanzanians define themselves in terms of occupation rather 
than tribe, language or religion.2075 This is largely attributed to the post-independence measures 
employed by nationalist leaders to achieve national unity. One of such measures was to promote 
Kiswahili as the national language. According to the survey by Afrobarometer, just under half of 
all Tanzanians consider Kiswahili as their ‘home language’, and it is undoubtedly the lingua franca 
of the majority of citizens.2076 Through Kiswahili, Tanzanians have created strong social 
cohesion. It is imperative to point out that English is the second official language.2077 However it 
is spoken largely by the country’s elite. Moreover, it is used in secondary school, colleges and 
universities as medium of instruction. It is also used as the language of record of courts except in 
primary courts and some tribunals. English is also a language of commerce. 
 
                                                          
2070 African Business, note 1146,supra. 
2071 CIA World Factbook 2012. 
2072 Notholt, S.A.,‘Fields of Fire: An Atlas of Ethnic Conflict’ paragraph 2.52,  
http://books.google.de/books?id=qiKl5jiwp8EC&pg=SA2-PA52&lpg=SA2-
PA52&dq=population+ethnic+in+zanzibar&source=bl&ots=3ocDOG7QHk&sig=CYOKTY0lUfI2fbSU2BZ9rd
PmhQE&hl=de&sa=X&ei=H26XT6qRLYfysgb7jPW4AQ&ved=0CEEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=population%2
0ethnic%20in%20zanzibar&f=false last visited 25/04/2012. 
2073 URT Constitution 1977, Art 3. 
2074 Chaligha, A et al., ‘Uncritical Citizens or Patient Trustees? Tanzanians’ Views of Political and Economic Reform’ 
Afrobarometer Paper No.18, 2002, p.2. 
2075 Ibid. 
2076 Ibid, p.8. 
2077 Ibid. 
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Tanzania is a constitutional multi-party democracy. The URT Constitution 1977 is the supreme 
law. Any law or conduct that contravenes the Constitution becomes invalid.2078 There is a similar 
provision in the Constitution of Zanzibar 1984.2079 The executive powers in the United Republic 
are vested in the President of the United Republic while for Zanzibar, the President of the 
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.2080 Legislative powers are vested in the Parliament of 
the United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar House of Representatives.2081 In both cases the 
legislature consists of the President and National Assembly. The latter is largely composed of 
elected representative of the people. It is imperative to note that currently the ruling party Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has majority seats in the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania 
and the Zanzibar House of Representative.  
 
The legal system in the United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar follows the English common 
law. However, judiciary is not generally a union matter. Hence the United Republic of Tanzania 
has its own judiciary while Zanzibar has also its own. Yet, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania (the 
Supreme Court) is a union matter. It means that appeal originating from the High Court of 
Tanzania (serving mainland Tanzania) and from the High Court of Zanzibar (excluding Islamic 
matters) may be filed in the Court of Appeal of Tanzania (CAT). Below the High Courts of 
Tanzania and Zanzibar there are subordinate courts with limited jurisdictions. 
 
The Tanzanian socialism based on Ujamaa ideology is the major determinant of the Tanzanian 
socio-economic and political context. Ujamaa as an ideology started formally with the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967. Summarising the basic tenets of this ideology, Karim F. Hirji posits:- 
 
‘While Mwalimu Nyerere2082 had talked about socialism from the early days of 
Uhuru, the Arusha Declaration of 1967 marked the first serious step in that 
direction. The Declaration envisioned a society based on equality, service for 
the common good and justice for all. It advocated public ownership of the 
major means of production and other pillars of the economy; it sought to 
extricate the masses from poverty, ignorance and disease by establishing 
Ujamaa villages; and it limited the private income-generating activities of 
political and governmental leaders to prevent the emergence of a privileged 
                                                          
2078 URT Constitution 1977, Arts 30(5) and 64(5). 
2079 Katiba ya Zanzibar ya 1984, Ibara ya 4. 
2080 URT Constitution 1977, Art 4(1) and Katiba ya Zanzibar ya 1984, Ibara ya 26. 
2081 Ibid, Art 64 and Ibara ya 78 respectively. 
2082 Julius Kambarage Nyerere, commonly known as Mwalimu (i.e. Teacher) was the first President of Tanzania. 
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stratum cut off from and ruling over the common man. It also stated that 
these goals would be achieved primarily with internal, national efforts, and not 
through reliance on foreign funds or supports.’2083 
 
It is imperative to note that, in order to impart, instil and consolidate the Ujamaa ideology in the 
minds and daily lives of Tanzanians, political leaders coined various terminologies to be used 
against practices that were anti-Ujamaa values. Brennan points that the Swahili words: ‘Unyonyaji’, 
‘Kupe’, ‘Kabaila’, ‘Bwanyenye’, and ‘Bepari’ which in different contexts signified someone who lives 
by exploiting others, were commonplace in order to shun individuals who were not upholding 
Ujamaa.2084 It was therefore not by accident that Ujamaa was the main justification for the 
nationalisation of private properties: commercial banks, insurance firms, sisal industry, textile 
industries, wholesale trade, etc.2085 Through nationalisation, the state became the main producer 
of goods and services. This marked the beginning of the command economy and mushrooming 
of parastatals. 
 
Ujamaa worked for sometime. However, it soon failed due to various reasons. One of them was 
lack of proper implementation of the ideology. For example, in the field of agriculture, Ujamaa 
was used to force citizens to live in Ujamaa villages and farm together. The ‘Operation Vijiji’ or 
‘Villagisation’ as the programme was referred to, received little public support. Together with 
other reasons, lack of public support collapsed the ‘Operation Vijiji’.2086  Yet, there were some 
other reasons beyond the implementation of Ujamaa policy. There is a large degree of consensus 
among scholars that the collapse of Ujamaa is largely the function of events that occurred 
between 1970s and 1980s.2087 During this period, Tanzania experienced economic crises triggered 
off by such factors like the Oil Crisis of 1973, Kagera War 1978/1979 between Tanzania and 
Uganda, the collapse of the East African Community in 1977 and the persistent drought 
conditions.2088 As alluded to, globally there was the collapse of U.S.S.R following the end of the 
                                                          
2083 Hirji, K.F., ‘Socialism Yesterday’ in Hirji, K. F(ed)., CHECHE: Reminiscences of a Radical Magazine, Mkuki na 
Nyota, Dar es Salaam, 2010, pp.134-154, at p.135. 
2084 Brennan, J.R., ‘Blood Enemies: Exploitation under Urban Citizenship in the Nationalist Political Thought of 
Tanzania, 1958-75’, Journal of African History, 2006, Vol.47, No.3, pp.389-413. 
2085 See e.g., Katunzi, J., ‘Managing Change in Tanzania Public Enterprises: Swallowing Bitter Pills’, The IFM Journal 
of Finance and Management, 1998, Vol.6, No.2, pp.14-23, at p.15. 
2086 For detailed discussion about Villagisation in Tanzania and its collapse see e.g., Lofchie, M., ‘Agrarian Crisis and 
Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1978, Vol.16, No.3, pp.451-475; 
Briggs, J., ‘Villagisation and the 1974-6 Economic Crisis in Tanzania’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1979, 
Vol.17, No.4, pp.695-702; Ergas, Z., ‘Why Did the Ujamaa Village Policy Fail?-Towards a Global Analysis’, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 1980, Vol.18, No.3, pp.387-410.  
2087 See e.g., Makulilo, A.B., ‘State-Party and Democracy: Tanzania and Zambia in Comparative Perspective’, PhD 
Thesis, University of Leipzig , 2010, p.25. 
2088 Ibid. 
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Cold War. The U.S.S.R was the main supporter of socialist system of which Tanzania was one of 
the beneficiaries. To address the economic crises of 1970s-1980s, Tanzania approached the 
IMF/WB and the international donor community.2089 As a condition for loan and other financial 
assistance, the IMF/WB and the international donor community imposed the SAPs with key 
demands for political and economic liberalisation. Specifically, SAPs demanded currency 
devaluation, removal of government involvement and allow the market mechanism to operate 
through the impersonal forces of supply and demand, elimination of subsidies, liberalisation of 
trade and politics.2090 Generally, the implementation of SAPs resulted into significant shifts of 
socialist policies and ideology in Tanzania: from Ujamaa to capitalism. Ujamaa was tactfully 
abandoned in the Zanzibar Declaration of 1991.2091 This policy shift was immediately followed 
by privatisation of the economy as well as political liberalisation.2092 Some commentators have 
unconvincingly argued that there was a favourable public mood that provided opportunity for 
privatisation, though there was no consensus on how to privatise.2093 However the opposing 
view has been repeated by influential scholars such as Professor Issa Shivji:- 
 
‘This so called new form of foreign investments that we are rushing for will 
not do us any good. They are coming just to take away our resources and leave 
us with nothing. A good example is in the mineral sector. We are only left with 
3% of what has been taken out of our land and they go with 97%. If this is not 
rape, what is it? They have had negative impact on the overall aspect of 
business and human rights, cooperate governance and good governance in 
general.’2094 
 
Despite the shift in policy through SAPs from Ujamaa to neo-liberal ideology; and the actual 
privatisation of parastatals, the URT Constitution 1977 maintains that Tanzania is a ‘socialist 
state’.2095 The same constitution provides further that its object is to build a nation of equal and 
free individuals through the pursuit of ‘the policy of Socialism and Self-Reliance which 
emphasises the application of socialist principles’.2096 Some commentators have argued that the 
                                                          
2089 Ibid. 
2090 Riddell, B., ‘Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa’, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 1992, Vol.30, No.1, pp.53-68, at pp.57-59. 
2091 Makulilo, A.B., ‘CCM at 34 and the Deepening Crisis’, The Citizen, 4th  February 2011. 
2092 See generally, Michael, A., ‘The Decision and Implementation of Privatization in Tanzania‘, M.A Thesis, 
Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands, 2002. 
2093 Ibid, p.28. 
2094 Shivji, I., ‘Current Investors plunder Our Resources‘, The African, 3rd  December 2009. 
2095 URT Constitution 1977, Art 3(1). 
2096 Ibid, Art 8. 
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continued retention of Ujamaa in the URT Constitution 1977 provides a significant tool for 
voters’ mobilisation by the CCM ruling Party.2097 This is because, majority of Tanzanians are still 
favourable to Ujamaa as they were able to access free social services.2098  
  
As pointed out, the socio-economic and political context in Tanzania is still based on Ujamaa 
despite the existing neo-liberal policies. For example, although in 1992 Tanzania adopted multi-
party political system, in what can be termed as political liberalisation, the actual practice is still 
centred on the single party regime. In his book, ‘Tanzania: A De facto One Party State?’ Makulilo 
has systematically analysed the legal regime and entire political environment in Tanzania only to 
find that they are all operating in favour of the ruling party.2099 It has similarly been observed that 
many African countries (including Tanzania) embraced multipartism without the will to liberalise 
the political space in terms of the institutional arrangement, legal framework and behavioural 
change.2100 Elections are only wanted if they yield the predetermined results in favour of 
governing regimes.2101 Yet, there are some areas which have significant changes. For example, the 
Tanzania economy has opened up. Most of the public enterprises have been privatised. The 
former President Benjamin Mkapa, under whose presidency the privatisation was largely carried 
out, pointed out recently that a total of 386 parastatals were privatised.2102 Out of them 180 were 
privatised to local investors and only 23 to foreign investors.2103 He also pointed out that the 
government sold shares in the remaining corporations and industries.2104 Yet, Mkapa has   
strongly been criticised by Professor Issa Shivji that it was wrong for the government to privatise 
important sectors such as banks and insurance.2105 It is important to note that, the general view is 
that privatisation has not improved the performance of corporations and industries in Tanzania. 
 
Technologically, Tanzania has come far. As pointed out, after independence, particularly in 1974, 
Tanzania banned the importation of computers and related equipments in the country.2106 This 
                                                          
2097 Makulilo, p.32, note 2087,supra. 
2098 Chaligha et al, p.20, note 2074, supra. 
2099 Makulilo, note 1150. 
2100 Bakari, M and Makulilo, A., ‘Beyond Polarity in Zanzibar? The “Silent” Referendum and the Government of 
National Unity’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 2012, Vol.30, No.2, pp.195-218, at p.211. 
2101 Ibid. 
2102 ‘Mkapa defends privatisation, blames bad management’, The Citizen, 14th April 2012, 
http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/-/21464-mkapa-defends-privatisation-blames-bad-management, 
last visited 26/04/2012. 
2103 Ibid. 
2104Ibid. 
2105 Ibid. 
2106 Mgaya, K., ‘Development of Information Technology in Tanzania’ in Drew, E.P and Foster, F.G (eds)., 
Information and Technology in Selected Countries: Reports from Ireland, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tanzania, 
University of United Nations, Tokyo, 1994, 
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was done through the Government Gazette.2107 However, in the late 1980s the ban was lifted and 
by 1990s, there was proliferation of computers in the country and their increasing usage in the 
public and private sectors.2108 The importation of the mobile phone technology in 1990s as well 
as the Internet particularly around 2000s, has seen the penetration of ICTs in Tanzania. A survey 
conducted by the Tanzania Regulatory Communications Authority (TCRA) reveals that by June 
2010, Tanzania had an estimated number of 4.8 million internet users.2109 Out of this number, 
only 5% used internet services from cyber cafes, 55% used internet from organisations or 
institutions, and 40% from households.2110 In terms of penetration, the survey reveals that only 
11% of Tanzanians were accessing and using internet services.2111 On the other hand, by March 
2010, there were more than 17 mobile phone users in Tanzania.2112 
 
Socially, Tanzanians are individualist and collectivists as well. Yet, the latter is dominant as 
Professor Geert Hofstede posits:- 
 
‘Tanzania, with a score of 25(measured in value range from 0 to 100) is 
considered a collectivist society. This is manifest in a close long-term 
commitment to the member “group”, be that a family, extended family, or 
extended relationships.’2113 
 
It is imperative to note that Ujamaa has largely contributed to collectivist culture in Tanzania. 
However, Westernisation aided with ICTs is fast changing individuals’ relationships both in the 
urban and rural Tanzania.2114 The impact of westernisation has also been captured by the music 
industry. In his famous song ‘Mnyonge Hana Haki’ (i.e. The Poor Have No Rights), Remmy 
Ongala opened the song with the phrase ‘Mother-where are you?’ suggesting that he is separated 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu19ie/uu19ie0i.htm#4:%20development%20of%20information%2
0technology%20in%20tanzania, last visited 26/04/2012. 
2107 Ibid. 
2108 Makulilo, A.B., ‘The Admissibility of Computer Printouts in Tanzania: Should it be any Different Than 
Traditional Paper Document?’, LL.M Thesis, University of Oslo(Norway), 2006, p.2. 
2109 Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA)., ‘Report on Internet and Data Services in Tanzania: A 
Supply-Side Survey’, September 2010, p.2, http://www.tcra.go.tz/publications/InternetDataSurveyScd.pdf, 
last visited 26/04/2012. 
2110 Ibid. 
2111 Ibid. 
2112 ‘Mobile Phone Users now top 17 million’, The Citizen, 19th  March 2010. 
2113 Hofstede, G., ‘Tanzania’, http://geert-hofstede.com/tanzania.html, last visited 26/04/2012. 
2114 See generally, FitzGerald, J.R.S., ‘The Last of the Maasai in Northern Tanzania?-Redefining Cultural Identity’, 
M.A Thesis, Oxford Brookes University, 2008. 
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from his family.2115 Moreover, in the same song Ongala makes more explicit about the pressures 
of liberalisation, competition and inequality in urban areas where he sings that ‘in Dar es Salaam 
everyone is on his/her own’.2116  
 
The loss of cultural ties both as a result of Western Christian and urban life-style in Tanzania had 
been considered by the High Court of Tanzania in oft-quoted case of Re Innocent Mbilinyi2117 well 
before liberalisation. This case involved the estate of the late Innocent Mbilinyi in which his 
relatives wished his estate to be administered under customary law. On the other hand the 
deceased’s widow wished her husband’s estate to be administered through the Indian Succession 
Act 1865 which is applicable to Christians in Tanzania. Both Innocent Mbilinyi and his wife were 
Christians, and they contracted a Christian marriage. However, they belonged to different tribes: 
Ngoni and Chagga, respectively. After marriage they lived in urban areas including Dar es Salaam 
(the Capital City of Tanzania by then). In its ruling, the High Court held that the deceased had 
abandoned the customary way of life in favour of a Christian one. Together with the fact that 
Innocent Mbilinyi lived in Dar es Salaam after marriage and worked there, the court ruled further 
that he had alienated from his family and that his children had no connection whatever with 
them. The High Court of Tanzania directed that the Indian Succession Act was applicable in the 
administration of the deceased estate. 
 
In terms of health, Tanzania, just like many other sub-Sahara African countries, is affected by 
HIV/Aids. By 2009, it is estimated that Tanzania, with a 5.6% adult prevalence HIV/Aids rate, 
ranked twelfth in the world.2118 The statistics indicate also that in 2009, there were 1.4 million 
people living with HIV/Aids, making the country ranks the sixth in the world.2119 By the same 
year, an estimated number of 86,000 people lost their lives through HIV/Aids, the record that 
ranked Tanzania the fourth in the world.2120 A monthly published magazine, ‘Tanzania AIDS 
Week in Review’2121 has estimated that by March 2012, the national prevalence of HIV/Aids in 
Tanzania mainland stood at 5.7% down from 7 in 2004, suggesting a declining rate though at a 
                                                          
2115 Hilhosrst, S., ‘Remmy Ongala: Capitalist Transition and Popular Music in Tanzania 1979-2002’, Journal of 
African Cultural Studies, 2009, Vol.21, No.2, pp.105-126, at p.120. 
2116 Ibid. 
2117 [1969]H.C.D 283. 
2118 CIA World Factbook 2012. 
2119 Ibid. 
2120 Ibid. 
2121 Tanzania AIDS Week in Review, Issue No.161, February 26-March 3, 2012, http://www.ajaat.or.tz, 
last visited 27/04/2012. 
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slow pace. Yet, on its website, the magazine provides extra information that the HIV/Aids 
population in Tanzania now stands at 1.8 million.2122 
 
7.3 Social Attitudes to Privacy 
 
Privacy is less prominent a public issue in Tanzania. However there are isolated cases and trends 
for claim for privacy which can give a wider picture of Tanzanians’ attitudes towards privacy. 
Debates on the registration of SIM cards comprise one of these isolated cases and trends.2123  
 
In January 2009 the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) announced that all 
existing and future subscribers of pre-paid SIM cards must be registered.2124 This public notice 
required mobile service providers to maintain databases of information of their subscribers. 
Included in such databases are information on the phone number, name, date of birth, gender, 
address, alternative phone numbers(if available), the number on ID card, passport, driving 
licence, student card, voter registration card, or a letter from a local government official. The 
deadline for registration was initially set for six months i.e. from 1 July 2009 to 31 December 
2009. However, this limitation period was extended for another period of six months to 30 June 
20102125  and subsequently for half a month to 15 July 2010.2126  
 
TCRA advanced four reasons in support for registration of pre-paid SIM cards: to protect 
consumers from misuse of communication services, to enable consumers to be identified as they 
use value added services, such as mobile banking, mobile money transfer, electronic payments 
for services such as water, electricity, pay-TV etc, to enhance national security and to enable 
network operators to promote “know your customer.”2127 In the beginning, the TCRA’s directive 
to service providers provided the basis for collection of personal information from their 
subscribers.2128 However this directive was not backed by any statutory law. Legislation on 
                                                          
2122 AJAAT Website, http://ajaat.or.tz/home/index.php last visited 27/04/2012. 
2123 Discussion in this part is partly adopted from Makulilo, notes 224 and 225, supra. 
2124 TCRA., ‘Public Notice: SIM Card Registration’, http://www.tcra.go.tz/headlines/simcardRegEng.pdf, 
last visited 27/04/2012; See also, DAILY NEWS, 29th January, 2009, p.3.   
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last visited 27/04/2012. 
2126 The Guardian, 1st July, 2010, pp.1-2; See also, THE CITIZEN, 1st July, 2010, p.2. 
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and 2123 supra). However the initial public notice (see footnote 2124 supra) indicated only security as the reason for 
SIM card registration. 
2128 TCRA’s directive being administrative in nature would not satisfy the requirements of Article 16(2) of the 
Tanzanian Constitution which requires that any derogation to the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Article 
16(1) of the Constitution must lay down legal procedure for that derogation. Moreover it must pass the 
proportionality test.   
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mandatory registration of SIM cards only came into force towards the end of the registration 
exercise. Yet, the need for registration of SIM cards first occupied the Tanzanian Parliamentary 
debates on 18 August 2008 well before the registration of SIM cards.2129 Interestingly, protection 
of subscribers’ right to privacy was a less priority concern for the legislators. It is imperative to 
note that during this session only one legislator raised concern over the right to privacy. 
However, since there was no Bill for SIM card registration tabled before the Parliament, no 
discussion took place over concern for privacy. It was until 27 January 2010 when the 
Government introduced the Electronic and Postal Communication Bill 2009 to the Parliament 
for its first reading that discussion took place. This Bill contained provisions for regulation of 
SIM cards. It was passed into law two days later, i.e. on 29 January 2010. Interestingly, no 
legislator raised concern over individual’s right to privacy during parliamentary debates, not even 
the only legislator who warned breach of right to privacy on 18 August 2008 over a law on 
registration of SIM cards.  
 
However, outside Parliament, some people raised serious objections to the registration of SIM 
cards on account of privacy concerns. Notable instances of such objections appeared on 28 
January 2009 in the discussions of a thread, ‘SIMCARD Registration in Tanzania now a MUST’ 
on JamiiForums.2130 Discussants were concerned with registration of SIM cards without having 
in place national ID cards, casting doubt on the information quality and reliability. The other 
aspect widely raised in the discussion was the lack of proper legal safeguards against interception 
of private communication by the government and service providers themselves. Similar concerns 
for privacy appeared in the headlines of newspapers. For example, the Arusha Times bore the 
headline, ‘SIM-card registration now viewed as spying move’.2131 It was generally feared by many 
people that SIM card registration that was going on since 2009 was aimed at spying their political 
interests and loyalties during the 2010 general elections.2132 A more critical article, ‘Kusajili simu za 
mkononi ni uhalifu’2133 translating in English, ‘Registering mobile phone is a crime’ argued that ‘the 
government and the mobile phone service providers have conspired with the mobile phone 
                                                          
2129 See, BUNGE LA TANZANIA, MAJADILIANO YA BUNGE, MKUTANO WA KUMI NA MBILI, Kikao 
cha Arobaini na Saba – Tarehe 18 Agosti, 2008. 
2130JamiiForums, ‘SIM Card Registration in Tanzania Now a Must’, discussions held on 28th January, 
2009http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/23569-simcard-registration-in-tanzania-now-a-must.html, 
last visited 27/04/2012.  
2131The ARUSHA TIMES., ‘Tanzania: SIM-Card Registration Now Viewed As Spying Move’, 7-13 November 2009, 
http://www.arushatimes.co.tz/2009/44/front_page_3.htm, last visited 27/04/2012. 
2132 Ibid. 
2133 Tanzania Daima Jumapili, Julai 26, 2009, uk 5. 
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operators in carrying out SIM card registration. They have agreed to intercept citizens’ private 
communications. Perhaps they have been doing so for long a time.’2134 
 
There are specific privacy incidents which are related to SIM cards. Most of them have raised 
serious concerns for individuals’ privacy. For example, in September 2010 there was a widely 
circulation of a hoax text message in Tanzania warning people that they would die if they 
received calls whose numbers were in red. The message raised fear and panic to most 
Tanzanians. Due to this, some people challenged the registration of SIM cards which aimed at 
enhancing security from misuse of mobile phones.2135  At the same time, there were defamatory 
and hateful text messages circulated to millions of Tanzanians during the political campaigns for 
the last 31 October 2010 General Elections.2136 These messages defamed and unreasonably 
attacked the presidential candidates for the two opposition parties: Chama cha Demokrasia na 
Maendeleo (CHADEMA) and the Civic United Front (CUF). However what puzzled many people 
was how the author of the massage managed to access the database of various mobile phone 
operators in order to reach millions of people countrywide directly.2137 The concern for privacy 
was exacerbated by the fact that under normal circumstances, no mobile handset can store that 
volume of contacts, but the mysterious author managed to jam over 5 million users within 48 
hours, causing panic and outrage among opposition supporters.2138  
 
Still in relation to the general elections carried in October 2010, the Director of the Prevention 
and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) confirmed to the general public that, his entity 
had the technology to monitor and identify people dishing out bribes through mobile cash 
transfer (i.e. Vodacom’s M-Pesa; Zain’s Zap and Tigo Pesa of Tigo).2139 The context in which the 
PCCB issued its statement was the elections which are usually tainted with bribes. In contrast, 
the Vodacom Tanzania’s head of public relations and corporate social responsibility, Ms. 
Mwamvita Makamba refuted PCCB’s statement by holding that the mobile company had not 
received any complaints from any agency, including PCCB, about the abuse of its mobile money 
                                                          
2134 Ibid. 
2135 See e.g., The Guardian, 6th September, 2010, pp.1-2; The Guardian, 7th September, 2010, pp.1-2; The Guardian, 
12th September, 2010, pp.1-3,18; THE CITICEN, 6th September, 2010, p.8; DAILY NEWS, 9th September, 2010, 
p.1; Dar Leo, 8th September, 2010,p.1 & 4, UWAZI, 14-20, Septemba, 2010, pp. 1 & 3; and SANI, 11-14, Septemba, 
2010, pp.1-2. 
2136 The Guardian on Sunday., ‘Revealed: Kingpin behind “hateful” text messages’, 17th October, 2010, 
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=22119 last visited 27/04/2012. 
2137 Ibid. 
2138 Ibid. 
2139 THE CITIZEN., ‘PCCB has eye on mobile cash transfer’, 6th September 2010, p.2. 
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transfer.2140 Surely, these opposing statements had left Tanzanians who use mobile cash transfer 
in a state of dilemma.  
 
Newspapers have also raised privacy concerns to Tanzanians. Some of them have published 
photographs depicting the likeness of individuals without authorisation. For example, in 2005, 
Mwananchi Communications Ltd, published in its two newspapers Mwananchi and the Citizen a 
commercial advertisement using the likeness of Ms. Sia Dominic Nyange who participated in the 
Miss Tanzania Beauty Pageantry 2004. The advertisement was circulated countrywide for about 
three months. In reacting to the publication of her likeness without her consent, Ms. Nyange 
instituted a civil suit against the company alleging violation of her right to privacy.2141 It is 
interesting to note that, in this case the company opted to settle the matter out of court by 
compensating Ms. Nyange, suggesting an admission of the violation her right to privacy. 
 
The other instance for claim of privacy against a newspaper is provided by Mkami Kasege & Ismail 
Msengi v Risasi.2142 In this case, the complainant instituted a claim against a newspaper, Risasi 
(owned by the Global Publishers Ltd) in the Media Council of Tanzania. Her complaint was 
about publication of false and malicious articles which had seriously damaged her reputation and 
invaded her privacy. One of the articles published in the Risasi tabloid appeared with a headline, 
‘Za mwizi fote’ translating in English as ‘A thief’s 40 days are over’. This article purported that Ms. 
Kasege had been caught two-timing with lovers while she was a married woman. In a follow-up 
story carried by Risasi under the headline ‘Ticha aliyefumaniwa anywa sumu’ translating in English as 
‘two-timing teacher attempts suicide’, it was alleged that Ms. Kasege attempted to kill herself because 
of the conflict between her lovers. Moreover she had ended up in a police case. Ms. Kasege was 
particularly concerned with private photographs which were published by the newspaper that 
showed her in a semi-nude state. This case was heard ex-parte since the editor of Risasi newspaper 
refused to attend the hearing. It was revealed in this case that the allegations raised in Risasi were 
not true. Based on that, the Media Council held that guidelines on privacy of individuals were 
clearly spelt out in the Code of Ethics for Media Professionals. It went on to hold that even in 
the case of public figures that usually have little protection of their privacy from the media, it is 
only acceptable to intrude in their privacy when it is absolutely necessary in the public interest. 
The Council observed that it was gravely concerned by the unacceptable trend of some tabloids 
                                                          
2140 Ibid. 
2141 Sia Dominic Nyange v Mwananchi Communications Ltd, Civil Case No. 155 of 2005, the Resident Magistrate’s 
Court of Dar es Salaam, at Kisutu (Unreported). 
2142 Conciliation Case No. 1 of 2005, 1997-2007, MCT 111.  
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that continuously invaded the privacy of individual citizens and exposed them to humiliation and 
unnecessary anguish. In the end, the Council ordered the Editor of Risasi newspaper to retract 
the story, apologise to the complainants and pay the costs incurred by the complainants. It is 
important to note that, the newspaper did not comply with the decision of the Council. Part and 
parcel of the non-compliance to this decision is the fact that the Media Council of Tanzania is a 
voluntary, self-regulatory body. It does not have powers to issue binding legal decisions rather it 
reconciles parties.  
 
Certain newspapers have intercepted private communication and published contents of their 
messages. For example, on 11-14 July 2009, Sani published an SMS implicating one of the 
Tanzanian female celebrities to have an affair with a married man.2143 These kinds of messages 
are common in some Tanzanian newspapers. Partly due to this, some legislators have raised 
serious concerns with regard to violation of privacy by newspapers. To be sure, on 14 July 2011, 
Ms. Martha Mosses Mlata, a legislator, said:- 
 
‘Honourable chairperson, some newspapers have dared to interfere with 
individuals’ mobile phone communications including politicians. However, 
TCRA (Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority) has not taken any 
action against perpetrators including mobile phone operators. We have seen in 
other countries actions have been taken to suspend such newspapers. For 
example, few days ago, in the United Kingdom, the News of the World has 
been abolished. Why does TCRA fail to take action? We request the 
government to empower TCRA to take actions, otherwise this state of affair 
amounts to interfering with an individual’s freedom. It is also humiliation and 
violation of human rights.’’2144 
 
Somewhat related to above are concerns for privacy from unsolicited text messages (SMSs) sent 
by mobile phone operators. Individuals’ protests to these massages can well be demonstrated by 
two appealing newspaper headlines, Airtel bothering me with unwanted text messages and Yes, unwanted 
                                                          
2143 Sani., ‘Mume wa Mtu amliza Wema’, 11-14 Julai 2009. 
2144 Translated in English from original Kiswahili language: ‘Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, baadhi ya magazeti yamediriki 
kuingilia mawasiliano ya simu ya watu fulani wakiwemo wanasiasa na kuchapisha magazeti, lakini TCRA imekuwa 
haichukui hatua kwa wahusika ikiwemo kampuni za simu. Tumeona nchi zingine zikichukua hatua pamoja na 
kuyafungia. Kwa mfano, juzi yalitokea Uingereza kufungiwa kwa gazeti la News the World. Je, ni kwa nini TCRA 
hawachukui hatua? Tunaomba sana Serikali iiongezee nguvu na ipewe uwezo wa kuchukua hatua, vinginevyo hali 
hiyo ni ya kuingilia uhuru wa mtu na pia ni udhalilishwaji na ni kukiuka haki za binadamu’, see Parliament of 
Tanzania, Parliamentary Questions and Answers, Session No. 4, Seating No. 4, 14 July 2011. 
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Airtel SMS a pain in the neck published in the Citizen of 26 July 2011 and 11 August 2011 
respectively.2145 As alluded to, the concerns for privacy here stemmed from unsolicited SMS by 
the Airtel, a mobile phone operator in Tanzania. During this period, Airtel sent unsolicited SMSs 
urging individuals to take part in some competition and win million of money. On average, 
Airtel’s customers received up to 20 of unwanted SMSs daily. These messages clogged the 
customers’ inboxes, forcing them to delete the messages every now and then. Surprisingly,when 
customers tried to call the Airtel’s customer care number with the intention of telling the 
company to stop sending them the SMSs, the number was permanently unavailable. The worse 
part of it was that, the customers were not given option to decide whether or not they wanted to 
take part in the ‘competition’. Customers also complained against the Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Authority for assuming the role of a bemused spectator. 
 
Perhaps one of the most incidents of privacy concerns that did not go unnoticed by many 
Tanzanians involved the eavesdropping devices placed in the hotel rooms of Dr. Willbroad Slaa 
and Dr. Ali Taarab Ali in February 2009. Both Dr. Slaa and Dr. Ali were members of Parliament 
from the opposition camp, attending parliamentary sessions. Later in 2010, Dr. Slaa became a 
presidential candidate for CHADEMA, one of the strongest opposition parties in Tanzania. 
Some of the newspaper headlines which captured the incident read, ‘Big Brother is watching 
you!’;2146 ‘MPs hotels bugging claim under police probe’;2147 and ‘MP Slaa blasts police over spy 
bug incident.’2148 No one has been arrested to date in connection with the incident. 
 
The use of Internet has also raised concerns for privacy. One of the areas which has generated 
such concerns are interceptions of email communications. For example, in June 2009, there was 
widely circulated news in the media of Tanzanians whose email accounts were intercepted by 
fraudsters. Most of these emails claimed their senders to have been stranded in far-off countries 
like Nigeria, etc. They also informed their recipients that they had lost or had been robbed of 
their wallets, passports and air tickets, and asked for some money to somehow get home.2149 It is 
imperative to note that, apart from fraud purposes, interception of email has been invoked to 
                                                          
2145 THE CITIZEN, 26th July 2011, http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/editorial-analysis/20-analysis-opinions/13167-
airtel-bothering-me-with-unwanted-text-messages.html last visited 29/04/2012; THE CITIZEN 11th August 2011, 
http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/editorial-analysis/46-letters-to-the-editor/13658-yes-unwanted-airtel-sms-a-pain-in-
the-neck.html last visited 29/04/2012. 
2146 Daily News, 12th February 2009. 
2147 Daily News, 6th February 2009. 
2148 JAMIIFORUMS, http://www.jamiiforums.com/habari-na-hoja-mchanganyiko/29145-dr-slaa-polisi-tanzania-ni-
kitengo-cha-ccm.html last visited 29/04/2012. 
2149 ‘International con artists tap into local email accounts’, THISDAY, 24th June 2009; see also, ‘Utapeli wa mtandao 
wawaliza wengi nchini’, KULIKONI, 24 Juni 2009. 
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target radical politicians. One of the instances for such interception was reported in MwanaHalisi 
tabloid with a headline, ‘Siri za Zitto nje’ translating in English as ‘Secrecy of Zitto out’.2150  
 
The other area resulting in privacy concern over the Internet relates to the most controversial 
blog called ‘Ze Utamu’. This blog is no longer operating. Ze Utamu used to publish pornographic 
photographs of individuals. In one occasion, the blog published the photograph of the current 
president of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete.2151 It was at this point 
that the government intervened to arrest its owner who was a Tanzanian-British citizen. The 
settlement of the matter culminated into shutting down of the blog. 
 
Health privacy has also generated a lot of concerns. The most sensitive aspect of such concerns 
is about HIV/Aids. This is probably because of the stigma surrounding it. One of the recent 
incidents which has raised the attention of not only Tanzanians but also the world, is the 
requirement for HIV positive pupils to wear ribbons in some of the Tanzanian schools. In 
reporting this concern, the Independent bore the heading, ‘Tanzanian pupils with HIV “forced to 
wear ribbons.”’2152 According to the school’s authority, the identification of these pupils was 
meant to exclude them from strenuous activity. On its part, the Amnesty International has 
required Tanzania to end HIV stigma in schools through ‘red ribbon’.2153 It is interesting to note 
that in refuting the truth of the claim, the Regional Commissioner of the Coastal Region where 
the ‘red ribbon’ stigma was reported, defended that those pupils with ‘red ribbon’ were suffering 
from other diseases, particularly the heart disease.2154 
 
HIV/Aids has also been a concern in the employment sector. Previous studies conducted in this 
filed have revealed that it is an established practice in Tanzania for employers in the public and 
private sectors to require pre-employment medical test for new employees.2155 This practice has 
generated privacy concerns in the employment sector because such medical tests involve secrete 
                                                          
2150 ‘Siri za Zitto nje’  MwanaHalisi, 9-15, Desemba 2009. 
2151 ‘Mzee wa Ze Utamu anaswa’, MWANANCHI, 20 Juni 2009; See also, ‘Ze Utamu bares local Police who walk 
away with a vendor’s table caught selling at a prohibited area’, DAILY NEWS, 27th June 2009. 
2152 The INDEPENDENT, 16th March 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/tanzanian-pupils-
with-hiv-forced-to-wear-ribbons-7574470.html last visited 29/04/2012; See also, BBC News., ‘Tanzania anger over 
red ribbon labels for HIV pupils’, 15th March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17380941 last visited 
29/04/2012. 
2153 Amnesty International., ‘Tanzania must end HIV “red ribbon” stigma in schools’, 16th March 2012, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/tanzania-must-end-hiv-red-ribbon-stigma-schools-2012-03-16, 
last visited 29/04/2012. 
2154 In2EastAfrica., ‘RC refutes reports on Tanzania pupils’ HIV/Aids stigma’, http://in2eastafrica.net/rc-refutes-
reports-on-tanzania-pupils-hivaids-stigma/ last visited 29/04/2012. 
2155 Makulilo, note 224, supra. 
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HIV testing. This is partly due to the fact that with the rapid decrease in the workforce and 
revenues and increasing sick leave costs as a result of HIV/Aids, many employers in Tanzania 
are reluctant to employ persons who are HIV positive.  
 
Similarly, health privacy has raised concern in other aspects other than HIV/Aids. Probably the 
most recent illustration is the ‘Mwakyembe saga’ which has drawn the attention of the media and 
public. The latter involved the revelation of health information of one prominent politician, Dr. 
Harrison Mwakyembe, the Deputy Minister for Works. Following the recent ill health of Dr. 
Mwakyembe, there were claims by people around him and at times Dr.Mwakyembe himself that 
he was poisoned. He received treatment in India. Later the Director of Criminal Investigation 
(DCI), Robert Manumba, issued a report that the ill health of the Deputy Minister for Works 
was not caused by poison.2156 The DCI’s report confirmed to have contacted the Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare about Mwakyembe’s claims. Part of the DCI’s report indicated that 
the Ministry for Health and Social Welfare had contacted the doctors who attended Dr. 
Mwakyembe in India to know about the disease he was suffering from. Dr. Mwakyembe alleged 
breach of the principle of doctor-patient confidentiality. As a result, the Ministry for Health and 
Social Welfare issued a statement that it had never contacted anybody in India about Dr. 
Mwakyembe’s health nor did it inform the DCI about the health information about the Deputy 
Minister for Works.2157  
 
It is interesting to note that, sometimes before the Mwakyembe’s saga, the Tanzanian President’s 
health was publicly revealed in detail in a news conference by his personal physician. Yet, there 
was no claim by the President that his health privacy had been divulged. Part of the reason was 
that, the disclosure was authorised by the President. Moreover, before he revealed such health 
information the President’s physician clearly pointed out that he had been obliged to breach 
normal doctor-patient confidentiality at the request of the President himself.2158 
 
Other areas which have touched upon individuals’ privacy in Tanzania include the current 
project on National Identity Card; smart driving licences; the planned project for CCTV in Dar 
                                                          
2156 THE CITIZEN., ‘Mwakyembe was not poisoned, say police’, 18th February 2012, 
http://thecitizen.co.tz/news/4-national-news/19863-mwakyembe-was-not-poisoned-say-police.html, 
last visited 30/04/2012. 
2157 THE CITIZEN., ‘Mwakyembe saga raises concern over team spirit’, 20th February 2012, 
http://thecitizen.co.tz/news/4-national-news/19947-mwakyembe-saga-raises-concern-over-team-spirit.html, 
last visited 30/04/2012. 
2158 THISDAY., ‘Revealed: JK’s health in detail’, 9th October 2009. 
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es Salaam; voter registration database; and biometric passports. Yet, there have been no strong 
privacy debates or concerns raised in relation to these privacy invasive activities. 
 
One recurring reason affecting negatively privacy concerns in Tanzania is lack of awareness. It 
has been argued by some Tanzanian commentators that lack of awareness is a paramount factor 
resulting in little privacy consciousness by individuals. To be sure Ubena posits:- 
 
‘I know not so many Tanzanians are aware of how communication service 
providers are using customers’ personal information. They are using such 
information for marketing purposes. They also use such information to 
evaluate their businesses. Hence monitoring and surveillance in Tanzania is 
(sic) rampant particularly online surveillance. As that is not enough, one will be 
surprised as the surveillance is not done by website owners or communication 
service providers only but even employers are reading employees’ emails, this 
for sure is surveillance. Thus Tanzanians’ privacy is not secured.’2159 
 
The above observations are also shared by Mjasiri who argues that consumers in Tanzania are 
docile and have no audacity to demand their rights.2160 However, unlike Ubena, Mjasiri has gone 
far to assign reasons for this state of affair. He has pointed lack of consumer education, the 
remnants of socialist economy which was command-based, and bureaucracy.2161 Somewhat 
similar to Mjasiri’s view, Bakari argues:- 
 
‘Another problem is that of culture. Based on my own experience and being 
part of the society, I can describe Tanzanians as characterised by generosity 
that affects not only material exchange, but also information exchange. 
Because of this generosity, you may ask to know about one thing and end up 
with a lot more information.’2162 
 
While the above observations are overstated, they may partly reflect some truth particularly in 
rural areas. Be as it may, Ujamaa has its effects still prevailing in Tanzania. It is important to 
                                                          
2159 Ubena, J., ‘Tanzania lag on privacy law’, Tanzania Legal News, posted on 8th June 2010, 
http://tanlex.wordpress.com/ last visited 30/04/2012. 
2160 Mjasiri, J., ‘Consumers’ rights “abused“, lack of awareness to blame’, Daily News, 13th March 2010. 
2161 Ibid. 
2162 Bakari, J.K., ‘A Holistic Approach for Managing ICT Security in Non-Commercial Organisations: A Case Study 
in a Developing Country’, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Stockholm, Sweden, 2007, p.9. 
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mention that lack of awareness does not only affect uneducated persons. Some Tanzanians who 
took part in the Awareness Survey on freedom of Information and Data Protection Legislation and Open 
Government Data Initiatives2163 indicated that they were not aware of the existence or non-existence 
of a data protection law as well as a freedom of information law in Tanzania. Since some of them 
were affiliated to research or academic institution, it is clear that the field of data privacy is little 
known to educated persons as well. Yet, this state of affair is changing with time. For example, 
during an interview with the Head of Consumer Affairs at TCRA, it was confirmed that the 
regulator (i.e. TCRA) receives privacy complaints regularly.2164 This is partly due to the efforts 
invested by TCRA to educate the public about their rights.2165  
 
7.4 Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
As pointed out, Tanzania has no data privacy legislation. However three legal sources regulate 
privacy protection. The URT Constitution 1977 is the major source of the right to privacy. There 
are also various statutory provisions in different pieces of legislation which in an ad hoc fashion 
address privacy issues. Case law is the third source but quite insignificant at present. This part 
attempts to evaluate un-exhaustively these sources, particularly the statutory ones which are 
scattered in various pieces of legislation. However, particular emphasis is put on privacy in the 
health and communications sectors. This is partly because, the researcher had already undertaken 
researches in these sectors prior to the present thesis. Moreover, such researches culminated in 
the publication of two journal articles: ‘You Must Take Medical Test: Do employers intrude into 
prospective employees’ privacy?’2166 and ‘Registration of SIM cards in Tanzania: A critical 
evaluation of the Electronic and Postal Communications Act 2010.’2167  These papers are relied 
in the present analyses. 
 
7.4.1 The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 
 
The URT Constitution generally guarantees the right to privacy in Article 16. The first limb of 
this provision states, ‘every person is entitled to respect and protection of his person, the privacy 
of his own person, his family and of his matrimonial life, and respect and protection of his 
                                                          
2163 Taylor, note 1367, supra. 
2164 Interview held between the researcher of this thesis and Mr. Richard Kayumbo, (Head of Department 
Consumer Affairs, Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority) on 7/09/2011 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
2165 Ibid. 
2166 Makulilo, note 224, supra. 
2167 Makulilo, note 225,supra. 
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residence and private communications.’2168 However this right to privacy is not absolute. It is 
limited in Article 16 (2). This provision states, ‘for the purpose of preserving the person’s right in 
accordance with this Article, the state authority shall lay down legal procedures regarding the 
circumstances, manner and extent to which the right to privacy, security of his person, his 
property and residence may be encroached upon without prejudice to the provisions of this 
Article.’  
 
Further restrictions to the constitutional right to privacy are generally provided in Article 30(2) of 
the Tanzanian Constitution. Article 30(2) states:-  
 
‘It is hereby declared that the provisions contained in this Part of this 
Constitution which set out the principles of rights, freedom and duties, does 
not render unlawful any existing law or prohibit the enactment of any law or 
the doing of any lawful act in accordance with such law for the purposes of:-  
 
(a)ensuring that the rights and freedoms of other people or of the interests of 
the public are not prejudiced by the wrongful exercise of the freedoms and 
rights of individuals; (b) ensuring the defence, public safety, public peace, 
public morality, public health, rural and urban development planning, the 
exploitation and utilisation of minerals or the increase and development of 
property of any other interests for the purposes of enhancing the public 
benefit;  (c) ensuring the execution of a judgement or order  of a court given 
or made in civil or criminal matter; (d)protecting the reputation, rights and 
freedoms of others or the privacy of persons involved in any court 
proceedings, prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information or 
safeguarding the dignity, authority and independence of the courts; 
(e)imposing restrictions, supervising and controlling the information, 
management and activities of private societies and organisations in the 
country;  or (f) enabling any other thing to be done which promotes or 
preserves the national interest in general.’ 
 
The High Court of Tanzania (HCT) has quite often held that a law which seeks to limit or 
derogate from the basic right of individual on ground of public interest will be saved by Article 
                                                          
2168 URT Constitution 1977, Art 16(1). 
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30(2) of the Constitution if it satisfies two requirements. Firstly, such law must be lawful in the 
sense that it is not arbitrary. This means that such law should make adequate safeguards against 
arbitrary decisions and provide effective controls against abuse of those in authority when using 
the law. Secondly, the limitation imposed must not be more than necessary to achieve the 
legitimate object. The second principle is sometimes called the principle of proportionality.2169 In 
Jackson Ole Nemeteni and 19 Others v the Attorney General2170 the HCT held that in the absence of a 
procedure prescribed by law, the administration of a provision of any law which seeks to limit 
the basic rights of an individual is susceptible to abuse, and cannot therefore be saved under 
Article 30(2) of the Constitution.2171  
 
Up until recently there has been no specific case filed in the High Court of Tanzania alleging 
breach of constitutional right to privacy. This notwithstanding, the URT Constitution provides a 
normative basis for enactment of a data privacy legislation. Also important to note is that, the 
use of the expression ‘every person...’ in the beginning of Article 16(1) of the URT Constitution 
clearly suggests that the constitutional right to privacy in Tanzania can be enjoyed by citizens and 
non-citizens. 
 
7.4.2 Electronic and Postal Communications Act 2010 
 
The Electronic and Postal Communications Act 2010, commonly abbreviated as EPOCA, was 
passed by the Tanzanian Parliament on 29 January 2010 and assented by the President on 20 
March 2010. The Act came into force on 7 May 2010.2172 EPOCA repealed and replaced2173 two 
pieces of legislation in the Tanzanian communication sector: the Broadcasting Services Act2174 
and Tanzania Communications Act.2175 Also, the Act amended the Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Authority Act2176 and the Fair Competition Act.2177 However it saved all regulations 
made under the repealed laws to the extent that they are not inconsistent with EPOCA and not 
                                                          
2169 See for example, Kukutia Ole Pumbun and Another v Attorney General and Another [ 1993]TLR 159; Julius 
Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo v Attorney General, Civil Appeal No. 64 of 2001, Court of appeal of Tanzania, Dar s 
Salaam(Unreported); Legal and Human Rights Centre and Others v Attorney General, Miscellaneous Civil Cause 
No. 77 of 2005, High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam(Unreported); Christopher Mtikila v Attorney General, 
Miscellaneous Cause No.10 of 2005, High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam(Unreported).  
2170  Misc. Civil Cause No. 117 of 2004, High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam(Unreported) 
2171 The Court of Appeal of Tanzania had already considered this principle in the case of Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Daudi Pete [1993] TLR 22. 
2172 Government Gazette, No.19 of 7th May 2010. 
2173 EPOCA 2010, s.186. 
2174 Cap.306 R.E 2002. 
2175 Cap. 302 R.E 2002. 
2176 Cap.172 R.E 2002. 
2177 Cap. 285 R.E 2002. 
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expressly revoked.2178 In 2011, several regulations were made and promulgated under the 
authority of EPOCA. 
 
EPOCA was enacted with three fundamental objectives.2179 First, is to address the challenges 
posed by modern technologies, especially the convergence of technologies. Second, is to 
harmonise and consolidate communication laws in order to overcome regular conflicts in their 
implementation, and third, to introduce the Central Equipment Identification Register (CEIR) 
and registration of SIM cards. The Act has nine parts. Part I covers preliminary provisions. This 
part has three sections providing for the name of the Act, its commencement date and 
application as well as interpretation of key terms and phrases. Part II is titled Electronic 
Communications. It has twenty eight sections. It governs licensing, interconnection and access 
issues. Part III bears the title Postal Communications. It has also twenty eight sections. This part 
regulates all matters pertaining to provision of postal services. Part IV deals with competition 
issues and conduct. This part is the longest of all. It has fifty five sections. The most prominent 
part in Part IV covers sections 84 to 102 which deal with the establishment of CEIR and 
registration of SIM cards. The reason is that this sub-part introduces significant development in 
the communications sector in Tanzania. Part V deals with enforcement issues. It has only two 
provisions. Part VI is the next longest part. It has forty four sections. This part deals with 
offences and penalties under EPOCA. However of particular importance are sections 118,120-
124, 125-137, and 152 which touch upon electronic communications generally and specifically  
SIM cards. Part VII deals with miscellaneous provisions. It has seven sections. Part VIII deals 
with transitional matters with only one section and Part IX deals with amendments and repeals. 
It has eighteen sections. 
 
EPOCA places obligation on every person who owns or intends to use mobile telephone in 
Tanzania to register his or her SIM card.2180 At the same time it places obligation on every service 
provider to obtain information from buyers of SIM cards which identify them before activating 
                                                          
2178 EPOCA 2010, s. 168(2). 
2179 Electronic and Postal Communications Bill, 2009, ‘Objects and Reasons’ at p.115. 
2180 EPOCA 2010, s.93(1). However it is doubtful if this obligation extends to persons who had acquired SIM cards 
prior to the coming into force of EPOCA. This is because on the 1st July 2009 when registration of SIM cards in 
Tanzania commenced, there was no legal obligation in its support. TCRA only issued a public notice requiring all 
service providers to register SIM-cards for their subscribers. Part of this notice reads, ‘...Pre-paid subscribers who 
have up to now not been registered shall be registered by their respective telecommunication service providers 
within a period of six months from 1st July 2009...With effect from 1st July, 2009 any new pre-paid subscribers shall 
be registered by their respective telecommunication service providers as soon as they start using a new SIM-
card...Appropriate legislation is in the process through which registration of every person desiring to own and use a 
SIM-card shall be mandatory.’ Worse still, EPOCA has no provision for the retrospective operation of the Act in 
order to take into account previous registered and unregistered SIM cards.  
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such cards in their networks.2181 The list of  information that a potential subscriber must give to 
the service provider on his or her identity include: in case of a natural person, full name of the 
potential subscriber, identity card number or any other document which proves identity of the 
potential subscriber, and residential, business or registered physical address, whichever is 
applicable.2182 In case of a legal person, certificate of registration or incorporation, business 
license, Tax Payers Identification Number Certificate and where applicable the Value Added Tax 
will be required for registration purposes.2183 In addition, a service provider may obtain ‘any 
other information’ from potential subscribers where it deems necessary.2184 In effecting 
registration, a service provider is put under obligation to verify all the information from a 
potential subscriber before he or she proceeds to register him or her.2185 Once registered, the 
information obtained from a potential subscriber will be retained in hard copies of documents or 
electronically.2186 Where the information is obtained on behalf of a service provider, such person 
who acted on behalf is obliged to submit such information to the service provider in every 
fifteen days.2187 A service provider, on the other hand, is required to submit all subscribers’ 
information collected by himself or herself together with those by its agents to TCRA once in 
every month.2188 The latter preserves this information in the subscribers’ database.2189  
 
As alluded to, once personal information is collected in a database a person from whom such 
information was collected has significantly less control over his or her personal information. This 
loss of control over ones personal information leads to lack of potential subscriber’s knowledge 
of data flows and blacklisting. Probably to prevent this, section 98 of EPOCA casts duty on 
service providers to ensure that the information collected from subscribers is kept secure, 
confidential and not tampered with. This section states, ‘a person who is a member, employee of 
application service licensee, or its agent, shall have a duty of confidentiality of any information 
received in accordance with the provisions of this Act.’2190 It further provides, ‘no person shall 
                                                          
2181 EPOCA 2010, ss. 93(2) and 94(1). 
2182 Ibid,  s. 93(2) (a). 
2183 Ibid, s. 93(2) (b). 
2184 Ibid, s. 93(2) (c). 
2185 Ibid, s. 93(3) (b); practically no verification has ever been done prior to registration of SIM card. Stakeholders 
raised concern over lack of National IDs in the registration process, see, Daily News, 27th June 2010, p.3,as such 
subscribers would come with various sorts of identification cards and got registered. It is therefore doubtful if the 
information submitted was accurate in the first place. This, in my view, will still complicate the ability of the 
database to trace criminals because of the possibility of false information with which criminals might have been 
registered. 
2186 EPOCA 2010, s. 93(4). 
2187 Ibid, s. 95. 
2188 Ibid, s. 91(3). 
2189 Ibid, ss. 91(1) and 91(2). 
2190 Ibid, s. 98(1). 
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disclose the content of information of any customer received in accordance with the provisions 
of this Act, except where such person is authorised by any other written law.’2191  
From the above provision, it is clear that section 98 applies only to three categories of persons: a 
member, employee and an agent of a service licensee.2192 Moreover, the duty of confidentiality 
imposed under this provision is limited to ‘any information’ received in accordance with the 
provisions of EPOCA. Unfortunately, the phrase ‘any information’ as used in section 98(1) of 
EPOCA is not defined. However, viewed narrowly, the information referred here may be 
relating to the identity of a subscriber which was submitted by a subscriber and obtained by a 
service provider during registration of SIM cards. This is because, when reading sections 93 and 
94 of EPOCA, reference is only made to this type of information. However, when one reads 
section 98(1) in conjunction with section 98(2), which prohibits disclosure of the ‘content of 
information’ of any customer received in accordance with the provision of EPOCA, it definitely 
appears that the phrase ‘any information’ as used in section 98(1) is broad enough to encompass  
‘content of information’. The latter is sometimes referred to as ‘content of communication’. 
Section 3 of EPOCA defines the term ‘content’ as information in the form of speech or other 
sound, data, text or images whether still or moving, except where transmitted in private 
communications. This type of information is not the one submitted during registration of SIM 
cards but the actual messages or conversations transmitted over service providers’ networks 
when one makes a call to another person. One could therefore argue that EPOCA is an 
interception law as it authorises interception of subscribers’ content of communication. This is 
so because it could be illogical for the Act to prohibit disclosure of the content of information 
which was not intercepted and retained it in the first place.  
 
As pointed out, section 98(2) of EPOCA permits discloser of content of communication where 
persons who disclose such information are authorised by ‘any other written law’. The phrase ‘any 
other written law’ is open ended.  
 
Besides the interception and disclosure of information under ‘any other written law’ clause, 
EPOCA itself authorises interception and disclosure of communication. Section 99 states, ‘a 
person shall not disclose any information received or obtained in exercising his powers or 
performing his duties in terms of this Act except - (a) where the information is required by any 
                                                          
2191 Ibid, s. 98 (2). 
2192 Under sections 91(1) and 91(2) of EPOCA, TCRA is also a custodian of the subscribers’ information, yet there 
is no provision in EPOCA which places upon it duty of confidentiality. Although such duty may be implied under 
section 99 of EPOCA, it is not adequate to bring TCRA within its ambit. 
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law enforcement agency, court of law, or other lawfully constituted tribunal; (b) notwithstanding 
the provision of this section, any authorized person who executes a directive or assist with 
execution thereof and obtains knowledge of information of any communication may - (i) 
disclose such information to another law officer to the extent that such disclosure is necessary 
for the proper performance of the official duties of the authorised person making or the law 
enforcement officer receiving the disclosure; or (ii) use such information to the extent that such 
use is necessary for the proper performance of official duties.’ As it can be noted from this 
provision, the ground for interception and subsequent disclosure of communication is only the 
need of such information by a law enforcement agency, court of law or tribunal. There are no 
other criteria. In effect therefore, when there is no specific provision in ‘any other written law’ 
authorising a person to intercept and retain the content of communication or other type of 
personal information, such person may still fulfil the requirements of section 98(2) by resorting 
to section 99 of EPOCA. He or she can just come forward and tell the service provider he or 
she wants certain information relating to a specific person by merely introducing himself or 
herself that he or she is a police officer carrying out investigation related to that person. Assessed 
from the constitutional right to privacy in Article 16 of the Tanzanian Constitution, it obviously 
appears that, section 99 of EPOCA fails to pass the proportionality test. This is because, the 
provision does not safeguard in any way subscribers’ personal information held in the 
subscribers’ database. Moreover, no one is placed in a position to scrutinise whether the need for 
intercepted information is justifiable in any way. Because of this, subscribers’ personal 
information is unsecured. Moreover, their communication can be intercepted at any time without 
any appropriate remedy. Although EPOCA makes it an offence for unauthorised person to 
intercept and disclose any information,2193 or for an authorised person having intercepted such 
communication to unlawfully disclose,2194 it is difficult to enforce these provisions given the 
broadly and loosely drafting of sections 98 and 99 of EPOCA. 
                                                          
2193 Section 120 of EPOCA states, ‘120, Any person who, without lawful authority under this Act or any other 
written law- (a) intercepts, attempts to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept 
any communications; or (b) discloses, or attempts to disclose to any other person the contents of any 
communications, knowingly or having reason to believe that the information was obtained through the interception 
of any communications in contravention of this section; or (c) uses, or attempts to use the contents of any 
communications, knowingly having reason to believe that the information was obtained through the interception of 
any communications in contravention of this section, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine 
of not less than five million Tanzanian shillings or to imprisonment for a term not less than twelve months, or to 
both.’ 
2194 Section 121 of EPOCA states, ‘121(1), Any person who is authorized under this Act intentionally discloses, or 
attempts to disclose, to any other person the contents of any communications, intercepted by means authorized by 
this Act- (a) knowing or having reason to believe that the information was obtained through the interception of such 
communications in connection with a criminal investigation; (b) having obtained or received the information in 
connection with a criminal investigation; or (c) improperly obstructs, impedes, or interferes with a duly authorized 
criminal investigation, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine of not less than five million 
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7.4.3 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 
 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act authorises interception of communication. 2195 Section 31 of 
this Act empowers a police officer to intercept communications in connection with investigation 
of terrorist offences.2196 2197 However before such police officer intercepts communication he 
must apply ex parte to the High Court of Tanzania2198 and obtain a warrant of interception of 
communications order. A police officer may only make an application for interception of 
communication order with prior consent of the Attorney General.2199 The High Court if is 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that material information relating to the 
commission of a terrorist offence or the whereabouts of a suspect of terrorist offence is 
contained in that communication or communications of that descriptions, it may make an order 
requiring a service provider to intercept and retain specified communication(s) received or 
transmitted, or about to be received or transmitted by the service provider.2200 Alternatively, the 
Court may authorise the police officer to enter any premises and to install on such premises, any 
device for the interception and retention of a specified communication(s), and subsequently to 
remove and retain it.2201 While section 31 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act seems to have 
fulfilled the procedural requirement of Article 16(2) of the Tanzanian Constitution, it is doubtful 
if the same has satisfied the proportionality test under Article 30(2) of this Constitution. This is 
because, for example, section 31 does not put a limitation period for the order which the High 
Court may grant. Because of this, a person who is a target of the said interception may find his 
communication intercepted throughout under the justification of an interception order of the 
High Court even if such investigation fails to reveal any material information linking such person 
with the alleged terrorist offence. Apart from that, this section is silent on what will happen to 
the communication tapped by the police officer if it is not sufficient to warrant prosecution of 
the suspected person.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Tanzanian shillings or to imprisonment for a term not less than twelve months, or to both. (2) It shall be lawful 
under this Act for an officer, employee or agent of any network facilities provider, network service provider, 
application service provider or content service provider whose facilities or services are used in communications, to 
intercept, disclose, or use those communications in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any 
activity which is a necessary incident to the performance of his facilities or services or to the protection of the rights 
or property of the provider of the facilities or services, but the provider shall not utilize the facilities or services for 
observing or random monitoring unless it is for mechanical or service quality control or checks.’ 
2195 Act. No.21 of 2002. 
2196 In this context, a police officer means a police officer of or above the rank of Assistant Superintendent, an 
immigration officer or a member of Tanzania Intelligence Security Service, see, section 28(2) of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, 2002. 
2197 What constitutes terrorist offences; see section 4 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002.  
2198 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002, s. 31(1). 
2199 Ibid, s.31(2). 
2200 Ibid, s.31(3) (a). 
2201 Ibid, s.31(3) (b). 
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7.4.4 Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service Act 1996 
 
The Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service Act is another legislation which authorises 
interception of communication.2202 Section 15(1) of this Act empowers the Tanzania Intelligence 
and Security Service (TISS) to investigate any person or body of persons whom or which it has 
reasonable cause to consider a risk or a source of risk of a threat to the state security. In the 
course of investigation TISS can institute surveillance of any person or category of persons.2203  It 
is worth noting that the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service Act contains the term 
‘intercept’ in the definition section but the term is not found in any other provision of the Act. 
According to section 3, the word ‘intercept’ means that in relation to any communication not 
otherwise lawfully obtainable by the person making the interception, includes hear, listen to, 
record, monitor, or acquire the communication, or acquire its substance, meaning or purport. 
And the word ‘interception’ has a corresponding meaning to the word ‘intercept’. However, the 
Act uses the term ‘surveillance’ in its substantive provisions instead of ‘interception’. 
Unfortunately, the former term is not defined in the definition section of the Act. However the 
term simply means monitoring of the behaviour, activities, or other changing information, 
usually of people and often in a surreptitious manner.2204 The former includes interception of 
electronically transmitted information.2205 It is arguable that although the Tanzania Intelligence 
and Security Service Act has avoided using the term interception, it still authorises interception 
under the umbrella of surveillance. Moreover, since under section 28(2) of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act a police officer also includes a member of the Tanzania Intelligence Security 
Service, the latter may still enforce interception under that law. Be as it may, the Tanzania 
Intelligence and Security Service Act, when measured against the provision of Article 16 of the 
Tanzanian Constitution, falls below the constitutional protection of the right to privacy. This is 
because, the Act does not prescribe any procedure for such interception. The interception is 
warrantless. Moreover, this Act broadly and loosely defines grounds for authorising interception. 
It simply provides state security as a blanket ground for interception. 
 
 
                                                          
2202 Cap. 406 R.E 2002. 
2203Ibid, ss. 5(1) (d) and (2) (b). 
2204 See, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance last visited 1/05/2012. 
2205 Ibid 
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7.4.5 HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act 2008 
 
The HIV/Aids Act applies in the context of HIV/Aids. It criminalises certain conducts and 
practices by health practitioners. One of such conducts is subjecting individuals into HIV test 
without their consent or knowledge.2206 It is important to underline that under section 15(7) of 
the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act 2008, consent and knowledge are distinct and 
separate criteria for establishing criminal liability. This is because the word ‘or’ has been used 
between the expressions ‘compels any person to undergo HIV testing’ and ‘procures HIV testing 
to another person without the knowledge’. However it is doubtful if mere knowledge of HIV 
test on the part of individuals may be sufficient to justify HIV testing by health practitioners and 
exonerate them from criminal liability. This is because, individuals may have knowledge of HIV 
testing to which they are subjected yet they may still have not consented to such testing. It is 
arguable that since consent to HIV testing presupposes prior knowledge and understanding of all 
elements and implications of the examinations by individuals as well as agreement to be tested 
then the criterion of knowledge is subsumed into the criterion of consent and the two are 
inseparable. Moreover knowledge of HIV testing as such by individuals lacks the element of 
agreement to be tested, hence any HIV testing, even though procured with their knowledge, 
amounts to HIV testing without informed consent.  
 
7.4.6 Regulations and Identification of Persons Act 1986 
 
Since the end of 2011, Tanzania had started to register and issue national identification cards 
(National IDs) to citizens and residents. All matters relating to national IDs are governed by the 
Regulation and Identification of Persons Act 1986.2207 This Act places an obligation on officers 
working in the agency not to disclose information collected from individuals for purposes of 
registration except under strict conditions provided by the law itself.2208 This provision is not 
sufficient to protect individuals’ personal information in the national ID database. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2206 See Section 15(7) of the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act 2008( Act No. 28 of 2008) which states, ‘ 
Any health practitioner who compels any person to undergo HIV testing or procures HIV testing to another person 
without the knowledge of that other person commits an offence’. 
2207 Act No. 11 of 1986. 
2208 Ibid, s.29. 
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7.4.7 Human DNA Regulation Act 2009 
 
The DNA Act2209 regulates the collection, packing, transportation, storage, analysis and disposal 
of sample for human DNA as well as disclosure of genetic information and research. The Act 
incorporates in its part IV (ss.23-37) provisions governing collection and analysis of sample for 
human DNA. It further incorporates provisions governing disclosure of information on human 
DNA in part VIII (ss.52-65). These provisions are not likely to be sufficient in protecting privacy 
in an environment which has no general right of protection of the right to privacy.2210 
 
7.5 Conclusion  
 
Privacy is a constitutional right in Tanzania. It is further entrenched in various statues albeit not 
comprehensively. It has also been shown that there is a gradual growth of concerns for privacy 
in Tanzania. This is partly because of the diminishing impact of Ujamaa ideology. At present 
there are no debates or discussions for the adoption of comprehensive data privacy law. This is 
despite the fact that Tanzania is a part of the East African Community which has adopted 
recommendations for its members to put in place legal mechanisms for regulating and protecting 
personal data. It is premature to predict the effect of the SADC Data Protection Framework and 
the AU Cyber Convention on Tanzania, once they are adopted. Similarly, the government has yet 
felt compelled by the requirements of Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC to provide an ‘adequate’ 
standard for protection of personal data in its legal system. Presumably, the exceptions provided 
in Article 26 of the Directive 95/46/EC are currently working smoothly for Tanzania.   
 
 
                                                          
2209 Act No.8 of 2009. 
2210 See e.g., Ubena, J., ‘Privacy: A Forgotten Right in Tanzania‘, the Tanzania Lawyer, 2012, Vol.1, No.2, pp. 72-
114. 
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8. Comparative Conclusions 
 
8.1 Key Findings  
 
The analyses comprised in the previous chapters have shown that data privacy is an international 
policy issue. The broad agenda saved by such policy and concomitantly data privacy regulations 
are mainly two: to afford individuals with protection of the right to privacy and to promote flow 
of information across nations in order to achieve economic objectives. Initially, data privacy 
issues were prominently considered an affair of the most individualised societies of America and 
Europe. This is probably because the discourse of data privacy originated there at the time when 
American and European societies had already transformed to that stage. The dominant literature 
asserts that beyond America and Europe, where societies are largely collectivist, there is no 
culture of privacy. As a result, the absence of data privacy legislation in those parts of the world 
has been regarded as an empirical evidence to support such literature. The present study has 
undertaken to investigate the state of privacy in sub-Saharan Africa with particular focus in the 
three case studies: Mauritius, South Africa and Tanzania. Three specific research questions were 
formulated:- 
 
a) Does a well-defined concept or value to privacy exist in sub-Saharan Africa? 
 
b) To what extent is privacy protected in sub-Saharan Africa? Do such means of protection 
reflect the pre-existing values of privacy in the sub-continent? 
 
c) Is the emerging regime of data privacy law in sub-Saharan Africa which most invariably is 
styled in European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, a mere compliance to meet the 
‘adequacy’ standard set by such law for non-European countries rather than a genuine 
attempt to ensure respect to individuals’ privacy in sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
In investigating the above research questions, this thesis employed a hybrid method. As pointed 
out in paragraph 1.2.4 of this thesis, such methods included doctrinal, empirical and international 
comparative legal research.  
 
As indicated in paragraph 4.3.3, this study has found that there is neither concept nor theory 
which defines the notion of privacy in sub-Saharan Africa. Calls for attempts to define privacy in 
the context of African culture particularly in Uganda has yet resulted to any of such definitions. 
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Yet, it has been found that, in Africa, privacy is understood almost the same way as it is the case 
in the Western individualist culture. Neethling’s theory of privacy, postulated in the context of 
South Africa, appears as the only attempt to define privacy in Africa. However, such definition is 
derived from the Western individualist theories. As alluded to, Neethling’s theory falls under the 
class of information control theory covered in paragraph 2.3.1 of this thesis. Since Neethling’s 
theory of privacy has been cited with approval by the South African courts and at the same time 
it has been frequently cited by commentators in different parts of Africa without almost any 
objection, there is little chance for a specific definition that will define privacy in terms of 
collective culture to develop.  
 
However, despite the lack of a privacy concept, values to privacy are evolving in different parts 
of Africa. As pointed out in chapter 4, particularly in paragraph 4.3, values to privacy in Africa 
have been largely externally influenced. Further in paragraph 4.3.1 of the thesis, it has been 
revealed that specific factors termed as ‘determinants of privacy concerns in Africa’ have worked 
in manners that make Africans attach weight on privacy issues. These factors have been further 
considered in the three specific cases in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Generally considered, the neo-liberal 
ideologies that became dominant through SAPs have far reaching implications towards Africans’ 
values to privacy. These have significantly transformed the economic, political, social and cultural 
foundations of Africans.  
 
It is imperative to mention that, some African countries’ values to privacy have been nourished 
by long history of persecutions and injustice. This study has revealed in chapter 6 that in South 
Africa, apartheid has nourished to a large extent concerns for privacy making privacy a relatively 
high value compared to other places in Africa. Conversely, Ujamaa ideology in Tanzania has 
greatly made individuals to share even the most sensitive information without being aware of the 
potential risks arising out of such sharing. Yet in Mauritius, the relatively higher penetration of 
ICTs has somewhat alerted individuals of the associated privacy risks. In contrast, in Nigeria, the 
prevalence of fraud scams have made individuals keen not to disclose personal information, 
including bank card details, to unknown persons over the Internet.   
 
It is submitted that, the dominant discourse based on ‘culture of collectivism’ as an explaining 
factor for the state of privacy in Africa is a generalised normative assumption which obscures 
concrete factual situations and specifics. Moreover, the fact that at some point such discourse 
takes cognisance of the emerging trend of adoption of data privacy legislation in Africa without 
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offering any explanation renders it problematic. This is because the dominant discourse takes 
‘individualism’ as a pre-condition for the development of values to privacy. 
 
This study has also found that prior to the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC; there was no any 
African country with comprehensive data privacy legislation. It has been shown in chapters 3 
and 4 that at that time there were three international data privacy policies influencing national 
data privacy legislation: Council of Europe Convention 108; OECD Guidelines and UN Guidelines. 
The last two policies are non-binding. This means that the Convention was the only international 
binding data privacy policy prior to Directive 95/46/EC. Yet, its influence was severely limited 
because of lack of provisions that would regulate flow of information from a party to a non-
party state. In other words, the Convention did not contain equivalent provisions as Articles 25 
and 26 of the Directive. Similarly, the U.S Self-Regulatory scheme had limited application. Its 
influence did not go far. Thus it can generally be submitted that previous international data 
privacy policies exerted little influence in the global development of privacy policies and 
regulations.  
 
However, this study has revealed in paragraphs 1.2.1 and 4.4 that, at national level, the dominant 
form of privacy protection in Africa was and still it is the constitutional right to privacy. This 
form of protection can not generally be regarded as a direct response to privacy concerns in 
African countries. It rather came about as a result of the independence constitutions which were 
largely prepared by the colonial masters on behalf of the people in African colonies. There is 
consensus among commentators that the Bill of Right in which the right to privacy is embedded, 
was incorporated in the independence constitutions in order to protect the interests of settlers 
who remained in the colonies after independence. Admittedly, at this juncture, claim for privacy 
were virtually absent. However some African countries’ independence constitutions, such as 
those in Kenya and Zimbabwe, did not incorporate express provisions for privacy although they 
had Bills of Right. Tanzania completely rejected a Bill of Right in its independence constitution. 
She incorporated it in its 1977 Constitution later in 1984 following SAPs’ conditionalities. In 
2010, Kenya adopted a new constitution with an express provision of privacy. In the same vein, 
Zimbabwe is currently considering a new constitution with an express provision on protection of 
privacy. This is also the case with South Africa, whose 1994 and 1996 Constitutions expressly 
contain the right to privacy. The latter three cases suggest that the constitutional right to privacy 
in those countries were adopted as a result of demands by citizens. Yet, it may be argued that 
those provisions were merely incorporated in these constitutions as compliance to the 
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international standards in the international human treaties. However, the South African 
Constitution 1996 has been the basis of the development of a fairly large body of case law on 
constitutional right to privacy. This suggests that although a constitutional right to privacy was 
not adopted as a response to concerns of privacy in many African countries, this system of 
protection increasingly provides a remedy for violations of privacy.  
 
Apart from constitutional protection, there are protections of privacy in statutes particularly in 
the communications sector. Other sectors with limited protection include the health sector 
particularly the medical confidentiality; penal laws, etc. Similarly, these were incorporated into the 
legal systems of African countries as a result of compliance to international standards. For 
example, the medical confidentiality is a requirement from international law and the Hippocratic 
Oath for the medical professionals.  
 
At the same time, privacy has long been protected under common law even before the adoption 
of the Directive 95/46/EC. South Africa is the only African country which has been protecting 
privacy through the common law tort of delict. The first landmark case is O’Keeffe. Decided in 
1954, O’Keeffe established for the first time an independent right to privacy in South African legal 
system. This was subsequently incorporated in the Constitution of South Africa in 1994 and later 
1996. Today, in South Africa, privacy is protected both under the common law and section 14 of 
the South African Constitution 1996. 
 
It has also been found that the eleven data privacy enactments in Africa were all adopted after 
2000. This was the time the Directive 95/46/EC had already come into operation. Previous 
chapters, particularly chapters 4, 5 and 6 have found that the adoption of data protection in 
Africa is largely a response to comply with Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive. The primary 
agenda behind this adoption is to achieve economic motives. Protection of individuals’ privacy in 
these countries appears only as a secondary agenda. Mauritius and South Africa present strong 
empirical evidence in support of this finding. In both cases the travaux préparatoires clearly indicate 
that the adoption of data privacy legislation is geared towards supporting the IT Enabled 
Services and Business Process Outsourcing sectors. Yet, in South Africa, the protection of 
privacy is also contemplated probably because of two other factors: the fact that the common 
law and constitutional protection can not sufficiently apply in the field of processing of personal 
data and also the country’s long history of the injustice of the apartheid regime. The accreditation 
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request for the EU rating by Mauritius and the intention to do so by South Africa, supports 
further the above finding. 
 
Yet, it has also been shown in the previous chapters that although Cape Verde was the first 
country in Africa to adopt data privacy legislation in 2001 it has not established the office of the 
data protection commissioner. This is similar to Seychelles. The latter adopted its data privacy 
legislation in 2003, hence becoming the second African country to adopt data privacy legislation. 
However, until the time of writing this thesis, Seychelles had not promulgated its law. It can be 
submitted that the Cape Verdean and Seychelles’ data privacy legislation are assets for these 
countries which await the right opportunity to be utilised. Similarly, a realistic interpretation is 
that these pieces of legislation were adopted as a response to the requirements of the Directive. 
The fact that such laws have remained unimplemented for about a decade since they were 
enacted, partly refutes any claim that their existence was largely a response to Africans’ concerns 
for privacy in the respective countries.  
 
It has also been shown in the previous discussions and analyses particularly in chapters 4, 5 and 6 
that the emerging data privacy legislation in Africa inhere significant disparities. This is partly due 
to various factors such as a country’s legal system and tradition; lack of a regional data privacy 
regime; multiplicities of uncoordinated sub-regional data privacy frameworks; and the needs of a 
particular country. For instance, although Mauritius has comprehensive data privacy legislation 
and South Africa has a Bill on such law, the two have significant different scopes. While South 
Africa proposes a Bill whose protection extends to juristic persons, Mauritian data privacy law 
protects only the natural living person. South Africa’s approach is based on the long recognition 
of protection of privacy of juristic person under its common law. Moreover, the South African 
Bill on data privacy law incorporates a special regime of protection of personal data of children 
while Mauritian law does not specifically provide such protection. The regime of international 
transfer of personal data is significantly different too. While the Mauritian law is premised on the 
‘adequacy’ standard similar to the EU Directive 95/46/EC, the South African Bill is premised on 
lower standard applicable when a foreign country fails to pass the ‘adequacy standard’. In other 
words, the Mauritian data privacy law is based on both Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Directive, 
while that of South Africa is only based on Article 26. The justification advanced in the travaux 
préparatoires of the South African Bill on data privacy is that, since South Africa has a large share 
of investments in other African countries, adopting the ‘adequacy’ standard would prejudice her 
investment interests in those jurisdictions which have not implemented comprehensive data 
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protection legislation. At the same time South Africa feels that by adopting an international 
regime of transfer of personal data based on Article 26, it will sufficiently meet the standards set 
by the European regime. On the other hand, Mauritius targets European investments as a result 
of which, adoption of a stronger ‘adequacy’ standard is necessary to guarantee and assure 
investors that Mauritius will not be a ‘data haven’. There are also notable differences on the data 
protection authorities in the two jurisdictions. Previous analyses in chapters 5 and 6 clearly 
indicate that the South African Bill contains more elaborative provisions which guarantee the 
independence of the data protection commissioner and the staff under him or her. This is 
different from similar provisions in the Mauritian law. It can be noted from the travaux 
préparatoires that right from the beginning, the Mauritian executive wanted to have a strong 
control of the commissioner of data protection. And in fact, the original Data Protection Act 
2004 in Mauritius incorporated a regime which empowered the prime minister to give direction 
to the commissioner in discharge of his or her statutory duties. The law was only amended in 
2009 in an attempt to seek EU adequacy rating. This is not the case for South Africa. Probably 
because of the experience of apartheid, the Bill has strong protection of the commissioner. For 
similar reasons, the legislative processes of the data privacy legislation in the two countries are 
sharply different. The data protection legislation in Mauritius was adopted nearly in a week’s time 
and without public consultation. On the other hand, the South African Bill has passed through 
extensive public consultations. The legislation has been on agenda since mid-1990s, yet up to 
now it has not been adopted. 
 
There are also other statutes protecting privacy in Africa. However some of them were largely 
influenced by the September 11 attacks in the United States. For example, the regime of 
interception of communications incorporated in the terrorism Acts or general communications 
Acts are aimed to control crimes rather than to regulate data processing as such. Some limited 
provisions relating to privacy are similarly incorporated in the freedom of information Acts in 
some African countries.  
 
Another important notable trend is the increasingly adoption of data privacy frameworks at sub-
regional and regional level in Africa. Chapter 4 indicates the adoption of such frameworks in the 
AU, EAC, ECOWAS, and SADC. Although all of them have been largely influenced by the EU 
Directive 95/46/EC, they have different scope. Their nature is also different. Some frameworks 
are binding while others are not. It is imperative to point that, the influence of such frameworks 
to the development of data privacy law in Africa is yet to be noted. For example, since it was 
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adopted in 2010, the ECOWAS data privacy framework has not exerted any significant impact to 
the adoption of data privacy law in the sub-region. The countries with data privacy legislation in 
ECOWAS appear to have adopted such law prior to the ECOWAS framework. Similarly, the 
EAC Cyber Law Frameworks which are largely recommendations have not yet influenced the 
development of data privacy law in the sub-region. 
 
The disparities of privacy standards in different national laws, sub-regional and regional level in 
Africa are bound to produce far reaching consequences. For example, in a long run the cross-
jurisdiction transfer of personal data will increasingly become difficult. Moreover, the problem of 
lack of harmonisation is likely to occur. This will in turn result in both strong and weak system 
of protection of individuals’ personal data.  
 
The general observation which can be made here is that there is little or no direct link between 
the level of privacy concerns and the system of privacy and data protection in Africa. The latter 
had arisen almost independently from Africans’ concerns for privacy. Despite that, such systems 
of privacy protection and more particularly the constitutional right to privacy have provided the 
legal foundations for data privacy legislation in Africa.  
 
Finally, it can be concluded that privacy is gradually becoming an important value in Africa. This 
is largely due to the interplay of many factors particularly those explained in chapter 4. Although, 
the emerging data privacy legislation in Africa is much influenced by the requirements of the 
Directive 95/46/EC, particularly Articles 25 and 26 suggesting that such laws exist largely to 
support European interests in Africa, Africans in their respective countries rely on them to 
obtain remedies for breach of their privacy. For example, the seven complaints filed and decided 
by the Commissioner of Data Protection in Mauritius concerned Mauritian citizens. At the same 
time, while such laws were not largely enacted in response to particular privacy concerns in 
Africa, they are potentially capable of influencing such concerns particularly when citizens in 
African countries increasingly become aware of their rights. 
 
8.2 Future Research Agenda 
 
The present study, although has been undertaken on Africa particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, it 
has special focus on Mauritius, South Africa and Tanzania. While the findings in these three 
cases are somewhat similar in many respects, there are notable significant dissimilarities. For this 
reason, these cases may not be replicated in some other African countries with specific different 
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conditions without difficulties. Based on this account, specific research studies are needed to 
understand for example, the state and protection of privacy in the North African countries 
which this study excluded due to the peculiarities of the Arab and Islamic cultures. Similarly, as 
the present study is a general one, more specific research studies in various sectors (e.g. 
communications, health, employment, biometric, et cetera) are needed in order to supplement 
general data privacy legislation with specific ones, codes of conduct and guidelines. Other areas 
which warrant research studies include privacy on the Internet in the African context; HIV/Aids 
context, etc. 
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